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 The diversity of the proletariat during the final two decades of the 20
th century 
reached  a  point  where  traditional  socialist  and  communist  parties  could  not 
represent all sections of the working class. Moreover, the development of social 
movements  other  than  the  working  class  after  the  1960s  further  sidelined 
traditional parties. The anti-capitalist movements in the 1970s and 1980s were 
looking for new political formations. This work is an effort to study the synthesis 
of  the  traditional  vanguard  socialist  party  and  spontaneous  working  class 
movements with other social groups. 
 
The  multi-tendency  socialist  organisation  that  formed  in  many  countries  after 
1980  has  its  roots  in  the  Marxist  theories  of  earlier  epochs.  It  is  a  mass 
organisation based on the direct initiatives of activists of all social movements 
springing from below. Its internal relations are not hierarchical but based on the 
horizontal relations between organs. This is an organisation belonging to both 
civil society and political society.       
 
This  study  does  not  suggest  that  the  era  for  a  vanguard  Leninist  party  is 
completely  over.  In  some  dictatorial  societies  a  centralised  party  is  the  most 
appropriate  political  method  of  organising  workers  and  the poor,  and  fighting 
oppression and censorship. After the success of a political revolution such a party 
would  face  the  question  of  coalition  and  cooperation  with  other  progressive 
forces. Therefore in the transitional epoch of the early 21
st century both traditional 
types  of  vanguard  parties  and  multi-tendency  organisations  coexist.  The  most 
successful  socialist  multi-tendency  organisation  is  the  one  in  which  the 
communists  and  radical  socialists  are  able  to  maintain  the  continuity  of  the 
organisation and influence a considerable section of the working class and poor. 
 
Though the formations of multi-tendency organisations have experienced setbacks 
in some countries those setbacks do not undermine their achievements in Latin 
America. The multi-tendency socialist organisation is the only viable alternative 
to the present capitalist system.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After  the  collapse  of the  USSR  and  Eastern  bloc,  a  powerful  shock  wave  hit 
Stalinist  and  semi-Stalinist  political  parties  and  organisations  throughout  the 
world. The political model they had taken for granted for so long had disappeared 
and the theories of such a model were facing a big question mark. Almost all 
Stalinist  and  semi-Stalinist  parties  and  groups  in  most  countries  split.  While 
dominant tendencies joined social democracy, the more radical sections started to 
look for an alternative model that was radically different from the Stalinist party-
state model. The alternative, they argued during the 1990s, should be different 
from the Russian model. It had to be new, inclusive, and bringing solutions to the 
problem of the divided working class movement. 
 
Trotskyist and other Marxist parties and organisations had criticised the policies 
of the USSR and Eastern bloc for decades and had been seeking an alternative. 
However, the collapse of the political system in the Eastern bloc awakened these 
groups to the realities of the Soviet system forcing these groups to improve their 
methods of organisation and to distance themselves from Stalinism and so-called 
Russian communism. In order to achieve this they had to get rid of bureaucratic 
and sectarian aspects of their policies. Those sections of Trotskyist and Marxist 
organisations  that  realised  this  started  to  work  toward  a  multi-tendency 
organisation to represent the interests of the 85% majority of society. 
 
The West interpreted the collapse of the USSR and Eastern European system as 
the collapse of communism. In order to survive under powerful anti-communist 
Western propaganda, the left as a whole needed a tool in order to move from its 
defensive position. It became the most urgent political task of all radical Marxist 
groups to work toward an anti-capitalist alternative that had clear differences from 
Stalinism and the bureaucratic system of the Eastern bloc. The socialist multi-
tendency umbrella organisation was that alternative.   8 
 
 
This work aims to study this alternative and for this purpose different methods 
will be used. Firstly, to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the multi-
tendency  umbrella  organisation  comparisons  will  be  made  between  the  multi-
tendency socialist model and other models and in particular with the centralised 
and disciplined party model. This work will refer to this model as the traditional 
party model. Secondly, due to the limitations of theoretical sources in the last 
fifteen years, this work will use interviews with supporters and critics of multi-
tendency  model as well as political discussions of existing  alliances, a survey 
among  the  activists,  and  Marxist  literature  related  to  the  subject  in  order  to 
describe the multi-tendency umbrella organisation model as the alternative put 
forward by the radical socialist left for the 21
st century.  
 
There are naturally limitations to this study and it is not within the scope of this 
work to embark upon a complete discussion about the aims and the structures of 
the multi-tendency umbrella organisation. This work started in the year 2000 and 
during the last eight years many multi-tendency organisations have experienced 
changes in their policies and structures. The multi-tendency umbrella organisation 
is a new model and it will take at least a few decades before it can endure future 
challenges.  During  that  journey  and  like  any  other  system  this  model  will  go 
through changes and improvements. It is because of the changing nature of the 
existing alliances of the socialist left that this study does not intend to go into the 
details  of  their  aims  and  structures.  Instead  this  work  will  concentrate  on  the 
common features of major alliances formed so far. 
 
The  formation  of  multi-tendency  umbrella  organisations  of  the  socialist  left 
started  with  the  formation  of  the  Brazil  Workers’  Party  (Partido  dos 
Trabalhadores  -  PT)  at  the  start  of  the  1980s.  Multi-tendency  organisations 
formed in many other countries in Europe, Latin America and the Middle East.  
Nearly  two  decades  since  the  formation  of  the  PT  as  the  first  major  multi-
tendency organisation, the party and many other umbrella organisations are no 9 
 
longer the same organisations as when they started. The process was by no means 
straightforward. Shifts in policies, combined with setbacks, and internal fighting 
made the progress of multi-tendency umbrella organisations painfully slow. The 
slow progress consequently affected the length of this study. The leading ideas 
and organisations in the 1980s and1990s were an obstacle to progress within the 
next decades as in the case of the PT in Brazil. In spite of these problems during 
the final two decades of the 20
th century one thing has been clear, the era for the 
traditional  vanguard  party  was  over  and  the  socialist  left  had  only  one  way 
forward. That was multi-tendency socialist umbrella organisation. The purpose of 
this study is to prove this point.   
 
The multi-tendency socialist umbrella organisation as a model will be understood 
better in comparison with other models. For this reason the next section starts 
with  describing  the  general  characteristics  of  three  models  in  order  to  put  a 
foundation for the arguments put forward in this work.  
 
Three models 
 
During  the  struggle  of  the  working  class  and  poor  peasantry  during  the  last 
century  three  models  of  political  organisation  have  developed.  They  were  the 
disciplined  party  model,  which  is  better  known  as  the  party-state  model,  the 
autonomous  direct  action  model,  and  the  multi-tendency  political  organisation 
model. The theories and practices of the three models did not develop together or 
during the same time period. While throughout the 20
th century there has been 
books and research on party models, and to a lesser extent on autonomous direct 
action  models,  the  literature  related  to  multi-tendency  political  organisation 
models did not exist until the last decade of the 20
th century. This work aims to 
study the politics of the third model in two ways. Firstly, by looking at what the 
activists of the third model say and write about policies and organisation and 
secondly, by comparing its advantages and disadvantages with those of the first 
model. That is to say this study will examine the problems of party models and 10 
 
compare  them  to  the  advantages  of  the  multi-tendency  model.    In  order  to 
understand the models that are being compared in the forthcoming chapters and 
more importantly what each model means the next section will briefly outline the 
characteristics of all three models. 
 
The party-state model- The advocates of the party-state model argue that for the 
emancipation of the working class an independent communist party is needed to 
form the theory of emancipation and convey it to the working class. Russian and 
Eastern European politics claimed to be based on this model. Needless to say, 
within this model there is a great difference between what the Bolshevik party 
leadership advocated before 1920 and what was practiced after  Lenin’s death, 
particularly after the Second World War in Russia and Eastern Europe. One needs 
to make a distinction between Lenin’s understanding of the relationship between 
the  party  and  the  soviets  between  1917  and  1920,  and  the  ideas  of  Stalin. 
However, the advocates of the party-state model from Lenin and Gramsci to Mao 
and Stalin and other political leaders in Eastern Europe believed that without a 
communist party independent of the class to lead the class struggle and to answer 
the  ideological  and  political  problem  facing  the  working  class  struggle,  the 
emancipation of the working class could never be achieved. 
 
Autonomous direct action model - The second model, in contrast, emphasises 
the capacity of the working class and the poor to emancipate themselves. The 
early advocates of this model were the young Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg 
during the early 20
th century. They emphasised Marx’s idea that the emancipation 
of the working class is the act of the working class itself. Based on this tradition 
various  movements  appeared  during  the  last  century.  Examples  of  these 
movements can be seen in the self-management system in the former Yugoslavia 
after the Second World War, the Zapatista movement in Mexico at the end of the 
20
th  century,  from  1980  onward  the  National  Confederation  of  Indigenous 
Nationalities  (CONAIE)  in  Ecuador,  the  Cocaleros  (coca  farmers)  in  Bolivia, 
Landless  Rural  Workers’  Movement  (MST)  in  Brazil,  and  the  local  people’s 11 
 
centre  or  Bnka  in  the  Kurdish  region  of  Iran  between  1980-1981.  There  are 
differences between these examples. In some examples such as the Yugoslavian 
self-management system where a political party was behind the movement and 
carefully  watched  its  progress,  while  in  other  cases  such  as  the  Zapatista 
movement,  the  conscious  element  of  the  movement  never  developed  a  party 
system  of  leadership.  The  Zapatista  movement  is  an  autonomous  self-
management movement of the poorest of the poor based on direct democracy and 
participation of the entire community in the day to day running of the movement 
and  the  decision making  processes  necessary  for  their  lives  and  struggle.  The 
movement’s starting point was to develop an alternative development strategy to 
the neo- liberal projects of the International Monetary Found (IMF) and World 
Bank in Chiapas. Years of struggle, in particular the experience of the last fifteen 
years has made the movement’s objectives clearer. Now the Zapatista movement 
has realised that in order to fight the neo-liberal policies of the Mexican central 
government  and  the  world’s  leading  financial  institutions,  they  have  to  fight 
capitalism. They now know who their true allies are in the global system and in 
other areas of Mexico. The supporters of the first model might argue that after ten 
years  it  is  not  ideal  to  look  for  allies  in  anti-capitalist  movements  and  leftist 
organisations. There is an element of truth in this, but even ten years is not a big 
price to pay for a life long assurance against bureaucratisation and sectarianism. 
The future will tell whether the Zapatista movement will repeat the mistakes of 
other Latin American movements by entering into electoral politics, which has 
caused divisions and disillusionment with the movement, or continue its method 
of autonomous direct action.  
 
Multi-tendency  political  organisation  model  -  The  third  political  model 
appeared at the end of the 20
th century. The multi-tendency model is a synthesis 
of both the self-management, autonomous, and the independent party models of 
the Eastern bloc. It is a multi-tendency organisation comprised of the entire left 
that is formed  from the bottom up,  allowing the initiatives of all  members to 
flourish  and  become  the  base  of  the  organisation’s  policies  in  all  areas.  This 12 
 
model is based on existing working class movements and allied movements such 
as women’s movements, the peace and environmental movements, etc and cannot 
exist without them. However, the multi-tendency political organisation that is put 
forward in this work is different from the other two models. This model conflicts 
with  the  hierarchical  structure  of  traditional  parties.  It  does  not  have  a  rigid 
structure and operates through the autonomous existence of its local and regional 
organs whose relationship to each other is horizontal rather than hierarchical. The 
leading organ, called the coordinating committee, unlike the central committee of 
a traditional communist party, is not god like and its power is limited by general 
meetings, various conferences and seminars, referendums, as well as the policies 
of  local  and  regional  organisations  and  tendencies  that  exist  within  it.  Unlike 
traditional parties of the left, capturing state power is not everything for the multi-
tendency organisation. Though they understand the importance of political power 
in their strategy, the activities of a multi-tendency political organisation cannot 
only be explained by the search for political power. The reason for this is simple. 
The demands of most movements did not start and stop with the question of state 
power. Women’s fight for equal rights is broader than the issue of state power. 
The same is true for other movements. The multi-tendency organisation has clear 
differences  with  any  or  all  of  the  movements  that  exist  within  it.  Unlike 
movements, the multi-tendency organisation is not based on spontaneity and the 
place and effect of consciousness in its formation and activity is very clear. It is 
not formed on a single issue such as war, women’s rights, higher wages, etc. and 
its existence does not depend on any one of these movements. It rises with one 
movement  and  continues  with  another.  In  fact,  like  a  political  party,  it  has 
continuity and knits all those movements together.  
 
The purpose of this work is to advance the theory of  multi-tendency political 
organisations and is based on several postulates. Firstly, the working class at the 
beginning of the 21
st century is not the same as the working class of the early 20
th 
century.  Secondly, as  early  as  the  first  half  of  the  20
th  century working  class 
leaders had realised the diversity of their class and favoured a party that had a 13 
 
variety of tendencies and more than one platform. Thirdly, social democratic and 
Stalinist  parties  betrayed the  working  class  cause and therefore  can  no  longer 
belong to the family of working class parties and organisations. Fourthly, a viable 
socialist  organisation  in  the  21
st  century  cannot  be  built  on  the  principle  of 
democratic centralism that was typical of traditional parties. Finally, the following 
chapters  will  concentrate  on  the  shortcomings  of  the  party-state  and  guerrilla 
warfare  that  alienates  the  masses  of  workers  and  poor  both  before  and  after 
capturing  state  power.  A  multi-tendency  organisation  which  consists  of  the 
bottom  85%  of  society  is  the  only  socialist  organisational  model  in  the  21
st 
century that allows political unity between the forces of progress, freedom and 
socialism,  while  at  the  same  time  reduces bureaucratization,  sectarianism,  and 
dogmatism among radical working class forces. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to prove, firstly that the idea of a multi-tendency political 
organisation is wide spread amongst intellectuals, academics, political activists, 
and working class shop stewards and activists, although it is not fully developed. 
Secondly, the idea of a mass multi-tendency political organisation of the working 
class goes back to the 19
th century and the formation of the First International. 
Thirdly, the classical Marxists before the 1940s supported the idea of a centralised 
mass  workers’  party  that  contained the  various  tendencies within the  working 
class. Moreover, the history of the Bolshevik party during the revolution (1917-
1923) demonstrates that many tendencies existed within the party, in addition to 
the one propagated by Lenin. These tendencies continued to exist after Lenin’s 
death in 1924. 
 
In addition, in Italy Antonio Gramsci argued for the need for unity between the 
working class movements in the North and peasant movements in the South. His 
theory  of  social  bloc is very  far from  a  monolithic  party  structure.  Gramsci’s 
theory  of  the  social  bloc  between  workers  and  peasants  is  similar  to  the 
Comintern’s tactic of the United Front in that both theories do not undermine the 
leadership of the communist party. In spite of the Narodnik tradition in which 14 
 
strong support came from the peasantry and the Social Revolutionaries Party in 
Russia, Lenin and Trotsky emphasised the independence of the working class as 
the agent of socialism. Gramsci, on the other hand, led the way for the social bloc 
between  workers  and  peasants.  The  contrast  between  Lenin  and  Trotsky’s 
emphasis and Gramsci’s was not a contrast between their methods but rather the 
political  situation  of  the  working  class movement  in  the  early  20
th century  in 
Russia  and  the  1930s  when  Italy  was  threatened  by  fascism.  One  should 
remember, while Lenin emphasised the independence of the working class party, 
until  April  1917  the  Bolsheviks  and  Lenin  advocated  the  revolutionary 
dictatorship  of  workers  and  peasants  which  meant  they  were  aware  of  the 
importance of the peasantry in Russia. On the other hand, Gramsci’s theory of 
social  bloc  did  not  contradict  his  life  long  support  for  a  working  class  party 
independent of all other classes.  
 
A viable 21
st century socialist organisation that is able to lead the struggle of the 
various parts of the majority of the population cannot be monolithic.  It must be a 
multi-tendency mass organisation that can bring together, under a single umbrella, 
the different working class parties and groups, as well as radical trade unions, the 
various types of activist such as peace, environmental, women, the permanently 
unemployed, and the leaders of the poor peasant movements. 
 
The main characteristics of a multi-tendency organisation can be summarised as 
follows:  Firstly,  the  formation  of  the  organisation  would  be  the  decision  of 
political  activists  from  below. This  method  of  formation  is  different  from the 
method  of  traditional  parties’  formation,  which  is  from  above  by  a  few 
intellectuals. Secondly, in a multi-tendency organisation the starting point unlike 
the traditional left is not a programme, but rather revolutionary action. Thirdly, 
unlike  the  traditional  left  who  did  not  understand  the  importance  of  party 
democracy  and  practised  bureaucratic  centralism  as  opposed  to  democratic 
centralism,  multi-tendency  socialist  organisations  emphasise  inclusiveness  and 
participation  of  all  activists  in  the  process  of  policy  making.    Finally,  unlike 15 
 
traditional parties, its organisational structure is not hierarchical but horizontal. 
That is to say, power is not only concentrated in the centre. 
   
 
Why traditional party models do not work 
   
The  traditional  vanguard  communist  party  is  no  longer  a  viable  leading 
organisation for the 21
st century. It is argued that the traditional communist parties 
(the vanguard party) have become anachronistic because the working class has 
undergone structural changes during the second half of the 20
th century.  The most 
prominent  Marxists  before  the  Second  World  War  supported  the  idea  of  a 
workers’ party and tolerated tendencies within the party. After the war Social 
Democratic  and  Stalinist  parties  did  not  continue  the  tradition  of  those  great 
Marxists,  and  the  so-called  communist  parties  in  the  Eastern  block  were  not 
communist by any standard. All these factors have led to the urgent need for a 
multi-tendency organisation. It is not merely the fact that the internal relations of 
a traditional party, what is known as democratic centralism, are not appropriate 
for a viable organisation of the future. A traditional communist party is no longer 
viable because a political party by definition is formed around an ideology or a 
particular interpretation of an ideology.  Today no one ideology is able to answer 
all the demands of all the social groups and classes. Just as it is not possible to 
organise the working class for socialism with a bourgeois ideology by a bourgeois 
party, it is equally impossible for a party that claims to be Marxist and identifies 
itself with a definition of the working class that is frozen in the early 20
th century 
to organise the 21
st century working class and several other social groups. A fair 
question might be: If a communist party that is naturally based upon a communist 
ideology can no longer be viable, then why did Lenin and Gramsci advocate it so 
firmly? 
 
To answer this question one must look at the debates. In exile at the end of the 
1930s Trotsky admitted that in all the controversies between Lenin, Trotsky and 16 
 
Rosa Luxemburg from 1902-1905 about the party’s independence from the class, 
Lenin  was  right  and  that  he  and  Luxemburg  were  wrong.  That  is  to  say,  he 
confirmed Marx’s life long effort for the emancipation of the working class, their 
re-education  to  become  a  class  for  itself  and  the  development  of  the  natural 
leaders of the working class to build a workers’ political organisation. In other 
words, after three decades Trotsky accepted that the party’s independence from 
the class as a whole was a pre-condition for the emancipation of the class. One 
should note that Trotsky did not specify the points in which he and Luxemburg 
were right and those that Lenin had agreed with them. One hundred years after 
their discussions on the party and class it is clear that Lenin’s party model in What 
Is To Be Done? was his specific answer to a particular time of police repression 
and the party’s defensive position. Therefore, this model may be undesirable for 
other times. In other words, any universal generalisations about Lenin’s early 20
th 
century model would be totally wrong. Moreover Lenin’s 1902 model allowed 
Stalin to build a huge bureaucracy against the working class. Lenin’s model was 
not galvanised  against  such  use  because  it  could  not  foresee bureaucratisation 
becoming the key problem of the soviet system. However, the working class’s 
need for a political organisation as a pre-condition of its emancipation is still an 
undeniable reality. Unlike what Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg suggested, without 
a political organisation the working class will not be emancipated by strikes and 
direct spontaneous actions just as peasants will not be freed from the oppression 
of capitalism by their direct actions such as road blockades, taking over municipal 
offices, occupying large estates, etc. This study will argue that a multi-tendency 
political organisation is a viable organisation that allows initiatives from below by 
the  masses.  This  is  the  only  model  of  political  organisation  that  allows  full 
participation  of  activists  and  members  in  the  making  of  local,  regional,  and 
general policies. Moreover, tendencies and various platforms within the umbrella 
organisation are allowed and they exert influence on the general policies of the 
entire  organisation.  The  centre  determines  very  general  policies  out  of  the 
agreement of all the activists and tendencies. That is to say, the centre cannot 
interfere with the specific problems of districts and local branches. In other words, 17 
 
this thesis is arguing for a synthesis of Lenin’s 1902 model and Trotsky and Rosa 
Luxemburg’s concept of the general strike.  The result would be a decentralised 
multi-tendency organisation of the working class.  Instead of a hierarchical top 
down relationship common to all traditional communist parties, it would allow 
initiatives from below by members of the organisation. It would be based on a 
horizontal  relationship  of  organs  within  the  general  policies  decided  by  the 
organisation’s  general  meetings  and  its  coordinating  bodies.  The  coordinating 
committee after capturing state power would not have any involvement in day to 
day policies. Its sole duty would be to make sure the general agreement and major 
principles of the organisation is not undermined by specific policies of branches 
and tendencies.  
 
The inability of a traditional party to organise other social groups 
 
The destructive forces of capitalism have deeply impacted the environment to the 
extent that more and more people have become aware of its destructive nature and 
have joined anti-capitalist movements across the globe. The inferiority of women 
at  work  and  in  the  home,  the  misery  and  destruction  caused  by  war,  the 
destruction of the rain forests, and the destruction caused by natural catastrophes 
are all directly related to the dominance of the present capitalist system and its 
cultural  hegemony.  About  one  billion  men  and  women  are  permanently 
unemployed to keep the level of profit acceptable for capital. Only in India are 
360 million people unemployed. The official rate of unemployment in third world 
countries  is  about  20%  of the  workforce.  Capitalism and its  agribusinesses  in 
many parts of the world have destroyed agriculture and people’s livelihood in the 
countryside.  The  motive  for  capital  is  profit.  Agribusinesses’  higher  profit  is 
directly related to the destruction of traditional methods of agriculture and the loss 
of  poor  peasants’  small  plots.  The  increasing  power  of  finance  capital  at  the 
expense of weaker industry adds to the misery of those who lose their jobs on a 
daily basis. All these activities, wars, and destruction have caused those directly 
affected to react. As the experience of the second half of the 20
th century has 18 
 
shown, a monolithic traditional party mechanism is not able to organise all the 
anti-capitalist movements. However, these movements have the potential to unite 
with working class parties under an umbrella organisation. It will be the political 
task of working class parties and unions to step forward for the formation of such 
an umbrella organisation. The unity of all social classes and groups depends on 
the  agreement  of  their  activists.  The  activists  of  many  social  groups  such  as 
women and environmentalists tended not join traditional parties, which for more 
than  half  a  century  neglected  their  demands  and  did  not  recognise  them  as 
independent social groups. 
 
Why a multi-tendency organisation? 
 
The socio-political history of the 20
th century has proven that neither a social 
movement without the backing of a political organisation, nor a vanguard party 
claiming to lead the working class were successful in spite of their great efforts. 
Only through the strategy of creating a multi-tendency political organisation will 
the working class become emancipated and with it the whole of humanity. To 
prove this hypothesis this thesis will discuss the various socio-economic, political, 
and organisational aspects related to the working class struggle and its class allies. 
 
The first chapter will look at the structural changes of the working class, i.e. the 
rise of unemployment to a degree never seen before and the negative impact that 
one billion unemployed in the world has had on the working class struggle. The 
first chapter will also examine the decline of the industrial working population, 
the increase in the number of service workers, the mass entry of women into the 
labour  market  after  the  Second  World  War,  and  the  effect  of  computers  and 
technology on the unity of the working class. As a result of all these processes, 
the first chapter will argue that the position of the industrial working  class is 
weakened. The diversity within the working class layers requires a new form of 
political organisation that is able to respond to the needs of all those groups and 
layers. Chapter one also studies the changes in capitalism in the second half of the 19 
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th century. That is to say, the first chapter discuses the place of finance capital, 
the movement of capital from the centre to peripheral countries, and militarism as 
three distinctive examples of capital’s efforts to control its systemic crisis and to 
postpone its terminal crisis  
 
As mentioned earlier the second chapter deals with the political theory of the 
mass workers’ party. That is to say, chapter two will discuss the ideas of four 
classical Marxists i.e. Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, and Gramsci. The author has 
explicit reasons for choosing these four Marxists. These reasons are as follows: 
Lenin,  Trotsky,  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Antonio  Gramsci were  the  top  working 
class  leaders  of  their  time  and  were  directly  involved  in  working  class 
movements; their theories had a deeper impact on the working class movement 
than other political leaders; they did not compromise their radical stand; and they 
were faithful to the emancipation of the working class until the end of their lives. 
While  Lenin  and  Trotsky  became  working  class  heroes  during  the  successful 
October  Revolution,  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Antonio  Gramsci  lost  their  lives 
attempting the proletarian revolution in their respective countries. In spite of Rosa 
Luxemburg’s and Antonio Gramsci’s tragic deaths, today all four theorists’ ideas 
are being re-read by millions of workers and poor. This chapter will also briefly 
discuss  the  movements  of  other  social  groups  such  as  women  and 
environmentalists and their relationship with the working class movement. The 
importance  of  this  section  is  that  it  underlies  the  necessity  of  multi-tendency 
socialist organisations for the 21
st century. That is to say, the necessity of a multi-
tendency organisation stems from a degree of proletarian diversity that has never 
been  seen  before.  The  four  classical  Marxists  before  the  Second  World  War 
identified a degree of diversity within the proletariat. They thought that a mass 
communist  party  of  the  proletariat  containing  tendencies  and  platforms 
representing  different  sections  of  the  proletariat  would  answer  the  problems 
caused by such diversity. Today at the beginning of the 21
st century not only has 
the  diversity  of  the  proletariat  increased  more  than  ever,  but  there  are  also 
powerful social movements outside of proletarian movement. These movements 20 
 
are  not  necessarily  for  communism  but  they  are  certainly  anti-capitalist,  for 
equality,  a  healthier  environment,  peace,  human  rights  and  indeed  women’s 
rights.  These  new  movements  are  different  from  traditional  proletarian 
movements and have different methods of organisation. Their experience and the 
history of their struggle, at times, might lead them to oppose the interests of other 
social groups. To promote the unity of, for instance, the women’s movement with 
the proletarian movement does not necessarily require the denial of the women’s 
movement’s identity. The history of the 20
th century proved that the monolithic 
organisation of a proletarian party cannot fully and equally represent the different 
and sometimes opposing interests of the above mentioned movements. Allowing 
the existence of tendencies in a political party does not necessarily mean allowing 
the independence of all those movements within the party at all times. All four 
Marxists addressed in this study agreed to the existence of tendencies within the 
mass  party.    However,  the  experiences  of  the  last  century  under  Stalinism 
neglected the demands of the various social movements and created a historical 
gap between some of those movements and the proletarian movement dominated 
by Stalinism. As a consequence it has become even more difficult to unite all 
those movements within a proletarian party. 
 
Chapter  three  discusses  the  failure  of  Stalinism  and  social  democracy.  It  will 
argue  that  Stalinist  and  social democratic  parties, as  two  different  treacherous 
parties,  betrayed  the  cause  of  the  working  class,  prevented  the  spread  of 
revolution, and saved capitalism during the most serious crisis of its time. It will 
argue that social democracy changed between1913–1920 and the social democrat 
leaders defended capitalism in Germany by suppressing proletarian uprisings in 
many  German  cities.  Social  democracy’s  war  policy  was  not  a  simple 
miscalculation or a tactical mistake by the party. It was an epoch making policy 
with  world  wide  consequences.  This  chapter  will  also  discuss  the  betrayal  of 
Stalinism  and  Stalinist  parties  around  the  world.  Stalinism  reduced  the  class 
struggle to activities within the framework of the state and competition between 
states. Capturing state power was at the centre of its attention and any method of 21 
 
getting state power was justified. In many countries such as Russia and Spain, 
Stalinist  parties  directly  or  indirectly  suppressed  and  murdered  many  working 
class  activists.  In  their  opposition  to  communist  leaders,  there  are  similarities 
between the social democrats and the Stalinists. The multi-tendency organisation 
of the 21
st century does not exclude Stalinists and left-wing social democrats. 
Unity in action is the most important reason for this. As long as radical Marxists, 
anarchists, social democrats, and Stalinists create divisions between working class 
activities,  the  conditions  of  the  working  class  will  go  from  bad  to  worse. 
However, any improvement in the life and struggle of the class is dependent on its 
unified action. A working class  multi-tendency organisation is the answer and the 
magic formula. It is the pre-condition for the unified action of the working class.   
 
Chapter four will deal with the concept of democratic centralism and its function 
in  traditional  Stalinist  parties.  This  chapter  will  compare  Lenin’s  original 
understanding  of  the  term  with  the  contemporary  bureaucratic  centralism 
practiced in traditional parties. The importance of a disciplined Leninist party as a 
pre-condition for the emancipation of the working class and poor in all dictatorial 
repressive  states  of  the  third  world  cannot  be  denied.    However,  when  the 
situation  allows  those  parties  should  try  to  unite  with  other  progressive 
movements  and  create  an  umbrella  organisation  for  the  bottom  85%  of  the 
population.  Despite  arguing  that  the  principle  of  democratic  centralism  is  not 
suitable for such an umbrella organisation, this chapter does not suggest that the 
time for a Leninist party is over. On the contrary, a well-disciplined Leninist party 
is  the  working  class’  organisational  response  to  censorship,  repression,  and 
dictatorial regimes. Capitalism has not removed these political features from most 
developing countries. In fact, it is in the interest of capitalism to support their 
existence. A military regime in Pakistan or Brazil a few decades ago is a safety 
belt  for  the  development  of  capitalism.  This  has  a  direct  relationship  with 
militarism on a world scale. It is not a mystery that Saddam Hussein in Iraq, 
Pinochet in Chile, King Faisal in Saudi Arabia, and many other dictators in the 
Middle East and Latin America were the darlings of Western capitalist leaders. It 22 
 
is not possible to fight these backward and repressive dictatorial regimes with an 
open  organisation.  However  when  the  balance  of  power  and  the  pressure  of 
popular movements forces the dictatorships to retreat, even in those societies, the 
disciplined,  underground,  and  highly  centralised  party  should  seek  a  coalition 
with other socialist organisations and movements in order to expand revolution to 
all corners of society.  
 
Chapter  five  starts  with  a  discussion  about  the  shortcomings  of  traditional 
Stalinist  parties,  guerrilla  movements,  and  political  parties  whose  activities 
exclude  the  direct  actions  of  workers,  peasants,  women,  peace  activists, 
environmentalists,  the  permanently  unemployed,  and  other  social  movements. 
The major problem with those parties is that they ignore the experience of the last 
five decades in the Eastern bloc. 
 
During the second half of the1980s and the early 1990s, the so-called socialist 
systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe collapsed. The majority of the 
population in those countries did not try to defend the system. On the contrary, in 
most of those countries they were against the so-called socialist system. Whether 
they were right to replace their old systems with capitalism, and more importantly 
whether  they  could  foresee  an  alternative  system,  is  a  question  for  future 
sociological researches. However, the fact that they did not support the system 
and joined popular movements against it has an important meaning. It means that 
those so-called socialist systems had alienated the working class and majority of 
the population and the ruling parties in those countries suffered from problems 
such as arrogance and bureaucratic illnesses resulting from Stalinism. One of the 
most important problems and illnesses was their ignorance of change in society 
and the specific demands of various social groups.    
 
The  ruling  parties  in  those  countries  alienated  the  working  class.  They  were 
working  class  parties  only  in  name.  Moreover,  right  from  the  beginning,  the 
poorer  sections  of  the  population  in  all  those  countries  were  alienated.  The 23 
 
problem with those systems was not only the lack of pluralism and a multi-party 
system but also the lack of socialist democracy, which means power in the hands 
of the people and their direct rule i.e. the rule  of workers’  and poor people’s 
councils.  Ruling  for  over  four  decades  corrupted  the  leaderships.    Although 
corruption in those societies was even greater than in Western societies, it was the 
result of the party-state system. The problem started in 1917 when the Bolshevik 
party was not able to organise the society on the new rule of soviets and decided 
to rule directly, reorganising the society on the basis of a party-state system.  
 
After  a  brief  outline  of  the  problems  of  traditional  parties  and  guerrilla 
movements,  the  main  discussion  in  this  chapter  deals  with  the  nature  and 
characteristics  of  a  multi-tendency  organisation  of  the  left.  Firstly,  this 
organisation  avoids  a  heavy  programme.  This  is  one  of  the  most  important 
features of a multi-tendency socialist organisation. A heavy detailed programme 
(characteristic  of  all  traditional  parties)  was  responsible  for  most  splits  and 
divisions amongst the left during the second half of the 20
th century. The utility of 
a programme is to strengthen the party position in society and provide a basis for 
its unity. The detailed lengthy programme of traditional communist parties was 
their weakness, as all members of the party could not unite around every detail. A 
programme  that  has  remained  unchanged  for  nearly  a  century  in  a  capitalist 
society which has gone through many stages of change has become problematic. 
It  is  exactly for  this  reason  that  a  multi-tendency  organisation  should avoid  a 
detailed programme.  
 
Secondly,  unlike  traditional  parties  who  neglected  working  class  and  social 
movements  for  many  decades,  multi-tendency  organisations  are  aware  of  the 
importance of the direct actions of the working class and other social groups and 
are trying to base their policies on the needs and demands of these movements. 
 
Thirdly, socialism is the aim of a multi-tendency organisation but its socialism is 
different from the bureaucratic political system practised in the Eastern bloc under 24 
 
the guise of socialism. This would be a system based on democratic economic 
planning from below by conferences of producers and consumers. It would be a 
system of participatory socialism and direct democracy, a system of councils of 
producers and consumers. In this system no political organisation would stand 
above the council of workers and poor. It is equally important to say that in this 
system the relationship between the workers’ movement, women’s movement and 
movements  of  other  social  groups  would  be  horizontal.  The  conferences, 
seminars, and many other similar methods of public debates would enable the 
masses to decide on the most important policies in referendums.  
 
It has to be said here that the UK Socialist Alliance (before its set back), Workers’ 
Party (PT) in Brazil before winning the election, Worker’s Left Unity (WLU) in 
Iran,  Part of the left and Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) alliance in Turkey, 
Party  of  Socialism  and  Freedom  in  Brazil,  Party  of  Socialist  Revolution  in 
Venezuela,  Movement  for  Socialism  in  Bolivia,  Broad  Front  in  Ecuador  and 
many  other  multi-tendency  organisations  have  been  unable  to  stress  their 
understanding of socialism clearly.  This is apparently deeply connected with their 
realities.  So  far  several  organisations  have  gained  electoral  success  in  Brazil, 
Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile, and Nicaragua, not to mention Argentina and Ecuador. 
Despite this gain they are facing huge problems such as under investment as in 
Bolivia and Nicaragua, poverty, drug related problems, weak industry, health and 
education system, etc. Apart from Venezuela, where oil money has allowed some 
investment in various areas, these problems have forced the other countries to 
compromise socialism and real democracy for investment and economic growth. 
Lula’s compromise with the  World Bank and the  IMF to continue neo-liberal 
projects in Brazil, Evo Morales’s call for investment in Bolivia by Iran, Brazil and 
Venezuela,  and  Daniel  Ortega’s  visit  to  Iran  and  his  close  relation  with  the 
Islamic Republic of Iran can be explained by their need for economic growth and 
sustainability.  However,  Venezuela’s,  Bolivia’s,  and  Nicaragua’s  relationship 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its fascist president Ahmadinejad cannot be 
justified by any socialist principles. All these compromises are the result of on the 25 
 
one hand the international balance of forces which allows capitalism to be on the 
offensive against the working class, and on the other hand the domestic situation 
in  those  countries,  i.e.  their  economic  and  political  problems. These  countries 
must either form an economic bloc enabling them to compete against international 
capitalism, which in turn releases pressure and allows them to take more steps 
towards their aim for a better future, or in their isolation sooner or later one by 
one  they  will  lose  future  elections  to  bourgeois  coalitions.  In  spite  of  their 
different  histories  and backgrounds,  the leadership  of  all  these  multi-tendency 
electoral  alliances  is  controlled  by  right  wing  tendencies.  A  radical  socialist 
tendency is not dominant in any of them. In Venezuela, the radical left has pushed 
reforms forward as the strong economic position of the country has allowed it. In 
Brazil the socialist tendency had no option but to leave the Worker’s Party (PT) 
and form the mass party of Socialism and Freedom (P-SOL) with about half a 
million members.  In spite of their radical stand, neither the P-SOL in Brazil nor 
the party of Revolution and Socialism in Venezuela and its coalition of twenty-
four groups and organisations have put forward a radical Marxist understanding 
of  socialism,  i.e.  one  that  is  against  market,  wage  slavery,  and  commodity 
fetishism.  
 
Until they are able to overcome this obstacle and put forward a radical Marxist 
view of socialism, the working class and urban poor will not be able to identify 
their advantages over traditional parties, social democrats, or Stalinists. Based on 
such  views  they  will  be  unable  to  attempt  to  create  a  radical  multi-tendency 
socialist organisation. In addition, there is at least one more reason to justify the 
need  for  a  socialist  multi-tendency  organisation.  As  the  experiences  of  seven 
Latin  American  countries  proves,  multi-tendency  umbrella  organisations  allow 
socialists as marginalised political forces to occupy the centre stage of politics in 
an  era  when  the  working  class  is  in  the  defensive  position  and  the  jobs  and 
achievements of the previous generations of the working class are attacked by 
neo-conservative regimes in most of the capitalist world on a daily basis. 
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These are the three main differences between a multi-tendency organisation and 
traditional communist parties. There are many other differences such as methods 
of organisation, which will be discussed in chapter five. 
 
 
The  peasant  movement  and  the  necessity  for  a  multi-tendency 
organisation 
 
Studies of peasant movements in Latin America over the last twenty-five years 
suggest that, along with other rural movements, peasant movements have become 
increasingly central to any process of social change and resistance against the 
neo-liberals in this region. Most peasant movements have built their local and 
regional  bases  of  political  hegemony  as  springboards  to  political  power  and 
challenges to state power. The cases of the Rural Landless Workers Movement 
(MST),  in  Brazil,  the  Confederation  of  Indigenous  Nationalities  of  Ecuador 
(CONAIE) in Ecuador, the coca farmers (Cocaleros) in Bolivia, and the Zapatista 
movement in Mexico are some examples of powerful radical peasant movements 
in Latin America. While re-vindication of ethnic rights and autonomy are central 
to  many  peasant  movements,  they  are  strongly  linked  to  class  interests  and 
horizontal alliances with other exploited classes. 
 
Paradoxically, this has happened at a time when the level of industrial working 
class organisation has weakened. According to James Petras, who is an adviser to 
the landless and jobless in Brazil and Argentina, “the weak link in any potential 
peasant-worker alliance is to be found in the decline of militancy and organisation 
among industrial trade union leaders, not from the rural organisations.”
1 In spite 
of Marxist theorists’ arguments for the marginality of the peasant movement as 
opposed to the centrality of the industrial proletariat in the revolutionary struggle, 
the  examples  of  powerful  peasant  movements in  Brazil,  Mexico,  Bolivia,  and 
Ecuador  challenge  these  assumptions.  “In  many  countries,  peasants  have 27 
 
demonstrated a  greater  capacity for collective action and solidarity than many 
urban workers and frequently their actions are more broadly focused on national 
or class issues than the narrow wage demands of unionized industrial workers.”
2     
 
In  Latin  America  rural  movements  are  associated  more  with  movements  for 
equality than the unionised movements of the industrial working class for higher 
wages. The radicalism of mass revolutionary movements in Argentina can hardly 
be explained by the activity of organised workers in bureaucratic trade unions. In 
Brazil  from  1985  to  2002  the  Rural  Landless  Workers  Movement  (MST) 
occupied thousands of large plots of land and settled over three hundred and fifty 
thousand rural families in cooperatives and family farms. Lula, who comes from a 
trade union background, is deeply engaged in the neo-liberal policies of the IMF 
and World Bank. His reluctance to support MST and its radical action of land 
occupation,  allows  landowners’  criminal  gangs    to  assassinate  MST  activists 
without being brought to justice. “In Bolivia, the peasant movements, Cocaleros, 
and Indian organisations relying on a broad horizontal coalition of miners, urban 
poor and trade unionists of La Paz and Cochabamba, succeeded in overthrowing 
the repressive neo-liberal regime of Sanchez de Losada.”
3 The mistake of one of 
the key peasant leaders, parliamentary deputy Evo Morales, who supported the 
neo-liberal  president  Carlos  Mesa,  severely  weakened  the  peasant  movement. 
Morales’ support for Carlos Mesa was to further his presidential ambitions in the 
2007 elections. After his success in the presidential race, Morales will have to 
show how far his strategy reflects the interest of the poor peasantry in Bolivia. 
 
Under Lula, Brazil is a neo-liberal regime run by and for agribusiness, which has 
led  to  problems  for  his  second  term  re-election,  while  Chávez  in  Venezuela 
follows a populist policy. In spite of the recent referendum set back and Chávez’s 
personal style and ambitions, a different horizon is possible in Venezuela if the 
cumbersome and incompetent agrarian reform bureaucratic structure can become 
operative.  In  the case  of  Bolivia, under  Morales  one  will  have  to wait  to see 
whether the new regime radicalizes towards a socialist democracy, abolishes the 28 
 
state  machinery  of  capitalism,  allows  the  workers  and  poor  to  organise 
themselves, and with that reorganise the society for socialism, democracy and 
freedom, or whether instead it will betray its electoral rhetoric and finds itself in 
opposition  to  the  majority  of  the  population  by  leaning  towards  neo-liberal 
policies.  
 
In spite of the rare exceptions the “peasant movements have achieved positive 
changes despite the state, not because of it.”
4 The achievements of the Zapatista 
movement in Mexico for example have had nothing to do with the state. One of 
the main reasons for this new capacity of the peasant movement is the fact that “a 
new peasant leadership has emerged. It is much better educated, politicized, and 
independent of the tutelage of urban elites and party machines than past peasant 
leaders.”
5 In spite of the peasant movements’ achievements, Petras does not deny 
the weaknesses of the peasant movement when it comes to state power and the 
alternative for the bourgeois state. “The question of the state and political power, 
and political strategies to achieve the latter, remain as the leading challenges to 
the peasant movements…. Peasants have carried out significant protests and even 
achieved reforms but, lacking state power, these reforms have been reversed when 
the movements ebbed”.
6Again the example of the Zapatista movement in Mexico 
is illustrative. For more than a decade this popular movement left the question of 
power  out  of  its  political  strategy.  Their  unique  method  of  struggle  avoided 
political  power  not  only  because  the  movement  was  based  in  south  eastern 
Mexico  but  because  the  leadership  of  the  movement  was  not  interested  in 
capturing political power. The Zapatista movement’s neglect of political power 
for many years equally did not spring from illusion in the Democratic Revolution 
Party, and negotiation with the central government.  
 
Thus, two and a half decades of peasant movements in Latin America is another 
reason to emphasise the need for a political organisation that is able to link these 
movements  with  other  social  movements  within  Latin  America,  as  well  as 
struggle  for  state  power.  That  political  organisation  cannot  be  a  traditional 29 
 
communist party but rather it must be a multi-tendency organisation. Over the last 
three decades there has always been a traditional communist party in most Latin 
American countries. However, those traditional parties have not tried and could 
not  try  to  link  the  organised  working  class  movements  to  peasants,  women, 
environmentalists and the unemployed movements. The reason for this is simple. 
Neither their ideology nor their structure allowed them to implement such a task. 
Only a political organisation that allows the existence of various ideologies within 
its ranks, which is not based upon an ideology, with a structure that is compatible 
with  the  horizontal  relationship  of  the  various  movements  is  able  to  link  and 
coordinate all these movements and link their struggle to the political struggle for 
state power. 
 
 
The  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  Multi-tendency  political 
organisation model   
 
The discussions about the advantages of a multi-tendency socialist organisation 
over the traditional communist party in the following chapters will be as follows: 
While  the  traditional  party  neglected  popular  movements  including  of  the 
worker’s movement, the multi-tendency organisation tends to base and associate 
its struggle with social movements which include all social classes and groups. 
The  traditional  party’s  rigid  party  discipline  and  structure  thwarted  socialist 
attempts to build socialism and unity in the second half of the 20
th century. Multi-
tendency  organisations  have  the  capacity  to  solve  these  problems.  Unlike 
traditional parties, multi-tendency organisations are compatible with the diversity 
of the working class, complexity of 21
st century capitalist society, and are capable 
of representing the great majority of social movements. In spite of these strengths, 
there are also several weaknesses of the third model. The first is the inability of 
multi-tendency organisations to capture state power. The second points to their 
lack  of  popular  support  in  many  countries  and  the  third  has  to  do  with  their 
limitations under dictatorial regimes in the third world. 30 
 
 
The part of the left that has not joined multi-tendency organisations believes that 
the most important weakness of the multi-tendency organisation is that they do 
not put the question of state power at the centre of their activity. J. Resa an ex-
member of the Iranian Communist Party puts an example of such an idea forward. 
In his opinion (appendix three of this work) Respect is a pressure group. This 
criticism is not based on real  facts. Over the last two decades  multi-tendency 
organisations in Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, South Africa, and some other countries 
have  toppled  neo-liberal  regimes  and  in  at  least  five  countries  have  gained 
political power. This was at a time when traditional communist parties had not 
been able to gain political power for the last twenty-five years. To say that multi-
tendency organisations are not able to achieve socialism is different from this 
criticism. Chapter five discusses the weakness of multi-tendency organisations i.e. 
their understanding of socialism and where they put it in their aim and principles. 
Their socialism is either similar to the Stalinist mechanistic understanding of the 
term or the social democratic and Rawlsian definition of socialism as justice. In 
their  socialism  the  abolition  of  wage  labour,  market  relations,  and  money  are 
absent. However, because their socialism is not faultless one cannot say that they 
cannot or would not obtain state power because that would only be possible for a 
political party.  In addition to all these reasons, the African National Congress 
(ANC)  in  South  Africa  was  a  multi-tendency  and  even  a  multi-factional 
organisation. Regardless of what they have done with their power, it has been a 
decade since they gained power in South Africa. The same principle applies to 
Chávez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia, and even Lula in Brazil. Some critics 
reject  these  movements  because  of  their  nationalistic  character.  This  line  of 
criticism appears to have no clear analytical difference with the traditional left. 
The Bolsheviks gained power because of Lenin’s correct policies regarding land 
and  peace.  Mao  gained  power  because  of  his  radical  policies  regarding  land, 
independence, and anti-imperialist war. Vietnam, Cuba, and any other revolution 
in the 20
th century were based on peasant movements, land reform, independence, 
and  other  popular  democratic  questions.  If,  in  all  those  countries,  the 31 
 
revolutionaries were not able to create a system of participatory socialism and 
bring the masses of workers and poor into politics, it was not because they were 
soaked in nationalism. On the contrary, it was because they were bureaucratic and 
leading bureaucratic sectarian parties that could not share power with the rest of 
the workers and poor.        
 
In his interview, J. Resa suggests that in the UK organisations like Respect are 
nothing more than pressure groups. In essence this comment is in line with the 
above criticism about the nature of Respect. Respect participates in elections, the 
anti-war movement, coalitions, and demonstrations. It also deals with the question 
of  religious  minorities,  working  class  movements,  and  women’s  issues.  A 
pressure group by definition concentrates on one issue. This by no means suggests 
that Respect is a perfect example of a multi-tendency organisation as it is only one 
example and perhaps has some inappropriate policies in some areas. The critics of 
Respect  point  to  the  presence  of  the  UK  Muslim  Association  as  a  useless 
partnership. This is a fair criticism as far as Political Islam is concerned. Unlike 
Christian theology, Political Islam is a philosophy, an identity, which is very anti-
communist. It is based on an ideology that has nothing in common with equality, 
freedom,  and  democracy.  Its  presence  in  Respect  does  not  contribute  to  the 
struggle for those objectives. On the contrary, it is using Respect for its dogmatic 
and anti-communist aims. However, in spite of one bad policy, multi-tendency 
organisations as a method of socialist organisation for the 21
st century is still at 
the beginning of its campaign and will undoubtedly learn from its mistakes. Just 
because Respect  has  compromised  in  one  policy  it does not  mean  that  multi-
tendency organisations could not have a more appropriate policy about religious 
groups.   
 
The  second  weakness  of  the  third  model  is  what  the  critics  call  their  lack  of 
popularity. It is true that the explosion of popular support everywhere did not 
accompany the appearance of left-wing multi-tendency organisations. In Bolivia 
and many other countries in Latin America the support is enormous, whereas in 32 
 
countries  like  Iran  and  other  Middle  Eastern  societies  formations  of  multi-
tendency  organisations  have  not  gained  popular  support.  In  this  regard,  this 
weakness is not equal to the strength of the traditional party. Wherever the multi-
tendency organisation is weak, the traditional parties are also weak. The weakness 
and strength of multi-tendency organisations in terms of public support is about 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  popular  movements.  In  Middle  Eastern  countries 
because of the obvious reasons of censorship, oppression, and the brutality of the 
dictatorial  regimes  against  leftists,  the  working  class,  and  women  activists, 
popular  movements  suffer  from  many  setbacks  and  any  popular  action  faces 
heavy oppression from the state repressive apparatus. However, in those countries 
traditional parties also lack popular support for the same reason. Therefore one 
cannot  blame  multi-tendency  organisations  for  the  weaknesses  of  popular 
movements. This point will lead us to the third criticism, the claim that multi-
tendency  organisations  are  not  a  suitable  model  for  the  third  world  where 
bourgeois democracy does not exist or is very weak. 
 
The data does not support this claim. Firstly, in comparison with Western Europe 
bourgeois democracy is much weaker in  Latin  America  where  multi-tendency 
organisations are supported by  millions. Secondly, in Europe where bourgeois 
democracy is at its best, the Socialist Alliance before its dissolution in England, 
the Socialist Party in Scotland, and Refoundation in Italy have not been able to 
gain the popular support of the working class and other movements such as the 
women’s movement, the peace and environmental movements, etc.  Finally, as 
examples from Middle East, Latin America, and Africa suggest, multi-tendency 
organisations cope with police repression and are able to reproduce themselves. 
The MST in Brazil and the Zapatistas in Mexico survived under heavy pressure 
from the state and private repressive apparatus. In his interview with the author, 
Mani Azad a member of Worker’s Left Unity (WLU) and a central committee 
member of the Iranian Revolutionary  Workers Organisation (IRWO) discusses 
this  matter.  See  appendix  two  in  this  work.  Without  the  presence  of  popular 
movements the fact is that both traditional and multi-tendency organisations are 33 
 
unprotected.  Therefore  the  question  is  not  which  model  better  resists  police 
oppression, but rather which model best deals with those popular movements. The 
answer is a model that is open to the members of those movements, one that is 
able to learn from them and teach them at the same time, and one that links all 
those  movements  together  and  maintains  their  continuity.  In  this  regard  the 
experiences of the past tell us that a multi-tendency organisation does better than 
a traditional communist party. 
 
As  mentioned  earlier  the  greatest  obstacle  before  these  multi-tendency 
organisations is their understanding, or rather lack of understanding, of socialism. 
This  is  a  serious  problem  that  cannot  easily  be  solved.  These  multi-tendency 
organisations could not repeat the methods used by Stalinists and other traditional 
communist parties in building their organisations. The traditional method was to 
agree on a communist programme and put it before society so that the party could 
recruit from those who accepted the programme. The maximum they could do in 
their initial organisational foundational meetings was to agree on a few general 
principles. Any over clarification of their principles during the early stages of a 
multi-tendency’s  organisational  development  could  be  dangerous  and  cause 
unnecessary  splits.  However,  during  the  later  stages  of  its  development, 
depending on the composition of forces within the umbrella organisation and in 
case  of  the  heavy  presence  of  non-communist  elements,  it  would  be  virtually 
impossible to radicalize the aims and principles of the organisation. In such a 
situation, once the multi-tendency organisation has gained power, as in the case of 
Brazil  and  Bolivia,  it  can  hardly  talk  about  socialism  let  alone  implement  it. 
Therefore,  if  from  the  beginning  multi-tendency  organisations  do  not  have  a 
Marxian view of the term socialism, there is not an easy way out of this problem. 
It  appears  that  Trotsky’s  suggestion  about  the  method  used  for  the  United 
Worker’s Front is the only sensible answer to this problem. Trotsky suggested 
when a communist party led a quarter or one third of the working class then that 
party could confront the question of united front in order to win over the rest of 
the class. That is to say, communists should have a certain amount of political and 34 
 
organisational  power  and  influence  before  launching  a  multi-tendency 
organisation as well as a clear understanding of socialism in line with Marx’s 
view of the term. 
 
 
The two interviews and one questionnaire 
 
The appendices of this work contain two interviews and a survey questionnaire.  
During the  summer  of  2001  more than  one  hundred  activists  from two  leftist 
organisations (in this work they are referred to as Iran’s Communist Party -ICP- 
Komala and Komala Party) in Iranian Kurdistan participated in the survey.   The 
methodology for this thesis is not interview based. However, due to the lack of 
serious theoretical discussion in Iran during Stalinist domination, the author chose 
to  conduct  interviews  to  develop  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  left-wing 
environment in Iran. The author interviewed academics and activists, however, 
the author has selected two of the most prominent for this work. Interviews with 
academics and political activists will compensate for the shortage of theoretical 
work on the subject. The aim of this thesis is to show how activists and political 
thinkers perceive the question of unity in the working class struggle and therefore 
the  question  of  multi-tendency  socialist  organisations.  This  is  the  first  time 
research  has  been  conducted  in  this  area.    Jafar  Resa’s  and  Mani  Azad’s 
interviews  were  specifically  selected  because  these  two  individuals  are  well 
known in Iran and have been active in the working class movement in Iran for the 
last three decades. Resa is the author of numerous books and articles and comes 
from a tradition that rejects multi-tendency organisations. Azad has also written 
many articles in Rahe Kargar for thirty years and has had an active role in the 
foundation  and  activity  of  the  WLU.  To  protect  the  identity  of  the  two 
interviewees the author has used their pen names. They have used these names for 
the last two decades to sign their writings. These two interviews support the main 
idea of this thesis. The socialist left is divided to the point that its fragments 
cannot agree on almost anything. There are obvious disagreements between the 35 
 
two interviews. In his interview Mani Azad believes that traditional communist 
parties are unable to organise a more diverse working class let alone other social 
groups. Jafar Resa points to the fact that in the past some popular communist 
parties organised the working class and concludes that there is no reason why they 
cannot do it in the future. Mani Azad looks to the popular movement in Latin 
America with hope. Jafar Resa is suspicious and blames them for their bourgeois 
nationalistic  aspirations.  These  two  activists,  Mani  Azad  from  Iranian 
Revolutionary Workers Organisation (IRWO), and Jafar Resa a former member 
of  the  Iran’s  Communist  Party  (ICP)  have  different  understandings  of  many 
concepts. While Resa still hopes that a Bolshevik type party will re-emerge and 
solve all problems of the left, Azad is looking for a multi-tendency organisation. 
These  two  interviews  represent  to  a  large  extent  the  difference  between  the 
activists of IRWO and ICP. These two interviews demonstrate that leftist activists 
are divided in their opinion of most aspects of the struggle for socialism and it is 
impossible to organise them into one working class party. In the UK, the Socialist 
Worker Party (SWP) and Socialist Party (SP) had differences about the policies 
and organisation of the Socialist Alliance (SA) and such differences eventually 
caused a split in the SA. This division between various sections of the left is not 
limited  to  a  country  or  region.  This  is  a  serious  problem  for  international 
communism. Resa’s interview also reveals that he still thinks of the proletarian 
party as the only means of liberation and emancipation. Resa’s interview shows 
that it will take some time before all activists realise the importance of multi-
tendency organisations. 
 
During the  summer  of  2001, the  author  designed a  questionnaire to  distribute 
between activists of two sections of the Komala organisation i.e. the ICP Komala 
and  the  Komala  Party.  The  purpose  of  this  survey  was  to  decipher  what  the 
activists  thought  about  the  necessity  and  characteristics  of  multi-tendency 
organisations.  This  survey  proved  the  author’s  hypothesis  that  because  of  the 
diversity  of  the  proletariat  and  emergence  of  social  movements  other  than 
workers’  movement  in  many  countries,  it  will  be  impossible  to  organise  all 36 
 
sections of the workers and poor into a traditional communist party. However it is 
possible to unite all social movements under a socialist umbrella organisation. 
The  survey  proved  that  the  activists  do  not  approve  of  sectarianism  and 
bureaucratic problems typical of traditional communist parties. They favoured the 
unity  of  the  entire  socialist  left  under  an  umbrella  organisation.  The  Iran’s 
Communist Party during the last three decades has been reluctant to unite and 
cooperate  with  other  sections  of  socialist  left  and  considered  them  sects.  The 
change in the opinions of ICP activists is the change in the opinions of those who 
supported division and were the last section of the left to welcome the idea of 
multi-tendency organisations. 
 
 
The  concluding  chapter  reiterates  the  ideas put  forward  throughout  the  thesis. 
Many  of  the  political  parties  who  acted  in  the  name  of  the  proletariat  and 
communism during the 20
th century had nothing to do with the proletariat and 
communism.  These parties were sects whose primary interests were to promote 
the  immediate  interests  of  their  sects  but  in  the  name  of  the  proletariat  and 
communism.  The  destructive  activity  of  these  sects  over  an  extended  period, 
while acting in the name of socialism, communism, and the communist party has 
meant  that  any  future  struggle  against  wage  slavery  and  capitalist  market 
relations, for justice, equality, freedom, and self-rule can no longer be associated 
with Marxist terminology. The way forward is a political movement that includes 
all sections of the working class and poorer sections of society. This will be a 
united  movement  of  all  popular  movements  against  capitalism  and  all  its 
exploitative activities; against neo-liberal projects and parasitic finance capital; 
against privatisation and the destruction of nature; and against racial hatred and 
capitalist war and its mass murder and destruction. This is a movement for the 
freedom of all humanity and human society from exploitation, slavery, inequality, 
oppression,  censorship,  human  rights  abuse  of  any  kind,  crime,  drugs, 
prostitution, unemployment and any other phenomena associated with capitalism 
and class society. This is a movement for the self-government of people on their 37 
 
local, regional, national, trans-national, and global level, for life and prosperity of 
all  regardless  of  colour,  race,  sex,  age,  social  and  educational  background, 
ideological  and  religious  belief  or  non-belief,  for  the  reconstruction  of  the 
environment, and for real freedom of all. 
 
In this movement all political parties and social movements; all trade unions and 
guild  associations;  all  women’s  groups  and  student  associations; 
environmentalists and peace activists; the permanently unemployed; and refugee 
groups, etc. will all unite and fight for the same aims and objectives. They can 
keep their internal discipline and particular activities as long as they give up their 
own particular interests for the interest of all. In other words, they will put the 
general interest of the organisation before their particular interests, and they will 
agree  to  unite  and  fight  against  capitalism  for  the  reconstruction  of  the 
environment, peace, education, health care and free housing for all, for equality 
and real freedom, and for their self-government and autonomy. This is a united 
movement for the rule of their councils’, both at work and where they live. This is 
participatory socialism without using the name associated with the 20
th century.    
 
This  work  does  not  suggest  that  after  the  appearance  of  multi-tendency 
organisations and its success in Latin America there would not be any effort to 
organise political parties. As discussed in this work, in some parts of the world 
where  dictatorships  do  not  allow  the  development  of  multi-tendency  socialist 
organisations the only viable organisation for resistance against oppression would 
be  a  well-disciplined  party.  In  those  societies  when  the  dictatorial  regime  is 
pushed  back  such  a  party  would  face  the  question  of  a  broad  coalition  with 
popular movements.         
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Socio-economic change and the working class 
 
“At the end of the 1980s, there were four democracies in the whole of Africa. 
Today there are as many as seventeen.”
1 This quote from the Financial Times 
symbolises one of the  greatest socio-economic changes that took place in the 
second  half  of  the  20
th  century.  These  changes  left  deep  impressions  on  the 
working class and its struggle for socialism. The aim of this chapter is not to 
study all aspects of the socio-economic changes that took place in the second half 
of the 20
th century. Such a task is neither possible nor useful. This chapter will 
concentrate on those changes that had the deepest and most direct impact on the 
working class struggle. 
 
Until the 1960s the main actors in the struggle for freedom and socialism were 
political parties and trade unions. Since then, however the participation of women 
and  students’  associations  has  changed  the  political  scene  in  most  societies. 
Today  in  countries  such  as  Iran,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Indonesia  the 
participation of the urban poor, women, students, and peasant associations is as 
important as that of workers and trade unions. How can this change be explained? 
At the start of the 21st century the political weight of the unified action of the 
working class is less effective than it was half a century to a century ago. 
 
The casualisation of the work force, high unemployment, and job losses are the 
main  causes  for  the  reduction  in  working  class  militancy  in  most  capitalist 
countries.  In this regard the role and place of finance capital, the introduction of 
computers and modern technology, and the globalisation of the economy will be 
examined.  In other words, to understand why the working class today  is less 
organised in its unions and indeed in its political organisations one needs to look 40 
 
into the root of the problem and see what it is that makes the working class today 
less united. That is to say what is behind diversity of 21
st century proletariat This 
chapter  will  begin  by  looking  at  some  facts  concerning  the  scale  of 
unemployment. 
 
 
Unemployment and the working class 
 
Many compared the massive unemployment in advanced capitalist countries in 
the  1990s  to  the  high  unemployment  of  the  1930s.  Such  a  high  rate  of 
unemployment  has  had  a  deep  impact  on  the  working  class  struggle.  Walter 
Korpi compares the unemployment rate of 14 developed countries. On one table 
he  shows  unemployment  figures  for  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. According to this table, after the 
end of the post war boom, unemployment started to rise once again from 1970 
onwards. The average figure for these 14 countries rose from around 2% in 1974 
to 4.5% in 1980, 6.5% in 1985, and 8.5% in 1993.
2 In addition to the officially 
registered  unemployed,  after  the  Second  World  War,  part-time  waged  work 
became  a  global  phenomenon.    According  to  Faruk  Tabak,  since  1945  wage 
labour as a proportion of the world’s labour force has been steadily declining: the 
proportion of waged and salaried workers fell from 51% to 40% between 1945 
and 1985. The socio-political consequence of this change is that a smaller number 
of  the  labour  force  is  being  proletarianised.  That  is  to  say  full  scale 
proletarianisation remained limited to the core and semi-periphery zones, which 
makes up less than one third of the world’s labour forces. 
  
There is little doubt that the real rate of unemployment is higher than the official 
figures. Istvan Mészáros in ‘Unemployment and casualisation: A great challenge 
to  the  left’  emphasised  on  the  globalised  nature  of  unemployment  and 
casualisation of the work force.  He claims that the real rate of unemployment in 41 
 
all major industrialised countries is much more than official figures.  According 
to  Mészáros,  in  Britain  by  the  admission  of  the  London  Economist  the 
government revised the unemployment figures 33 times in order to make them 
look better. 
  
This high level of unemployment is not limited to blue collar workers. It includes 
all layers of employment. 
    
The dramatic rise in unemployment as the necessary and ever-
worsening  feature  of  the  structural  crisis  of  capitalism  is  no 
longer just the plight of unskilled labourers but also that of highly 
skilled workers who are now chasing, in addition to the earlier 
pool of unemployed, the depressingly few available jobs.
3 
 
There  are  more  than  40  million  unemployed  in  most  industrially  developed 
countries. Of this figure Europe accounts for more than 20million and Germany 
for  more  than  5  million.  336  million  people  are  unemployed  in  India.  
Unemployment in other countries from Mexico to Russia to Hungary is just as 
high. He concludes: “We have reached a point in historical development at which 
unemployment is a dominant feature of the capitalist system as a whole.”
4Hillel 
Ticktin in Critique 26 draws attention to the high unemployment and writes:  
 
The  standard  of  living  in  the  most  advanced  countries,  United 
States  and  Sweden  has  gone  down  for  around  twenty  years  for 
most of the population. Levels of unemployment are either similar 
to or not far from depression levels in many countries around the 
world. This is, of course, particularly true of the third world, where 
unemployment rates of over half the employable population seem 
to be common.
5  
 
Mészáros’  and  Ticktin’s  claims  are  supported  by  the  available  data  in  many 
countries. In the last two decades of the 20
th century job security came under 
attack. Redundancy of the workforce was familiar news of this period. In fact this 
practice is still very much the case. The so-called modernisation of industry is 
interpreted by the workers as an attack on their job security. Modernisation is 42 
 
nothing but a Damocles Sword on the workers’ strike. Any agreement to a pay 
rise is subject to modernisation or redundancies of some part of the work force by 
the employers. 
 
  As a result of downsizing and outsourcing work, in a mere twelve 
years between 1986 and 1997, 3.3 million full-time workers were 
retrenched. Of these 2 million were blue-collar male workers. By 
the mid-1990s, more than half of all Australian organizations had 
been downsized, with the public sector leading the way. Among 
large  corporations,  downsizing  became  almost  a  standard 
practice. Between 1990 and 1995, about 55000 jobs were lost in 
just twenty large corporations. Most of these firms cut between 
20% and 80% of their work force. 
6 
 
In  his classic  historical  work  “The  Economics  of  Global  Turbulence,’  Robert 
Brenner looks at the rate of unemployment in two periods (1950-73 and 1973-93) 
for the US, Germany, and Japan as the three leading economies as well as the G7 
countries  and  comes  up  with  the  following  figures.  In  the  USA  the  rate  of 
unemployment for these two periods rose from 4.2% to 6.7%; in Germany it 
increased from 2.3% to 5.7%; and in Japan unemployment only raised from 1.6% 
to 2.1%. During these two periods, unemployment in the G7 countries averaged 
3.1% and 6.2%, which suggests that the average rate of unemployment doubled 
during  1973-1993.  “In  1996  unemployment  in  the  eleven  European  Union 
countries averaged 11.3%, for the 28 member of Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD countries) including the US 7.3%, and for 
the US was 5%.”
7   
 
It  must  be  added  that  the  present  figure  for  US unemployment  is  6% and is 
increasing. The standard working time is defined, in most Western countries, as 
an eight hour day worked over a five day week, during eleven months of the year, 
and over forty-five years of a person’s working life. This standard working time 
is now a dream for a large portion of the working population. At the turn of the 
millennium only a fraction of the workforce retained standard hours each week. 
In Australia, according to Rob Lambert, “by the late 1990s, only about one third 43 
 
of the workforce has retained standard hours each week.”
8  The following figures 
for different countries and industries show the scale of the temporary and casual 
employment. 
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Fig. 1 Incidence of temporary employment, 1983 and 1994: percentage of the 
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Fig.  2  Casual  density  by  industry  divisions  1984  and  1993:  Casuals  as  a 
percentage of total employees in each industry. 
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The two decades between 1973 and 1993 show a steady decline in full-time jobs 
and  a  rise  in  part-time  employment  from  16.6%  to  18.8%  of  the  general 
workforce in the United States. 
 
According to the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), for 1997 there were 5.6 
million workers with contingent jobs (employment not expected to last for more 
than  one  additional  year),  most  of  whom  were  young,  female,  predominantly 
concentrated in low-wage temporary employment, and 53% of whom would have 
preferred a job that was permanent.
10 
 
The  disappearance  of  the  full-time  long  term  work  is  not  limited  to  the  low 
waged unskilled workforce. It covers every area from academic and professional 
to skilled workers, from construction to industry, from car and steel production to 
energy,  from  researchers  to  scientists  to  university  lecturers.  Andrew  Ross 
believes that the occupational hazard is much greater for the academic labour 
force than for industrial workers. “In 1970, the proportion of part-time faculty 
stood at 22%. By 1987 part-timers held 38% of faculty appointments, and ten 
years later, the proportion had risen to 42.5%.”
11 
 
During 2002  a factory  run by  General Electric  (GE),  a US company  and the 
world’s biggest maker of electricity generators, made 244 gas turbines, which 
was nearly the same as its 2001 production. “In the past year, however, GE has 
cut  the  plant’s  workforce  by  1200,  a  reduction  of  more  than  a  third  and  is 
expecting to make just 125 turbines this year, a number that could reduce to only 
25 for the next year.”
12    
 
According to Peter Marsh, several factors explain such a reduction: competition 
and the production of ever more sophisticated machines, gradual introduction of 
more environmentally friendly technologies, and the use of alternative sources of 
power such as wind, waves, biomass, solar and hydropower. 
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The story of coal and steel production in England and Wales in the second half of 
the 20
th century can truly be called the slow death of these industries. The last 
round of pit closures was imposed upon the British coalfields in 1992 and the last 
deep mine was ultimately closed by British Coal on 23 April 1992. As closures 
and redundancies hit valley factories in the 1980s the importance of saving the 
pits of the locality became doubly urgent. However, the miners’ buyout of Tower 
Colliery  proved  that  workers  could  run  their  own  affairs  and  that  the  coal 
industry’s lack of profitability was a lie perpetuated by employers. By keeping 
the last pit in their own hands, the  miners have kept the pit open for  over  a 
decade.  They  managed  to  find  local  and  international  markets  for  their 
production,  improved  their  working  conditions,  and  employed  more  miners 
during a time when a Conservative government contributed to the increase in 
unemployment.
13  
 
The sad closure of the coal mines, car plants, and the ship building industry in 
Britain is just as dramatic as the story of steel production. The reduction of the 
workforce by the steel and aluminium company Corus, which is Europe’s second 
largest steel producer with annual revenues of over £11 billion and a crude steel 
production of about 20 million tons is one of many examples. On 30 April 2003, 
the Independent reported: 
 
  In  the  1950s,  Britain’s  iron  and  steel  industry  employed  more 
than  half a  million  workers and symbolised  the  manufacturing 
might of a superpower. By the time the industry was nationalised 
in  1967,  the  number  employed  had  dropped  to  270000. 
Thatcher’s  re-privatisation  in  1988  resulted  in  the  workforce’s 
further  decline  to  51000.  Yesterday’s  announcement  by  the 
Directors of CORUS will take the workforce below 24000. 
14 
 
Therefore  it  is  not  wrong  to  say  that  full-time  employment  is  a  dream  that 
belongs to the past. Everyday newspapers announce the closure of plants, job 
losses, cost cuts, and redundancies. For instance, The Financial Times on 1 May 
2003 reported:  “Goodyear seeks $1bn in cost cuts. Goodyear Tyre & Rubber 46 
 
plans to import 10m tyres from its operations abroad for this year, up from 4m 
last year. Analysts said that the increased use of imported tyres almost certainly 
meant that plant closures were imminent.”
15 A few days later it reported, “The 
jobless rate rose to 6 per cent last month, from 5.8 per cent in March, returning to 
December’s  eight  –  year  high,  the  department  said.  The  one  month  increase 
matched  April  2002’s  as  the  biggest  since  September  11.  Manufacturing 
remained a weak spot thanks to rapid productivity gains, soft domestic demand 
and heavy imports from China, Mexico and India. Factory payrolls were down by 
95000 in April and have fallen more than 12 per cent since July 2000.” 
16 All this 
happens under the watchful eyes of the confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
the  UK’s  leading  independent  employers’  organisation.    “The  manufacturing 
industry  will  continue  to  cut  jobs  as  confidence  and  order  books  remain 
depressed, the CBI warns today.”
17    
 
 
Mass unemployment  
  
Unemployment as the reserved army of labour is not a recent phenomenon of the 
capitalist system. Marx and Marxists such as Lenin, recognised its effect on the 
working class’s life and struggles. In the first volume of Capital in chapter 15, 
Marx clearly predicts the effect of machinery on the workers and the loss of their 
jobs. His understanding of unemployment, as well as women and child labour can 
be seen in the following sentences of Capital: 
 
  We  have  already  alluded  to  the  physical  deterioration  of  the 
children  and  young  persons,  as  well  as  the  women,  whom 
machinery subjects to the exploitation of capital, first directly in 
the factories that sprout forth on the basis of machinery, and 
then indirectly in all the remaining branches of industry.
18  
 
 Marx believed that the labour of women and children was the first result of the 
capitalist application of machinery. As a result of using the labour of women and 
children previously unavailable to the capital a surplus working population or as 47 
 
Marx puts it a reserved army of labour appears.   
 
  The capitalist application of machinery on the one hand supplies 
new and powerful incentives for an unbounded prolongation of 
the working-day, and produces such a revolution in the mode of 
labour, as well as the character of the social working organism 
that it is able to break all resistance to this tendency. But on the 
other  hand,  partly  by  placing  at  the  capitalists’  disposal  new 
strata of the working class previously inaccessible to him, partly 
by setting free the workers it supplants, machinery produces a 
surplus working population, which is compelled to submit to the 
dictates of capital.
19    
 
Here  Marx  explains  the  relationship  between  unemployment,  profit,  and 
technology in the context of the class struggle. These three factors are in fact the 
main basis for what contemporary Marxists call the structural crisis of capital. In 
reality, it is the dramatic rise in unemployment in advanced capitalist countries 
reappearing after the post-war expansion with the onset of the structural crisis of 
the  capitalist  system  as  a  whole  that  explains  the  more  than  40  million 
unemployed in the advanced capitalist countries. Marxist analysts believe that 
globalisation, the shift to finance capital, computerisation, and the rapid increase 
in  women  and  child  labour  are  the  main  causes  of  the  present  mass 
unemployment.  
 
Employers  use  unemployment,  redundancy,  the  lack  of  job  security,  and  the 
replacement  of  full-time  employment  with  part-time  as  a  weapon  against  the 
working class.   For Marxists, this process stems from the structural crisis of 
capitalism. That is to say, to prevent a fall in the rate of profit, employers cut 
labour.  However, there is a limit to the amount of labour employers can cut. 
Employers are only able to appropriate profit from fully automated industry if 
there are people working the machines. The fact that there are jobs for some 
machines’ experts cannot be a solution to the problem of unemployment in itself. 
Capitalism, as Ticktin rightly put it, delays its terminal crisis by using various 
methods such as war, fascism, job loss, and where profit is not considered high 48 
 
enough, it uses cheap labour and creates new markets, etc. Therefore, capital’s 
tendency to reduce the number of workers (variable capital) is in contradiction 
with its tendency to maximize surplus value, which can be appropriated from 
living labour. In other words this does not mean that the structural crisis is equal 
to the terminal crisis or the end of capitalism as a system. The real question is 
how, despite its structural crisis, is it possible for capital to continue to exploit 
labour and yet still increase its profits? 
 
There are several approaches to the question of mass unemployment. The Marxist 
approach  emphasises  the  structural  crisis  of  capital.  For  Marxists  productive 
power  of  capital increases automation and  equally  decreases  the need  for  the 
living labour. “Automation of most of the branches of industries has an indirect 
relation with the use of living labour.”
20 The change in the organic composition 
of capital according to Marxists can be interpreted as the change in the relation of 
variable capital (V) to the constant capital (C). That is to say, if capital consists of 
(200V and 800C) the organic composition of capital (OCC) will be ¼. According 
to Nikitin, “in the US Montage industry the OCC was 1/4.5 for 1889; 1/6 for 
1939;  and  1/8  for  1955.” 
21 This change  in the  OCC  means  that  the  relative 
reduction  of  variable  capital  also  means  reduction  of  the  living  labour  and 
therefore more unemployment.  
 
For employers the biggest part of production cost comes from living labour. So in 
order to compete in a highly competitive world their operation has to be cost 
effective. The most successful industry therefore, by definition, will be the one 
that is able to carry out the process of automation and reduce the cost of living 
labour. 
 
In steel production the transition from the Thomas process to the acid process has 
lowered the share of labour cost in the total costs of production from 25% to 
17%,  while  the  share  of  fixed  capital  costs  rose  from  16%  to  25%.  In  oil 
refineries, the proportion of fixed capital costs rose, for four successive cracking 49 
 
procedures between 1913 and 1955, from 0.21 to 10; while the number of living 
labour hours needed for producing 10,000 tons of gasoline dropped from 56 to 
0.4 in 1955. 
22 
   
The replacement of universal production machines by fully automated transfer 
machines, and more so, the computerisation of industries in the 1980s and 1990s 
has altered the relation between labour cost and equipment costs even further. 
 
  In the French Renault case the relation between labour costs and 
equipment costs per vehicle altered from 640/131 to 53/200. In 
the West German plastics industry, gross fixed investment per 
wage and salary-earner rose by 85% between 1960 and 1966, 
while wage salaries per employee increased only 68.5% (wage 
alone,  65.8%)  in  the  same  period.  Such  examples  could  be 
multiplied indefinitely. Virtually  no commodity can be found 
for which living labour costs represent a growing share of total 
production costs, in the strict sense of the word.
23  
 
Automation, however, as Ticktin, Mészáros and Mandel quite rightly emphasise, 
by definition, must be limited. “The amount of living labour needed to operate 
dead labour declines and hence the value of dead labour itself declines, ultimately 
to zero. Clearly under these circumstances profit will tend to zero, since there is 
no one to exploit.”
24 Here lays the basis of capitalist crisis and limitation. “The 
logic of the development of machinery is the total replacement of manpower by 
machinery. At that point no value is produced.”
25 Kruse, Kunz and Uhlmann 
established that beyond a certain point it is uneconomic to raise the degree of 
automation. “It became evident that by its very nature capital puts up growing 
resistance to automation beyond that point. The forms of this resistance include 
the use of cheap labour in the semi-automated branches of industry such as, 
female and apprentice labour in the textile industry and the food and drink 
industries.”
26  
 
Other  approaches  emphasise  the  power  relations  between  employers  and 
employees.  “The  central  issues  about  explaining  unemployment  concern 50 
 
assumptions made about power relations between employers and employees and 
the  roles  accorded  to  distributive  conflict,  politics,  and  unions  for 
unemployment.”
27 This idea is based on the neoclassical economic theory that the 
perfect market defines away differences in power. 
 
  The firm has no power, no authority, and no disciplinary action 
any  different  in  the  slightest  form  from  an  ordinary  market 
contracting between any two people. The presumed power to 
manage and assign workers to various tasks is exactly the same 
as one little consumer’s power to manage and assign his grocer 
to various tasks.
28 
 
This  idea  shows  itself  in  the  comment  made  by  an  Australian  minister  after 
returning  from  a  trade  mission  in  China  in  1997.  “Asian  nations  are  not 
dominated by militant union officials as is the case in Australia. The ugly face of 
unionism is responsible for exporting the jobs for our people.”
29 In addition, in 
1943, The Times (the leading conservative newspaper in Britain) made the claim: 
 
Unemployment  is  not  a  mere  accidental  blemish  in a  private 
enterprise economy. On the contrary, it is part of the essential 
mechanism of the system, and has a definite function to fulfil. 
The  first  function  of  unemployment  is  that  it  maintains  the 
authority of master over man. The master has normally been in a 
position to say: “if you do not want the job, there are plenty of 
others who do.” When the man can say:  “if you do not want to 
employ me, there are plenty of others who will,” the situation is 
radically altered. 
30 
 
The anatomy of the different schools of thought is not the concern of this study. 
However one can argue that the problem with neoclassical economic theory is 
that it does not explain to what extent the existence of mass unemployment is 
man made. It considers unemployment as a natural given and does not account 
for  its  causation.  It  cannot  answer  why strikes  and  conflicts  exist  if  relations 
between workers and their employers are the relations of two equal parties in the 
market place. Power conflicts are one way of describing the destructive effect 
that  unemployment  has  on  the  life  and  struggle  of  the  working  class.    Alan 51 
 
Thornett, in his personal and political account of organising car workers, outlines 
this effect. 
               The return of Labour to office in 1974 saw the economic 
condition of British capitalism deteriorate rapidly, while the 
employers’ offensive against the working class was stepped up 
and made more effective by the new government this offensive 
took the form of an austerity programme, a sharp rise in 
unemployment, more plant closures, state intervention into 
industry and the wage restrained.
31 
 
Women, child labour, and the working class 
 
                  To understand the exact character and scale of mass unemployment today and the 
elements and factors involved in its creation, it is necessary to look at the place of 
women  and  child  labour.  As  Ticktin  asserts,  the  employment  of  women  and 
children in the capitalist system has the function of delaying the terminal crisis of 
capital.  Capital,  by  introducing  technology,  makes  women  and  children 
employable. Lindsey German uses the following examples to show the effect of 
women’s employment. 
 
                  In  every  modern  recession,  women  have  been  drawn  into  the 
labour market as men have lost their jobs. New ‘women’s work’ 
has replaced many of the old jobs traditionally done by men…. 
Unemployment  rates  reflect  this  with  men  having  higher 
unemployment  rates  than  women.  So  whereas  in  1993,  12.4 
percent of men over 16 were unemployed only 7.5 percent of 
women were. 
32  
 
Juliet Mitchell offers interesting insight to this situation. According to Mitchell, 
“Most women in England work as un-skilled or semi-skilled industrial labour, 
mainly in food, clothing, textiles, electrical engineering, or as clerical assistants, 
within the professional and scientific services and distributive trades.”
33 David 
Turner  supports this  argument  in  his analysis  of  the  following  statistical  data 
from the first quarter of 2003. “The Office for National Statistics (ONS) said the 
number of Britons in work rose to 29,559,000 in the first quarter of this year--an 
increase of 283,000 in a year. Recent ONS figures suggest that the public sector, 52 
 
retailers, hotels, and restaurants are responsible for the bulk of this increase.”
34 
The cheap labour of women and children account for the increase in capital’s 
profit.  The Equal Pay  Act was passed in 1970. Despite this, “there are nine 
million women in the work force and only 12% of them receive equal pay.”
35 In 
employing women and children capital has one motive. That is to reduce the cost 
of  production  and  therefore  to  increase  its  profit.  If  profit  is  found  in  the 
industrial  sector,  then  capital  investment  is  poured  into  industry.  If  industry 
suffers from high competition and lack of profit, then capital pulls out and goes 
into a more profitable area such as non-productive speculation and finance or the 
service sector.  
 
  The  increasing  displacement  of  the  proletarian  family,  the 
growing market for pre-cooked meals and tinned foods, ready-
made clothes and vacuum cleaners, and the increasing demand 
for all kinds of electrical household appliances, corresponds to 
the  rapid  decline  of  the  production  of  immediate  use-values 
within the family, previously  cared for by the  worker’s wife, 
mother or daughter: meals, clothes and direct services for the 
entire household i.e., heating, cleaning, washing, and so on. This 
development in turn corresponds to the  growing occupational 
activity of women.
36 
 
Though it is the cheap labour of women and children that accounts for their usage 
in the labour market, the actual mass employment of women has a wider impact 
over the working class in their struggle for socialism. Female and male workers 
have a different set of demands. It is true that working class unity is much more 
essential  and  more  likely  today  than  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.  In  advanced 
capitalist  countries,  the  pace  of  women  gaining  professions,  supervisory,  and 
clerical work is higher than in the 1960s and even the 1980s.  However, it would 
be  wrong  to  suggest  that  gender  equality  has  replaced  discrimination  in  the 
employment process or job loss. Though the employment of women is not a new 
phenomenon and goes back to the beginning of industrialisation, the impact of 
the  mass  employment  of  women,  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  modern 
technology, has been great. The increases in women’s expectations, economic 
independence of women from men, and the breakdown of the traditional family 53 
 
have certainly altered the forms of class solidarity. Today, unlike half a century 
ago, a male worker participating in the class struggle does not necessarily have 
the  support  of  his  family.  The  male  members  of  the  working  class  need  to 
understand the new situation and make alliances with their female colleagues. 
This was and, to a great extent, still is the case for female workers too. To see 
male workers as members of their own class rather than members of the enemy 
camp has been and, still is, a great challenge for the women’s movement. Today, 
the women’s movement does not have a common position about its relationship 
to the working class movement.  
 
The relocation of production from the core to the semi-peripheral and peripheral 
zones, which began in the US in the 1960s and in Europe in the 1970s, generated 
quick  growth  in  the  service  and  administrative  sectors  at  the  core.    It  also 
encouraged  the  increasing  feminisation  of  the  workforce  and  employment  of 
female labour, usually on a part-time basis, in these sectors. According to the 
International  Labour  Office  (ILO)  report  for  1984,  the  rise  in  part-time 
employment became such an integral part of the reorganisation of work in the 
post-war  period  that  it  became  largely,  and  almost  exclusively,  a  female 
phenomenon. For example, According to ILO report in Denmark and Sweden the 
proportion of women in the labour force was already around 40% in the early 
1970s and accelerated further with the onset of the crisis. The percentage was 
relatively lower in the Western hemisphere, rising from 26% in 1962 to 29% in 
1972 in the USA, and from 19% to 25% in Canada. At the beginning of the 
1970s, in the European core (Germany, France, Netherlands, UK), 80 – 90% of 
all part-time workers were women; in the USA, the share was lower – 65%. That 
is to say during the 1960s and 1970s in the USA, Europe, and Japan both the 
feminisation of the labour force and the attribution of part-time work to female 
labour became common throughout the core zone.  
 
This is an important structural change to the working class. To reduce the labour 
cost, capitalism brings women and children into the labour market on a mass 54 
 
scale. But this only adds to the problems facing the working class. The influx of 
women, students, and children into the labour market leads to an increase in the 
number  of  unemployed.    As  a  result,  achieving  class  solidarity,  developing 
militant working class organisations, as well as, mass organisations of the labour 
force becomes an increasingly difficult task.  Part-time and seasonal workers, by 
definition, are limited in their ability to develop their class identity based on the 
short time they spend on the job. As a result a big army of students, women, and 
children come into the labour market, decreasing the bargaining power of the 
working class. However, they do not identify themselves with the working class, 
and therefore, do not participate in working class struggles or its affairs.   
 
 
The service sector and the working class        
                                                                                                   
The  expansion  of  the  service  sector  has  an  equally  important  impact  on  the 
structure of the working class and its economic and political struggles. Ernest 
Mandel in  Late Capitalism explains why the service sector of the economy has 
been expanding throughout the 20
th century. According to Mandel, it is no longer 
economically possible for the average wage earner to go to work on foot and not 
to  use  public  transport,  to not  enroll in  a  health  insurance  scheme,  or  to  use 
privately  produced  charcoal  for  heating  instead  of  briquettes,  oil,  gas  or 
electricity.  These  are  the  consequences  of  a  genuine  extension  of  the  needs 
(living  standards)  of  the  wage  earner,  which  represents  a  rise  in  his  level  of 
culture and civilization. The list of the genuine needs of the wage earner today is 
much longer than two or three decades ago. The entire tourist industry and the 
urban entertainment industry (including, radio and TV, health clubs, bars and 
restaurants, computer games, and DVDs, etc.) are newly created branches of the 
service sector that employ a large percentage of the labour force. If we add these 
to other services such as health, education, and housing it shows a rapid increase 
in service workers compared to industrial workers. According to the available 
statistics for OECD countries, the share of the service sector for OECD countries 55 
 
increased  from  3.8%  of  the  GDP  to  62%  between  1960  and  1989.  Mandel’s 
argument supports Marx’s thought about rich individuality in the Grundrise.  
 
Capital’s ceaseless striving towards the general form of wealth 
drives labour beyond the limits of its natural paltriness, and thus 
creates the material elements for the development of the rich 
individuality  which  is  as  all-sided  in  its  production  as  in  its 
consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer 
as  labour  but  as  full  development  of  activity  itself,  in  which 
natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared; because a 
historically created need has taken the place of the natural one. 
37 
 
Until 1960 sociologists’ criteria for defining the poverty line was basic human 
need such as a warm coat and shoes, three meals a day, access to clean water to 
wash, and similar basic needs. Today, their list includes a car, some household 
electrical  appliances,  a  minimum  of  one  holiday  a  year,  children’s  birthday 
parties,  personal  computer,  mobile  phone,  access  to  the  internet,  meals  in 
restaurants, etc. 
 
In the employment of children capital gains cheap labour, as well as, a new card 
to  play  in  its  struggle  against the  working  class.  This  is  not the  case  for  the 
employment of service sector wage earners because their wage is not necessarily 
cheaper for capital. That is why Mandel believes that the expansion of the service 
sector is a genuine consequence of the extension of needs or as Marx asserted in 
Grundrise, as individuals gain higher culture and become more civilised their 
needs also develop.  Such a civilised individual creates his or her new needs to 
substantiate his or her individuality, whether these needs are computer games, 
short outings, sport, art, etc.  
 
According to Mandel the expansion of the service sector as a typical feature of 
late capitalism involves:  
·  The  tendency  towards  a  general  extension  of  intermediate 
functions,  as  a  result  of  growing  socialisation  and  division  of 56 
 
labour.  
·  The  tendency  towards  an  enormous  expansion  both  of  selling 
costs  (advertising,  marketing,  packaging)  and  of  consumer 
credit.  
·  The possibilities for developing the cultural and civilizing needs 
of the working population (education, health care, recreational 
activity).  
·  The extension of commodity production such as electricity, gas, 
water, ready-made meals and so on.  
·  The result is growth in the number of unproductively employed 
wage-earner.
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The service sector’s enormous expansion in the second half of the 20
th century 
had a deep impact on the working class’ struggle for socialism. The problem is 
not that wage earners in the service sector cannot be organised in trade unions. In 
reality, National and Local Government Officers Association - NALGO and the 
Public  Service  Union-  Unison  in  England  have  organised  a  considerable 
percentage of the labour force in this sector. This is the case for most Western 
capitalist countries. The problem is not even the fact that the labour force in the 
service sector is in small groups and therefore difficult to organise. Rather, the 
problem is the complexity of the labour force in this sector. Different sections of 
service sector workers differ from one another in at least two ways. Firstly, there 
are wage and salary gaps between lecturers, nurses, and cleaners, for example. 
Secondly,  in  spite  of  the  issue  of  salary,  the  question  of  status  is  equally 
important. Doctors or university lecturers join their own clubs rather than mixed 
clubs regardless of the status of the members in their society. It is very difficult to 
bring road sweepers and fire fighters under the same banner as bank officers, 
lecturers, doctors, and teachers for the lengthy struggle for socialism. Moreover, 
in such a struggle, part of the labour force in the service sector will leave the 
campaign  and  join  the  opposite  camp  because  in  spite  of  their  salary,  which 
might be less than an industrial worker, it is questionable whether they consider 57 
 
themselves as part of the working class. Furthermore, unlike earlier periods of the 
20
th century it is very difficult to organise the support of the different sections of 
the working class into one single organisation. 
 
 
Finance capital and the working class 
 
The finance capital’s destructive effect on the working class struggle for socialism 
is  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  socio-economic  change  that  occurred 
throughout the 20
th century. It can be argued that finance capital’s effect on the 
working class is greater than any other factor looked at in this study. For a start, 
finance capital is, as Ticktin describes, the declining form of capital. “We put 
forward the view that the natural form of a declining capitalism is that of finance 
capitalism and that its natural tendency is to separate itself off from productive 
capital to constitute a free-floating abstract capital.”
39 According to Ticktin, 
 
Finance capital, on the one hand, reduces productive capital, 
industry,  transport,  construction,  mining,  etc.,  to  shadow 
through the redeployment of its investment in more profitable 
places. On the other hand, it would cease to exist in the absence 
of productive labour so that finance capital is both parasitic and 
like any parasite dependent on its host.
40  
 
Quoting from the Grundrise, Ticktin concludes that the history of capital is one of 
movement from competition to the concentration of capital and thence to finance 
capital. Claude Serfati describes the difference between the centralisation and the 
concentration of capital that is usually considered identical. He believes that the 
two leave different effects on capital accumulation in the macro economy. “It is 
only  the  concentration  of  capital  that  creates new  initiatives  and  capacities  of 
production and relates to capitalist accumulation, in the real meaning of the term. 
In contrast, centralisation is nothing but a change in the capital’s possession.”
41 
Finance  capital,  with  the  development  of  financial  engineering,  becomes  ever 
more metaphorical and its unrestrained accumulation prevents real accumulation. 58 
 
In  Critique,  Ticktin  gives  a  useful  definition  of  the  characteristics  of  finance 
capital: 
 
  In short the characteristic of finance capital is that it is capital 
which attempts to raise its own rate of profit above an otherwise 
existing  typical  rate  of  profit  by  either  using  forms  of 
unproductive  capital  or  less  developed  capitals  with  lower 
organic compositions and higher rates of surplus value, which 
may or may not be in the same country. In its crudest form it 
amounts to an outflanking operation to the working-class.
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Before  looking  at  figures  and  showing  the  effect  of  finance  capital  over  the 
working  class,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  rise  of  monetarist  schools  and  the 
expansion of parasitic activities of finance capital in the 1980s and 1990s was 
supported by the British and US governments. At the end of the 1960s, when 
industrial  productivity  declined  inflation  increased  and  governments’  budget 
deficits continued to exist, monetarists convinced the US and UK governments to 
seriously reduce the issue of money. As a result, the US government stopped 
unlimited financial support of the European dollar. Consequently, the interest rate 
reached  20%.  A  similar  process  can  be  seen  in  Britain  under  Thatcher.  This 
policy, later applied by other Western governments, was based on unrestrained 
privatisation, a severe attack against the working class and its militant branches. 
In its very nature, this policy was also political. Declining capitalism could not 
survive unless the powerfully organised working classes could be destroyed. It is 
this tendency of capital that accounts for the destruction of the steel workers and 
miners.  
 
The following figures will give an idea of the scale of finance capital’s activity 
and its parasitic operations. Until 1960 speculative operation accounted for only 
one-tenth of foreign trade. This figure around 1990 was 110%. According to John 
Grahl, “In 1979 the daily foreign exchange transactions in Euro land was just 
above $100bn, in 1989 it became $600bn. In 1992 only 3 years later it increased 
to more than $800bn, the figures for 1995 and 1998 were $1,200bn and $1,500bn 59 
 
respectively.”  Also,  “ECB  data  shows  that  total  daily  payments  through 
TARGET were 1,042bn Euros in January 1999 and 1,035bn in October 2000; 
within  this  total,  cross-border  payments,  that  is,  new  flows  induced  by 
integration, rose from 355bn to 429bn.” 
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Goran Therborn, in his article, “Into the 21
st Century,” published in New Left 
Review in 2001 provides some examples of the scale of the parasitic operation of 
finance capital. The figures are unbelievable. “On a world scale, stock-market 
turnover has increased from 28% of the world product in 1990 to 81% in 1998. 
US stock-market capitalisation rose from about 40% of the GDP in 1980, to 55% 
in 1990, to 150% by early 2001 after peaking around 180%.”
44 According to the 
World Bank figures betting on the future, between 1986 and 1996, derivatives 
trading multiplied 56-fold, reaching a volume of around $34,000billion. 
With such a big scale of operation the effect of finance capital over the working 
class is undeniable. Ticktin predicts that a long period of massive unemployment 
would appear as essential for the recovery of the capitalist system. His theory is 
supported by the International Labour Office (ILO) data, which maintained that 
in 1998 unemployment increased by tens of millions and includes one-third of the 
labour force on the planet (around 700m).
45 
  
Brazil suffered from foreign loans to the extent that the country was not able to 
repay the interest of the loans. According to Serfati the destructive cycle of loan – 
growth – unemployment - loan is shown in the following table.  
                                 1994       1995      1996      1997      1998      1999 prediction 
 
Economic                   5.9           2.8          3.0        0.5          0.5        3.5 
Growth 
Unemployment          5.1           4.6          5.4         5.7         7.8           - 
Rate 
Foreign Loan            196.1     209.1     218.9       214.3    227.8      244.3 
$bn 60 
 
Loan service               34.6      40.02      47.5          65         67.2       69.3 
Export 
Source: World Bank, No.1374  
 
According to Serfati, privatisation is a result of and directly related to foreign 
loans.  “Between  1995  and  1998  the  privatisation  programme  in  developing 
countries resulted in the sale of $110 billion of the active productive capital, more 
than half of which was purchased by multinational companies. In this operation 
IMF was directly involved.”
46 According to Lemond, “Between 1990 and 1997 
governments on a world scale have sold $513bn of their social assets. Only in 
Europe was $215bn of the nationalised assets sold to private companies.”
47 There 
are many aspects of finance capital still to be examined.  For instance, was it 
industrial capital’s weakness and its lack of profitability, as Brenner argues that 
resulted  in  the  rapid  increase  of  finance  capital’s  operation  from  the  1970s 
onwards or was it simply capitalism’s natural development and the decline in the 
rate of profit that resulted in its increase? It is not the aim of this work to study 
these aspects. Whatever the reason, the aim is to find the effect of finance capital 
on the working class and its struggle for socialism. Privatisation, job losses in 
less profitable industries and the massive unemployment of the unskilled labour 
force  are  all  direct  results  of  the  operation  of  capital  in  its  latest  stage  of 
development, finance  capital, which  can  no  longer  be  explained  by  industrial 
productivity and industrial development.  
 
The world’s working class has found itself in a more defensive position caused 
by the parasitic activities of finance capital. Profitability of less than 40% results 
in the closure of industry and more unemployed workers. The condition of the 
working class in third world countries is even worse. The severe repression of the 
industrial  working  class  by  dictatorial  regimes  under  the  conditions  directly 
imposed by the world financial institutions has left the workers of those societies 
with very little space to manoeuvre. This point will be further discussed later in 
this chapter. 61 
 
 
 
Computerisation and the working class 
 
Machines, like any other phenomenon, have advantages as well as disadvantages. 
In different circumstances and under different conditions they can be used for 
different aims and purposes and in this sense they are neutral.  However, there are 
certain aspects of machinism and computerisation that have negative effects on 
the  working  class  and  its  struggle.  As  previously  discussed  computers  have 
enabled capitalism to use the labour of youth and women on a mass scale and 
therefore has resulted in an increase in unemployment. Another aspect of the 
computers’ negative effect on the working class and their jobs is the effect the 
internet has had on some areas of the production process. Storage accounts for a 
big part of production costs.
48 By using the internet, storage as a big department 
of the production process will disappear. In other words, with the introduction of 
“just in time production” it is possible to order parts as and when required, get rid 
of  costly  storage,  and  reduce  the  total  cost  of  production.  Obviously,  this 
development puts the jobs of many at risk. This certainly does not mean that the 
process of automation and mechanization will continue to a point where robots 
replace living labour.  
It is unlikely that capitalism will ever reach this point, although it 
is constantly getting nearer. The reason is partly that it prefers to 
use cheap labour, wherever it can find it, and partly that it prefers 
to  transfer  capital  out  of  industry  into  finance  capital.  The 
ultimate  reason  is  that  the  effect  of  robots  making  robots  will 
destroy value and so price itself. If machines make machines and 
machines extract the raw materials, there are no longer any costs, 
if the raw materials are either infinite or infinitely substitutable.
49  
 
According to Hans Morach, by 2050 robotic brains will be able to implement 100 
trillion orders in a second and will compete with human brains. “In October 1995 
an  experimentation  vehicle  named  Navlab  V  passed  through  the  width  of 
America  (from  Washington  to  Santiago)  and  did  that  automatically  without 
human intervention for 95% of the distance. A movable computer with 25 million 62 
 
orders in a second (MIPS) power supported the automatic direction and driving 
system  of  this  vehicle.  In  the  1970s  and  1980s  robotic  researchers  used 
computers that were able to implement one million orders in a second (MIPS). In 
the  1990s  the  power  of  a  computer  suitable  for  an  experimentation  robot 
improved  from  10 MIPS  to  100m  MIPS,  and  recently in  the  latest  moveable 
model to 1000m MIPS. That means the operation that could not be implemented 
by  the  1970s  and  1980s’  robots  is  possible  today.”
50  Thus,  mobilisation  and 
computerisation  directly  reduces  the  number  of  the  labour  force  by  replacing 
them with robots and computers.  Computer use on a mass scale has made it 
possible  to  use  the  cheap  labour  of  women  and  children.  As  a  consequence, 
unemployment amongst male workers has increased. 
 
In addition, there is another important factor that enhances the negative impact of  
computer  technology  on  the  militancy  of  the  working  class.  That  is  to  say, 
computerisation  in the  second half  of  the  20
th  century  led to  increases  in  the 
wages of skilled workers and therefore has increased overall wage inequality. 
According to Tashiro, data on individual workers in the US shows that computer 
use in the workplace rose from 27% in 1984 to 60% in 2001. By any standard 
this is a massive increase. 
 
The  most  common  theory  in  this  regard  is  the  skill-bias  technical  change 
hypothesis  (SBTC),  which  states  that  the  invention  and  diffusion  of  new 
information technologies has increased the relative demand for skilled workers 
and  this  has  resulted  in  an  increase  in  the  relative  wages  of  skilled  workers 
compared to unskilled workers. 
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This theory is supported by many detailed studies of US plants, such as:  
·  Berman, Bound and Griliches  
·  Berndt, Morrison & Rosenblum  
·  Autor, Katz and Krueger  
·  Siegel   63 
 
·  Haskel and Heden. 
 
It should be noted that there are theories opposed to this common theory. For 
instance, Card and Dinardo argue, “Much of the growth in wage inequality is due 
to within group changes in wages and these cannot be readily explained by shifts 
in  technology.”
52  In  addition,  according  to  Doms,  Dunne  and  Troske,  the 
relationship  between  skill  upgrading  and  technology  differs  by  the  type  of 
technology  and  the  type  of  technology  measures  employed.
53  Finally,  after 
carefully  reviewing  the  literature  Timothy  Dunne  concludes:  First,  skills  and 
technology are clearly related at the workplace level. Plants and firms that utilise 
more advanced technology employ more skilled workers and pay higher wages. 
Second,  the  relationship  between  skill  upgrading  and  technology  adoption  is 
much less clear.
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The  point  is  that  computerisation  although  to  a  different  degree  in  various 
industries and to a lesser degree in the production sphere compared to design and 
engineering, left a degree of wage inequality among the working class. This has 
had  a  negative impact,  which has  had  important  consequences  for  the  labour 
movement and its struggle for higher wages, collective bargaining, and industrial 
action. 
  
Another important aspect of computerisation is the use of the internet in popular 
protests. The last two decades of the 20
th century witnessed an important shift in 
the  globalised  struggle  against  capitalism.  Unlike  decades  earlier  when  blue 
collar workers were at the forefront of popular protests, students, intellectuals, 
graduated unemployed, activists of various fields, environmentalists and leftists 
have  been  the  forces  behind  a  popular  struggle  that  started  in  Seattle  and 
continues today. There is an undeniable relation between computers and internet 
access  and  the  organisation  of  the  contemporary  popular  movement.  In  fact, 
access  to  the  internet  is  a  condition  of  connection  and  participation  in  this 
movement. Blue collar workers who do not have access to the internet or do not 64 
 
have the necessary computer skills risk being politically marginalised.  In other 
words, only those sections of the working class who have access to a computer 
and the internet can keep up with the pace of political development. However, 
without  full  participation  of  blue  collar  workers,  the  struggle  of  the  above 
mentioned social groups will not lead to socialism. 
   
Globalisation of the economy and the working class 
 
Many  authors  widely  use  the  term  globalisation  for  many  different  purposes. 
Many, from leaders of bourgeois political parties to union leaders to the press and 
media,  use  the  term  globalisation  to  mean  that  the  world  market  and 
multinationals are very powerful and that the working class in every country and 
nation-states are  completely  powerless. Despite  the exaggeration  concealed  in 
this statement, there is a certain degree of truth in it. It is true that multinational 
companies are much more powerful today and their power is rapidly increasing. 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades) predicts that up to one-third of 
the  world’s  trade  is  in  fact  nothing  but  the  transfer  of  goods  between 
multinational  companies.
55  But  such  a  definition  of  globalisation  is  too 
pessimistic. Marxists generally consider globalisation as the natural continuation 
of capitalist development. For example, Anderiu Glin and Bob Sutcliff claim, in 
the first place, globalisation is the result of the expansion of capitalist relations of 
production. They point out that the inclusion of women in wage labour after the 
war is in fact the transition of a big section of labour from non-capitalist relations 
to capitalist relations. Other examples of this expansion include the privatisation 
of state owned companies and marketisation of command economies in former 
socialist  countries.  In  the  second  place,  globalisation  is  the  increase  in  the 
interdependence  of  the  global  economy.  This  interdependence  is  not  a  new 
phenomenon. Marx more than 150 years ago predicted the present expansion and 
put it in an interesting way. 
 
  The  need  for  a  constantly  expanding  market  chases  the 65 
 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere,  settle  everywhere  establish  connections 
everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the 
world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption  in  every  country.  To  the  great  chagrin  of 
reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the 
national ground on which it stood. All old-established national 
industries  have  been  destroyed  or  are  daily  being  destroyed. 
They  are  dislodged  by  new  industries,  whose  introduction 
becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by 
industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but 
raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose 
products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of 
the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions 
of  the  country,  we  find  new  wants,  requiring  for  their 
satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of 
the  old  local  and  national  seclusion  and  self-sufficiency,  we 
have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence 
of nations. 
56 
 
This  quote  from  Marx  clearly  shows  that  the  process  of  globalisation  is  not 
unknown  or  unexpected  for  Marxists.  However,  knowing  and  expecting 
something does not necessarily mean being prepared for confrontation. The truth 
of the matter is that the pace of rapid expansion in the 1980s and 1990s caught 
the  working  class  by  surprise,  which  resulted  in  delays  and  pauses  in  its 
organised resistance against capitalism. That is to say, where capital has been 
able to use new communication achievements for its own benefit and adapted 
itself to the so-called information society, a similar development cannot be seen 
for  workers.  Capital’s  dominance  around  the  world  is  greater  than  ever.  The 
labour camp; however, is not that organised on the world scale.   
   
The interdependence of the national, regional, and global economies, at least for 
the  time  being,  works  against  the  world’s  working  class.  Advanced  transport 
communication systems make it possible for capital to pull out where profits are 
not good and invest where production costs less. In a globalised economy it is 
better to produce where the cost is less and sell where price is high. For instance, 
in the 1950s one in every four Americans owned a car and in 1979 one in every 66 
 
two  Americans  owned  a  car.  The  increase  in  the  number  of  cars  used  by 
American  households  reveals  another  important  aspect  of  globalisation. 
According to Bent Harrison and Berry Blustone, between 1969 and 1979 the 
value of US imports doubled. The figure for the import of industrial products 
increased from 14% in 1969 to 38% in 1979. In 1986 for every $100 spent by 
American families $45 was spent on imported commodities. Imports included 
shoes, clothes, textiles, cars, steal, car parts, electronic goods, computers, and 
high tech. products from Japan, Germany, Sweden, South Korea, and Taiwan.
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In  this  globalised  world  where  capital  is  able  to  fly  wherever  labour  is  less 
organised and cheaper to buy, and where freedom of movement does not exist for 
labour,  the  relationship  between  labour  and  capital  is  not  the  relation  of  two 
equals. It is a relation that favours capital over workers. 
 
The destructive effect of the globalisation of the economy becomes clearer when 
one looks at its relationship with the levels of unemployment, finance capital, etc. 
In a globalised economy the power of finance capital, the effect of privatisation, 
and unemployment are greatly enhanced. It is only in a globalised economy that 
finance capital can move so freely around the world destroying the development 
process in one area in order to chase the higher rate of profit and capital return in 
another. In a globalised economy the shift from industry to the service sector, 
finance, and other unproductive areas has a double effect. Put in a different way, 
capitalist expansion to the four corners of the world in itself is neither positive 
nor negative. It is the activity of some branches of capital such as finance capital 
that  shows  its  destructive  impact  on  the  working  class  and  its  struggle  for 
socialism, which becomes more difficult in an economy that operates on a world 
scale. It is obvious that if the operation of capital was limited to the US and 
Europe, then its ability to manoeuvre would be much less and it would die out in 
its contradiction. Thus globalisation is another element of delaying the terminal 
crisis of capitalism.    
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The globalisation of the economy provided great opportunities for capitalism to 
further delay its terminal crisis and to overcome the cyclical crisis by moving 
location and changing industries. These opportunities; however, have a negative 
impact on the life and struggle of the working class. With any closure of industry, 
the militant sections of the working class lose their established connections and 
face disruptions. When capital pulls out of an industry it needs to be reinvested 
for its very survival. Today, capitalism has more avenues open to it compared to 
the beginning of the 20
th century. Today, capital can be invested in the service 
sector, finance, banking and speculative operations, as well as, industry. 
 
The ability of capital to manoeuvre between different areas and branches of the 
economy, or to pull out completely from industry and go into finance, does not 
mean that capital has overcome its contradictions. On the contrary, time is slowly 
running  out  for  capitalism.  With  all  new  competitors  in  the  market  it  is 
increasingly more difficult to hold on to the present degree of the rate of profit. 
Paul Sweezy defines globalisation in a rather interesting way. He proclaims that 
globalisation  is  an  ever  invasive  and  often  inflammatory  process  of  capitalist 
expansion.
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To summarise, on the one hand, by destroying traditional ways of farming and 
agriculture, sending the rural poor into urban areas in search of jobs, bringing 
women and children into the labour market, and the expansion of the service 
sector, capital has truly made 80% of all societies wage labourers.  On the other 
hand,  as  a  result  of  automation  and  computerisation,  globalisation  of  the 
economy, and the shift to finance capital, and their effects on the working class, a 
larger  working  class  today  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it is stronger.  The 
world working class is bigger than ever before. However, the diversity of the 
working class is also bigger than before. Capitalist relations are operating on a 
world  scale.  However,  with  these  developments  capitalism  also  subjected  the 
working class to great changes. Today, the working class does not only refer to 
the industrial sector. It includes anyone who sells his/her labour power in order to 68 
 
stay alive. All wage and salary earners are members of this class as long as they 
do  not  exploit  other  workers  and  do  not  side  with  the  capitalism  against  the 
working class. 
 
Such  a  broad  definition  of  the  working  class  brings  some  difficulties  for  the 
labour  camp.  Many  parts  of  this  class  consider  themselves  out  with  the 
framework of the working class. Police officers, parking attendants, bus ticket 
conductors,  train  inspectors,  court  ushers  and  clerks,  security  officers, 
immigration  officers,  etc.  are  all  somehow  instruments  of  control  and  partly 
border class relations. The diversity of interests of the different sections of the 
working class is another factor that makes economic, and in particular, political 
organisation around a single purpose very difficult. It is a widely accepted fact in 
any major workers’ strike that some trade unions oppose the rest of the class, for 
instance, the electrical union in England. Workers on higher salaries or wages are 
less likely to support the lower strata’s struggle for the obvious reason that they 
have relatively privileged jobs to lose. Capitalism’s developments over the last 
three decades of the 20
th century created workers who obtained higher skills and 
received higher wages for their skill. As a result of this increase in skills in the 
computer world, computer trained office workers hardly considered themselves 
as part of the working class. Reciprocally, many of the working class’ activists 
hardly consider social groups, such as, office computer experts, bank officers, 
and social workers as part of their class.   
 
Contrary  to  the  power  relation’s  definition  of  unemployment,  a  high  rate  of 
unemployment has a greater impact than just workers being made redundant, the 
disruption to organisation, or the loss of activists. Unemployment also weakens 
the position of workers who are still employed.  The defensive position of the 
working  class  from  1980  onward  is  directly  related  to  the  increase  of 
unemployment on a world scale.  
 
The largest reserve army of labour, to use Marx’s terminology, is the result of the 69 
 
above  mentioned  development.  Between  one-quarter  and  one-half  of  all 
countries’ working population are unemployed. This huge level of unemployment 
has multiple effects on the working class. Firstly, the unemployed population, 
either in their own country or in the form of migrant workers, have to give into 
the capital’s demands in order to preserve their physical survival. By doing this, 
they keep pressure on the employed sections of the working class. Secondly, a 
chronically unemployed person tends to be more conservative when it comes to 
the question of the class struggle. It is not surprising that migrant workers, who 
are mostly engaged in manual labour and do jobs that are rarely accepted by local 
people, do not participate in workers’ strikes. Lack of job security is greater for 
this part of the working class. Thirdly, the unemployed participate in collective 
action  only  until  getting  a  job.  Once  that  is  achieved  s/he  has  no  motive  to 
continue  collective  action.  Hence,  the  unemployed’s  collective  action  is  not 
continuous and reliable. The unemployed’s reliability can change as s/he changes 
jobs.  The case for the employed, theoretically speaking, is different. They know 
that united with their colleagues they can achieve their aims but individually the 
same goal cannot be fulfilled. The problems caused by unemployment are more 
than those aspects discussed. 
 
The  risk  of  losing  their  job  and  becoming  unemployed  creates  a  spirit  of 
competition  amongst  workers.  There  is  competition  not  only  between  the 
employed  and  unemployed,  but  also  between  the  unemployed  workers 
themselves. That is to say, unemployment’s most devastating effect is the decline 
of the spirit of solidarity. Usually when there is a large population of unemployed 
in a country, militant collective action also declines. There is no doubt that other 
factors play important roles in the increase and decline of radical class action. 
However, unemployment is one of the most important factors. 
 
Workers’ participation in collective action is dependent on many factors. The 
economic interest of a person is only one factor. Ideology is another factor. An 
unemployed person because of his or her ideology might choose to take part in a 70 
 
demonstration for peace or saving the planet rather than signing a petition for 
jobs.  Another  effect  of  unemployment,  especially  if it  is  prolonged,  is  losing 
interest in class action. Unlike an employed person who enjoys strong ties with 
his or her colleagues in any collective action, an unemployed person might end 
up participating in actions that are not particularly class actions.   
 
In  addition  to  the  problems  caused  by  the  above  factors,  the  organisation  of 
unemployed women for class action is even more difficult. As mentioned earlier, 
the  rapid  increase  of  women  in  the  labour  market  caused  difficulties  for  the 
labour movement. As a result of wage discrimination and domestic inequality 
between male and female wage labourers, it became difficult to bring these two 
sections of the working class together into a unified class based action. Knowing 
this difficulty, the bourgeoisie made the most of it by replacing traditionally male 
jobs with female workers and further declining the class unity between men and 
women workers. Though, this problem is not as important today as it was in the 
1960s and 1970s, out of the three main feminist groupings only social feminists 
are still committed to putting class unity before the question of women. Many 
lesbians are still suspicious of men. Liberal feminists, for different reasons, are 
less concerned about workers class action. Injustice at home and work affects and 
undermines the possibility of unified class action between men and women. As 
long as there are women who are moved by feminist ideas, unified class action 
cannot be based on a single ideology in a political party type of organisation.  
 
Moreover,  there  is  a  cultural  diversity  amongst  the  working  class.  The 
development  of  capitalism  over  the  last  two  decades  of  the  20
th  century  has 
created a population of wage and salary earners, who maintain a different level of 
culture. The cultural interests of computer experts and bank officers are not the 
same  as  industrial  workers.  This  variety  of  cultural  interests  affects  their 
preference when it comes to the question of political organisation. It is difficult to 
unite various groups of workers into a monolithic political party based on a single 
ideology  with  rigid  party  discipline  who  do  not  consider  the  changes  of 71 
 
capitalism.  Party  discipline  that  might  suit  an  industrial  worker  may  not 
necessarily suit a worker who has at least one degree as the prerequisite of his or 
her job. One of the greatest socio-economic changes of the 1980s and 1990s was 
the replacement of the unskilled and less skilled workforce with the highly skilled 
workforce in the high tech industry. The variety of skills, economic interests, 
wages, and culture among different groups of the modern working class results in 
a  change  in  the  superstructure,  and  specifically,  a  change  in  the  character  of 
political organisation. 
 
Just  as  the  Trades  Union  Congress  (TUC),  General  Confederation  of  Labour 
(CGT),  Trade  Union  Confederation  (DGB),  and  Confederation  of  Progressive 
Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK) are umbrella economic organisations for trade 
unions  in  Britain,  France,  Germany,  and  Turkey,  a  similar  umbrella  political 
organisation is needed to unite various sections of the working class. At present, 
in most countries, different parts of such a political organisation have already 
appeared. The working class movement is one step away from the emergence of 
the political umbrella organisation. For instance, in Britain the Marxist elements 
of the Labour Party either split and formed the Socialist Labour Party or stayed 
inside the Labour Party but kept their internal bylaw and discipline in the form of 
the Militant. The formation of umbrella socialist organisations from the Socialist 
Alliance, to the Socialist Labour Party, to the Militant appears to be a matter of 
time and effort by activists. A similar process can be seen in other countries such 
as Italy. 
 
The  impact  of  finance  capital  on  the  working  class  struggle  in  the  last  two 
decades appears to be worse than other aspects of socio-economic changes of the 
20
th  century.  The  huge  scale  of  finance  capital’s  operation  and  its  parasitic 
character has pushed the working class into a defensive position in all countries. 
The fact that capital can exist and enhance its profit through parasitic operations 
without the direct involvement of the industrial working class, in itself, is very 
difficult  to  challenge.  The  threat  that  capitalism  might  run  out  of  industry  if 72 
 
profitability is low gives it the upper hand in its affair with workers. This directly 
affects workers and their militancy. Capital, even in its finance form, cannot exist 
without  living  labour  and  the  exploitation  of  workers.  However,  what  gives 
capitalism the upper hand against labour is the unrestricted movement of capital 
from  one  place  to  the  next,  especially  from  1980  onwards.  This  freedom  of 
movement does not exist for workers. Capital can partially leave an industry but 
that is not the case for the workers.   
 
Summary 
 
The  world’s  working  class  has  grown  numerically  and  is  greater  than  ever. 
However,  bigger  does  not  necessarily  mean  stronger.  On  the  contrary,  the 
position of the working class is weaker today as opposed to the first half of the 
20
th  century.  Firstly,  a  bigger  working  class  means  a  bigger  number  of 
unemployed,  which  weakens  the  position  of  workers  in  the  class  struggle. 
Secondly, the development of capitalism and the rapid growth of computer use 
created  an  identity  crisis  for  some  sections  of  the  working  class,  created 
inequality  among  skilled  and  unskilled  workers,  and  resulted  in  the  further 
fragmentation  of  the  working  class.  Thirdly,  women  coming  into  the  labour 
market in mass numbers created disunity among workers. Finally, finance capital 
has weakened the position of workers even further.  
 
Today the organisation of the working class for socialism is much more difficult. 
This is partly because of the diversity of the working class and complications of 
its demands, and partly because of the identity crisis within some sections of the 
working class. This problem has more than one dimension. Those sections of the 
working  class  that  are  not  easily  organised  under  the  name  and  banners  of 
working  class  join  other  organisations.  Some  female  workers  join  feminist 
movements, some join anti-socialist parties, and some stay at home. 
 
As  a  result  of  the  diversity  of  the  working  class  and  the  above  mentioned 73 
 
changes, one could say that it is no longer possible for a traditional working class 
socialist party to unite the demands of feminists, Greens, peace lovers, human 
rights  campaigners,  and  socialist  workers  all  under  the  red  banner.  All  these 
demands; however, can be united and all those forces can join under a general 
umbrella organisation. Such an organisation would naturally reflect the demands 
of the working class, as well as, environmentalists, feminists, and human rights 
campaigners.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
Marxism, the party, and class 
 
Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels wrote in The Manifesto of the Communist Party, 
“The History of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles…a 
fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at 
large  or  in  the  common  ruin  of  the  contending  classes.”
1  What  is  the  most 
determining factor for the success and failure of the working class in its strategy 
for  the  revolutionary  re-constitution  of  the  society?  Is  it  class  consciousness, 
economic  organisation,  or  political  organisation?  More  than  one  and  a  half 
centuries after this statement in The Communist Manifesto the history of class 
struggle  since  the  Russian  Revolution  in  October  1917  has  provided  many 
examples of the importance of workers’ political organisation. In other words, it is 
the working class and bourgeois class’ organisation and particularly their political 
organisations that determine the future of these contending classes in the present 
capitalist  society.  Although  there  are  many  other  factors  involved,  political 
organisation is the main factor for working class success or failure. The better 
politically organised, the higher the chances of victory. The aim of this work is to 
study the viability of the different types of socialist organisations of the working 
class  during  the  21
st  century.  However,  in  order  to  study  the  socialist 
organisations  most  viable  for  the  present  century,  one  needs  to  look  at  their 
predecessors, i.e. socialist organisations of the last century. It is also important to 
find out what was meant by a communist party in the early 20th century. That is 
to  say,  one  must  study  both  the  theory  and  practice  of  past  communist  and 
socialist parties and organisations to better understand the viability of socialist 
organisations  in  the  21
st  century.  It  will  be  equally  important  to  look  at  the 
changes within the capitalist system, its structure, its effects on the structure of the 
working  class,  and  the  consequences  this  had  on  the  strategies  and  tactics  of 81 
 
communist parties, as well as the impact that these parties had on the survival and 
changes of capitalism as a system.  
 
The previous chapter discussed the diversity and changes in the structure of the 
working  class.  It  examined  categories  such  as  unemployment,  globalisation, 
computerisation,  as  well  as  the  entry  of  women  and  children  into  the  labour 
market.  It  also discussed  their  impact  on  the  working  class’  struggle.  Chapter 
three will look at the ways in which the Stalinists’ practices and social democratic 
parties throughout the world saved the essence of capitalism. This chapter will 
outline  the  theories  of  early  20
th  century  revolutionary  Marxists  such  as  V.I. 
Lenin,  Leon  Trotsky,  Rosa  Luxemburg,  and  Antonio  Gramsci  regarding  the 
importance of independent communist parties in the process of the working class 
struggle and the relationship between the party and class as a whole. In order to 
understand their points of view and before looking at the way in which the most 
important communist thinkers describe the communist party, the next section will 
look at some of the basic ideas of the nature of political organisation.  
 
What is a political organisation? 
 
An organisation is a set of people who are combined in the virtue of activities 
directed  to  common  ends.  Bertrand  Russell  asserts,  “There  are  two  important 
respects in  which organisations may differ: one is size, the other is  what one 
might call density of power, by which I mean the degree of control which they 
exert  over  their  members.”
2  Russell’s  definition  of  organisation  is  a  general 
definition.  One  may  add  that  there  is  more  to  the  characteristics  of  political 
organisations than size and density of power.  For instance, the relationship of 
political organisation to the general public or, in other words, its accessibility to 
the public or the masses is as important as the actual size and the density of power 
– what Marxists refer to as centralisation. The purpose of this study is not to 
examine  political  organisations  in  general,  but  rather  it  seeks  to  explore  a 82 
 
particular  type  of  organisation.  That  organisation  is  the  revolutionary  Marxist 
organisation of the working class for socialism.  
 
For  Georg  Lukács  organisation  is  the  form  of  mediation  between  theory  and 
practice. That is to say, it is at the level of organisation that socialist ideas are put 
to  the  test  of  practice.  “Every  theoretical  tendency  or  clash  of  views  must 
immediately develop an organisational arm if it is to rise above the level of pure 
theory or abstract opinion, in other words, if it really intends to point the way to 
its own fulfilment in practice.”
3 
 
However, there is a problem with this position. In The Communist Manifesto, 
Marx  and  Engels  state  that  “the  history  of  all  hitherto  existing  society  is  the 
history  of  the  class  struggle.”  Marx  talks  about  the  class  struggle,  not  about 
tendencies  existing  within  the  classes.  Lukács’  remark  justifies  sectarian 
tendencies within the proletarian movement. His starting point is not the action of 
the working class but theoretical tendencies that are brought to the working class 
from outside its boundaries. From such a position nearly all political splits and 
partitions  within  the  working  class  movement  are  justified.    If  every  clash  of 
views according to the above remark resulted immediately in an organisational 
arm, then the working class would never become a class for itself. Moreover this 
remark is not able to explain Marx and Engels’ action for most of their political 
careers. Marx and Engels stopped their direct membership to any political party 
very early in their political careers but continued their theoretical activities to the 
end of their lives. It appears that Lukács is addressing the members and activists 
of  communist  parties.  Based  on  Lukács’  discussion,  the  working  class  would 
never unite around any industrial action let alone the question of political power. 
Lukács does not talk about freedom of tendencies within the communist party. On 
the contrary, he talks about the fulfilment of the views of tendencies in practice. If 
every tendency tries to put its view into practice, the result would be nothing but a 
party that cannot unite on any issue.   
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Leon Trotsky has a very interesting metaphor to describe the importance of the 
Bolshevik  party  during  the  Russian  Revolution.  In  the History  of  the  Russian 
Revolution, Trotsky declares, “Without a guiding organisation, the energy of the 
masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston box. But nevertheless 
what moves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam.”
4 Trotsky’s view on 
the role of the party is similar to the writings of Rosa Luxemburg. In their view it 
is the working class movement that is important and the parties or theories unlike 
what Lukács says are means for the aims of the working class. For instance, Rosa 
Luxemburg in Leninism or Marxism writes: 
 
In Russia, however, the social democratic party must make up by its 
own  efforts  an  entire  historical  period.  It  must  lead  the  Russian 
proletarians from their present “atomised” condition, which prolongs 
the autocratic regime, to a class organisation that would help them to 
become  aware  of  their  historical  objectives  and  prepare  them  to 
struggle to achieve those objectives.
5  
 
In  Luxemburg’s view, the proletarians’ organisation and leadership to  achieve 
their  historical  objectives  as  a  class  measures  the  party’s  function  and 
achievement. In her view the party is a means that prepares the working class for 
its  historical  achievement.  Rosa  Luxemburg  further  explains  her  view  in  The 
Mass  Strike.  “The  task  of  social  democracy  does  not  consist  in  the  technical 
preparation and direction of mass strikes, but first and foremost in the political 
leadership  of  the  whole  movement.”
6  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  understanding  of  the 
relationship between the communist party and the masses of proletariat is similar 
to  Marx’s  view.  In  The  Mass  Strike,  Rosa  Luxemburg  describes  the  social 
democrats as follows: 
  
The  social  democrats  are  the  most  enlightened,  the  most  class-
conscious vanguard of the proletariat. They cannot and dare not wait, 
in  a  fatalistic  fashion  with  folded  arms  for  the  advent  of  the 
“revolutionary situation.”
7    
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 Rosa Luxemburg sees the party as the continuation of the way in which Marx and 
Engels  define  the  communist  party.  In  The  Communist  Manifesto  Marx  and 
Engels asserted:   
 
Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working 
class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those of 
the proletariat as a whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles 
of  their  own,  by  which  to  shape  and  mould  the  proletarian 
movement.
8  
 
Therefore, communists are the conscious sections of the working class. They do 
not  separate  themselves  from  other  workers  and  do  not  set  up  any  sectarian 
principles without participation of the masses of workers.
 
  
Why is it that communists should not set up their own principles and put them to 
the masses of workers who are not party members? If Luxemburg and Marx were 
alive they would probably have answered: Only during the class struggle, when 
standing  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  other  members  of  the  class  and  when 
answering the specific questions facing the class struggle, should communists put 
forward  their  own  answers  to  those  specific  questions.  Both  Marx’s  and 
Luxemburg’s  political  lives  were  associated  with  the  struggle  of  a  strong 
proletariat,  which  consisted  of  the  majority  of  the  population.  The  number  of 
industrial workers in 19
th century Britain and 20
th century Germany were by far 
greater than the Russian, Italian or even the French industrial working classes. 
Moreover,  the  political  weight  of  the  British  working  class  allowed  Marx  to 
predict the possibility of gaining political power by peaceful means such as the 
working  class’  vote.  In  addition,  political  freedom  in  Britain  and  Germany 
allowed openness and the existence of Marxists in factories. In Russia, Hungary, 
Italy, and other parts of the world political suppression, censorship, and terror 
imposed the highest degree of secrecy and led to the separation of communists 
from the rest of the working class. In Britain and Germany socialists did not have 
to put their lives at risk in order to get to the workers, whereas in Russia any 
socialist activity in factories would have resulted in exile to Siberia. Due to the 85 
 
weight of the proletariat in Britain as the leading capitalist country of the time 
Marx maintained that only the working class, not any other class or social group, 
was in a position to emancipate itself, and with it the whole of humanity. That is 
to say, only the working class, at the bottom of capitalist society, had no interest 
in keeping a society that was based on its exploitation. No other social group was 
in such a position.  
 
In societies where the working class was not the majority of the population and it 
had to form a social block with other oppressed classes, this very act imposed 
changes to its political strategy. The form and structure of a political organisation 
that was based on and supported by a strong working class was different from the 
one that operated in a society where the weight of other poorer social groups was 
as heavy as the working class. When it came to the question of theory, the effect 
was  similar.  That  is  to  say,  when  it  came  to  the  relationship  between  the 
communist  party  as  an  independent  entity  from  the  working  class,  the  less 
conscious, less organised, and the smaller the size of the working class resulted in 
a party that was not controlled by the class and its political demands. The next 
section will discuss the relationship between the party and class.  
 
The party and class 
 
 There are at least three different theories that describe the relationship between 
the working class and the political party of the working class. These include the 
Blankist, the Marxist, and the social democratic. This study will concentrate on 
Marxist theory and the trends within this school. Among the great pre-Second 
World  War  Marxist  thinkers,  Lenin  and  Gramsci  have  a  very  similar 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the  party  and  class,  whereas  Rosa 
Luxemburg and the young Trotsky have a very different approach. The remaining 
sections of this chapter will look at the ways in which these Marxist thinkers have 
presented their theories. The reasons this work will only discuss Lenin, Trotsky, 
Luxemburg, and Gramsci are as follows: They all lived before the Second World 86 
 
War; they all lead strong working class movements; they all left lasting political 
legacies among the working class movement around the world; and they have all 
discussed the relationship between the proletariat and its political party. 
 
Lenin 
 
Lenin  insists  that  without  revolutionary  theory  there  can  be  no  revolutionary 
action by the working class. That is to say, workers do not share in the formation 
of the ideology. According to Lenin in What Is To Be Done? the main function of 
the party is to shape and form the ideology of the working class. This activity is 
the party’s sole right. In What Is To Be Done? Lenin valued the independence of 
the  party  to  a  degree  that  not  only  was  it  the  most  important  element  of  the 
socialist  revolution,  but  without  it  workers’  action  could  only  lead  to  trade 
unionist  consciousness.  Later,  at  the  second  congress  of  the  Russian  Social 
Democratic  Labour  Party  (RSDLP), he  corrected his position by saying, “The 
economists have gone to one extreme. To straighten matters out somebody had to 
pull in the other direction- and that is what I have done.”
9 As early as 1903 Lenin 
realised that he could not defend the central claim he had put forward in What Is 
To Be Done? 
 
In  spite  of  his  ideas  in  the  early  20
th  century,  in  his  writings  after  the  1905 
Revolution,  Lenin  recognised  the  problems  of  bureaucratisation  and 
substitutionism without getting trapped into the fatalistic view typical of social 
democracy. Chris Harman put forward several reasons for this viewpoint. Firstly, 
Lenin believed that the revolutionary period transferred the masses into new men. 
In  other  words,  it  was  not  always  the  case  that  the  masses  need  the  party’s 
leadership in their revolutionary struggle all of the time. In a short article titled 
What is happening in Russia Lenin wrote:  
 
In the history of revolutions there come to light contradictions that 
have  ripened  for  decades  and  centuries.  Life  becomes  unusually 
eventful.  The  masses,  which  have  always  stood  in  the  shade  and 87 
 
therefore have often been despised by superficial observers, enter the 
political  arena  as  active  combatants…these  masses  are  making 
heroic efforts to rise to the occasion and cope with the gigantic tasks 
of world significance imposed upon them by history; and however 
great  individual  defeats  may  be…nothing  will  ever  compare  in 
importance with this direct training that the masses and the classes 
receive in the course of the revolutionary struggle itself.
10 
 
Lenin came back to this subject in another article The Revolutionary Army and the 
Revolutionary Government to confirm the importance of revolutionary periods for 
people’s self-education. In that article he compared the revolutionary period with 
the time of stagnation. He explained how during  revolutionary periods the masses 
learned in a few days what they might not learn during years of stagnation.  
 
We are able to appreciate the importance of the slow, steady and 
often  imperceptible  work  of  political  education  which  social 
democrats have always conducted and always will conduct. But we 
must not allow what in the present circumstances would be still more 
dangerous-  a  lack  of  faith  in the  powers  of  the  people.  We  must 
remember what a tremendous educational and organisational power 
the revolution has when mighty historical events force the man in the 
street out of his remote garret or basement corner, and make a citizen 
of  him.  Months  of  revolution  sometimes  educate  citizens  more 
quickly and fully than decades of political stagnation.
11 
 
Secondly, Lenin did not oppose the ability of the working class to obtain social 
democratic consciousness. In spite of political restrictions in Russian society, with 
the exception of brief periods in 1905 and 1917, the following quotes from Lenin 
sound rather like Rosa Luxemburg’s words. “The working class is instinctively, 
spontaneously  social  democratic.”
12  Chris  Harman  and  R.  Dunayevskaya  in 
Marxism and Freedom  pointed out another example that showed Lenin’s faith in 
the masses of proletariat in capitalist society.  
 
The special condition of the proletariat in capitalistic society leads to 
a striving of workers for socialism; a union of them with the socialist 
party bursts forth with a spontaneous force in the very early stages of 
the movement.
13 
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Thirdly, according to Harman, Lenin’s strong faith in the masses did not 
change even in the worst months after the outbreak of war in 1914. Lenin 
asserted: 
 
The  objective  war-created  situation…is  inevitably  engendering 
revolutionary  sentiments;  it  is  tempering  and  enlightening  all  the 
finest and most class conscious proletarians. A sudden change in the 
mood of the masses is not only possible, but is becoming more and 
more probable.
14  
 
Finally, Harman claimed that Lenin’s faith in the masses led to conflict with his 
own party in April and again in August and September. According to Trotsky, 
“Lenin said more than once that the masses are to the left of the party. He knew 
the party was to the left of its own upper layer of ‘old Bolsheviks’.”
15 In writing 
about the Democratic conference Lenin stated, “We must draw the masses into 
the discussion of this question. Class conscious workers must take the matter into 
their  own  hands,  organise  the  discussion  and  exert  pressure  on  ‘those  at  the 
top’.”
16  
  
This  argument  is  very  convincing.  Although  Lenin  defended  the  embryonic 
organisation of the party tooth and nail and emphasised the role of the communist 
party in the formation  of working  class ideology, during the 1905 Revolution 
Lenin sided with the workers against the party’s bureaucrats. 
 
For example, Bogdanov, an old Bolshevik, took up an anti-soviet 
position on the grounds that such a non-party organizational form 
would challenge the social democratic party. Perhaps becoming the 
nucleus of activity aimed against it. He thus called for the soviets to 
accept party authority and its programme, or face the withdrawal of 
party support.
17 
  
Lenin defended the independence of the soviets from the party and explained that 
both  the  party  and  soviets  were  necessary  for  the  revolution.  As  a  result  of 
Lenin’s  firm  support  of  the  soviets  Bogdanov  left  the  party.  The  Bolsheviks’ 
position inside Russia was similar to that of Bogdanov. Radin (also a Bolshevik) 89 
 
had  a  similar  position  during  the  1905  Revolution.  Lenin’s  position  against 
Radin’s article Party or Soviet will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
 
It could be argued that after the 1905 Revolution, Lenin could see the possibility 
of building a mass workers’ party in Russia and started to turn his attention to 
building  one.  Lenin  never  relinquished  his  firm  belief  in  a  centralised  well-
disciplined  working  class  party  as  a  vital  means  for  a  successful  revolution. 
However, as Harman argued, he put his efforts into bringing more and more class 
conscious workers into the party and tried to transfer the leading role of the party 
to  class  conscious  working  class  leaders.  Although  he  never  criticised  his 
definition of the party that he put forward in What Is To Be Done? Lenin very 
quickly realised that he was leading a mass party with several tendencies. In 1903 
apart from different factions there were other tendencies that were not as well 
known as the three main factions of the party. Earlier this work discussed the 
position of other Bolsheviks on the relationship between the party and the soviets 
during the 1905 Revolution. Despite the clandestine nature of party’s activities 
and it being a young party, tendencies and clashes of views on many issues facing 
the party could only be expected. To regulate relations between these tendencies 
Lenin offered his formula of freedom of discussion and unity in action.  
 
Trotsky 
 
Unlike other great Marxist thinkers, Leon Trotsky’s position on the question of 
organisation is contradictory and, therefore, is not clear to his readers. Whatever 
the  reason  for  his  apparent  contradiction,  there  are  at  least  two  opposite 
explanations as to why his early writings on the subject contradict his later works. 
Historians, such as Isaac Deutscher and some of his followers argue that Trotsky, 
finally realising his errors embraced Lenin’s organisational line, as laid out in 
What Is To Be Done?
18 For example, Tony Cliff claimed, “Trotsky…for some 14 
years refused to accept Lenin’s concept of the party, which he wholeheartedly 
embraced  only  in  1917.” 
19  Even  people  such  as  Baruch  Knei-Pez  attributed 90 
 
“Trotsky’s  joining  the  Bolsheviks  to  his  coming  to  terms  with  the  central 
importance of purely political devices in revolutionary social change and the lure 
of power.
”20 This argument was amplified by Trotsky’s own renunciation of his 
early writings during his years in exile when he said: “I wrote a brochure in 1904, 
Our  Political  Tasks,  in  which  I  developed  some  views  on  the  question  of 
organisation quite similar to those of Rosa Luxemburg, nonetheless all my later 
experience  has  shown  me  that  in  this  controversy  Lenin  was  right  against 
Luxemburg, and against myself.
”21  
 
 Antonio Carlo and Lenne Poole argued the view that in 1917 Lenin accepted 
Trotsky’s  theory  of  permanent  revolution,  while  Trotsky  in  turn  accepted  the 
Bolsheviks’ theory of organisation and abandoned his youthful spontaneity in the 
process,  was  simplistic  and  wrong.  In  their  respective  articles  they  provided 
convincing  arguments  that  after  the  1905  Revolution  Lenin’s  view  on 
organisation underwent a radical change, which brought him close to the ideas of 
Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg. This is a realistic view and can be supported by 
Lenin’s formula of “freedom of discussion and unity in action.” 
 
Freedom of discussion and unity in action is used in a mass party. In order for 
freedom of discussion to have any meaning (or value), it cannot be restricted to a 
small secretive party consisting of a minority.  That is to say, Lenin’s slogan for 
full discussion while at the same time maintaining unity of action could only be 
used in a mass party, as opposed to a small group, if the aim of such discussion 
was to educate the whole class. 
 
Even though Trotsky renounced his 1904 works on organisation, and regardless of 
the reasons for his renunciation, Our Political Tasks is still Trotsky’s writing just 
as  Marx’s  early  writings  are  his.  Regardless  of  Trotsky’s  renunciation,  Our 
Political Tasks had a lasting impact on the proletarian movement.  In other words, 
what  was  said  in  Our  Political  Tasks  is  a  part  of  history  and  Trotsky’s 91 
 
dissociation from his own work more than three decades later does not change its 
value.  
 
This  work  will  now  look  at  the  way  in  which  Trotsky  saw  the  relationship 
between  the  party  and  the  working  class.  Trotsky’s  Report  of  the  Siberian 
Delegation showed the origin of the Lenin-Trotsky disputes over the forms of 
organisation in the second congress of RSDLP. Trotsky pointed out the lack of 
understanding  of some  comrades  regarding  the  relationship between  particular 
industrial  interests  and  general  class  politics  during  the  revolutionary  period 
leading to the 1905 Revolution as well as the stagnation period. He explained the 
importance of linking their consciousness with local detailed tasks, the limited 
demands of specific trades, and the daily immediate demands with the need to 
create a central fighting apparatus.  
  
Now, at the height of “centralism” they make a complete abstraction, 
in their considerations and resolutions about this apparatus, of all 
practical  complexity and concrete  character of  the tasks the party 
must carry out, tasks with which the organisational apparatus must 
conform, tasks which alone permit the existence of this apparatus. 
This is why, to go ahead a little, unilinear “centralism,” that is the 
purely formal centralism put forward by Lenin, found its warmest 
supporters  in  certain  ex-“economists.”  They  were  the  one  who 
turned out to be the hardest “Iskraists.”
 22 
 
As early as 1903 Trotsky not only rejected activities of a purely economist nature, 
but  he  wanted  political  activity  that  was  directly  related  to  and  based  on  the 
factory. On the one hand Trotsky still thought in the framework of Lenin’s 1896 
The Tasks of Russian Social Democrat, where he suggested their limited forces 
should concentrate on factories, and on the other hand he rejected Lenin’s general 
centralism in What Is To Be Done? As Carlo put it, “Trotsky, makes himself the 
spokesman  of  a  current  within  the  RSDLP  that  was  critical  of  both  the 
spontaneism  of  economists  and  the  abstract  political  agitationism  of  the 
‘politicians’.”
23 Trotsky further maintained that the form of organisation was not 
given a priority, but was a variable, which was dependent on the politics that 92 
 
caused its existence. That is to say, the party for him was a means for a greater 
aim. On this fundamental principle, Trotsky and Lenin held a similar view.
 
 
Trotsky’s starting point emphasised the importance of class, its characteristics, 
and potentials, and in the RSDLP split he supported the Menshevik organisational 
view. However, in Our Political Tasks, he clearly indicated the importance of the 
party and its unique role: 
 
Marxism teaches that the interests of the proletariat are determined 
by the objective conditions of its existence. These interests are so 
powerful and so inescapable that they finally oblige the proletariat to 
allow them into the realm of its subjective concern. Between these 
two factors - the objective fact of its class interest and its subjective 
consciousness - lies the realm inherent in life, that of clashes and 
blows, mistakes and disillusionment, vicissitudes and defeats. The 
tactical  farsightedness  of  the  party  of  the  proletariat  is  located 
entirely  between these two factors and consists of shortening  and 
easing the road from one to another.
24 
 
Once again, Trotsky attributed mistakes, defeats, and disillusionment directly to 
the working class and its direct action rather than to the working class party as the 
mediator between the theory and practice, which Lukács advocated. In agreement 
with  Rosa  Luxemburg,  Trotsky  insisted  that  the  ability  to  acquire  subjective 
consciousness  was  in  the  nature  of  the  proletariat  with  or  without  a  party. 
However, in this view the purpose of the presence and the impact of the party was 
to  shorten  the  distance  between  capitalist  slavery  and  the  realm  of  freedom. 
According to Lynne Poole,  
 
Trotsky argued for the mass party which consists principally of 
workers  who  themselves  have  the  role  of  political  actors  and 
organisers, rather than the role of theoreticians. He thus argued 
against the notion of an intelligentsia-dominated party…. While 
Trotsky saw an important role for the intelligentsia, in terms of 
theoretical development of social democracy and even as actors 
within a socialist party itself, he did not accept the inflated role 
that Lenin ascribed to them.
25   
 93 
 
Trotsky  criticised  Lenin’s  format  of  the  party  for  two  main  reasons.  Trotsky 
maintained  that  the theory  of  the party  put  forward in  What Is  To  Be  Done? 
invited substitutionism. According to this theory, the party would substitute itself 
for the working class and therefore would deny the historical role of the class 
prescribed  by  Marx.  This  is  not  to  say  that  Trotsky  had  predicted  the 
bureaucratisation of  the  Bolshevik  party  in  1903-4.  According  to Trotsky, the 
proletariat would not tolerate substitutionism. Substitutionism would result in the 
workers  keeping  away  from  the  party  and  going  their  own  way.  In  many 
countries, the working class deserted parties that considered themselves as the 
working class’ guardians, and tutors.  
 
The second criticism was sectarianism. According to Trotsky, the party design 
based on the Leninist theory in What Is To Be Done? was over-centralised and the 
members  had  no  role  in  the  party  as  they  were  subordinated  to  the  central 
committee. This would result in a situation where the party was no longer capable 
of the political education of the revolutionary class, it was unable to develop the 
organisational link with the revolution, and therefore would be pushed aside by 
the working class.
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Rosa Luxemburg 
 
Rosa  Luxemburg  is  wrongly  known  among  Marxists  for  her emphasis  on the 
spontaneous movement of the proletariat. Her true contribution to the theory and 
practice of Marxism is, to a great extent, obscured among Marxists. It is not the 
task of this work to introduce the true Rosa Luxemburg to the reader. However, it 
is necessary to briefly say that her revolutionary activity, as well as her theoretical 
legacy, leaves no doubt that if she is not the greatest Marxist revolutionary after 
Marx, then she certainly is among the greatest Marxists of the 20
th century. 
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While she was still at school in Warsaw, she joined the small Proletariat Party. In 
1892 she was one of the founding members of the Polish Socialist Party. In 1894 
she split from the party’s leadership over the question of Polish independence. 
Rosa  Luxemburg  held  that  supporting  Polish  independence  would  mean 
subordinating the working class to  Polish capitalists. She co-founded the Social 
Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP) with Leo Jogiches. Then it 
merged with another party and formed the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of 
Poland  and  Lithuania  (SDKPiL).  Her  party  became  the  Communist  Party  of 
Poland after the success of the October Revolution in Russia. In addition to the 
SDKP and SDKPiL, she also founded the Group International, the Spartacist, and 
the  German  Communist  Party.  This  proud  political  history,  given  her  radical 
standing throughout her political life is enough to prove that she was far from 
spontaneity. There is a great difference between someone who devoted her entire 
life  to  communist  political  organisations  and  tried  to  link  these  political 
organisations  to real  working  class  activities  and  another  who  emphasised the 
importance of workers’ action without any concern for the political party of the 
class. Rosa Luxemburg’s approach to the working class question in all her major 
works from The Mass Strike, The Political Party and the Trade Unions, to the 
Accumulation  of  Capital,  What  is  Economics,  Social  Reform  or  Revolution, 
Leninism or Marxism, and to the Junius Pamphlet was of a communist leader 
trying to link communism as an ideology to the real movement of the proletarian 
masses. 
 
From the outset, it has to be said that Luxemburg’s understanding of the political 
party of the working class was very similar to Trotsky’s writings. 
·  Both thinkers emphasised the need for internal party democracy;  
·  both put a greater emphasis on working class action as opposed to the 
party when it came to the relationship between the two;  
·  both saw the party as necessary and as an important part of the class;  
·  both  deeply  trusted  the  potential  of  the  working  class  to  acquire  the 
necessary  political  and  organisational  skills  needed  for  a  successful 95 
 
revolution  and  saw  the  main  duty  of  the  party  to  assist  the  class  to 
organise itself. 
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  before  his  murder,  Trotsky  was  alive  long  enough  to 
dissociate  himself  from  his  early  thought  on  the  nature  of  the  political 
organisation of the working class, whereas Luxemburg held her view of the party 
and its relationship to the the working class to the end. 
 
Many  Marxist  thinkers  from  Mandel  to Cliff  to  Löwy have  put  forward  their 
judgments  about  Luxemburg’s  political  stand.  According  to  Mandel,  “Rosa 
Luxemburg  argued  that  the  revolutionary  party  ‘will  be  created  by  the 
revolutionary action of the masses’.”
27 Mandel added that “the so-called theory of 
spontaneity  can  be  attributed  to  Luxemburg  only  with  reservations.”
28  These 
reservations  according  to  Norman  Geras  turned  out  to  be  very  significant, 
particularly  when,  in  an  important  work  about  Rosa  Luxemburg’s  work  and 
activities, Mandel affirmed that “she was never guilty of the very conceptions 
(‘infantillages’) attributed to her.”
29 That is to say, Mandel did not fully support 
Lenin’s  criticism  of  the  Spartacus  League  in  which  he  termed  the  infantile 
disorder of Leftism. 
  
In “Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder Lenin attacked the Spartacists 
and rejected their ideas. After quoting from a Spartacist pamphlet Lenin wrote, 
“What old and familiar rubbish! What ‘Left’ childishness!”
30 It is not possible to 
discuss the dispute between the Spartacists and Lenin fully and it is not the aim of 
this work to do so. It is enough to say that the argument was about the party and 
class. Both sides of the argument agreed that the party and working class were not 
separated and certainly did not oppose each other. However, as mentioned earlier, 
Rosa Luxemburg put a greater emphasis on class whereas for Lenin the party 
came first. By saying Rosa Luxemburg was not guilty of the infantile disorder as 
Lenin attributed to her, Mandel made it known where he stood in that argument. 
Earlier this work discussed how  Lenin’s ideas  of the relationship between the 96 
 
party  and  working  class  improved  after  the  1905  Revolution  and  how  Lenin 
learned from Rosa Luxemburg and the young Trotsky. It is simplistic to suggest 
that  in  all  those  years  that  Lenin  did  not  change  his  ideas,  Trotsky  accepted 
Lenin’s  organisational  form,  and  in  return  Lenin  accepted  Trotsky’s  idea  of 
permanent  revolution.  Mandel’s  hesitation  pointed  to  the  strength  of  Rosa 
Luxemburg’s argument against Lenin’s organisational model in What Is To Be 
Done? In other words, the issue is not that Luxemburg’s theory had no faults in 
the early 20
th century, but rather the issue is that Lenin’s model and theory had 
more flaws.   
 
Socialism or barbarism  was not a mere passing thought for  Luxemburg. Rosa 
Luxemburg used it many times in different works and it even found its place into 
the proclamations and programme of the Spartacus League. Tony Cliff, according 
to Geras, “makes reference to Luxemburg’s concept of socialism or barbarism in 
order to justify the assertion that Luxemburg’s ‘non fatalistic’ perspective did not 
presuppose the inevitability of socialism. However, Cliff shows no awareness that 
certain aspects of her work might render the demonstration, rather than assertion, 
of  this  point  problematic.”
31  Frölich’s  book  “acquits  Luxemburg  of  fatalism, 
objectivism, and spontanism; but at the same time he refers to her conviction of 
the inevitability and historical necessity of socialism, this being the only possible 
issue of certain capitalist collapse.”
32  
 
Michael Löwy correctly identified the concept of socialism or barbarism as Rosa 
Luxemburg’s  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of  the  working  class’  political 
organisation, class conscious action, and socialism as dependent on the existence 
of a working class party. According to Geras, Löwy was wrong to suggest that 
Luxemburg held the same optimistic and passive fatalism central to Karl Kautsky 
up until the introduction of the concept of socialism or barbarism at the outbreak 
of the First World War. In other words, according to Löwy, Luxemburg’s vision 
prior to 1914 -15 was to some extent mixed with spontaneity and economism. 
However, the concept of socialism or barbarism was her decisive break from her 97 
 
mistaken past. This conclusion denied years of bitter ideological dispute between 
Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Karl  Kautsky.  Luxemburg  wrote  Reform  or  Revolution 
against  Kautsky’s  centrism  and  Bernstein’s  revisionism  and  reformism.  Years 
before  Lenin  joined  the  dispute.  Rosa  Luxemburg  was  the  only  revolutionary 
Marxist defending socialism and revolution against centrism and opportunism of 
Kautsky and the revisionism and reformism of other right wing leaders of German 
Social Democratic Party - SPD.   
 
 In his book, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, Norman Geras rejected Löwy’s 
opinion and provided several reasons for this. Firstly, before the First World War 
there was no shortage of concepts which played the same role as the slogan - 
socialism or barbarism. For instance, as early as 1899, Rosa Luxemburg declared 
that  without the  conscious political struggle  of  the  working  class  the  socialist 
transformation would never come about. Secondly, in spite of all her previous 
works, concepts, and slogans, Luxemburg used the new and more effective slogan 
of socialism or barbarism. In other words, the fact that she did not criticise her 
previous slogans and used the new slogan meant, as far as she was concerned, 
there was no difference between her previous works and her work after the slogan 
of  socialism  or  barbarism.  Norman  Geras  explained  that  this  slogan  was  the 
natural  continuation  of  Luxemburg’s  thought  under  new  conditions  where 
imperialistic war, the dominance of finance capital, and permanent militarism, if 
allowed to take their course to their ultimate consequences, would lead to the 
destruction  of  all  culture,  depopulation,  desolation,  degeneration,  a  period  of 
catastrophe, and barbarism.
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Thus, as far as Luxemburg was concerned, capitalism had two opposite potentials. 
One  was  socialism,  which  depended  on  the  strength  and  preparation  of  the 
working class, as the grave diggers of capitalism, to form its political organisation 
and become a class for itself, in Marxian terms. The other was finance capital, 
permanent  militarism,  a  struggle  for  more  profits  and  bigger  markets,  and 
therefore,  barbarism.  Luxemburg  maintained  throughout  her  political  life  that 98 
 
relation between these two aspects was dialectical. The strength and weakness of 
one pole was the weakness and strength of the other. Needless to say, between the 
two extremes of socialism or barbarism there were many states, which can be 
categorised in the last analogy as one form of barbarism or socialism. To put it 
differently, socialism is not and has never been the automatic future of capitalism. 
It is only one alternative among many and the most difficult to come about. Left 
alone on its own, capitalism will lead to barbarism and catastrophe because they 
are inherent within it.  
 
Unlike  what  many  Marxists  have  previously  thought,  Luxemburg’s  method  is 
more Marxist than Lenin’s method in What Is To Be Done? Instead of conveying 
a ready made “revolutionary ideology” from outside the class to the class and 
ignoring  the  policies  of  the  “unconscious  class”  by  forcing  it  to  accept  the 
programme of social democracy or the Bolshevik party, as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter by Radin and Bogdanov in Russia, Rosa Luxemburg believed:  
 
The party must immerse its own truth in the spontaneous mass 
movement and raise it from the depths of economic necessity, 
where  it  was  conceived,  on  to  the  heights  of  free,  conscious 
action. In so doing it will transform itself in the moment of the 
outbreak of revolution from a party that makes demands to one 
that imposes an effective reality. This change from demand to 
realization becomes the lever of the truly class-oriented and truly 
revolutionary organisation of the proletariat.
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Rosa  Luxemburg  never  suggested  abandoning  the  party  organisation  for  the 
spontaneous  movement  of  the  proletariat.  On  the  contrary,  her  theory  of  the 
revolutionary activity of the party and revolution was more faithful to Marx than 
any other Marxist. “She maintained that social tactics could become hidebound 
and mechanical unless controlled by the total membership of the party.” 
35 
 
Rosa  Luxemburg’s  methodology  of  revolution  can  be  summarised as  a  strong 
objection  against  a  party  that  rests  on  decrees  and  orders.  She  was  the  first 
Marxist revolutionary after Marx who emphasised the necessity for the political 99 
 
contribution of every member of the working class in the party. She had a strong 
faith in the ability of the masses to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge of 
organisation and revolution. These ideas made her a true founder of the ideology 
of the mass movement and mass organisation. “Although she became a martyr for 
her  contributions  to  radical  thought,  more  than  40  years  before  the  sixties 
movement  of  the  New  Left,  Luxemburg,  is  –  as  Robert  Bland  suggests  -  the 
ideological founder of that movement.”
36 Unlike what has been understood about 
her, Luxemburg was never an economist or a spontaneist. “The task of social 
democracy and its leaders is not to let themselves be dragged along in the wake of 
events, but to deliberately to forge ahead of them; to foresee events, to shorten 
development by conscious action, and to accelerate progress.”
37 These are Marx’s 
revolutionary  words  in  The  Manifesto  of  the  Communist  party  regarding  the 
relationship  between  communists  and  proletarians  and  his  description  of  the 
revolution as the pain of accouchement. Rosa Luxemburg’s major conviction, if 
there was one, was that she continued Marx’s trend and did not change Marxism 
based on the conditions of the time and place. “She questioned political dogma. 
She  agreed  that  the  advanced  guard  of  the  class  struggle  must  be  centrally 
organised with a disciplined majority carrying out policies. At the same time she 
regarded the continued existence of an all-powerful central committee as a danger 
to the development of the struggle itself.”
38 Geras maintained that for Luxemburg 
the dictatorship of the proletariat was a more direct and more extensive form of 
democracy than anything that had existed before. For Luxemburg “this involved a 
system  based  on  the  plurality  of  tendencies  and  parties,  and  comprehensive 
democratic procedure and freedoms. Such freedoms need to include: elections, 
freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  of  opinion  for  the  one  who  think  differently, 
freedom of assembly, etc.”
 39  
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Antonio Gramsci 
 
Among Western Marxists, Antonio Gramsci’s political thought was the closest to 
Lenin, particularly when it came to the question of the workers’ party. Like Lenin, 
he argued for an independent communist party. Like Lenin, Gramsci believed that 
the party, and only the party, was responsible for the formation of the proletariat’s 
ideology. For Gramsci, the ideology of the working class could not exist without 
intellectuals. According to Gramsci, three elements are needed for a party to exist: 
     
1-  A  mass  element,  composed  of  ordinary,  average  men,  whose 
participation takes the form of discipline and loyalty, rather than any 
creative spirit or organisational ability. Without this the party would 
not exist, it is true, but it is also true that neither could it exist with 
these  alone.  They  are  a  force  in  so  far  as  there  is  somebody  to 
centralise, organise and discipline them. 
2- The principal cohesive element, which centralises nationally and 
renders  effective and powerful  a  complex  of forces  which  left  to 
themselves  would  count  for  little  or  nothing.  This  element  is 
endowed with great cohesive, centralising and disciplinary power; 
also with the power of innovation…. It is also true that neither could 
this element form the party alone; however, it could do so more than 
the  first  element  considered.  One  speaks  of  generals  without  an 
army, but in reality it is easier to form an army than to form generals. 
3- An intermediate element, which articulates the first element with 
the second and maintains contact between them, not only physically 
but also morally and intellectually. In reality, for every party there 
exist  “fixed  proportions”  between  these  three  elements,  and  the 
greatest effectiveness is achieved when these “fixed proportions” are 
realised.
40 
  
In  spite  of  the  use  of  militaristic  language,  the  similarity  of  this  party  model 
(which is based on a powerful central committee and party cadres, intermediate 
party  members,  and  the  mass  of party)  to  Lenin’s  model is obvious. Gramsci 
argued, just like Lenin, without experienced party leaders and cadres there would 
be no party. The difference between his understanding of the party and Lenin’s 
model in What Is To Be Done? was that Lenin preferred a smaller party consisting 
of experienced cadres, whereas Gramsci did not believe that cadres could form a 
party  on  their  own.  Moreover,  unlike  Lenin,  Gramsci  believed  that  the  most 101 
 
important layer of the party was the middle i.e. those members of the party who 
made the party’s day to day relations with the masses possible.  
 
Central to Gramsci’s political thought was the concept of hegemony, the war of 
position, and what he termed “organic intellectuals.” More than anything else, 
Gramsci is famous amongst Marxists for his concept of hegemony. Hegemony 
was at the very centre of his ideas on the political party of the proletariat, the class 
struggle, and political power. In the Prison Notebook, Gramsci explained: 
 
A  social  group  can,  indeed  must,  already  exercise  “leadership” 
before  winning  governmental  power    (this  is  indeed  one  of  the 
principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently 
becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it 
firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well.
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Here Gramsci advocated a type of rule (both in the party as well as in the state) 
that was based on leadership and real authority, which was based upon persuasion 
rather than order, coercion, and decrees. The similarity between his understanding 
of the proletarian revolution and Lenin’s ideas is even clearer in the following 
passage from the Prison Notebook. 
 
Critical  self-consciousness  means,  historically  and  politically,  the 
creation  of  an  elite  of  intellectuals.  A  human  mass  does  not 
“distinguish” itself, does not become independent in its own right 
without,  in  the  widest  sense,  organising  itself:  and  there  is  no 
organisation  without  intellectuals,  that  is  without  organisers  and 
leaders.
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It should be noted that for Gramsci revolutionary intellectuals should originate 
from within the working class rather than be imposed from outside or above the 
class. Gramsci insisted that intellectuals were not only writers, thinkers and/or 
artists, but they were also organisers and political leaders, who functioned in civil 
society and the state as well as in the productive apparatus. According to Gramsci, 
during  Feudalism,  as  well  as  during  capitalism, the  ruling classes  formed  and 
founded  their  organic  intellectuals  in  certain  figures  and  social  groups.  As  a 102 
 
historical class, the proletariat also needed to produce its own organic intellectuals 
in order to build a counter-hegemony opposing the ruling class. That is to say, 
although labour, surplus value, and the ownership of the means of production 
were at the core of the class struggle, socialists needed to win the ideological 
struggle  by  enlightening  and  raising  the  majority  of  the  population’s 
consciousness  to  enable  them  to  challenge  the  ruling  class’  right  to  rule.  An 
inseparable element of this counter-hegemonic working class strategy was known 
as  non-sectarian  alliances.  The  proletariat’s  success  in  leading  society  and 
becoming the ruling class was directly related to its ability to create a system of 
class alliances; thus enabling the working class to mobilise the majority of the 
working men and women against capitalism.  
 
There  are  obvious  similarities  between  Gramsci’s,  Rosa  Luxemburg’s,  and 
Trotsky’s ideas, in particular, when Gramsci emphasised the need for mobilising 
the majority of the working class and raising the proletariat’s self-consciousness 
as a pre-condition for a successful socialist revolution. Gramsci, like Luxemburg, 
saw workers’ own activities as the key to socialist transformation. Gramsci spent 
years actively participating in the working class struggle in the North of Italy in 
the Turin factory council movement. He published numerous articles in L’Ordine 
Nuovo, which underlined this similarity. 
 
For  ourselves  and  our  followers,  L’Ordine  Nuovo  became  the 
“Journal  of  the  factory  councils.”  The  workers  loved  L’Ordine 
Nuovo (this we can state with inner satisfaction) and why did they 
love it? Because in its articles they rediscovered a part, the best part, 
of themselves. Because they felt its articles were pervaded by the 
same spirit of inner searching that they experienced: “How can we 
become free? How can we become ourselves? Because its articles 
were  not  cold,  intellectual  structures,  but  sprang  from  our 
discussions  with  the  best  workers;  they  elaborated  the  actual 
sentiments, goals and passions of the Turin working class, that we 
ourselves had provoked and tested.
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Gramsci  collected  his  many  years  of  first  hand  experience  of  organising  and 
leading the Turin workers’ council movement in his later writings such as Prison 103 
 
Notebooks.  Based  on  his  experience,  Gramsci  maintained  that  the  task  of  a 
revolutionary party was to bring to the fore the class consciousness implicit in 
workers’ struggle, to try to systematise it, and to give it coherence. However, 
according to Gramsci, “This is only possible in the actual process of the class 
struggle.”
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The war of position did not solve the question of state power, and for that reason 
building a political party was needed. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
socialist transformation, as far as he could see, was not an event but rather a 
process.  When  the  proletariats’  organisation  was  able  to  change  the  present 
position of society through a strategy of class alliances and the working masses 
had learned to trust their own judgement, policy, and decision, then that was when 
the war of position had been won. In “The General Confederation of Labour,” 
written  for  L’ordine  Nuovo  in  1921,  Gramsci  described  the  way  in  which 
communists should have dealt with the General Confederation of Labour. 
 
To win a majority at a congress, the communists would have to be 
able to carry out a radical revision of the rules; but to change the 
rules, it is necessary already to have the majority…. The communist 
must  consider  the  confederation  in  the  same  light  as  the 
parliamentary state, i.e. as an organism whose conquest cannot take 
place  by  constitutional  means…disturbed  by  their  condition  of 
absolute  inferiority,  and  lacking  any  constitutional  education,  the 
masses abdicated completely all sovereignty and all power through 
the struggle for the councils, it will be possible to win the majority of 
the confederation in a stable and permanent fashion.
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Gramsci went on to say in the same article that thereafter it would also be possible 
to win the leading positions if not in the pre-revolutionary period, then certainly in 
the post-revolutionary period. Thus, with concepts such as the war of position, 
Gramsci emphasised the fact that revolutionary communists cannot and should 
not play the game set by the upper class. An important element of the proletarian 
revolution  was  the  change within the  proletarians  themselves  from  an  inferior 
class  to  a  self-organised  and  self-conscious  class  who  trusted  itself  and  had 
confidence  in  itself.  Needless  to  say,  such  a  change  in  attitude  and  mentality 104 
 
within the working class depended, to a great extent, on the formation of organic 
intellectuals produced by the working class during the class struggle. That is to 
say, when the proletariat had produced enough intellectuals, i.e. organisers and 
natural  leaders  within  itself  and  these  intellectuals  managed  to  form  a  strong 
working  class  party;  then  this  class  would  be  ready  to  engage  in  the  war  of 
position and launch its counter-hegemony strategy. 
 
A  class  and  its  representatives  exercise  power  over  subordinate 
groups  by  means  of  a  combination  of  coercion  and  persuasion. 
Hegemony is a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of 
consent by means of political and ideological leadership and control. 
Thus Gramsci, according to Roger Simon, develops the need for a 
hegemonic  strategy  and  its  exercise  as  a  condition  for  the 
achievement of state power. Hegemony is a relation between classes 
and other social forces. A hegemonic class or part of a class is one 
which gains the consent of others through creating and maintaining a 
system of alliances through political and ideological struggle.
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One of  the  two  main  strands  lead to  the  Gramscian  idea of  hegemony  was  a 
debate within the Third International concerning the strategy of the Bolshevik 
Revolution  and  the  creation  of  a  soviet  socialist  state.  “For  Gramsci,  the 
hegemony of a dominant class bridged the conventional categories of state and 
civil  society.”
47  In  his  study  of  the  European  states,  Gramsci  explained  how 
landed aristocrats in England, Junkers in Prussia, and the mantle of Napoleon I in 
France, along with coercion made concessions to subordinate classes in return for 
bourgeois  leadership  and  its  hegemony  in  civil  society.  Gramsci  believed 
however,  the  circumstances  in  Western  Europe  were  different  from  those  in 
Russia. As he put it, 
 
  In Russia, the state was everything, civil society was primordialand         
            gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state    
            and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of  
            civil society was at once revealed 
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The study of the concept of hegemony in all levels from the party to the state to 
international relations, world institutions, and world order is not the aim of this 105 
 
work.  However,  as  far  as  Gramsci  is  concerned,  the  law  of  hegemony  in  the 
national level applies to all other levels too. The idea of hegemony, the war of 
position  and  the  theory  of  the  bloc  of  classes  are  intertwined.  Only  a  war  of 
position can, in the long run, bring about structural changes and that involves 
building up the socio-political base through the creation of new historic blocs. 
 
Thus, Gramsci like all other theorists mentioned in this chapter, was in favour of a 
centralised working class party that was well rooted in civil society: a party that 
was  capable of  implementing  working  class hegemony  within  society  and the 
working class’ historical allies. This leads the discussion to a general conclusion 
about the theories of the four above mentioned Marxists. 
 
It can be said that all four of the pre-Second World War political theorists named 
in this study believed in the proletarian mass party, except Lenin prior to the 1905 
Revolution. Moreover, all advocated a revolutionary strategy for socialism and all 
were  in  favour  of  the  centralisation  of  the  proletarian  organisation.  However, 
whereas Lenin and Gramsci emphasised the independence of the party from the 
rest of the working class, Luxemburg and the young Trotsky had a deeper faith in 
the  ability  of  the  proletariat  to  obtain  socialist  consciousness  and  saw  every 
member  of  the  class  as  potential  members  of  the  party.  Although  Gramsci 
maintained the need for the proletarian party’s independence, due to Italy’s socio-
economic conditions with its industrialised North and peasant South, he suggested 
a  strategy  of  class  alliance  between  the  Northern  proletariat  and  the  poorer 
peasants of the South. That strategy was his reaction to Italy’s socio-economic 
and political conditions, which were threatened by Fascism.  
 
Today  the  world  is  facing  a  very  different  socio-economic  system.  Important 
changes  in  the  structure  of  capitalism  in  advanced  capitalist  countries  created 
diversity and changes in the structure of the proletariat in the West, as well as the 
rest of the world. This new situation needs even greater courage and radicalism 
than what was seen by the past proletarian revolutionary leaders in order to face 106 
 
the challenges ahead, while at the same time maintaining and continuing Marx’s 
method. It is important to remember that Karl Marx did not hesitate to create the 
First International with Anarchists and  Lassalleans.  Lenin was always  keen to 
make alliances with the Mensheviks. The same applied to Trotsky’s group from 
1904 to 1916. Luxemburg stayed in the German Social Democratic Party next to 
Kautsky  and  Bernstein  and  criticised  their  policies  for  many  years.  Gramsci 
suggested an alliance of classes and put forward his theory for it. Moreover, he 
stayed next to Togliatti and others in a party that were going in the direction of 
Stalinism until his death. Marxists today tend to forget that Marxism is about 
uniting the bottom 80% of society. Marx used the word proletariat because in his 
view the working class constituted 80% of society in 19
th century Britain. That 
80%, in his view, included workers’ wives or women, their children or the new 
generation of workers, the unemployed or reserve army of labour, and those who 
could be led by the proletariat e.g. the poor peasants and the poorer sections of the 
petit bourgeoisie. Lenin was ready to sit next to the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR) 
knowing that they were not even a proletarian party. He did not intend to sit with 
them  in  the  constitutional  assembly  as  an  enemy,  but  as  a  friend.  If  he  had 
considered them as enemies of the working class, he would not have used their 
policies on land reform in Russia. One of the main criteria for the distinction 
between Marxist and non-Marxist, if there is one, must be the dedication, effort, 
and relevant policies for the unity of the bottom 80% of the population in all 
countries. The absence of those qualities is anything but Marxist.  
 
 
The second half of the 20
th century witnessed great changes in the structure of the 
capitalist  system  in  which  masses  of  women  and  children  entered  the  labour 
market. Rapid urbanisation took place in many third world countries. But those 
who entered shanty towns around big urban centres never found the jobs they 
were chasing. The industrial sector of the economy declined in advanced Western 
European  countries.  Instead,  the  service  sector  of  the  economy  surpassed  the 
industrial  sector  to  the  point  where  today  services  account  for  75%  of  the 107 
 
economy in countries such as the UK. Another important aspect of the change in 
the nature of capitalism was the rise of finance capital. The rise of the parasitic 
activity of this section of capital, and its destructive impact on the structure and 
struggle of the working class created a totally different situation in terms of the 
working class struggle, its tactics, and strategies.  
 
Other  aspects  of  change  in  the  capitalist  system  include  the  privatisation  of 
already nationalised economies; the closure of non-profitable industries as well as 
militant sectors under Thatcher and Reagan; and militarism and militarisation of 
the  world  economy.  Obviously  finance  capital  and  its  destructive  activities, 
militarism  and  its  effect  on  the  national  and  international  economy,  and 
capitalism’s structural changes after the Second World War have all had a major 
impact  on  the  class  struggle.  Today,  unlike  the  early  20
th  century,  financial 
institutions have such powerful levers in their hands that they are able to rule in 
most poor countries by economic means. Foreign debt is suffocating many poorer 
economies. The impact of workers’ strikes in different societies has a lesser effect 
on socio-economic systems. All these factors and their impact on the national and 
international  strategies  of  the  proletariat  account  for  the  necessity  of  a  wider 
Marxist  approach.  21
st  century  Marxists  need  a  modern  approach  that  is  not 
limited  to  the  boundaries  of  traditional  communist  parties  and  contemporary 
working  class  trade  unions.  The  bottom  85%of  the  population  today  need  a 
radical socialist approach that understands the problems of the 21
st century.  
 
The  second  half  of  the  20
th  century  also  witnessed  another  important  change. 
Stalinists and social democratic parties, respectively, contributed to the weakened 
position of the working class and strengthened the position of the bourgeoisie. 
The anatomy of the betrayal of the two camps is not the aim of this chapter. 
However, it is important to mention both these camps, in spite of the guidance of 
revolutionary thinkers such as Gramsci, participated in or protected the bourgeois 
state. Stalinists and social democratic parties had one thing in common:  capturing 
state power was their first priority and they would do almost anything for that 108 
 
aim. Neither the Stalinists nor social democratic parties acted in accordance with 
the requirements of a counter-hegemony strategy before or after capturing state 
power, nor did they fulfil the requirements for a revolutionary transformation of 
society.  As  a  result  they  ended  up  either  using  anti-democratic  repressive 
measures against so-called counter-revolutionaries (as in the case of Stalinists) or 
they gradually became the defenders of the present capitalist system (as in the 
case of social democracy). 
 
In 1919, the SPD set an example of the shameless betrayal of the working class by 
positioning  itself against  the  revolutionary  masses  and  saving  the  monarchical 
regime in Germany. In Spain, in the 1920s, the Socialist party rejected joining the 
Third International.  
 
While  Rivera’s  gunmen  were  hunting  down  the  National 
Confederation of Labour (CNT), the pro-Anarchist working class 
organisation, organisers, The General Workers’ Union (UGT)’s 
general secretary, Largo Caballero, joined the government as the 
Minister of Labour to enforce compulsory arbitration procedures, 
which had been agreed with the dictatorship. In exchange, his 
union was legalised and the Socialist Party was tolerated.
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The  betrayal  of  social  democracy  has  continued  to  the  present  day.  Social 
democracy today is deeply involved in imperialist wars, anti-workers and anti-
union legislation procedures, and most of the other dirty business of the present 
capitalist system.  
 
Stalinist  parties  also  betrayed  the  revolutionary  masses  by  joining  dictatorial 
regimes, supporting the worst methods of getting state power such as military 
coups  and  oppressing  working  class  revolutions  in  many  countries.  In 
Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s, Stalinist parties did nothing more than 
capture state power through a military coup and then invited the Russian army to 
defend their rule. The 20
th century is full of examples of Stalinist party leaders 109 
 
joining the worst dictatorial governments, condemning the independent activities 
of workers and the revolutionary masses.  
 
Most  Marxist  activists  reject  having  anything  to  do  with  Stalinists  and  social 
democrats. However, tendencies among them suggest that the right approach for 
Marxist  parties  is  to  engage  in  dialog,  and  where  necessary,  alliances  with 
Stalinists  and  the  radical  sections  of  the  social  democrats.  The  policy  of 
isolationism  leaves  the  proletariat  without  any  protection  from  Stalinists  and 
social democrats. Sectarianism and isolationism are poison for the progress of the 
working class struggle. The dozens of Stalinist, Maoist, and Castroist parties do 
not  intend  to  dissolve  themselves;  therefore  adding  a  so-called  independent 
working  class  party  would  not  help  the  working  class,  but  rather  adds  to  its 
confusion, frustration, fragmentation, and despair. 
 
Other movements 
 
Since the 1960s the increasingly strengthened women’s, students’, and peasants’ 
movements challenged the authority of Stalinist, social democratic and all other 
traditional  parties  in  Europe,  Latin  America,  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East.  The 
appearance  and  strengthening  of  these  movements,  as  well  as  peace  and 
environmentalist movements independent of all traditional parties, was the end of 
an era and the beginning of a new one. That is to say, the reasons for utilising a 
multi-tendency  mass  organisation  of workers  and  semi-workers  are above  and 
beyond the changes in the structure of capitalism, the diversity of the working 
class, the weaknesses of previous political working class organisations, or their 
unsuccessful strategies and dogmatic usage of the organisational principles of the 
Leninist party. More importantly because of their contradictions and anachronism 
traditional parties have lost their grasp of movements that compose a significant 
part of the population.  
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According to Gramsci, it was the ideological struggle that had to be won if the 
people’s  consciousness  was  to  be  enlightened  in  order  for  them  to  seriously 
question their political and economic rulers’ right to rule. Parties that acted in the 
name of the proletariat, during most of the 20
th century, lost this ideological battle 
on the questions of the women’s movement and environmentalism. 
 
Marxists have only started to focus on these important questions in the last 20 
years. The common approach of so-called communist organisations, before the 
1980s, was one of hostility and rivalry against feminism and environmentalism. 
However, in the last 25 years, Stalinism, which was a mechanical and dogmatic 
interpretation of Marxist ideology that solely emphasised economic development 
in  their  competition  with  Western  capitalism  has  been  defeated in  Russia  and 
Eastern  Europe.    This  has  made  communists  rethink  their  approach  to 
environmentalist  movements.  Marxism  is  on  the  offensive,  leaving  capitalism 
with no defence against ecological criticisms.  
   
This  realisation  led  Marxists  to  develop  eco-socialist  politics.  Various 
combinations  of  Red-Green  strategies  are  being  put  forward.  The  Red-Green 
strategy is the result of both Marxists and environmentalists understanding the 
need for united struggle against exploitation and capital’s destruction of nature at 
the  same  time. This is a  positive move.  Unlike  the  predictions  of  people  like 
Francis Fukuyama, today Marxism is very much alive and relevant to the daily 
protests  of  various  social  movements.  Marxist  ecologists  believe  that  the 
ecological  crisis  is  rooted  in  the  capitalist  accumulation  process  and  the  only 
solution to the crisis is the abolition of the capitalist system. Though there was far 
too little of this Red-Green synthesis throughout most of the 20
th century, today at 
the beginning of the 21
st century, it is becoming stronger. 
 
Care for the future of mankind is the overruling duty of collective 
human action in the age of a technical civilization that has become 
“almighty” in its destructive potential. We live under the threat of a 
universal catastrophe if we let things take their present course…. The 111 
 
danger  derives  from  the  excessive  dimensions  of  the  scientific-
technological-  industrial  civilization,  not  so  much  from  any 
shortcomings  of  its  performance  as  from  the  magnitude  of  its 
economic and biological success.
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This is a powerful argument about the crisis inherent in the nature of the present 
capitalist system. On the one hand, the expanded reproduction of capital, or what 
experts in the field “call grow or die” (GOD), is vital for the continued viability of 
a  capitalist  economy,  or  as  Barry  O’Connor  and  Schwartzman  put  it,  its 
sustainability. On the other hand, “Many eco-Marxists who supported the GOD 
position argue that capitalism and nature are inherently incompatible since capital 
must grow without limits and the biosphere has limits, i.e., GOD = GAD (grow 
and  die).”
51  Basically,  the  eco-Marxists’  argument  is  a  valuable  effort  to 
compensate for the years that Marxists have neglected environmental issues. The 
truth of the matter is that the Marxists’ contribution to the environment is, if not 
better, then it certainly is not worse than any other school of thought. An incorrect 
approach  would  be  to  try  and  put  together  arguments  that  in  the  absence  of 
Marxists other environmentalists have used in the past. Along with these efforts, 
the  right  approach  is  to  unite  the  two  movements  provided  that  the  common 
principles of the two camps allow such a unity. 
 
This principle also applies to the relationship between Marxists and feminists, as 
long as the movement of both camps stems from the same social base and follows 
similar aims i.e. equality in all aspects of life. Unfortunately, many in the Marxist 
school do not support this basic principle. 
 
In  order  to  bring  about  the  socialist  revolution, it  is  necessary  to 
unite the working class and its organisations, cutting across all lines 
of language, nationality, race, religion and sex. This implies, on the 
one hand, that the working class must take upon itself the task of 
fighting against all form of oppression and exploitation, and place 
itself at the head of all the oppressed layers of society, and on the 
other, must decisively reject all attempts to divide it - even when 
these attempts are made by sections of the oppressed themselves.
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The above quote is an example of a traditional sectarian view among Marxists. 
Alan Wood talks about the movement of the oppressed, not of petit bourgeois 
feminists. He assumes that either these oppressed women accept the leading role 
of the proletariat (i.e. its political organisation) or their attempts must be rejected. 
This type of view caused Marxists to lose their grasp of women’s movements for 
most of the 20
th century. The problem with this approach to women’s movements 
is  the  fact  that  it  starts  from  ideology  rather  than  from  the  real  movement. 
Marxists are not allowed to reject any movements of the poor for equality and 
freedom. The power of the working class movement is two-fold: first, its unity, 
and second its leadership ability. That is to say, its power comes from its ability of 
leading the movement of the poor, or in Gramscian terms, its counter-hegemony 
strategy. Instead of setting up a social block with those movements, Wood and 
people like him are quick to reject the movements of other sections of the poor in 
the name of the proletariat. 
 
In  addition  to  cultural,  educational,  ideological  diversity  and  the  existence  of 
other  social  movements  another  reason  for  the  viability  of  a  multi-tendency 
organisation  is  the  effect  of  computers  and  the  internet  on  the  working  class 
movement.    As  a  consequence  of  computerisation,  the  local  workforce  of 
economically developed societies is being increasingly subjected to competition 
with  those  in  low-wage  developing  countries.  This  leads  to  a  rise  in 
unemployment  as  a  direct  consequence  of  this  process.  But  the  impact  of 
computerisation on the work force is much more than the reduction of the number 
of industrial workers. In fact, reduction in number is not considerable and should 
not change the strategy of the working class. A more important impact is the gap 
that computerisation has created between skilled and non-skilled workers. That is 
to say, computerisation has led to increases in the wages of skilled workers and 
has increased overall wage inequality. 
 
The most common theory in this regard is the skill-bias technical 
change  hypothesis  (SBTC),  which  states  that  the  invention  and 
diffusion of new information technologies has increased the relative 113 
 
demand for skilled workers and this has resulted in an increase in the 
relative  wages  of  skilled  workers  as  compared  to  unskilled 
workers.
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The impact of computerisation has become a big threat to the unity of the working 
class movement. Traditionally Marxist groups recruited their new members from 
the more conscious members of the working class. This more conscious part of 
the class can be influenced by a higher wage. Moreover, it may lose its influence 
over the non-skilled sections of the working class because of this wage inequality. 
As  a  consequence,  their  utility  in  the  working  class  movement  can  be 
considerably undermined. 
 
As  a  result  of  all  these  processes  it  is  becoming  increasingly  difficult  for  a 
traditional  Leninist  type  communist  party  to  lead  all  sections  of  the  working 
class’, women’s, peace and environmental movements under a single banner. This 
does  not  mean  that  communists  should  not  try  to  organise  and  lead  social 
movements  by  means  of  a  centralised  party.  Instead,  in  societies  where  the 
movements of poorer sections of the population refuse to march under the unified 
red banner of the communists, those parties should provide space for compatible 
ideologies  within  it.  The  latter  should  be  prepared  to  create  a  multi-tendency 
organisation.   
 
To  summarise,  the  monolithic  and  bureaucratic  structure  of  traditional  parties 
cannot represent the interests and policies of the much more diverse proletariat in 
the early 21
st century. Moreover, such traditional party’s after the 1968 movement 
in Europe and America lost their grasp of non-working class social movements. 
Furthermore  Marx  and  Engles  made  an  effort  to  organise  the  working  class 
struggle. For that aim they went as far as organising the First International with 
anarchists and Lassallians. The four pre-Second World War Marxists discussed in 
this chapter all supported mass parties of proletariat and recognised the right of 
tendencies  and  platforms  within  such  parties.  Today,  the  proletariat  is  more 
diverse  than  ever  before.  The  women’s,  peace,  environmental  and  students’ 114 
 
movements  are  stronger  than  ever.  The  viable  policy  to  unite  the  workers’ 
movement  with  other  social  movements  is  the  one  that  recognises  the 
independence  of  each  and  tries  to  find  the  common  language  and  common 
principles  of  their  unity.  Sectarianism  and  dogmatism  are  poisons  for  the 
movement of the bottom 85% of all societies.  
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                     CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Political parties and the need for an umbrella organisation 
 
 
In the latter half of the 20
th century two different types of political parties laid 
claim  to  the  interests  of  the  working  class.  They  were  the  social  democratic 
parties  of  Western  Europe  and  the  Stalinist  (so-called  communist  parties) 
throughout the world. Both  these parties were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
justify their claims. They failed to make the working class a hegemonic class; 
they failed to replace the capitalist mode of production with socialism; and they 
failed  to  reorganise  society  on  the  principle  of  the  participatory  democracy. 
Chapter  five  will  discuss  the  idea  of  participatory  socialism  or  participatory 
democracy and its relevance to this study.  
 
This chapter will examine social democratic and Stalinist parties and the reasons 
for  their  failures.  This  chapter  looks,  in  particular,  at  their  policies,  and  their 
organisational  life.  While  the  failure  of  their  policies  rather  than  organisation 
explains the defeat of social democracy, three elements are responsible for the 
disastrous  defeat  of  Stalinist  parties.  These  elements  consist  of  organisational 
shortcomings,  wrong  policies,  and  what  one  might  call  communist 
fundamentalism. This chapter will argue that the weakness of the radical left has 
had  a  direct  link  to  social  democracy’s  metamorphosis  to  the  right,  which 
enhances the need for an umbrella organisation of the left. 
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A serious study of a viable socialist organisation for the 21
st century has to take 
into  account  political  parties  from  the  last  century  (or  at  least  the  last  four 
decades) that acted in the name of the working class. Moreover, any suggestion of 
the qualities and or characteristics of a viable socialist organisation cannot be 
complete  without  a discussion  of  those  socialist  parties  and organisations  that 
politically represented the working class in the second half of the 20
th century.  
 
Social democracy:  past and present  
 
Social democratic parties are far more responsible for the failure and victories of 
the working class in Western Europe than Stalinist parties. It is undeniably true 
that the condition of the working class in Europe is better in comparison to any 
other  part  of  the  world.  They  enjoy  better  pay,  economic  organisation,  and 
collective bargaining, whereas in other parts of the world, workers dream of these 
achievements. It would be wrong, however, to associate all the achievements of 
the working class in Europe with social democracy, for it could be argued that had 
it not been for social democracy, the revolutionary socialists could have helped 
the  working  class  reorganise  the  society  on  the  basis  of  a  socialist  principle. 
Moreover, it is said that the achievements of the working class in Europe e.g. “the 
welfare state” were the side effect of the revolutionary processes in Russia and 
Eastern Europe. This study will look at the differences between “classical” and 
“modern” social democracy as well as the way in which the policies of social 
democracy changed shape. It examines the changes in three areas: the changes of 
the political principles or domestic politics; the changes in foreign policies; and 
the changes in organisational structure. 
 
Social democracy originally claimed to be a socialist party and waved the banner 
of the working class. However, it agreed to, and in many cases was responsible 
for  policies,  which  were  incompatible  and  antagonistic  to  their  claims.  The 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD), as one of the most influential parties in 
the world, supported and voted for the war. Lenin analysed the revisionism of 123 
 
Karl  Kautsky,  this  epoch  making  policy,  and  its  destructive  impact  on  world 
revolution.  As  a  result  of  this  policy  the  socialist  movement  split  into  two 
sections:  the  right  wing  social  democrats,  which  were  no  longer  interested  in 
revolutionary methods and devoted their efforts to reforms and the revolutionary 
section led by the Russian Social Democratic Party. Needless to say, this split in 
the movement of the working class had a direct link to the defeat of socialist 
revolution in the 1920s in many European countries. 
 
After their post-war victory, the Labour government’s foreign policies are another 
example of the social democracy’s right wing policy change. 
 
The Labour government had begun its military intervention on behalf of 
the French in what was soon to be called Vietnam; at the same time it 
was  sending  troops  to  support  the  Dutch  in  Indonesia.  A  party  that 
further provided troops for the American war in Korea and supported 
German rearmament and did not officially oppose imperialist repression 
in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus was not a politically comfortable home 
for those who tried to be principled; and by the middle nineteen fifties 
Labour-Socialism was a wholly tainted practice.
1  
 
Socialists  such  as  John  Saville  expected  the  British  Labour  Party  to  oppose 
imperialist  repression  around  the  world  in  the  mid-1950s,  yet  today  (at  the 
beginning  of  the  21
st  century)  the  Labour  Party  is  at  the  heart  of  imperialist 
repression in Afghanistan and Iraq. Labour’s right wing thinking in its policies, 
from education to health care, to asylum, to foreign intervention, has turned the 
party into an instrument of the capitalist class. The Labour Party today is in the 
midst of bourgeois parties and can be categorised to the left of such parties. 
 
Another  example  of  policy  change  is  the  case  of  Spanish  social  democracy. 
Vicente Navarro examined the policies of the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialisto Obrero Espanola– PSOE). The PSOE were in power for more than 14 
years, a long enough period for a radical party in Spain to manifest its policies and 
bring about reforms by means of cultural and socio-economic change. Classical 
social democracy stipulated that reform was the key to socialism, however, the 124 
 
PSOE, the Spanish equivalent of the social democracy, not only abandoned all 
reform processes necessary for the transition, it also ignored any onslaught on the 
roots of the capitalist state. On the contrary, it attacked radical trade unions and 
radical political organisations. Under the PSOE, unemployment reached an all-
time high of 23% among men, although the percentage of women in employment 
remained relatively unchanged. In spite of such high unemployment, the public 
sector  of  the  economy,  even  by  a  Keynesian  standard,  remained  passive. 
According to Navarro, “It was this passivity of the public sector per se in the face 
of  the  serious  social  -  problem  of  unemployment  that  characterized  the 
employment policies of all four Spanish Socialist governments.”
2 The examples 
are not only confined to Spain and the UK, they can be found in every single 
European country.  
 
Until the 1930s and 1940s social democracy was directly involved in organising 
and radicalising workers. For example, the general strikes in Britain in 1926 and 
other European countries stemmed from this organisation and radicalisation of the 
working class by social democracy. However, it must not be forgotten that even in 
that period, “The social democrats had been reluctant to enter the struggle and had 
rapidly entered into negotiations, and the reforms secured by these methods did 
not constitute a step toward the abolition of capitalism.”
3 In other words, the aim 
of social democrats in organising workers as a class was not to recognise the 
workers  needs.  On  the  contrary  their  aim  was  perfidious,  in  that  they  used 
workers as voting machinery in their thirst for power. According to  Liebman, 
social democracy betrayed the aims of classic reformism in two ways: 
 
It owed its successes (organising the working class and strengthening 
it) to      methods which were much more brutal than those implied by 
its moderate philosophy and its legalism; and, valuable as they may 
have been, its successes did not open up the road to socialism. On the 
contrary, the fact that it had occupied a certain territory within the 
state  apparatus  meant  that  social  democracy  was  rapidly  integrated 
into that apparatus. As a result, it assumed that it no longer needed to 
rely upon the powerful but compromising weapon of mass action.
4 
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Until  1914,  classical  social  democracy  saw  the  assault  upon  the  state  as  a 
necessary evil, but after 1914 social democracy saw the assault on the state as an 
absolute  evil.  To  get  a  full  picture  one  needs  to  look  at  the  German  Social 
Democratic Party (SPD). As the oldest and most famous social democratic party 
in Western Europe, its origins date back to the leading revisionists of the 19
th 
century such as Bernstein. Without getting embroiled in the history, it must be 
pointed out that “the modern history of the party really begins with the creation of 
the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany. However, this was formed at Gotha in 
1875  by  the  fusion  of  the  German  General  Workers’  Association  founded  by 
Ferdinand Lassalle, with the Social Democratic Workers Party, led by August 
Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht.”
5 The Gotha and Erfurt programmes and Marx’s 
and Engels’ positions on them are well known. Going into further detail of these 
debates would take away the focus from the aim of this chapter. It is enough to 
say  that  as  a  result  of  Marx’s  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Programme  the  Erfurt 
programme  was  ratified  in  1891  and  this  programme  was  a  synthesis  of 
revolutionary  and  reformist  tendencies.  The  tension  and  conflict  between 
revolutionaries and revisionists resulted in first, the split, and then later in the 
death of the revolutionary leaders, which paved the way for further dominance of 
the reformists in the party. “Although the SPD officially remained an anti-system 
party, in practice it became ever more involved in the system. By 1913 there were 
nearly  11,000  social  democrats  on  municipal  and  district  council.”
6  The 
domination of the reformists in the party resulted in a series of changes in the 
party  organisation.  The  basic  unit  of  the  SPD  changed  from  being  the  local 
association  to  being  the  constituency  association  because  winning  elections 
became the only aim of the social democrats. The informal system turned into a 
more formalised hierarchical structure. The old voluntary system was replaced by 
paid party officials. The participation of individual members was reduced and 
party members could no longer control the SPD’s Reichstagsfraktion. As a result, 
in 1914 the SPD’s parliamentary fraction voted for the war. This was an epoch 
making  betrayal  despite  its  Marxist  doctrine.  The  SPD  supported  the  German 
bourgeois fatherland and with their chauvinist actions determined the nature of 126 
 
our epoch. The SPD’s support for war was not a tactical policy like other policies. 
In voting for war credits, the SPD leadership chose to side with the bourgeoisie 
against  the  working  class.  Social  democracy  supported,  and to  a  great  extent, 
made  the  First  World  War  possible.  Such  a  policy  opposed  the  international 
solidarity of the working class. The departure of the SPD’s articulate left to the 
United Socialist Party (USPD) and the German Communist Party (KPD) allowed 
the reformists to bureaucratise the party even more. The bureaucratisation and 
liberalisation of the SPD continued more rapidly than ever.  
 
By 1952, the SPD was well on the way to becoming an electoral party in 
that  its  orientation  was  almost  exclusively  towards  electoral  success. 
Membership had fallen steeply since 1948 and the parliamentary party 
was becoming the most influential organ of party decision. The party 
executive  retained  some  importance  but  the  control  commission  and 
party  conference  were  if  anything  weaker  than  they  had  been  in  the 
Weimar.
7 
 
Efforts to modify the party accelerated after the second electoral defeat of 1953, 
particularly after the banning of the communist party in 1956, which removed all 
competition on the left. According to Paterson, at the 1959 party conference in 
Bad  Godesberg  a  programme  was  adopted.  “This  programme  totally  ignored 
Marx and accepted the principle of private ownership in so far as it did not hinder 
the  creation  of  a  just  order.  Economic  and  social  change,  it  was  argued,  had 
outstripped  the  old  party  doctrines.  The  SPD  would  now  concentrate  on 
improving and reforming rather than abolishing the system of free competition.”
8 
At the same time, in a famous speech at the Bundestag on 30 June 1960, Herbert 
Wehner, on behalf of the SPD indicated his willingness to join with other German 
groups in defence of the Federal Republic against the communist threat by fully 
accepting NATO and its foreign policy postulates. Following this period, even the 
colour of party membership books changed from red to blue and addressing each 
other  as  “comrade”  was  replaced  by  “party  friend.”  Since  then,  the  federal 
republic flag had accompanied the red flag of the SPD at the party’s headquarters.   
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The formation of the Labour Party in Britain is another example of the change in 
the nature of social democracy. British Marxists such as Keir Hardie at the end of 
the 19
th century “attempted to argue that the Social Democrats, the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP) and the anarchists shared common objectives, and differed 
only  about methods.”
9 Hardie’s argument that social democracy was changing 
from  an  anti-systemic  political  force  to  a  defender  of  capitalism  ,  which  was 
anarchistic and  did not believe in any sort of state was simplistic and premature. 
Moreover,  Keir  Hardie’s  objective  in  the  ILP  was  a  non-bureaucratic,  non-
centralised socialist commonwealth, whereas social democracy’s objective was 
changing  toward  reformism  and  preserving  capitalism.  Therefore,  either  his 
premature belief resulted from changes in the nature of social democracy still 
unknown to him or maybe his simplistic radical view was not so radical.  
 
To  better  understand  such  changes,  this  chapter  will  first  look  at  the 
characteristics  of  classical  and  modern  social  democracy.  This  section  will 
consider social democracy’s  programmes and aims at the beginning and end of 
the 20
th century, as well as the social groupings that formed social democracy in 
the two respective periods. It will also discuss the dilemmas for both periods. The 
next section will examine policy changes i.e. the changes that took place within 
social democracy in foreign and domestic policies. This chapter will discuss the 
relationship  between  social  democrats  and  the  working  class  movement, 
international communists, and their relationship with the electorates.  
 
The  following  section  will  examine  the  structural  and  organisational  changes 
within  social  democracy.  That  is  to  say,  to  understand  the  background  of the 
policy changes in all Western social democratic parties one needs to look at the 
changes these parties went through in terms of their organisation and internal life. 
For this purpose, this chapter will examine the relationship between the party 
fractions, and in particular, the parliamentary fraction to other leadership organs 
of  the  party;  the  existence  of  tendencies  and  the  relationship  between  those 
tendencies; and finally the role and authority of the party conference, the national 128 
 
executive committees, and the position of internal democracy in Western social 
democracy.  This  study  will  also  examine  the  bureaucratisation  of  social 
democracy,  the  reduction  of  voluntary  activity,  grassroots  politics,  and  the 
uncontrollability of the leaders by the party. 
 
Finally, it is important to understand the way in which the radical left has treated 
social  democracy.  Needless  to  say,  the  impact  of  fascism  on  the  communist 
movement was different from country to country. In Germany, the communist 
movement was totally destroyed, while in countries such as Italy and France the 
movement had a better chance of survival. This difference certainly has to be 
considered  when  looking  at  the  relationship  between  communists  and  social 
democrats. Similarly, the position of the radical left, its strengths and weaknesses, 
has had a direct impact on its relationship with social democracy and therefore on 
West European social democracy. 
 
 
Definition 
 
In defining social democracy, the most important factor to take into account is the 
differences  that  exist  between  classical  and  contemporary  social  democracy. 
There are contrasting definitions of social democracy by different contemporary 
authors.  For  example,  William  E.  Paterson  and  Alastair  H.  Thomas  perceive 
social democracy to be “a belief that social and economic reform designed to 
benefit the less privileged should be pursued within a framework of democracy, 
liberty  and  the  parliamentary  process.”
10  Crosland  has  a  different  view  and 
suggests that social democracy is political liberalism, the mixed economy, the 
welfare state, Keynesian economics and a belief in equality. For others, however, 
social  democracy  simply  means  democratic  socialism  and  would  include  all 
parties of the non-communist left.
11The problem with these definitions is that they 
ignore significant historical changes that took place within social democracy. It is 
enough  to  say  that  social  democracy  existed  before  Keynes,  Keynesian 129 
 
economics,  and  the  mixed  economy.  Moreover,  defining  contemporary  social 
democracy in terms of democratic socialism is to give social democracy a degree 
of credit to that it does not deserve. Socialism is a system where the producers and 
consumers decide collectively what is to be produced, how it should be produced, 
why  and  how  much  should  be  produced,  and  how  the  products  should  be 
consumed. Social democracies today from the Labour Party in Britain and the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany, to the French and Italian socialist parties 
are at odds with socialism. In fact, all socialist ideas and all socialist practices 
have been wiped from their political agendas and even from their language. At the 
beginning of the 21
st century, it is hardly possible to separate the policies of the 
British Labour Party from those of the Conservative party. 
 
            Labour’s presentation of the ‘national interest’ is not qualitatively 
different from that of the Conservative’s. Its commitment to a world 
role within the US alliance is as great as theirs. Its identification with 
the  whole  paraphernalia  of  the  modern  capitalist  state  and  its 
dominant symbols such as monarchy and parliament is just the same 
as the pro-capitalist parties.”
12  
 
However, this form of social democracy is different from the social democracy 
that existed at the beginning of the 20
th century. Whether under pressure from 
radical Marxist organisations and the demands of the working class or simply as a 
result  of  the  genuine  will  of  their  members,  classical  social  democracy  in 
Germany was a party for socialism and freedom. There was a desire to bring 
about profound social change and even to abolish capitalism by gradual, legal, 
and peaceful means. Moreover, we must remember that leaders such as “Kautsky 
and Bebel did sometimes state that it might be necessary to resort to more radical 
means to overcome the resistance of the bourgeoisie.”
13 Even so, statements of 
this  kind  were  used  more  and  more  infrequently.  The  contradictions  in  social 
democracy  originated  from    Marx’s  and  Engels’  remark  claiming  that  it  was 
possible to get state power through votes and peaceful means in countries such as 
Britain where the working class constituted the majority of voters. Although Marx 
stated that such a possibility was an exception, social democracy based its entire 130 
 
strategy on parliamentary means. In other words, right from the beginning social 
democracy’s division between reformism and the need for a truly revolutionary 
action was  not clear.  Moreover,  this  contradiction  and  uncertainty  was  solved 
very soon in favour of reformist tendencies. Day by day reformism became more 
prominent. 
  
Until the First World War, this choice could be justified in terms of the 
growing strength of the working class. The working class appeared to be 
strong enough to use its organisations to take over the state.
14 
 
Therefore, before 1920, putting emphasis on peaceful means of action such as the 
vote was not considered a dangerous strategy. Patriotic collaboration, however, 
caused the social democrats to change. On the one hand, in spite of their working 
class origins, the social democrats wanted to extend their base by taking in the 
middle  class,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  presence  of  socialist  ministers  in 
bourgeois governments helped them to address the problem of the state in new 
terms. This was clearly against the principles of orthodox Marxism. Until 1914, 
social democracy saw the assault on the state as a necessary evil. After the First 
World  War,  as  a  responsible  member  of  the  bourgeois  government,  social 
democracy considered the assault on the state as an absolute evil. All relations 
with the Communist International were cut off. During the 1920s and 1930s no 
reformist  social  democratic  party  in  Europe  encouraged  any  offensive  action 
against the state; on the contrary they forbade such action. 
 
Another aspect of defining social democracy is membership composition in the 
past and present. The Labour Party was a synthesis of the Fabian Society, the 
Independent Labour Party and the Social Democratic Federation, as well as forty-
one  trade  unions.  In  1918,  it  adopted  a  new  constitution  with  a  specific 
commitment to the common ownership of the means of production and adopted a 
programme, “Labour and the New Social Order,” which, according to Minkin and 
Seyd was clearly socialist and distinctly anti-capitalist.
15 This was a party born out 
of the unions, with an affiliated membership, which consisted mainly of manual 131 
 
worker trade unionists and with an electoral support mainly from manual workers. 
At the beginning of the 21
st century, more than one hundred years since the birth 
of the Labour Party, some trade unions such as the miners and rail workers and 
other sections of the Labour movement have broken their link with the party. 
Chapter one accounted for the changes within the structure of the working class 
during the second half of the 20
th century, the diversity of the working class, and 
the reduction of the industrial sector and increase in the service sector, etc. In 
spite of all those changes, it is wrong to suggest that the changes in the structure 
of the working class caused reformism and the right turn in social democratic 
parties.  In reality, social democracy’s changes in policy began decades earlier 
while  the  industrial  working  class  was  still  very  powerful  in  Germany,  Great 
Britain, and many other European countries.  However, major reductions in the 
industrial sector of the economy and increases in the finance and service sectors 
created  a  new  balance  of  forces  in  the  major  European  economies.  This  new 
situation accelerated social democracy’s march to the right.      
 
The  early  working  class  composition of  social democracy  was  transformed  to 
accommodate the upper strata of the working class and a middle class status. At 
the beginning of the 21
st century, social democratic parties across Europe were 
accustomed to all sorts of professionals, the new middle class strata, and some 
factions of the business circle. In contrast, as mentioned above, in the UK trade 
unions and the various sections of the working class to whom the Labour Party 
owes its existence have broken their link with the party. 
 
Therefore, contemporary social democracy is radically different from the social 
democracy  that  was  founded  at  the  end  of  the  19
th  century  in  Europe.  While 
classical  social  democracy  was  the  political  party  of  the  working  class,  its 
political programme represented the interest of the workers and was founded by 
trade unions and working class movements. It went through a series of important 
changes and as a result its composition, programme, and its electoral base are now 
at odds with what they were before. Modern social democracy has nothing to do 132 
 
with socialism and the working class; it only uses the name of the working class 
for its political gains. 
 
 From the break-up of the Independent Labour Party in Britain and the Spartacists 
in Germany in the early 20
th century to the split of the Socialist Labour Party in 
Britain at the end of the 20
th century, there were a series of breaks of the more 
radical socialists within social democracy, which resulted in greater power being 
yielded  to  the  reformists  and  right  wing.  After  each  break  social  democracy 
moved even further to the right alongside bourgeois elements – opportunistic and 
power hungry – and liberal democrats exerted greater influence. 
 
 
The organisational structure of social democracy 
  
Today the suppressed voices of the  rank and file cannot be heard outside the 
social democratic party walls. The party leader is more than ever uncontrollable. 
The working masses and the rank and file have lost their grasp of the party leader 
who is protected by a shield. The social democracy’s organisation has not always 
been a bureaucratic, parliamentary, and a hierarchical type of organisation. Prior 
to  the  First  World  War,  the  social  democracy’s  organisation  was  open, 
democratic,  and  based  upon  the  voluntary  efforts  of  activists.  However,  its 
bureaucratisation  started  very  early.  As  early  as  1905in  the  German  Social 
Democratic Party, the precondition for party bureaucracy was created.  
 
         These reforms presupposed the replacement of the old voluntary system 
by  the  paid  party officials.  These  developments  tended  to  reduce  the 
need for active commitment and participation by the individual member 
and to replace it with permanent and formal organisation, better adapted 
to the exigencies of election.
16                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
The individual member’s direct participation and voluntary activity was made less 
of a priority. This was directly linked to parliamentary involvement and social 
democracy’s  bureaucratisation.  As  the  party  became  more  bureaucratised 133 
 
individual  members  became  less  involved  in  voluntary  activities  and  direct 
participation. Each leftist’s split from the party served as a catalyst for a further 
reduction  in  voluntary  activities  and  direct  participation.  Given  the  social 
democratic parties’ policy changes, the reduction in voluntary activities suggested 
that  the  social  democratic  party  had  never  seriously  believed  in  direct  action, 
particularly when that form of action was considered radical. 
 
The  connection  between  the  parliamentary  party  committee  and  the  party’s 
leading organs, such as the Executive Committee or the party conference, also 
changed. The following two examples from the SPD and the British Labour Party 
are worth looking at.  
         Membership had fallen steeply since 1948 and the parliamentary party 
was becoming the most influential organ of party decision. The party 
Executive retained some importance but the Control Commission and 
party  conference  were  if  anything  weaker  than  they  had  been  in 
Weimar.
17  
 
In  the  case  of  the  Labour  Party  “by  the  end  of  1968  the  Labour  conference 
appeared  an  impotent  ceremonial  assembly,  intra-party  democracy  an  empty 
procedure, and the authority of the party conference superseded by the permanent 
authority  of  the  parliamentary  leadership.”
18  These  changes  signalled  the 
beginning of the end for democracy within the party. As one Constituent Labour 
Party (CLP) delegate argued: “How can we go to the pressure groups and say, ‘if 
you join us perhaps we can say to you that your policies will be accepted and 
implemented’. We cannot. Unless the participation that had been strangled in the 
party was renewed….”
19 Minkin and Seyd’s article provided useful incite into the 
changes that took place in intra-party democracy. According to Minkin and Seyd, 
within the Labour Party “in principle there was free and open discussion but in 
practice  there  was  a  list  of  proscribed  organisations,  a  close  observance  over 
groups  which  might  form  ‘parties  within  the  party’,  a  ban  on  parliamentary 
factions, and considerable pressure upon parliamentary dissidents.”
20 As a result 
of partial centralism between the competing factions, a new role was given to the 
annual conference: “In principle the agenda was decided by the freely elected 134 
 
committee  of  conference  delegates  but  in  practice  party  officials  played  an 
important part in the links between the parliamentary leaders and the Conference 
Arrangements Committee which established an agenda….”
21 
 
Therefore,  soon  after  the  Second  World  War,  as  social  democracy  became 
increasingly bureaucratised internal democracy was limited, the party’s leading 
organs  became  nothing  more  than  discussion  clubs,  and  the  party’s  only  real 
centre  of  power  was  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  parliamentary  party 
committee.  Individual  members’  voluntary  activity  and  participation  in  the 
decision making process became almost nonexistent. All these changes could not 
have taken place had it not been for social democracy’s right wing playing such a 
prominent role. In other words, there is a direct link between social democracy’s 
right wing having a dominant role from the beginning and the process of growing 
bureaucratisation and reformism in social democratic parties. That is to say,  
 
The  SPD  had  a  left  wing  as  well  as  a  right,  but  all  along  the  right 
remained  in  invulnerable  and  virtually  unchallenged  control  of  its 
affairs…  the  left-leaning  tendencies  were  themselves  in  a  state  of 
permanent  subordination  to  those  by  whom  the  identity  of  social 
democracy was to be defined; namely the ‘labour lieutenants of capital’ 
whose commitment was absolute to both the structures of the existing 
state  and  the  political  culture  whose  norms  were  founded  by  the 
traditional establishment.”
22  
 
In short, social democracy throughout the 20
th century changed its structure in a 
way that minimised party members’ voluntary activities. The parliamentary party 
committee became the most influential organ of social democratic parties and the 
party organisation became bureaucratised. The left became weaker and the right 
reformists became stronger than ever. 
 
Domestic and foreign policies 
  
In his article “Edward Thomson, the Communist Party, and 1956”, John Saville,  
argued that right from the beginning Labour had a strong vehement to military 135 
 
intervention, occupation, arousing hostility between the workers of the West and 
the rest of the world. There is a contrasting similarity with the SPD. As soon as it 
became a government party, it shifted away from its policy of close relations with 
the international communist movement. As Liebman described,  
 
Its most obvious characteristic was the phenomenon of integration into 
the state apparatus. At the same time there was a complete break with 
the international communist movement, which emerged at precisely the 
time when social democracy was becoming integrated into the state. 
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The  disappearance  of  communist  leaders  such  as  Rosa  Luxemburg  and  Karl 
Liebknecht was only the beginning of this shift in policy. Although at times party 
leaders such as Willy Brandt had a softer policy towards the left, as far as the 
SPD’s dominant policy makers were concerned, “His loose style in dealing with 
the challenge from the left was undoubtedly an electoral handicap.”
24 Therefore, 
the conclusion that the SPD’s history is one of banning communists and isolating 
the left within the party and society as a whole, is not far from the truth.  
 
Although in different countries there were unique patterns of development and 
political evolution, the extended political history of social democracy shows that 
these patterns of evolution were in fact quite similar. For example, in the 1930s in 
France,  the  relationship  between  the  French  Communist  Party  (FCP)  and  the 
French Socialist Party (FSP) was a close and hospitable one, whereas in the 1980s 
it was hostile and averse. Liebman outlined this change: 
  
In 1936, the union of the left was the expression at the electoral level of 
a vast popular mobilisation which forced political leaders-and especially 
those of the Communist and Socialist parties- to put an end to their old 
quarrels.  Hundreds  of  parliamentary  candidates  were  backed  up  by 
millions of workers inspired by the call for unity. In 1981, the socialist-
communist left, which had rallied together between 1974 and 1977, was 
more disunited than ever. The socialists did all they could to weaken the 
communists.
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Studying  the  relationship  between  social  democracy  and  communists  in  the 
majority of countries reveals that it went from bad to worse. The relationship 136 
 
between  social  democracy  and  the  radical  left  in  the  second  half  of  the  20
th 
century was one of hostility. Social democracy today cannot be categorised as a 
leftist organisation because of their policies over the last five decades. Throughout 
the  last  century  the  world’s  social  democratic  parties  strived  to  distance 
themselves  from the radical left, and in doing so stained their hands with the 
blood  of  communists  from  around  the  globe.  Brazil,  Iran,  Kurdistan,  and 
Germany are only a few examples of such hostility.
26 
   
Despite this reality, one needs to remember that a significant part of the left still 
finds their political home in the social democratic party. From the 1920s onwards, 
the  majority  of  leftists  in  Britain  and  other  European  countries  joined  social 
democratic  parties.    For  half  a  century  this  participation  in  social  democratic 
parties was a major obstacle for the unity of the left. In other words, the left’s 
concurrence depends to a great extent on the definition of the left within social 
democracy. As long as there is not a common understanding of social democracy 
by  the  leftists  and  leftists’  groups  offer  their  skills  and  energies  to  social 
democratic parties instead of developing and improving the independent socialist 
parties  of  the  working  class,  the  unity  of  the  left  and  the  creation  of  a  mass 
political organisation of the working class remains an open question. 
 
Social democracy today does not belong to the great family of the left. More and 
more  socialist  activists  inside  and  outside  social  democratic  parties  need  to 
understand this reality. Several reasons account for the metamorphosis of classical 
social  democracy  of  the  early  20
th  century  into  the  present  social  democratic 
parties  of  Western  Europe.  Firstly,  without  any  doubt,  the  revisionism  of 
theoreticians such as Edward Bernstein is the most important reason. The SPD 
leadership’s farewell to revolutionary Marxism and their journey to reformism 
and pragmatism was characterised by slogans such as Kautsky’s “The movement 
is  everything:  the  goal  is  nothing!”    This  allowed  leaders  such  as  Ebert  and 
Scheidemann to do all they could to keep the monarchy intact and to side with the 
ruling bourgeois class against the working class. During the height of the German 137 
 
revolution  the head  of government  Prince  Max  Von  Baden  asked  Ebert:  “If  I 
should succeed in persuading the Kaiser, do I have you on my side in the battle 
against the social revolution? Ebert replied: If the Kaiser does not abdicate the 
social revolution is inevitable. I do not want it. In fact I hate it like sin.”
27 He truly 
hated revolution and was a loyal servant to the monarchy. He and his colleagues 
did everything they could to defeat the revolution and return state power to the 
ruling class. The betrayal of the SPD’s leaders was an epoch making act and for 
that  reason  it  can  be  categorised  as  the  most  important  factor  for  the 
metamorphosis of social democracy.  
 
Secondly, and equally important, is the position of the communist left in the early 
1920s in Germany and on the international level, in the form of the Comintern’s 
policies. For example, the Spartacists (who were a tiny minority of the German 
working  class)  took  an  ultra-left  attitude  towards  the  convening  of  a  national 
assembly. That policy was harmful to their cause and justified the reformism of 
the  SPD’s  leaders.  The  Comintern  under  Stalin  categorised  the  SPD  as  social 
fascist.  That  policy  was  also  harmful.  In  fact,  further  divisions  between 
communists and social democrats helped the fascists to consolidate their position.  
 
Thirdly, it has to be remembered that the SPD after the war was a completely 
different entity. During Nazi rule all communists and leftist were eliminated. That 
tiny minority who had fled the country were helped by the Labour Party and the 
Labour  government  to  re-establish  the  SPD  in  Germany.  But  this  SPD  was 
radically different from the pre-war SPD.  
 
         As the war drew towards its close and the likely features of post-war 
European politics started to take shape, the possibility of using a revived 
SPD to act as a counterweight to the expansion of communist influence 
in  Germany  and  elsewhere,  began  to  preoccupy  the  British  Foreign 
Office.”
28  
 
In addition, one should not forget the influence of US policies during the Cold 
War.  In  Germany, Austria,  Spain,  and  Italy  social  democracy  was  completely 138 
 
destroyed  during  WW2.  There  was  a  connection  between  the  restructuring  of 
social democratic parties from above by the US and British governments in these 
European countries (in the form of the Marshall Plan and US aid for the economic 
reconstruction of Europe) and the careful design of the CIA to prevent further 
expansion of the USSR.  
 
The threat of a PCI-PSI coalition coming to power in Italy by electoral 
means  was  regarded  as  so  alarming  that the  US  had  trained  a  secret 
underground armed right-wing force to commence operations in such 
eventuality.  The  danger  was  abated  by  the  use  of  CIA  funding  to 
encourage the defection in 1947 of a part of the PSI to form a safely 
anti-communist social democratic party.
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In spite of all these historical realities, a great majority of the working class in 
Germany,  for  example,  circled  around  their  traditional  party.  “Despite  the 
treacherous role of the SPD leaders, who opposed the revolution, the masses saw 
their traditional organisation as the embodiment of the party that had awakened 
them to political life.”
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Thus the history of European social democracy in the second half of the 20
th 
century is on one hand the history of further bureaucratisation, more hostility for 
the communist left and working class activists. On the other hand, this is a history 
of increasing compatibility with capitalism. This is a history of social democrat 
leaders as grateful servants of the capitalist state. This is the history of a party that 
is not anti-system any more but an important part of the capitalist system; a party 
that was born by the working class but is not worthy of its name.    
 
In spite of this reality, an important part of the left stayed within social democratic 
parties in Western Europe. Until this part of the left leaves social democracy and 
participates in building an independent revolutionary socialist organisation with 
the rest of the radical left the question of left unity remains open. Until social 
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the working class card and as a result the working class and socialist left will 
continue to be divided.   
 
The Stalinism and communist parties 
 
In order to understand the organisation of the working class it is just as important 
to understand and analyse Stalinist parties, as it is to understand and dissect social 
democratic parties. The main difference between the two types of parties is social 
democracy has a more open organisation and a more liberal approach in policy 
making, whereas Stalinist communist parties are secretive, more hierarchical, and 
more  radical  in  their  policies.  In  order  to  fully  comprehend  the  political  and 
organisational development of Stalinist communist parties, one must comprehend 
that after the Second World War Stalinism was a unifying feature in all of the 
major  communist  parties  in  both  the  West  and  East.  This  is  despite  Stalinist 
parties shifting towards social democracy, as will be seen in the case of Iran; 
Western  communist  parties  developing  a  more  open  model  of  organisation  in 
comparison to East European communist parties; and the growing gap between 
the increasingly Western pluralistic policy and the policies of the USSR. For this 
reason, this section will examine the main features of Stalinism as the ideology of 
all pro-USSR communist parties.  
 
Stalinism and Stalinist regimes were a tendency that originated from within the 
socialist  camp.  This  tendency  represented  bureaucratic  interests  and  the 
radicalism  of  the  vanguard  of  the  working  class,  irrespective  of  whether  they 
originated from the working class or middle class. The vanguard of the working 
class  in  this  sense  means  something  different  from  what  Gramsci  called  the 
organic intellectuals of the working class. The vanguard of a Stalinist communist 
party did not necessarily originate from the working class. They might have been 
members of other social groups and joined the party for various reasons. Some 
joined  for  bureaucratic  ambitions,  some  by  pure  chance  and  following  their 
common  sense,  and  some  for  the  right  reasons  and  their  genuine  desire  for 140 
 
progress towards socialism. An individual activist was not necessarily trapped in 
only one tendency. S/he may have had more than one reason to join a party.       
 
The absence of a strong working class movement and its tradition of fighting for 
democracy and socialism  gave rise to the  emergence of  a Stalinist party. The 
chance  for  the  emergence  of  a  Stalinist  organisation  significantly  increased 
wherever  the  working  class  were  defeated  in  its  mass  open  struggle.  Good 
examples for this situation were 1871 in France and the constitutional assembly in 
Russia  after  the  October  Revolution.  Furthermore,  countries  with  weak 
democratic traditions (such as China, Vietnam and Cuba) where the working class 
did not have enough weight, the possibility for the formation of secretive Stalinist 
organisations increased. The point is that the existence of Stalinist parties did not 
depend on the existence of the working class. Stalin tried to build socialism in one 
country without considering any major preconditions for such an ambition. There 
are less adverse consequences in building a working class political party when the 
working class hardly exists. To put it differently, the building of a communist 
party under the orders of the USSR, regardless of the degree of working class 
expansion gave rise to all sorts of problems within the party. Stalinist parties were 
not  working  class  parties  just  as  Stalin’s  socialism  in  one  country  was  not 
socialism.  
 
The major characteristics of Stalinist organisations can briefly be summed up as 
follows:  Firstly,  they  lacked  internal  democracy.  Usually  Stalinist  party 
emphasised security  issues  to  justify  its  desire  for  bureaucratisation  and  over-
centralism. This tendency was directly anti-communist and bureaucratic. In this 
view any degree of internal democracy would have allowed alternative factions to 
present their case and develop their policies within the party. That in turn would 
have led, according to Stalinists, to undermining the party’s unity. This is why, 
according  to  the  history  of  Stalinist  parties,  the  gap  between  the  parties’ 
congresses was sometimes more than a decade.  
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Secondly,  the  structural  dimension  of  a  bureaucratised  Stalinist  party  was  a 
central committee that held all the power; a non-replaceable powerful leader who 
was worshiped by the party’s rank and file, almost like a religious cult; a top-
down  relationship  within  the  organisation  of  the  party;  and  a  suffocating 
atmosphere for the party’s minority. In such a system the entire party structure 
was  not  engaged  in  policy  making  and  usually  the  lower  organs  of  the  party 
resigned from policy making. Their job simply became the preparation of reports 
for  their  superior  organs.  As  a  result, the  engagement  in daily  policy  making 
became the sole activity of the party’s leading committee. 
 
Thirdly, the weakness in policies was another major characteristic of a Stalinist 
party. With the party’s Stalinisation came the disintegration of politics. A central 
committee receiving reports, mostly about the party’s daily routine, was not fed 
with quality papers about the various aspects of political, social and economic 
activities and changes, and surely lacked the basic information needed to make 
policies.  Such  a  leading  committee,  no  matter  how  genuine,  was  unable  to 
influence national or international politics. This was one of the main reasons for 
the weakening of Stalinist communist parties in many countries.     
 
The bureaucratisation of Stalinist parties was a disease that affected every aspect 
of social life. Victor Serge pointed this out in the case of Stalinist Russia: 
 
Everyone lies and lies and lies! From top to bottom they all lie, it’s 
diabolical…nauseating…. I live on the summit of an edifice of lies - do 
you know that? The statistics lie, of course. They are the sum total of the 
stupidities of the little officials at the base, the intrigues of the middle 
stratum of administrators, the imaginings, the servility, the sabotage, the 
immense stupidity of our leading cadres…. The plans lie, because nine 
times out of ten they are based on false data; the plan executives lie 
because they haven’t the courage to say what they can do and what they 
can’t do; the most expert economists lie because they live in the moon, 
they are lunatics, I tell you…. Old Russia is a swamp - the further you 
go, the more the ground gives…and the human rubbish! To remake the 
hopeless human animal will take centuries. I haven’t got centuries to 
work with, not I….
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Obviously,  in  power,  the  shortcomings  of  Stalinism  affected  the  society  on  a 
much  greater scale than being in opposition, where the problems had a lesser 
effect and were confined to the party. 
 
Fourthly, another characteristic of the pro-Russian Stalinist parties was that they 
identified themselves with the working class. This does not mean that they were a 
true workers’ party or even that they considered the working class as an integral 
part of their organisation. On the contrary, in most cases, they were parties of 
classes other than the working class and their activists were descendants of middle 
class families. The Iranian Tudeh Party formally announced in its programme that 
it  was  the  party  of  workers,  farmers,  state  officials,  business  people,  and 
intellectuals.  This  new  definition  cannot  be  explained  by  what  Marxists  call 
proleterianisation or the disappearance of the middle strata. On the contrary, the 
Tudeh party and its associate organisations imagined themselves to represent the 
entire population of the country. Wherever Stalinist parties had the support of the 
working class, it was the result of the needs and demands of the workers in their 
efforts to create their own political party.  
   
The Stalinist Tudeh Party’s most prominent characteristic was its subordination to 
the USSR’s foreign policies. Under the influence and pressure of the USSR the 
Stalinist party in Iran supported the dirtiest policies of the Shah and Khomeini in 
order to maintain the so-called unity of the people against American imperialism. 
The origins of this problem dates back to the Comintern era, when the principle of 
democratic centralism was used to impose the Comintern’s general policies on all 
its parties. Examining how communism, as a concept and as a movement, was 
weakened by this practice takes us away from our main purpose. The long dispute 
between  the  Comintern’s  leadership  and  the  French  and  Italian  parties’ 
leaderships in the 1930s and 1940s are two well known examples that prove how 
organisational structure can cause disunity and despair. It was, in fact, Communist 
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other communist parties  after  he  managed to  get  rid of  prominent  communist 
leaders and replaced them with his own followers. The majority of communist 
parties,  from  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party  and  the  Iranian  Tudeh  Party,  to  the 
French Communist Party, under pressure or so-called supervision of the Russian 
Communist Party and for the protection of the only socialist country, had to join 
bourgeois blocks or in many cases bourgeois governments. In Iran, for example, 
the Tudeh Party joined the government of Qhavam and provided three ministers 
to  his  cabinet.  This  allowed  Qhavam  to  keep  hold  of  power  during  the  most 
critical  period  of  Iranian  political  history  and  enabled  him  to  suppress  the 
republican  national  liberation  movements  in  the  Azerbaijan  and  Kurdistan 
provinces when the Russian troops had to leave the country.  Later on the Tudeh 
Party was subject to such suppression. In Iraq, the ICP had to join a coalition led 
by Arab nationalists of the Ba’th party only to be suppressed by them. The list of 
communists  joining  in  bourgeois  coalitions  and  their  suppression  by  their 
previous bourgeois partners lasted throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s around 
the world. The case of Spain is very interesting: 
 
Far behind the anarchist and socialist currents, in terms of membership 
and  influence,  came the  Communist  Party.  According  to  a  statement 
made later by one of its leaders, Dolores Ibarruri, the CP had only 800 
members in 1931. Its relative weakness had less to do with Primo de 
Rivera’s  repression  than  with  Stalin’s  policies.  The  expulsion  of 
Trotsky’s supporters, following the victory of Stalin in the USSR, had 
deprived the CP of a number of key activists, such as some trade-union 
figures in the Asturias, Catalonia and the Basque country. Subsequently, 
not being a large organisation like its French counterpart for instance, 
every  one  of the  Third  International‘s  u-turns initiated by  Stalin  had 
resulted  in  significant  sections  of  its  membership  choosing  to  resign 
from the organisation rather than keeping their heads down.
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Under the leadership of Breschnev, the policy of joining bourgeois fronts was 
justified by what was known as a non-capitalist development strategy. According 
to  this  strategy,  the  hegemony  of  the  world  proletariat,  which  meant  the 
hegemony of Russia, would replace the proletariat leadership in each country, and 
based on the formation of a national block through the spontaneous deepening of 144 
 
the composition of social forces, it would undergo a socialist transformation. It 
must  be  said  that  this  strategy  was  doomed  to  failure  and  did  not  succeed 
anywhere. The Russian foreign policy’s domination of the national policies of the 
communist parties in question forced them to support the most dictatorial regimes 
such as the Shah and the Ayatollahs in Iran.  
 
What happened in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries, 
Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Europe, during and after the Second 
World War, was directly related to the failure of the usually powerful communist 
parties.  These  parties  were  related  to  world  socialist  organisations  that  were 
Stalinist in nature. Therefore, their failure also meant the failure of Stalinism as an 
ideology. This conclusion does not mean in any way that if instead of the pro-
Russian communist parties there were social democratic parties the result would 
be different. There is an important similarity between Stalinist organisations and 
social democratic organisations as the example of Iran proves. 
 
After  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  pro-Russian  communist  parties 
experienced many splits and partitions. This is true of most cases in the 1990s. In 
Iran,  there is hardly anything  left  of  the  traditional  Tudeh  Party.  In  Italy, the 
Communist Party experienced major splits. In the UK, the fate of the Communist 
Party was not very promising. In Iraq, a major split took place and the Kurdish 
section  of  the  Communist  Party  formed  the  Kurdistan  Communist  Party.  The 
majority of these splits resulted in, more or less, the bigger factions of the party 
ending up with social democratic ideals. Although the circumstances of the 1990s 
and the dramatic collapse of the USSR and Eastern bloc is of vital importance in 
explaining all the sudden internal changes that took place within those parties, one 
must  still  address  the  important  question  of  why  these  splits  resulted  in  an 
increase of social democracy around the world. This can be explained by the fact 
that there is a deeper ideological connection between Russian communism and 
social democracy. 
 145 
 
 
Stalinism and social democracy: the case of Iran  
 
After the collapse of the USSR there was a social democratic transformation of 
the Tudeh Party in Iran. From the mighty Tudeh Party of the 1940s, there was 
hardly anyone left to defend its history. The majority of its prominent members, 
either  as  individuals  or  collectively  (in  the  form  of  the  Iranian  Democratic 
People’s Party  and other smaller organisations) officially announced their social 
democratic principles. A minority of the members joined radical Marxist parties. 
Only a small section decided to carry on under the banner of the traditional Tudeh 
Party.  A  close  analysis  of  Eastern  European  political  parties  supports  the 
proposition that there was a transformation of Stalinist communist parties into 
social democratic parties and organisations.  
 
Why did the majority of the Tudeh Party in Iran and the majority of the Stalinist 
parties in Eastern Europe transform into social  democracy?  More importantly, 
what  made  Gorbachev  shift  from  Stalinism  towards  social  democracy?  The 
transformation could be possible for two different reasons. Either the Stalinist 
parties  shared  the  same  basic  principles  as  social  democratic  parties  or  the 
transformation took place by force. How was it that in all but one country in 
Eastern Europe the transition from the Stalinist system to the social democratic 
system  took  place  without  bloodshed?    The  answer  is  because  Stalinism  and 
social democracy shared many basic principles. A brief look into the case of Iran 
explains this process. 
 
Both  Stalinism  and  social  democracy  believed  in  nationalisation  rather  than 
socialisation; both rejected the era of transition from capitalism to socialism and 
denied the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat; and both shared the 
same historic economism. Stalinist parties and certainly the Tudeh Party in Iran 
based their reformist arguments on Kautsky’s theses that the contradictions of 
capitalism  spontaneously  led  to  socialism.  For  over  three  decades,  the  Tudeh 146 
 
Party supported the policies of both the Shah and Khomeini in the hope that the 
leadership of the USSR, which was considered by the party as the hegemony of 
proletariat on the world scale, would bring socialism to Iran. According to the 
Tudeh Party, it would then be enough for the Iranian regime to get closer and to 
increase  its  trade  relations  with  the  USSR.  They  put  all  their  efforts  into 
convincing both regimes to get closer to the USSR. The Tudeh Party considered 
the smallest economic deals between the USSR and the bourgeois regimes in Iran 
as an important part of the transition from bourgeois regimes to socialism. 
 
In the hands of social democracy, the natural outcome of Kautsky’s theses is the 
separation of socialism from the idea of a proletarian social revolution and the 
separation of the idea of a social revolution from the realms of politics. Likewise, 
the Tudeh Party, as the representative of Stalinism in Iran, for more than half a 
century  based  its  policies  on  the  mercy  of  bourgeois  regimes  instead  of 
concentrating on the organisation of the working class. According to this party, 
there was no need for the leadership of the proletariat in Iran as long as there was 
the leadership of the USSR.   
 
In terms of economic policies, just like social democracy, the Tudeh Party had a 
strategy  of  economic  reforms  and  acted  in  accordance  with  the  primacy  of 
economics to politics in the social struggle. As was mentioned earlier, the Tudeh 
Party considered any economic deal that the Iranian bourgeois regime made with 
the USSR as a step towards socialism. Just like social democracy, the Tudeh Party 
rejected  revolutionary  actions;  they  compromised  with  the  bourgeois  power 
structure and justified this by arguing that reform and democratisation allowed the 
working masses to impose their will; and they agreed on a national block with 
non-monopolist  capital  because  just  like  social  democracy  the  Stalinist  party 
believed  that  only  finance  capital  and  monopolies  were  oppressive.  After  the 
revolution,  the  Tudeh  Party  stood  next  to  and  supported  the  Islamic  regime 
against  the  working  class  and  leftist  organisations.  In  their  support  of  this 147 
 
detrimental policy, they argued that the Islamic Republic could pursue the party’s 
non-capitalist development strategy only if it could get closer to the USSR. 
 
In  spite  of  their  formal  differences,  which  stemmed  mainly  from  their 
geographical differences, organisational interests, and their struggle for power, 
Stalinist parties shared many important principles with social democratic parties. 
In  some  cases  such  as  the  French  Communist  Party,  the  similarity  of  their 
principles resulted  in power  sharing  coalitions  with  the  French  Socialist  Party 
before and after the death of Stalin, regardless of how USSR perceived this line of 
action.  In  other  cases,  where  Stalinist  parties  were  less  effective,  the  social 
democratic transformation only took place after the collapse of the USSR. In both 
cases, the outcome was the separation of the party from the working class and 
giving superiority to the party in relation to the class. This similarity resulted from 
a similar understanding of a political party. What Stalin claimed to be Leninist 
teachings on the political party were actually the teaching of Kautsky. Wherever 
the interest of the party was opposed to the interest of the class, both the social 
democrats and Stalinists supported the party against the class. To prove the case 
against social democracy, one can look for examples in any epoch of its history 
throughout the 20
th century. The bloody defeat of the workers’ resistance in the 
early 1920s by German Social Democracy is only one example. In the early 21
st 
century, the governing Social Democratic parties in Britain, Germany, Spain, and 
France were equally ignorant to the demands of the workers and were equally 
prepared to do all in their power to prevent the radicalisation of the workers’ 
movements. In the second half of the 20
th century, the history of Stalinist parties 
was as equally dreadful as the history of social democratic parties.   
 
In Iran and Iraq, in the 1950s, the pro-Russian parties joined bourgeois nationalist 
regimes instead of organising and supporting workers’ movements and the urban 
poor, who were very active and present in the scene. That policy was directly 
linked  with  the  party’s  leadership  in  the  USSR  and  caused  destruction  and 
despair, not just in Middle Eastern societies, but also in many other countries.    148 
 
 
Though the Stalinist and social democratic parties were different in their tactical 
policies  and  methods  of  organisation,  as  mentioned  earlier,  they  share  vital 
principles. What makes these two parties share the above mentioned principles? 
One plausible answer is that the leftist movement, both social democratic and 
Stalinist,  in  the  second  half  of  the  20
th  century,  was  the  movement  of  young 
intellectuals. These intellectuals originated from the petit bourgeoisie, not only in 
Western  European  countries,  but  also  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  They  were 
hiding behind a socialist mask for one obvious reason. The victory of Russia over 
fascist Germany had made socialism fashionable. However, under that mask they 
were in fact after some degree of democracy and justice, which they referred to as 
socialism.  It would take a few decades for them to realise their true identity. 
Social democracy’s move to the right and the social democratic transformation of 
Stalinist parties were the result of these intellectuals finding their identity. It is 
obvious that the process was different in different societies. In some cases it was 
more rapid than in others. The impact on the working class movement varied 
according  to  the  party’s  popularity  among  the  workers  and  according  to  the 
party’s organisational successes. 
 
Though not the direct concern of this study, the question of why social democracy 
and Stalinism betrayed the working class has to be briefly addressed. Why did 
social democracy and Stalinism betray the working class and its movements? Was 
the reason the change in their underlying material reality or was it their ideas and 
programmes? According to Marxism both factors should be taken into account.  
Throughout  the  20
th  century,  many  theorists  supported  Lenin’s  analysis  that 
imperialism had altered the nature of capitalism and its social structure, which 
resulted in changes in social democracy. Lenin’s analysis was based on Marxist 
theory.  Both  factors  were  involved  in  Stalinism.  According  to  Trotsky,  the 
Russian  working  class  in  the  mid-1920s  was  tired  of  another  revolutionary 
assault. The majority of the proletariat was passive. A tired and passive proletariat 
supported Stalin’s programme of building socialism in Russia and resting rather 149 
 
than  the  Left  Opposition’s  programme  for  a  world  revolution.  Consequently, 
Stalin won and the Left Opposition became isolated. As a result without serious 
opposition the new Stalinist bureaucracy put its ideas and programme to practice. 
In spite of the argument of those political theorists who preferred to explain the 
Stalinist  phenomenon  as  a  coup  in  the  USSR,  Trotsky’s  analysis  in  The 
Revolution Betrayed was based on the Marxist theory.  
 
In summary, in the second half of the 20
th century, the two main types of parties 
involved in the organisation of the working class were Western social democratic 
parties and pro-Russian Stalinist parties. Despite their important differences in 
methods  of  organisation  and  tactics,  these  two  types  of  parties  shared  some 
important  principles.  It  was  those  similarities  that  accounted  for  the  social 
democratic  transformation  of  Stalinist  parties  after  the  collapse  of  the  USSR. 
Though  both  social  democracy  and  Stalinist  parties  acted  in  the  name  of  the 
working class, the historical reality clearly shows that neither of the two really 
represented the interests of the working class. The workers still needed to form 
their own party, and for that reason, many other political parties formed during 
the second half of the 20
th century. However, to this day not a single party has 
been able to solve the political and organisational problems of the working class 
movement.  Creating  a  real  independent  party  of  the  working  class  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  social  democracy  and  Stalinism  must  pull  out  of  the 
working class movement. This is where the necessity of an umbrella organisation 
comes into question.  
 
In  the  second  half  of  the  20
th  century,  many  parties  were  formed  to  protect 
working  class  from  the  detriments  of  social  democracy  and  Stalinist  parties. 
Trotskyists,  Maoists,  Marxist  parties,  and  armed  Marxist  guerrilla  groups  all 
claimed  to  be  against  social  democracy  and  bureaucratic  Stalinist  parties, 
regardless  of  how  true  they  were  to  their  claims.  However,  they  were  not 
successful  in  their  attempts  to  organise  the  working  class  around  their 
programmes. In most of the cases, they remained marginalised, and after a while, 150 
 
disintegrated.  In  spite  of  their  big  numbers,  none  of  these  radical  groups  and 
parties managed to obtain state power. There is more than one reason for their 
failure. Firstly, these radical groups shared many principles with social democracy 
and  Stalinist  parties  with  respect  to  organisational  methods  and  political 
programmes. Secondly, nearly all of them suffered  greatly as a result of their 
sectarian  policies.  Thirdly,  unlike  Stalinist  and  social  democratic  parties,  they 
lacked  the  support  of  the  USSR  and  European  powers.  Fourthly,  they  were 
subjected  to a  great  degree  of  political  control  and  suppression by oppressive 
bourgeois  regimes.  However,  this  was  never  the  case  for  social  democratic 
parties.  Finally,  structurally  speaking,  they  were  equally  bureaucratic  and 
unrepresentative of the working class. Throughout their long history, instead of 
focusing their time and energies on organising the working class, the majority of 
radical leftist groups were pre-occupied with their internal domestic ideological 
wars. 
 
   
Internal relations and political parties 
 
This section will look at the question of the internal relations of political parties to 
show how the principle of democratic centralism was used for the bureaucratic 
purposes of political leaders in social democratic, Stalinist, independent socialist 
parties, and groups who associated themselves with the working class. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that all these political groupings, throughout the last century, 
practiced bureaucratic centralism in the name of democratic centralism. One has 
to ask why nearly all communist parties practiced bureaucratic centralism rather 
than  democratic  centralism.  They  were  all  aware  of  the  Leninist  view  of 
democratic centralism; they knew about his view after What Is To Be Done? and 
the  1905  revolution;  and  they  had  read  about  the  rich  history  of  the  Russian 
Revolution. Why, in spite of all their knowledge, did they choose the wrong path?  
It is too simplistic to put all the blame on the evil nature of the communist leaders 
throughout  the  20
th  century.  One  could  argue  that  the  problem  lies  in  its 151 
 
foundations.  Shortly after capturing power, the traditional party faced a mountain 
of  problems  –  unknown  new  tasks,  the  undemocratic  threat  of  international 
capital, etc. – and did not have much choice but to utilise undemocratic measures. 
The reason is that a single party, no matter how big, cannot politically represent 
the entire population of the working class and the bottom eighty percent of the 
population who are exposed to the cultural influence of outside capital.   
 
Despite  Lenin’s  democratic  view,  the  majority  of  the  parties  that  associated 
themselves with his name never continued his tradition and never allowed decent 
discussions  of  any  important  issue  concerning  their  campaigns,  let  alone  the 
campaign  of  the  proletariat.  In  most  cases  any  serious  discussion  resulted  in 
further  splits  and  disunity.  One  possible  explanation  for  the  poor  record  of 
Stalinist communist parties, from the Chinese Communist Party to the  Iranian 
Tudeh  Party,  is  that  under  the  banner  of  these  parties,  activists  and  political 
leaders  of  various  social  groups  joined  forces,  yet  each  had  a  different 
interpretation of the line the party was taking based on their own interests and 
desires. However, only one interpretation was put into practice. The rest were 
alienated, suppressed, and perished. 
 
The point here is that even if those Stalinist parties deprived of state power were 
to  gain  power  and  become  the  dominant  political  force  in  their  respective 
countries, they would not be able to create something different from what their 
counter-parts formed in Eastern Europe and Russia. A bureaucratic party cannot 
create a real democratic society and therefore their future would be doomed to 
failure. 
 
 The main question that this study puts forward is how the working class and with 
it the whole of humanity get emancipated? The answer lies in a famous remark by 
Marx. The emancipation of the proletariat is possible only by the working class 
itself.
31 Marx did not suggest that the proletariat did not need a political party or 
organisation for its emancipation. On the contrary, he believed that the proletariat 152 
 
could  emancipate  itself  when  it was  able to  organise  itself politically.  This  is 
exactly why Marx had a particular understanding of the party, which was not 
bureaucratic, dogmatic, or sectarian. This is why neither he nor Engels remained 
members of a party that had bureaucratic tendencies. Marx clearly saw that the 
working class was organised into different parties and associations. The only way 
to organise this class politically was to create an organisation that comprised all 
these factions, tendencies, and interests. This was why Marx was in the centre of 
an effort to organise the First International.  
 
Several things have enhanced and increased the necessity for a different type of 
working class political organisation. Firstly, as explained in earlier chapters, the 
working class itself was the subject of great changes during the 20
th century. As 
early  as  1900,  Kautsky  wrote  about  the  literate  working  class.  Although  his 
emphasis on the change in the working class’ structure served certain political 
aims,  his  outline  of  the  new  changes  in  the  class  structure,  in  particular  his 
terminology  of  literate  workers  was  nevertheless  plausible.  Now  in  the  21
st 
century,  it  can  be  said  that  in  most  parts  of  the  world  many  sections  of  the 
working class have to be literate in order to be employed. In addition to books and 
newspapers, they have access to computers, the internet, and participate in pal talk 
on a regular basis or other computer meetings from their home. 
 
Today with the introduction of computers and the internet less emphasis is placed 
on a political party becoming the school of the working class. Moreover, as a 
result of socio-economic changes in the last three decades, no political leader has 
the answer to every question.  The anti-capitalist movement of the 1990s proved 
that the radical movements of workers and poor could be organised without the 
leadership and direct involvement of any political party on a national level. 
 
Furthermore, now in the 21
st century unlike the early 20
th century, many more 
groups  of  workers are  capable  of  learning the  complicated  tasks  of  their  own 
class. The working class rely to a lesser extent on a leader or political party to 153 
 
come  forward  and  solve  their  problems.  Marxist  doctrine  teaches  that  the 
relationship is usually the other way round. The working class enters the class 
struggle and during the process forms a political party or parties. The most recent 
example to support this teaching is the creation of the Brazilian Workers’ Party 
(PT) by working class leaders such  as  Lula. Though many opportunities have 
been missed by the traditional organisations in the past, the need for a worker’s 
umbrella organisation is greater today than ever before. 
   
This  brings  the  discussion  to  another  aspect  of  the  working  class’  political 
organisation. In addition to social democratic and Stalinist parties, many other 
parties and political groups have claimed to represent the working class. They 
have  been  critical  of  both  Stalinism  and  social  democracy.  Many  parties  and 
groups  were  formed  as  reactions  against  Stalinist  bureaucratisation  and  the 
liberalism  of  social  democracy.  These  included  the  Trotskyist  parties  of  the 
Fourth  International,  leftist  guerrilla  organisations,  and  various  revolutionary 
independent Marxist parties and groups. A common flaw that these parties and 
groups shared was their zealous hatred of social democracy and Stalinism. Their 
hatred was so intense that they abandoned their duty to organise the working class 
and became preoccupied with discussing the flaws and deficiencies of Stalinism 
and social democracy.   
 
Moreover, these groups have always been busy fighting one another and accusing 
each other of being either Stalinist or social democrats. For half a century they 
forgot  to  unite  on  the  basis  of  their  common  socialist  principles.  This  is  the 
starting point of the working class’ political project for the 21
st century. In other 
words, in the 21
st century left-wing radical parties and groups that are critical of 
past mistakes and believe in the working class’ self-rule and self emancipation 
have  to  be  at  the  centre  of  any  socialist  unity.  Only  when  this  objective  is 
achieved can the inclusion of Stalinists and the left wing of social democracy be 
considered. 
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The earlier chapters of this study looked at the ideas of Marxist revolutionaries 
such as Rosa Luxemburg. Chapter two discussed her emphasis on the centrality of 
the working class in the relationship between the party and class. A majority of 
Marxist parties and political organisations ignored her political ideas for many 
decades. At the end of the 20
th century and beginning of the 21
st century, the 
working class is left with a history of political parties suffering from sectarianism, 
bureaucratic  centralism,  liberalism,  and  many  other  “isms”  all  alien  to  the 
working class’ demands and interests. They suffer from political parties whose 
formation and organisation had nothing to do with the activity of the working 
masses and the daily needs of the class struggle and parties who put their own 
interest before the interest of the working class.  As a result they are trapped in an 
endless ideological conflict with rival parties. 
 
To conclude, after the Second World War the policies of both social democratic 
parties in European countries and Stalinist pro-Russian parties in many parts of 
the world had nothing to do with the working class. Both claimed to represent the 
interests  of  the  working  class,  yet  both  participated  in  anti-working  class 
governments and implemented anti-union policies. Today social democracy does 
not belong to the family of the left because of five decades of right-wing policies 
including support for imperialist wars. However, social democratic parties’ leftist 
tendencies are a part of the left and their come back to the great family of the left 
will complete the process of socialist unity. 
 
The  unity  of  socialist  –multi-tendency  organisations  requires  the  unity  of 
Trotskyist and other radical independent Marxist parties and organisations in the 
first place. After that sections of Stalinist parties and organisations that criticise 
their  dogmatic,  sectarian,  and  bureaucratic  past  can  join  the  unity.  The 
participation  of  women,  students,  peace  and  environment,  and  working  class 
activists in such a unity creates a mass organisation that influences the political 
culture of the entire country and encourages social democracy’s leftist sections to 155 
 
abandon their party and join the socialist unity. The common principles between 
these various parties and groups will be discussed in chapter five. 
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                             CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Democratic centralism 
 
Introduction 
Some analysts look at governmental political parties’ policy changes from the 
point  of  view  of  the  dominant  faction’s  interests.  This  method  of  analysis  is 
known  as  elite  theory.  According  to  this  theory,  Mao  started  the  Cultural 
Revolution in China because his authority amongst the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party was undermined. Starting the Cultural Revolution and using 
inexperienced fiery youth against the party’s high ranking members was his way 
of fighting back against his rival factions. The validity of this theory is not the 
concern of this study. However, it is important to understand the mechanism that 
helped Mao carry out policies such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution without any major obstacles within the party for nearly twenty years. 
Moreover, immediately after Mao’s death Deng Xiao Ping changed the party’s 
strategy  and  started  market  reforms.  Apart  from  a  few  individuals  including 
Mao’s widow, the bureaucratised party did not question the new strategy. Another 
and certainly a better example to illustrate the importance of the party’s internal 
regime is Stalin’s brutal purge policy. What party mechanism allowed Stalin to 
blame and execute someone who posed an obstacle, which his closest allies saw 
as a conspiracy? If it had not been for the bureaucratic system and military type 
discipline in the party, he would have not been able to get rid of every member of 
the  political  bureau,  who  had  been  members  since  Lenin’s  time,  without  any 
protest, question, or reaction from the party. Obviously neither Mao nor Stalin 
would agree that their internal party regimes were bureaucratic. They considered 
themselves  Leninists  and  their  internal  party  regimes  as  systems  based  on 
democratic centralism, a term used by Lenin. Regardless of their leaders’ rhetoric, 161 
 
the history of the Eastern bloc is the history of bureaucratic centralism under the 
name of democratic centralism.  
 
The  betrayal  of  Stalinist  leaders  replacing  democratic  centralism  with 
bureaucratic centralism is as important as social democrats betrayal of socialism 
as their aim. All Stalinist, Maoist, Castroist, and most of the other independent 
Marxist  parties  after  the  1917  Russian  Revolution  misused  the  principle  of 
democratic centralism. Each party arbitrarily decided what degree of centralism 
and how much internal democracy was allowed. Some parties completely denied 
democracy from their rank and file.  
 
By hiding behind the principles of democratic  centralism Stalinism  and social 
democracy managed to carry out their treacherous bureaucratic policies and not 
face serious reactions from their party members. In this study, the importance of 
understanding  the  true  meaning  of  democratic  centralism  as  a  concept  is  not 
limited to the history of 20
th century socialist parties. On the contrary, a viable 
21
st century socialist organisation cannot base its structure on the bureaucratic 
system of 20
th century socialist parties. That is why it is crucial to learn what 
democratic centralism is and how an organisation prevents bureaucratisation. This 
chapter will look at the origin of the term democratic centralism and its transition 
to  bureaucratic  centralism,  mainly  in  Stalinist  parties.  It  will  also  look  at  the 
theory and practice of democratic centralism in Maoist and Trotskyist parties and 
organisations.  Needless  to  say,  this  work  studies  Maoism  as  an  independent 
ideology from the official ideology of Maoist China. Until recently in Nepal the 
Maoist movement followed a strategy opposite to the official ideology in China. 
In  many  countries  Maoist  organisations  existed  as  independent  parties  and 
organisations  critical  of  both  the  USSR  and  China.  In  some  Trotskyist 
organisations democratic centralism was distorted sometimes in favour of over-
centralism, while at times in favour of endless discussions. The next section will 
briefly look at the background and meaning of the concept. 
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Democratic centralism  
 
What  is  democratic  centralism?  What  did  it  originally  mean  and  how  did  its 
meaning change when it became the official method of organisation in the USSR? 
Was there any difference between Lenin’s understanding of the term and its use 
by Stalinist parties and organisations? Was there any connection between the term 
democratic centralism and the bureaucratic centralism practiced in most socialist 
parties?  What  problems were  related  to the  theory  and  practice of  democratic 
centralism?  This  chapter  will look at  these  questions  and  other  aspects of  the 
theory and practice of democratic centralism. 
 
In the socialist world during the first half of the 20
th century the formation of the 
party’s organisation and structure was heavily affected by a principle known as 
democratic centralism. The impact of this functional method was so extensive that 
all Leninist, Stalinist, Trotskyist, Maoist, and social democratic parties based their 
structure according to this principle. It can be said that the purpose of democratic 
centralism as the socialist party’s practical method is similar to the function of 
Marxism in the ideology of the communist party or the purpose of socialism in its 
political strategy. No other structural principle in the socialist party has such an 
extensive effect. In fact, one might compare it to the roles of prayer and other 
practices of devoted religious believers. 
 
The concept of democratic centralism is the name given to the principles of the 
internal  organisation  used  by  Leninist  political  parties.  As  Lenin  described  it, 
democratic centralism meant freedom of discussion, criticism, and unity in action                                                                                                                              
all at the same time. However, once democratic centralism was transformed into 
the official doctrine of the USSR, the Comintern, the Fourth International, and the 
Chinese Communist Party, its meaning became associated with the organisational 
methods of Stalinism, Maoism, and Trotskyism. 
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The social democratic parties of Western Europe claimed that their internal party 
relations  were  based  on  democracy  and  rejected  the  Leninist  concept  of 
democratic  centralism.  This  study  does  not  intend  to  test  the  validity  and  the 
credibility of this claim. It is enough to mention that all major Western social 
democratic  parties,  just  like  Stalinist  parties,  routinely  dealt  with  day-to-day 
issues such as the leader’s inner circle, the central committee or party’s national 
executive, parliamentary party, party cell, area party headquarters, etc. In fairness, 
it must be said that the social democratic party maintained a much looser structure 
when  it  came  to  membership  conditions.  For  a  Stalinist  party,  in  addition  to 
adhering to the party’s programme and paying membership donations, the most 
important condition of membership was individual participation in party activities 
under the direct supervision of a party branch. This condition either did not exist 
or was not taken as seriously in social democratic parties. Moreover, in a social 
democratic  party  such  as  the  UK  Labour  Party,  the  right-wing  New  Labour 
faction and Old  Labour did not have  a lot in  common.  In this party,  Marxist 
tendencies led by Arthur Scarggil, Tony Benn and others lived with right-wing 
tendencies led by Callahan, Kinak, Smith, etc.  Today, the Labour Party is a front 
for  various  sections  of  the  liberal  left,  trade  unionists,  and  some  sections  of 
bourgeoisie. This structure has  nothing in  common with a  Leninist type party 
based on democratic centralism. But in the early 20
th century, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the structure of social democratic parties was different. Before 
its metamorphosis, social democracy had a similar organisational principle to that 
of the Communist Party of Soviet Union.  
 
 
The origins of the concept  
 
According to Paul LeBlanc, the origin of the concept of democratic centralism 
pre-dated Lenin by many years. J.B. Schweitzer, a Lassallean, first used the term 
in  1865.  Moreover,  In  Russia,  the  Mensheviks  first  used  the  term  democratic 
centralism  at  their  1905  November  conference.  In  the  resolution,  “On  the 164 
 
Organisation  of  the  Party,”  they  agreed,  “The  RSDLP  must  be  organised 
according  to  the  principle  of  democratic  centralism.”
1  One  month  later  the 
Bolsheviks  embraced  the  term  at  their  own  conference.  Their  resolution,  “On 
Party Organisation” stated: 
 
Recognising as indisputable the principle of democratic centralism, the 
conference considers the broad implementation of the elective principle 
necessary; and, while granting elected centres full powers in matters of 
ideological and practical leadership, they are at the same time subject to 
recall, their actions are given broad publicity, and they are to be strictly 
accountable for these activities.
2  
 
         Thus, there was no difference between the Mensheviks’ and Bolsheviks’ need for 
democratic  centralism  and  its  meaning.  Both  the  Mensheviks  and  Bolsheviks 
accepted and agreed on the need for the centralisation of the movement. Any 
claims  that  the  two  factions  differed  on  this  organisational  breakthrough  are 
simply mistaken. One does not need to look into every party resolution between 
1903 and 1907 to prove this. It is enough to mention that both factions were trying 
to reunite. They organised several united conferences and in all those meetings 
their discussions were focussed on issues other than the concept of democratic 
centralism. The obvious reason for this is that both factions were in agreement 
about  this  concept.  Following  the  1905  Revolution  (under  pressure  from  the 
Tsarist regime on one hand and the negative effects of the split on the other) both 
factions  of  the  RSDLP  took  steps  toward  some  sort  of  reunification.  The 
Menshevik leader Paul Axelrod stated, “On the whole, the Menshevik’s tactics 
have hardly differed from the Bolsheviks. I am not even sure that they differed 
from them  at all.” Lenin concurred: “The tactics adopted in the period of the 
‘whirlwind’  did  not  further  estrange  the  two  wings  of  the  Russian  Social 
Democratic Labour Party, but brought them closer together…the upsurge of the 
revolutionary tide pushed aside disagreements, compelling the social democrats to 
adopt militant tactics.”
3 
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Lenin’s  argument  for  a  centralised  party  of  professional  revolutionaries  (who 
advanced and improved the proletariats’ struggle in a despotic regime and under 
severe police repression) is often misinterpreted.  Many analysts associated the 
Bolsheviks  with  centralism  and  the  Mensheviks  with  party  democracy.  In 
reaction,  C.  Silahtar  explained  the  dangers  of  such  a  formalistic  view  of  the 
relationship between centralism and democracy. 
 
There is an important point which must be made on the subject of 
democratic  centralism:  that  it  is  the  formalistic,  and  solely 
formalistic, interpretation which rejects the essence of this principle 
and  robs  it  of  its  content.  This  danger  is  especially  pertinent  for 
parties with young and inexperienced cadres and which are passing 
through a process of re-establishment. The formalistic understanding 
imposes “bureaucratic centralism” in the name of centralism.
4 
 
There  is  a  dialectical  relation  between  socialism  as  the  aim  and  democratic 
centralism as a practical method of organisation. This is the essence of democratic 
centralism. As mentioned earlier the origin of democratic centralism as a concept 
goes back to the 1860s but it is associated to Lenin more than any other name. 
Lenin based the structure of the Bolshevik party on democratic centralism. That 
party succeeded in leading the revolution. Marxists interpreted the success of the 
Bolshevik led October Revolution as the success of democratic centralism. This is 
why the concept of democratic centralism has been associated with Lenin more 
than anyone else. Lenin founded the dialectical relation between socialism as the 
party’s aim and its practical method of organisation.  
 
The  success  of  the  October  Revolution  and  by  association  the  concept  of 
democratic centralism should not have led to worshiping this concept. Democratic 
centralism is not and should not be taken as an inseparable part of the working 
class’ political organisation or its foundation. For Marxists democratic centralism 
is  a  means,  just  like  the  party  or  any  other  form  of  organisation.  The  aim  is 
freedom. To achieve this aim in a particular society a means might or might not 
be used. 
 166 
 
The concept of democratic centralism is made up of two elements. The element of 
centralisation is a reaction to a highly centralised capitalist state. The working 
class require a degree of centralism in its class struggle against the centralisation 
of the bourgeois state. In other words, the capitalism’s centralisation imposes a 
degree of centralism on the working class and its struggle. This element is not 
what the working class want to carry forever. It is a shield used only in war zones. 
This armour loses its usefulness as soon as the battle is over. As Lenin stated, 
military wars are the continuation of politics in another form. Once the political 
stage of revolution has ended and the economic reconstruction of society becomes 
the main focus, centralisation becomes an excessive load that slows down the 
pace of progress. 
 
The  democratic  element  is  the  antithesis  of  centralism.  The  function  of  this 
element, unlike centralism, which is rooted in the past and imposed by capitalism, 
is to put conditions and limitations on centralism. The democratic element is the 
power of the party members to pull the party policy line toward freedom and 
equality. It is a counter balance against international and national bourgeois policy 
to put pressure on the party and its leadership. The democratic element protects 
the party from compromises and concessions to capitalism. A capitalist army is 
based on pure centralism without a democratic element. Such an army is needed 
for  the  protection  of  capitalism.  The  proletarian  party  fights  for  freedom  and 
socialism. A party based on following a leader cannot fight for equality and its 
aim  cannot  be  freedom  and  socialism.  The  democratic  element  of  democratic 
centralism is the last circle of the chain that connects the centralised  party of 
proletariat to socialism as its political aim.     
 
Lenin and democratic centralism  
 
More than a century after the publication of What Is To Be Done? neither social 
democracy  nor  communist  parties  have  put  forward  an  alternative  to  Lenin’s 
theory of party organisation. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is 167 
 
that Lenin’s theory of the party, in some respects, was similar to that of Karl 
Kautsky, who was the leading Marxist theorist of the German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD). Lenin’s theory was the adaptation of Kautsky’s pre-1908 theory, 
when  he  was  the  most  important  theorist  of  the  SPD  and  the  Second 
International’s leading Marxist theorist. In fact, Lenin’s call for all revolutionary 
circles  to  centralise  and  form  a  party  at  the  1903  Russian  Social  Democratic 
Labour Party (RSDLP) congress included members that belonged to the branch 
agreeing to the program, and all branches that used the same party newspaper as 
an organisational tool. Lenin’s form of centralisation was very much along the 
lines of European parties, and in particular the SPD. Lenin’s party operated under 
the  conditions  of  illegality.  Unlike  European  parties  that  accepted  members 
despite  their  low  levels  of  participation  in  the  party  cell  and  branches,  Lenin 
insisted  on  a  small  party  of  professional  revolutionaries  who  were  directly 
involved in building the party. The second reason is more important. For Stalinist 
parties  around  the  world  including  China,  Mongolia,  Vietnam,  Cuba,  East 
Germany, Poland, and Hungary it was easier to practice bureaucratic centralism 
under the banner of Lenin’s democratic centralism rather than refer to it by its real 
name. 
  
This  study  does  not  disagree  with  the  relevance  of  democratic  centralism, 
especially in the third world where countries are ruled by brutal regimes and the 
police regularly suppress progressive movements and anti-government activities. 
However, this study suggests that the very nature of the principle of democratic 
centralism  opposes  the  internal  relations  necessary  for  the  development  of  a 
viable socialist organisation in the 21
st century. That is to say, wherever there is a 
need for a socialist revolution, the only vehicle capable of successfully leading 
such a revolution would be a Leninist party that operates under the principle of 
democratic centralism as prescribed by Lenin. Therefore, it is not the intention of 
this study to deny the relevance of Leninist parties in countries where any type of 
opposition  is  suppressed.  However,  a  growing  number  of  countries  in  Africa, 
Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  are  introducing  Western  types  of  parliamentary 168 
 
political systems and some degree of openness. In such situations, socialists need 
different tools if they are to become the voice of the people. They need a mass 
organisation that is less secretive, broadly based, and represents the bottom 80% 
of society. There is no doubt that the principle of democratic centralism cannot be 
the sole organisational guide for a mass organisation consisting of many parties 
and groups. In a multi-tendency political organisation, where there is less central 
power  and  more  cooperation  and  coordination  between  local  centres,  the 
consequence is more democracy and less centralism.  
 
 Political parties of the proletariat exist under different conditions and face various 
degrees of suppression, which affects their internal relations. Consequently, the 
internal  party  organisation  reflects,  to  a  great  extent,  external  conditions  and 
changes accordingly. That is to say, the proletariat’s political party policies and 
internal system changes to suite the time period and conditions of the struggle 
because it is not a fixed entity. In a short article written to the editors of Socialist 
Appeal , titled “On Democratic Centralism & the Regime” prior to the formation 
of the American SWP, Trotsky evaluated the possible violation of democracy by a 
tiny minority and came up with an important point about democratic centralism:   
 
   Neither do I think that I can give such a formula on democratic 
centralism  that  “once  and  for  all”  would  eliminate 
misunderstandings and false interpretations. A party is an active 
organism. It develops in the struggle with outside obstacles and 
inner contradictions.… One cannot overcome the difficulties ahead 
of a party with a magic formula. The regime of a party does not 
fall ready made from the sky but is formed gradually in struggle.
5  
 
This is exactly the reason why there is not a universal definition of democratic 
centralism.  This  also  explains  why  Lenin  repeated  time  and  time  again  that 
political developments in Russia, inside and outside the party, were a Russian 
phenomenon and should not have been copied uncritically in other countries. A 
good example is his policy concerning the Constitutional Assembly. His emphasis 
on the Tsarist police’s censorship and repression and its impact on party policy 
and centralism was something that was particular to Russian society. It is more 169 
 
important to understand this point rather than reading Lenin’s work out of context 
then  applying  his  policies  to  problems  that  the  party  faces.  It  is  not  Lenin’s 
attitude that needs to be applied but rather his method. 
  
The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party adopted its rules in 1898.  Article 19 
of the CPSU’s rules stated:  
 
         Democratic centralism comprises of the election of all leading party 
organs from top to bottom; periodic accounting by party organs to 
their own party organisation as well as to the higher party organs; 
strict  party  discipline  and  subordination  of  the  minority  to  the 
majority;  and  finally  the  unconditionally  binding  force  on  lower 
organs of the decisions of higher organs.
6  
 
These  rules  were  revised  many  times  in  the  communist  party’s  congresses, 
including the 1961 and 1966 congresses. The Communist International put a more 
general definition of democratic centralism forward:  
 
The communist party must be built up on the basis of democratic 
centralism.  The  chief  principle  of  democratic  centralism  is  the 
election of higher party cells by the lower, the unconditional and 
indispensable binding authority of all the instructions of the higher 
bodies for the lower, and the existence of a strong party centre whose 
authority is generally recognised for all the leading party comrades 
in the period from one party conference to another.
7 
 
The relationship between democracy and centralism in the communist party is 
said to be a dialectical one. For Marxists, the party is not a “basket” with separate 
compartments for democracy and centralism. On the contrary, the two terms are 
inter-connected  and  democracy  gives  the  party  the  strength  and  courage  to 
centralise. In other words, a communist party that internalises democracy in its 
system, by definition is better suited for times of crises than a party that bases its 
existence mainly on orders and decrees. 
 
Democratic  centralism  is  a  fundamental  organisational  principle, 
which comprises the dialectical unity of democracy and centralism. 170 
 
Centralism  is  required  to  form  an  organisation  which  strikes 
simultaneously as one fist; democracy is required to ensure that the 
blows are struck on correct principles. Democratic centralism is a 
vital  mechanism  which  enables  the  majority  to  adopt  correct 
positions,  ensures  unity  of  will  on  the  correct  principles  and 
subsequently impose unity in action through the submission of the 
minority to the majority.
8  
 
 Lenin did not recognise unity of action without freedom to discuss and criticise. 
According to Lenin,  
 
         There can be no mass party, no party of a class, without full clarity 
of  essential  shadings,  without  an  open  struggle  between  various 
tendencies, without informing the masses as to which leaders and 
which  organisations  of  the  party  are  pursuing  this  or  that  line. 
Without this, a party worthy of the name cannot be built.
9  
 
This democratic view of party organisation was not limited to the boundaries of 
the  party.  In  society  as  a  whole,  Lenin  also  defended  true  democracy.  His 
uncompromising emphasis on giving power to the soviets proved this.  
 
From  the  start  of  the  Russian  Revolution,  democratic  tendencies 
became  the  rage.  Everywhere  there  were  meetings,  discussions, 
voting. In the soviets there was voting on all the vital issues of the 
day, on programmes set up by leaders of rival parties fighting for 
power.
10  
 
This  is  not  to  say  that  participation  of  the  workers  and  poor  in  the  decision 
making processes during the revolutionary period in Russia resulted from Lenin’s 
democratic idea. On the contrary, his ideas resulted from the revolutionary reality 
of  Russian  society.  However,  his  ideas  in  The  State  and  Revolution  firmly 
supported  radical  democracy.  As  the  most  prominent  revolutionary  leader  in 
Russia  in  1917,  Lenin’s  radical  view  of  society  as  well  as  the  party  was 
undoubtedly the most important reason for the success of the October Revolution. 
Lenin’s emphasis on the overthrow of the old state machine, bureaucracy, the 
transfer of power to the soviets, and his understanding of the term dictatorship of 
proletariat were interconnected with his theory of democratic centralism. In his 171 
 
system of thought, it was not possible to successfully lead the  revolution and 
replace  the  old  state  machine  with  workers’  and  peasants’  councils  without  a 
centralised party of experienced revolutionary cadres. If instead he had suggested 
replacing  the  old  regime  with  his  party,  then  Stalinism  would  have  been  the 
legitimate  successor  of  Leninism.  Lenin’s  compromise  and  acceptance  of 
Bolshevik rule after the Constitutional Assembly election was due to Russia’s 
extremely exceptional conditions. He hoped that a revolution in Europe would 
change the balance of power, which would result in the reduction of pressure on 
the  young  soviet  state  and  special  measures  introduced  by  the  workers’  state 
would be replaced by a situation that allowed the workers and poor to become the 
real rulers of the new society.        
 
The Leninist view of the internal relations of a communist party was certainly 
different from that of Stalin. The Leninist view was democratic and favoured full 
discussion before all major decisions. This democratic view had helped hundreds 
of party cadres to develop the necessary skills in order to test party’s perspectives 
in the working class movement and if necessary challenge the leadership when 
they made mistakes. “Without a membership that is loyal to the party but not 
deferential to its leadership no revolutionary organisation can develop strategy 
and tactics, maintain a healthy internal regime, and recruit militants.”
11 In October 
1917 the Bolsheviks’ power was a direct consequence of  Lenin’s view of the 
party’s internal relations and the true application of the principle of democratic 
centralism.  What  else  could  explain  the  ability  of  party  propagandists  and 
agitators to convince thousands of people all over Russia? In other words, the 
explosive expansion of the Bolshevik party in a relatively short period of time 
was directly related to the readiness of the existing party cadres to recruit new 
members and expand the level of activity to every corner of the country. Only if 
the party’s internal organisation is democratic, will party members have a chance 
to participate in the party’s decision making, which will increase and improve 
their  revolutionary  skills.    From  the  beginning  of  his  campaign,  Lenin’s 172 
 
democratic view of the party’s internal relations was clearly seen in the following 
passage: 
 
The St Petersburg Worker Social Democrats know that the whole 
party organisation is now built on a democratic basis. This means 
that  all  the  party  members  take  part  in  the  election  of  officials, 
committee members and so forth, that all the party members discuss 
and  decide  questions  concerning  the  political  campaigns  of  the 
proletariat,  and  that  all  the  party  members  determine  the  line  of 
tactics of party organisations.
12   
 
Lenin’s starting point in his theory of internal party relations in What Is To Be 
Done? is the oppression of revolutionary social democracy by the Tsarist regime, 
which  prevented  any  degree  of  openness,  elections  of  party  officials,  and 
development  of  internal  democracy  in  the  party.  His  alternative,  which  he 
considered superior to any degree of democracy under such conditions, was full 
comradely trust between the revolutionaries. Unfortunately, Lenin’s methods of 
comparing democracy and trust between revolutionaries were unclear and could 
be misleading. In spite of the fact that after the 1905 Revolution, as discussed in 
the second chapter of this study, Lenin’s idea about the party went through a 
radical change, which did not justify his attitude toward party democracy in What 
Is  To  Be  Done?.  In  1902  Lenin  clearly  preferred  comradely  trust  to 
democratization. According to his 1902 method, democracy and openness would 
have allowed the party to be dominated by the police and therefore would have 
led  to  the  party’s  destruction  by  the  oppressive  tsarist  regime.  As  mentioned 
earlier, Lenin’s time and condition would certainly have allowed him to postpone 
full implementation of democracy but his preference of so-called trust between 
activists to democracy inside the party is not something to defend.  
 
There is a connection between this tendency and the dominant tendency at the 10
th 
party congress in 1921. At the 10
th party congress Lenin ordered the Workers’ 
Opposition  and  Democratic  Centralism  Opposition  to  be  dissolved.  This 
Bolshevik congress resolution and its decision to expel any party member who 173 
 
tried to form a faction was clearly an anti-democratic, and at the same time, a 
bureaucratic  tendency.  There  is  a  difference  between  a  situation  where 
revolutionary members under siege trust their leaders and implement leadership 
directives  without  question  and  a  theory  that  favours  comradely  trust  to 
democracy  and  grimaces  at  democracy.  Lenin’s  attitude  during  the  10
th  party 
congress  proved  that  he  was  willing  to  sacrifice  democracy  during  difficult 
periods. Before 1905, under the pressure of Tsarist police and after the October 
Revolution during the civil war and War Communism under the pressure of the 
vast peasantry and foreign threat, Lenin advocated restrictions on democracy. In 
both periods the amounts of restrictions were extreme.  
  
The problem with Lenin’s early understanding of the party was that it left little or 
no  room  for  dissent.  He  argued  that  individual  members’  obedience  of  party 
orders was similar to factory discipline. His idea of order through party members’ 
blind obedience negates the difference between his understanding of democratic 
centralism  and  the  bureaucratic  tendencies  within  the  party.  It  was  Lenin’s 
preference of trust to democracy and his extreme emphasis on the discipline in the 
party system that allowed Stalin to bureaucratise the party and state in Lenin’s 
name and under his authority. However, Lenin’s concept of the party was heavily 
affected by the Bolsheviks’ underground conditions. Real democracy cannot be 
achieved in an underground party. Such a situation imposes strict discipline as a 
pre-condition of survival, which sometimes prevents using any degree of internal 
democracy. That is to say, in spite of Tsarist police oppression, internal party 
democracy should have been an important Bolshevik objective. In other words, 
internal democracy should have been considered as an aim that police oppression 
wouldn’t allow.
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Stalinism and democratic centralism  
 
It is important to know that Lenin’s democratic view of the party did not continue 
after his death. Under Stalin’s leadership most of the avenues of internal party 
democracy  were  very  quickly  shut. As  early  as  1923,  the  soviets’  power  was 
considerably  reduced.  Stalin  made  it  clear  that  the  party  was  superior  to  the 
soviets and held the centre of power. A few years after Lenin’s death, the soviets 
simply turned into powerless organs to implement party policies. It is true that at 
the 1921 congress, Lenin did not support freedom of the democratic opposition 
and actually led a campaign to ban factionalism but that measure, as far as he was 
concerned,  was  temporary  and  reversible.  Moreover,  the  record  of  his  long 
campaign for true democracy and freedom is clear and cannot be denigrated by 
the  difficult  years  immediately  following  the  post-revolutionary  period.  The 
conditions of civil war, foreign imperialists’ intervention, and the vast peasantry 
who supported the right, pushed the minority Bolsheviks into a corner and left 
Lenin no other option but to compromise democracy for the sake of their survival. 
Lenin’s  choices  were  not  indicative  of  his  true  intentions  but  rather  they  are 
explained by the limitations of his life and the specific problems he faced. 
 
It is important to point out that throughout the 20
th century what has existed under 
the name of the Leninist democratic centralism in Stalinist parties was in fact 
bureaucratic centralism. This section will look at some examples from Stalinist 
and other traditional parties around the world. The problem with these parties is 
their lack of understanding of the conditions of their struggle. What may have 
been  appropriate  for  an  illegal  underground  opposition  party,  such  as  the 
Bolshevik Party, was lethal in a parliamentary party or a party in power. The 
particulars of the conditions of the struggle in Russia and under the pressure from 
War  Communism  and  the  civil  war  did  not  allow  the  opening  of  a  political 
society. The Bolsheviks had to stay rigid and ready for the troubled times that lay 
ahead.  In  fact,  as  far  as  they  were  concerned,  conditions before and after the 
revolution had not changed. In a sea of peasants and under foreign threat opening 175 
 
up  could  have  meant  political  suicide.  The  most  experienced  members  of  the 
party were in the military and bureaucratic administration rather than the political 
leadership and education.   
 
        Under  conditions  of  civil  war,  facing  extermination,  secret-police 
methods, absolutely inconsistent with the principles of democratic 
centralism, were introduced as a matter of survival, but with fatal 
political  consequences….  The  Bolshevik  party  itself  was 
transformed into a self-serving bureaucracy.”
13   
 
From 1922 onward, Lenin’s illness forced him further and further to the sidelines, 
which allowed Stalin, as the head of the party organisation, to consolidate his 
power inside the party. Coming out as the winner from his first major ideological 
battle after Lenin’s death, he determined, more or less, all policies. He managed 
to get Zinoviev’s, Kamenev’s, and Bucharin’s support in his battle against the 
mighty Trotsky, only to later turn against them one by one. Stalin, “the great 
leader,” determined policy, and everyone else down the hierarchy fell into line. 
Holding discussions before making decisions was limited to the party leadership. 
After  Stalin’s  death  the  situation  became  even  worse.  Within  all  pro-Russian 
Stalinist parties democratic centralism became associated with intolerance of the 
opposition and further restrictions on internal debate. 
 
 
In practice Stalinist parties from China to Cuba altered democratic centralism to 
mean the mysterious killing of the main political opponents. Camilo Cienfuegos 
in Cuba and Liu Shaoqi in China are only two examples. Opponent factions were 
subjected to extreme pressure to conform. The Cultural Revolution in China from 
1966  to  1976,  with  its  theatrical  shows  against  mature  party  members  by  the 
party’s  youths,  is  the  best  example.  The  cult  of  worshiping  the  party  leaders 
became  the  norm.  Unanimous  decisions  became  the  party’s  political  culture, 
which meant absolute intolerance of dissent. To a great extent, Mao’s Red Book 
was looked at like a religious book. In fact, democratic centralism had turned into 176 
 
plain centralism where countries were run by the decrees of their so-called great 
party leaders. 
 
Under the guidance of early party leaders Horloyn Choybalsan and 
Yumjagiyn  Tsedenbal,  the  principle  of democratic centralism  was 
weighted heavily toward its centralizing features, just as it was being 
applied in the Soviet Union under J. Stalin. Purges, reprisals, and 
political violence in Mongolia mirrored the arbitrary behaviour of 
Stalin.
14      
 
Democratic centralism was the principle governing the organisation and activity 
of  communist  parties  in  Vietnam,  Cambodia,  North  Korea,  the  GDR,  Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia prior to the 1990s. In all those 
societies the worst type of bureaucratic centralism was practiced under the banner 
of  democratic  centralism.  Obviously,  amongst  these  countries,  Vietnam,  from 
many points of view, is the most respected for its recent past. Unlike Eastern 
European countries Vietnam gained its independence and freedom after a long 
anti-imperialist  campaign.  The  Vietnam  War  against  France  and  later  US 
aggression gained massive public support in the world. A victory after such a long 
and difficult campaign lived in the hearts of millions for many years. In spite of 
this  Vietnam  accepted  USSR’s  dominance  too.  As  the  Soviet  Union  gained 
ground in many parts of the world against the west in the 1970s, its interpretation 
of  democratic  centralism  was  accepted  without  suspicion.    However,  their 
interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism was nothing more than 
Stalinist bureaucratic centralism. It was only after the collapse of the USSR that 
people started to question things they had previously taken for granted. 
  
Hanoi, Dec 9- A senior Vietnamese communist cadre has denounced 
the absence of democracy and concentration of power in the hands of 
the  CPV.  According  to  General  Tran  Do’s  22  page  appeal  the 
principle  of  democratic  centralism…has  killed  all  creative 
initiatives.
15  
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Amnesty  International  estimated  that  there  are  between  30  and  35  political 
prisoners in Vietnam, many of whom were jailed for calling for a multi-party 
democracy. Do, has never called for multiple parties in Vietnam.
16 
 
The  particular  conditions  that  the  Bolsheviks  faced  did  not  justify  the 
bureaucratization of either the USSR or the communist party. It can be argued that 
the problems communist parties in China and Vietnam faced after the revolution 
were just as serious as those the Bolsheviks faced, and they had to centralise for 
the same reasons. Post revolutionary difficulties might be a good reason in these 
three countries and maybe in other countries too. But it is certainly not a defence. 
Unlike these three countries, communist parties in Eastern Europe were offered 
political power by the Red Army without any serious effort from their side. They 
enjoyed full support of the USSR and never faced the question of life and death, 
civil war, or foreign intervention. Nothing can justify bureaucratic centralism in 
those  countries.  That is to  say,  bureaucratic  centralism  in  Stalinist  parties  has 
nothing to do with political circumstances. Bureaucratization is in the essence of 
Stalinism as an ideology.   
 
Trotskyism and democratic centralism 
 
The  problem  of  democratic  centralism  in  the  Trotskyist  movement,  unlike 
Stalinism, cannot be characterised by a single concept. Generally speaking, in this 
movement, the balance between democracy and centralism moved one way or the 
other in different groups.  
 
Within the Trotskyist movement, democratic centralism came to be 
associated in particular with the obligation upon members of a party 
to  present  only  the  party  line  outside  the ranks of  the party.  The 
degree of internal discussion and openness varied considerably.
17 
 
The  emphasis  on  discipline  in  Trotskyist  parties  is  just  as  great  as  it  was  in 
Stalinist parties; their only advantage over Stalinist parties was that they were 178 
 
untested. In their programmatic principles adopted at the founding conference of 
the International Trotskyist Committee on 24 July 1984 they asserted: 
 
Trotskyism  sees  democratic  centralism  as  the  structural  basis  of 
revolutionary political organisation. Democratic-centralist principles 
imply the right to free internal debate as well as the duty of external 
discipline,  with  the  subordination  of  the  minority  to  majority. 
Democratic  centralism  includes  the  right  to  build  both  tendencies 
and factions within the revolutionary organization. 
18    
 
The fact that they recognised the right to build factions and tendencies was an 
important difference between Trotskyism and Stalinism. However, recognition of 
these rights could not solve the problem of internal democracy in this movement. 
In reality, the activists and members of some parties in this movement were well 
aware of the difficulties these tendencies and factions were facing. 
 
Up  to  the  recent  period  there  did  not  appear  to  be  any  serious 
political disagreements. In fact, there have been disagreements on all 
kinds of political and organizational matters, but these were never 
allowed to reach even the level of the CC (Central Committee) or 
IEC (International Executive Committee). Nothing was permitted to 
indicate  the  slightest  disagreement  in  the  leadership…there  was 
uniformity,  which  at  times  came  dangerously  close  to 
conformism…. The tendency became unused to genuine discussion 
and  debate.  To  be  frank,  many  comrades  (including  leading 
comrades) simply stopped thinking. It was sufficient just to accept 
the line of the leadership….
19  
 
While there were a few who maintained a degree of independence and were still 
able to put their thoughts together in the form of resolutions at party conferences, 
their resolutions were usually blocked or did not get the necessary votes. 
 
All  resolutions  at  party  conferences  would  either  come  from  the 
leadership or be completely supportive of its position. If branches or 
members  submitted  resolutions  which  were  insufficiently 
enthusiastic about the general line, the Committee for a  Workers’ 
International (CWI) leaders exerted enormous pressure for them to 
be withdrawn. They invariably were.
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In fact, for those who were active in these intellectual groupings of the left it was 
quite clear that bureaucratic centralism had created the ridiculous condition where 
without the agreement of the general secretary, people did not dare drink a cup of 
tea  or  open  a  window  in  a  meeting.  This  meant  they  lacked  any  degree  of 
independence. Instead of teaching the values of unity among the radical left, all 
the  leadership’s  efforts in  the  CWI and  indeed  the majority of  Trotskyist  and 
Stalinist  organisations,  were  concentrated  in  creating  hatred  for  other  leftist 
groups. The use of centralism in this case was not for working class unity and 
bringing about a new generation of working class political leaders, but rather it 
was a waste of their very limited energy. The following example from the CWI is 
useful to look at.  
 
We were taught to absolutely hate every other political organisation 
that there was…. But other Trotskyist groupings were the worst. We 
just laughed at them in internal meetings. We called them “the sects” 
and took the view that they were incapable of any development at 
all…. If we ever had taken power God knows what we would have 
done to them.
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The  problem  with  one  particular  Trotskyist  party  or  group  should  not  be 
generalised to Trotskyism. The problem with Trotskyist organisations  was not 
their  restriction  of  internal  discussions.  On  the  contrary,  the  main  problem  of 
Trotskyist  groups  was  that  they  had  endless  discussions  to  the  point  that  any 
disagreement during their internal meetings could have led to dissension or a split. 
As a result, they became almost inoperative. It is this characteristic that explains 
why Trotskyism was not able to lead a single revolutionary movement to victory. 
This  endless  discussion  in  meetings,  which  is  the  other  side  of  the  coin  in 
suffocating internal party atmosphere, crippled Trotskyism as a political trend. 
Endless  discussions  as  a  weakness  is  different  from  Stalinist  bureaucratic 
centralism. In fact, it is its opposite in that in Stalinist parties’ decisions are taken 
without discussion whereas in Trotskyist parties there were discussions without 
decisions.  180 
 
 
Maintaining the right balance between centralism and democracy was a difficult 
task for any Marxist party. Discussions about various trends and the way they 
understood and practiced democratic centralism does not mean that all traditional 
parties of the past got it all wrong and the parties and organisations of future 
would  be  free  from  those  mistakes  and  shortcomings.  After  all  it  is  almost 
impossible to have a democratic party in an undemocratic society. Both Leninist 
and  Trotskyist  models  of  organisation  intended  to  get  the  balance  right.  As 
discussed above sometimes they have failed. 
 
In his justification for the necessity of centralism, Harman referred to Lenin’s idea 
of  democratic  centralism.  According  to  Harman, centralism  for  Lenin  was  far 
from being the opposite of developing the initiative and independence of party 
members; it was the precondition of this. A comparison can be made between 
Harman’s description and a letter Lenin wrote in 1902 to a comrade discussing 
organisational tasks. 
 
We  must  centralise  the  leadership  of  the  movement.  We  must 
also…as far as possible decentralise responsibility to the party on the 
part of its individual members, of every participant in its work, and 
of  every  circle  belonging  to  or  associated  with  the  party.  This 
decentralization  is  an  essential  prerequisite  of  revolutionary 
centralism and an essential corrective to it.
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Lenin wrote these words at the height of his polemics against the economists and 
for a centralised vanguard party. As mentioned elsewhere, it is quite clear that for 
Lenin  centralism  was  the  means  to  organise  the  disunited  movement  of  the 
proletariat. If there were any other methods more effective than a centralised party 
of revolutionaries, he would not have hesitated to use them. Under the Tsarist 
autocracy, Lenin had to compromise the party’s elective principles but he had no 
doubt that “under conditions of political freedom the party will be built entirely 
on the elective principle.” Thus, Harman was right.  Lenin did not want to take 
away  the  independence  and  development  of  party  members  when  he  was 181 
 
suggesting the centralisation of the movement. But he was wrong to conclude that 
centralism  was  the  precondition  for  party  democracy  and  the  development  of 
younger  generations  into  working  class  leaders.  Taking  Lenin  out  of  context 
creates  many  problems.  In  many  parts  of  the  world  there  are  decentralised 
organisations that are able to produce the greatest number of political leaders from 
within the movements of workers, women, and peasants, as in the case of the 
Zapatistas in Mexico. 
 
Trotskyism in Europe did not understand the difference between Europe at the 
end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21
st century and the despotic 
conditions  of  Tsarist  Russia  in  the  early  20th  century.  Centralism  in  Europe 
secured leadership’s position and prevented challenges from the rank and file. 
Some leaders in the Trotskyist movement were born leaders and died as leaders. 
This situation could only be explained by bureaucratic centralism. Harman did not 
fundamentally  alter  what  Lenin  suggested  in  the  early  20
th  century.  Lenin 
postponed the free development of each individual member for the higher purpose 
of creating an organised proletarian movement around a revolutionary leadership. 
Harman focused on the centralised party at the end of the 20
th century in Europe 
when the working class was already organised by other forces.   
 
Thus,  as  previously  mentioned,  despite  Lenin’s  democratic  view,  the  great 
majority  of  political  parties  that  associate  themselves  with  his  name  never 
continued the Leninist tradition of free and full discussions, while at the same 
time practicing unity in action. Neither Stalinist nor Trotskyist parties allowed or 
managed to have successful decent discussions without putting pressure on their 
factions,  consequential  splits,  or  creating  further  disunity  within  their  own 
movement, let alone the movement of the proletariat. In most cases, any serious 
discussion  would  have  resulted  in  a  split  of  the  faction  involved  and  further 
disunity, particularly in Trotskyist movements. In the case of the Stalinist parties, 
discussion  was  simply  not  allowed  and  any  attempt  would  have  resulted  in 
expulsion, if not disappearance. 182 
 
 
One possible explanation  for  Stalinist  parties’ poor record , from  the  Chinese 
Communist Party  to the  Iranian  Tudeh  Party  on the  one  hand,  and  Trotskyist 
organisations on the other hand, is that under the banners of these parties and 
organisations, activists and political leaders of various social groups joined forces 
against a common enemy, but each one had a different interpretation of their unity 
and its policies according to their desires and interests. However, according to the 
principle of democratic centralism, only one interpretation was put into practice. 
The rest were alienated, suppressed, and perished.   
 
If those Stalinist and Trotskyist parties who were deprived of state power during 
the second half of the 20
th century had gained power and become the dominant 
political force in their respective countries, then they would not have been able to 
create  something  radically  different  from  what  their  Russian  and  Eastern 
European  counterparts  had  formed.  A  bureaucratic  party  that  is  scared  of 
openness and democracy cannot create a real democratic society. They were lucky 
that they remained in opposition, and therefore, as untested parties found a chance 
to change and amend their fundamental problems. 
 
 
Maoism and democratic centralism  
 
 In its origins the theory of democratic centralism was not a pure and faultless 
theory. Its use today however, creates even greater theoretical problems. Party 
organisation, by definition, is organised distrust. That is to say, a modern party 
cannot only be based on trust. It also requires a clear constitution or articles of 
association and internal discipline. At the same time, no serious political party can 
survive any serious political hurdle without a great degree of trust between the 
rank and file and leadership. This contradiction is more clearly seen in Maoist 
parties. Needless to say, Maoism is not the same as the official ideology of China. 
Until a few years ago in Nepal, the Maoist party was fighting according to the 183 
 
teachings of Mao. Only recently they joined the government’s political process. In 
many countries around the world Maoist parties and organisations are the main 
opposition or part of the opposition of the bourgeois state. As an independent 
political force Maoism is critical of both the USSR and China. Therefore, Maoism 
means a movement wider than China. In these Maoist parties the members have to 
fully trust their leaders and should not question their judgement. However, as far 
as the leadership is concerned, the same party members who should not question 
party leadership are threatened by bourgeois ideology. As a result, the main usage 
for democratic centralism, from the point of view of the leadership, is to correct 
them from all sorts of deviations. 
 
Of course, party members are not immune from the pressures the 
dominant capitalist ideology and culture exert on everyone’s analysis 
and  behaviour.  Even  without  state  agents  consciously  trying  to 
subvert the party, cadres are susceptible to spontaneous actions and 
incorrect ideas. Democratic centralism protects the party from being 
discredited by individual cadres following their spontaneous whims 
which  cannot  help  but  be  influenced  by  bourgeois  forces  and 
ideology.
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These semi-religious words, so hostile to the whims of individual members, are 
rooted in the teachings of Mao. His famous Little Red Book was full of rhetoric 
against the dangers of ultra-democracy that might damage or even completely 
wreck  party  organisation  and  weakens  or  undermines  the  party’s  fighting 
capacity. 
 
Education in democracy must be carried on within the party so that 
members  can  understand  the  meaning  of  democratic  life,  the 
meaning of the relationship between democracy and centralism, and 
the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. 
Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the party 
and  at  the  same  time  avoid  ultra-democracy  and  the  laissez-faire 
which destroys discipline.
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Mao  did  not  stop  here.  He  ensured  democracy  was  kept  under  centralised 
guidance and described how it should be done:  184 
 
 
1-  The leading bodies must give a correct line of guidance and find 
solutions when problems arise, in order to establish themselves 
as centres of leadership; 
 
2-   The  higher  bodies  must  be  familiar  with  the  situation  in  the 
lower bodies and with the life of the masses so as to have an 
objective basis for correct guidance; 
 
3-   All  decisions  of  any  importance  made  by  the  party’s  higher 
bodies must be promptly transmitted to the lower bodies and the 
party rank and file;
 
4-  The lower bodies of the party and the rank and file must discuss 
the higher bodies’ directives in detail in order to understand their 
meaning thoroughly and decide on the methods of carrying them 
out.
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Mao’s  version  of  democratic  centralism  had  nothing  in  common  with  Lenin’s 
understanding. Lenin made it clear that pressure from a despotic regime and the 
immanent danger of Tsarist police attacks pushed the party to centralise. He did 
not  worship  this  condition  and  counted  the  moments  until  restrictions  on  full 
democracy would come to an end, whereas Mao hated democracy and hid his 
hatred  behind  the  term  ultra-democracy.  For  Lenin,  the  theory  of  democratic 
centralism  was  not  a  universal  theory  useful  for  all  times,  whereas  for  Mao, 
democratic centralism was universal regardless of the time or place.     
 
What  was  practiced  as  democratic  centralism  by  all  communist  parties  in  the 
Stalinist camp during the 20
th century was not Lenin’s understanding but rather 
what Mao formulated in 1929, as quoted above. Mao’s formulation had nothing to 
do  with  what  Harman  understood  as  the  relationship  between  centralism  and 
democracy  i.e.  centralism  was  the  precondition  for  the  independence  of  party 
members. Mao’s theory of  democratic  centralism  was,  in fact, preparation  for 
totalitarian rule. In his understanding of the term democratic centralism, the lower 
organs and the party members had no say in discussions about party policies. All 
they could do was discuss the details of the directives of higher organs to make 
sure  they  understood  them  and  were  able  to  implement  those  policies  to  the 
satisfaction of their leaders. This bureaucratic view had nothing in common with 
Marxism and Leninism. 185 
 
 
Needless to say, the understanding and interpretation of the concept of democratic 
centralism was not the same in Leninist, Stalinist, Trotskyist, or Maoist camps. It 
should  also  be  mentioned  that  Maoism  is  nothing  but  a  variant  of  Stalinism. 
However, in countries such as Nepal, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, the Maoist 
movements were critical of the USSR and China. Maoism cannot be taken as the 
ruling ideology  of  China  and  continues  to  grow  as  an independent  movement 
outside of China. As a result, one has to look at it as a different ideology. 
 
The problem and misuse of the theory and practice of democratic centralism is 
better  understood  when  one  takes  into  consideration  that  sometimes  the  gap 
between two party congresses is ten years. For ten years, party activists had to 
obey the rules of the party and implement policies that were not their own in order 
to protect the party and its discipline. In many cases, after several years, the best 
course of action for party members was to quietly resign from party activities. 
This has been the sad story for thousands of communists in the second half of the 
20th century, which was too great a price to pay for the bureaucratic practice of 
the party’s internal relations. That is to say, the bureaucratic internal relations of 
the traditional parties caused thousands of political activists to leave the party. In 
Iran,  during  the  early  1980s,  some  leftist  organisations  called  for  a  cease-fire 
against the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq war, which they considered to be 
patriotic.  The  Trotskyist  groups  in  Europe  had  no  clear  understanding  of  the 
dictatorial regimes in Iran, Iraq, or Libya in the 1980s and 1990s, and in some 
cases  they  supported  those  so-called  anti-imperialist  regimes.  These  harmful 
policies were criticised by their rank and file internally, but the leaders continued 
their existence in their secure entrenchment, behind the principle of democratic 
centralism.  
 
Moreover,  today  in  most  countries,  both  socialists  and  communists  are 
experiencing  a  pre-party  era.  They  are  usually  organised  in  small  groups  and 
organisations. In almost all these small groups the leaders have not even held one 186 
 
congress. The unelected leadership carries on from the beginning of the formation 
to the end of their respective organisation’s existence without any worries, while 
at  the  same  time  they  expect  members  to  respect  the  organisation’s  internal 
discipline. If it were not for the theory of democratic centralism, this abuse and 
double standard would not take place. 
 
The underling thread in all traditional Stalinist, Maoist, Trotskyist, and Leninist 
parties is the conflict between the need for democracy on the one hand and the 
absence or limitation of democracy in existing parties and groups on the other. 
Limited democracy in those parties weakened their structure to the point that they 
were not capable of facing any serious crisis. As mentioned earlier, the place of 
democracy  was  different  in  the  ideology  and  structure  of  each  camp.  While 
Luxemburg understood its importance and criticised Lenin on the issue, Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks’ conditions and existence as an underground party did not allow 
them  to  practice  real  democracy  even  if  their  understanding  was  faultless. 
Maoists’ and Stalinists’ parties looked at democracy in a negative way regardless 
of their condition of struggle. They usually attacked ultra-democracy, for as far as 
they  were  concerned,  it  would  weaken  party  discipline.  Trotskyists  however, 
differed from Trotsky’s clear emphasis on the need for a mass proletarian party 
and suffered, more than anything else, from the absence of a mass party. In their 
typically  small  groups,  depending  on  the  conditions  of  their  struggle,  they 
practiced  democracy  in  their  internal  relations  to  the  extent  that  it  sometimes 
caused further splits in the group.    
 
Summary 
 
The problems of theory and practice of democratic centralism in all traditional 
parties  were  the  result  of  various  causes.  The  limitations  and  absence  of 
democracy in different parties were caused by different factors. The Bolshevik 
party in the 1920s put conditions and limitations on democracy mainly as a result 187 
 
of foreign threat. One might claim that foreign imperialist attacks and imminent 
danger never allowed the Bolshevik party to introduce democracy to the party and 
country  as  a  whole.  Lenin’s  compromise  in  the  10
th  party  congress  and  his 
campaign  against  factionalism  mainly  was  due  to  the  conditions  of  the  post-
revolutionary  period.  A  revolutionary  state  in  a  sea  of  domestic  and  foreign 
enemies was hardly able to allow full democracy and hold on to power at the 
same  time.  However,  in  Lenin’s  theory  of  democratic  centralism  freedom  to 
criticise was subject to the unity of a defined action.  Criticism in this view is 
allowed so long as it dose not disrupt the unity of a defined action. Any criticism 
that disrupted or made unity of action difficult that the party decided upon would 
be ruled out. Lenin’s theory of the party in 1902 accepted centralism and was 
based on trust. In that model there was little room for dissent. Democracy in that 
model was compromised for survival. His view after the 1905 Revolution went 
through a radical change. In 1917 the Bolshevik Party was a mass party with 
tendencies  and  platforms.  During  a  difficult  period  and  under  foreign  and 
domestic threat once again, Lenin compromised democracy for survival at the 10
th 
party congress.   
 
This  view,  which  was  defended  by  Lenin,  allowed  Stalin  to  build  up  his 
bureaucratic  view  of  the  party  and  destroy  any  degree  of  democracy  in  the 
Bolshevik  party  within  a  few  years  between  1922  and  1927.  The  theory  and 
practice  of  Stalinist  and  Maoist  parties  were  essentially  bureaucratic  and  had 
nothing to do with Leninist democratic centralism. In these parties the leaders are 
not elected and could not be removed. Democracy and freedom of criticism were 
absent in their internal party relations. Democracy represented bourgeois ideology 
in the party. The leaderships of these parties made sure party members were not 
contaminated by ultra-democracy as a bourgeois ideology. 
 
Trotskyist parties and groups, in spite of Trotsky’s clear guidance were usually 
small. Though in these groups discussions are allowed, they hardly had any effect 
on the workers’ struggle. The main problem with Trotskyist groups was that they 188 
 
were not based on the working class struggle. Therefore, their endless discussions 
had  hardly  anything  to  do  with  the  struggle  of  the  workers  and  poor.  The 
contradiction between self-made leaders and principles of democratic centralism 
caused mistrust and reduced unity in action in these groups. 
 
Democratic centralism is not a suitable method of organization for multi-tendency 
political organisations of the bottom 85% of the population in the 21
st century. 
However,  in  most  African,  Latin  American  and  Middle  Eastern  counties  the 
principle  of  democratic  centralism  is  the  most  viable  practical  method  of 
organisation  for  parties  who  face  censorship  and  repression  from  dictatorial 
regimes.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Viable socialist organisations for the 21
st century  
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, in addition to globalisation, structural and 
economic changes, the IT revolution of the last three decades of the 20
th century, 
social democracy’s defeat , Stalinism and pro-Russian communist parties as well 
as Maoism and guerrilla movements in Latin America and the Middle East all 
account  for  the  rise  of  the  New  Left.  This  chapter  will  briefly  outline  the 
contradictions of the traditional left and guerrilla movements. This chapter will 
then  concentrate  on  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  multi-tendency  socialist 
organisations in the 21
st Century.  
 
Until  1960  dominant  organisations  that  were  recognised  and  supported  by 
socialists  throughout  the  world  were  Stalinist  communist  parties.  Although 
Trotskyist and council communist organisations sporadically existed, they were 
very  weak  compared  to  the  powerful  Stalinist  communist  parties.  After  the 
Second  World  War  and  Stalinism’s  domination  of  the  communist  movement, 
almost  all  communist  parties  went  through  a  process  of  restructuring  in 
accordance to the directions of Stalinist Russia. Even those traditional parties who 
claimed to be Leninist were nothing but Stalinist bureaucratic parties. Therefore, 
when  this  work  refers  to  traditional  parties  it  is  referring  to  Stalinist  parties.  
Among other things, these parties suffered from two main weaknesses: the lack of 
internal  democracy  and  the  belief  in  a  method  of  politics  that was  passive  in 
nature. If bourgeois parties in Western democracies wanted people to cast their 
votes at least every four to five years, then Stalinist parties wanted people’s trust 
forever. They did not believe in any kind of democracy, be it direct or indirect, 
internal or external. 
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Traditional communist parties did not hide their thirst for power. On the contrary, 
they sought the worst methods of gaining power such as participating in bourgeois 
governments, coup d’états and sometimes the aid of foreign armies. However, 
they did not commit themselves to organising the working class and the masses of 
urban  poor.  As  a  result  these  attempts  were  miscalculated  and  led  to  further 
disaster, defeat, and on many occasions the massacre of party members by so-
called  democratic  leaders.  Throughout  the  20
th  century  traditional  communist 
parties  supported  bourgeois dictatorships in  Asia,  America,  and Europe  in  the 
hope  that  their  respective  governments  would  choose  a  non-capitalist 
development strategy and abandon capitalism. This ineffective approach stemmed 
from Stalinism, which reduced the class struggle to relations between states and 
replaced  the  socialist  revolution  with  democratic  revolution.  Nasser  in  Egypt, 
Qhasim  in  Iraq  as  well  as  many  other  so-called  democratic  leaders  were  all 
products  of  the  shift  toward  Stalinism  by  the  Iraqi  and  Egyptian  communist 
parties. “The juxtaposition of the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution 
and the preference for the first is not the property of the Social Democratic leaders 
alone, but became the guiding line of Stalinist leaderships throughout the world.”
1  
 
    
After the collapse of the USSR most pro-Russian so-called communist parties 
split into smaller groups. In cases such as the Asian republics of the former USSR 
many different political interests resulted from the dismantled so-called unified 
communist party. The fact that hardly any communist parties survived after 1990 
shows that these parties were not unified and homogenous. Even the communist 
parties in Western societies did not maintain their unity and split.  
 
By the late 1980s, a mixture of fairly coherent ideologies coexisted 
with a variety of far more diffuse sensibilities. The ensemble was 
lively, but highly fragmented. It was primarily held together by the 
common tradition that was about to be eliminated. Even after the 
departure of nostalgic old-style communists and the most socially 
radical elements for Rifondazione, the left that remains within the 
Democratic Socialist Party (PDS) remains a mixed bag.
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Shortly after the collapse of the USSR, the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB) also split. Its radical elements reorganised themselves as Leninists and 
later joined the Socialist Alliance.
3 The coexistence of various tendencies and 
interests within a so-called homogenous party was not necessarily a weak point. It 
only became a disastrous feature because there was no internal democracy within 
the  party.  In  all  pro-Russian  traditional  communist  parties,  during  their  long 
existence, there was not a decent ideological discussion let alone the formation 
and  existence  of  factions  and  tendencies  within  the  party.  Under  the  bipolar 
system that existed during the Cold War, if the possibility of gaining power, even 
by a relatively unpopular pro-Russian party, prevented the split of discontented 
elements  from  the  party,  then  after  the  collapse  of  the  USSR  nothing  could 
prevent it. For example, in the Iranian Stalinist Tudeh party, social democrats as 
well as radicals split from the party. From the massive Tudeh party of the 1950s 
only a small group remained to carry its long history into the 21
st century. The 
Iraqi  communist  party  was  also  the  victim  of  a  major split  in which  Kurdish 
elements created the Kurdistan communist party, in the hope of gaining a share of 
state power in the semi-autonomous state of Iraqi Kurdistan. The list is endless.  
 
Two factors account for the rather unfortunate fate of these communist parties. 
Firstly, there existed different elements and at times contradictory interests within 
the party without existence of an appropriate communication mechanism in their 
internal relations. These parties did not have a policy that was independent from 
the Soviet Union. The needs of the USSR’s foreign policy forced them to limit 
their policies within certain stereotypes which were not acceptable to the younger 
members  of  these  parties  who  had  not  witnessed  the  USSR’s  post-war 
achievements.  As  a  result  their  policy  was  a  mixture  of  reformism,  anti-
Americanism, and the need for the USSR’s foreign policy of the day regarding 
their respective governments. Close economic relations between the USSR and 
their  respective  governments  resulted  in  a  shift  in  their  national  policy  and  a 
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repressive measures against the working class struggle for equality and freedom. 
Secondly, wherever the party was not committed to organising the working class 
and was not engaged in such an activity the risk of elimination and split was more 
serious. This is the experience that younger  generations of socialists must not 
forget. That is to say, the closer the party’s policy was to the USSR, the less 
independent it was from the Soviet Union, which meant that the party made less 
effort to organise the working class. As a result, this made the party weaker. 
  
Three decades of structural adjustment programmes brought impoverishment to 
the  workers,  further  destruction  to  the  agricultural  sector  and  therefore  more 
social unrest against the IMF, World Bank programmes in Latin America and 
other areas of the world such as the Middle East. The traditional left did not have 
the  courage  to  organise these  social  frustrations  and  anger.  As  a  result,  some 
elements of workers, students, intellectuals and the urban poor in Latin America 
and  the  Middle  East  filled  this  empty  space  by  organising  guerrilla  warfare. 
Movimiento  de  Isquerda  Revolucionary  (MIR)  in  Chile,  the  Sandinistas  in 
Nicaragua,  and  Fedaie  in  Iran  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  are  only  a  few 
examples. In spite of some success, these movements shared a serious weakness 
with the traditional left. As far as people and their independent organisations were 
concerned the guerrilla movements were just as ignorant as the traditional left. 
With different intentions both movements did not get involved in organising the 
working  class  for  socialism.  The  bureaucratic  pro-Russian  Stalinist  parties 
considered the leadership of USSR as the proletarian leadership on a world scale 
and did not feel the need for proletarian leadership in each country. What they 
wanted from the proletariat was not active participation in the party affairs but 
rather  passive support for the party. The guerrilla movement was not against 
workers’ participation in the political arena. However, as far as the leadership was 
concerned, between needs of the guerrilla movement came before those of the 
workers’  movement.  The  secrecy  of  guerrilla  warfare  was  not  going  to  be 
jeopardised by openly sending activists into the labour movement. As long as the 
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worker’s movement had to wait for guerrilla movements to destroy the wall of 
censorship and repression. Only then would it be possible for workers to enter 
into the political arena without fear of reprisal by the repressive apparatus. Apart 
from Cuba and Nicaragua, where guerrilla movements obtained state power and 
expanded their activities to other  areas of people’s daily struggle, in no other 
countries  did  these  movements  gain  similar  success.  Although  (unlike  the 
traditional  left)  guerrilla  movements  were  very  radical  and  very  active,  their 
activities and radicalism were not  connected to the daily life and struggles of 
workers and the poor. Consequently, in its isolation guerrilla movements came 
under  severe  attack  from  dictatorial  regimes.  The  internal  contradictions  of 
guerrilla warfare, their inability to organise mass movements of the poor, and 
military pressure from bourgeois regimes brought the movements to an end. In 
many countries, guerrilla movements split into many branches with hardly any 
one section supporting or continuing armed struggle today. For example, the MIR 
in  Chile  and  Fedaie  in  Iran  were  totally  eliminated.  In  many  countries  the 
surviving members of armed struggle joined or are joining the new organisations 
of the left. The failure of the traditional pro-Russian parties, the weaknesses of 
Trotskyists and other radical communist organisations, and the contradictions and 
deadlock  of  guerrilla  warfare  as  a  method  of  struggle  became  clear  to  many 
socialist activists by the end of the 1980s. An alternative organisation capable of 
organising  the  working  class  for  socialism  while  not  suffering  from  the 
shortcomings of its predecessor organisations was what the majority of radical 
socialist activists wanted.  
 
During the 1980s and throughout the 1990s a new type of political working class 
organisation started to appear. In Latin America massive multi-tendency parties 
and organisations grew rapidly and became the main stream of leftist politics. The 
Zapatista movement in south eastern Mexico introduced a completely new model 
of politics in which state power did not have a central role. They did not limit 
themselves  within  any  ideology.  Their  aim  was  the  direct  participation  of  all 
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effort to increase solidarity among all movements of working class and poor in all 
countries. The new Mexican Zapatista movement that came to the attention of the 
outside world after their famous January 1994 operation has continued as the most 
important  political  organisation  in  the  region  since.  The  Zapatista  National 
Liberation Army (EZLN) in many ways promotes participatory democracy and a 
development  strategy  that  is  based  upon  the  real  improvement  of  people’s 
consciousness, culture, independent education as opposed to central government’s 
imposed education, and a non-bureaucratic system of governance. For more than 
a decade the EZLN in Mexico put into practice what other revolutionary non-
Stalinist, non-social democratic leftists such as Mandel theorised as an alternative 
to present-day capitalism and the bureaucratic command economies of Eastern 
Europe. Mandel called his suggested system a democratic planned economy from 
below, which was based on the participation of every worker and poor member of 
society  as  consumers  and  producers  in  the  conferences  of  producers  and 
consumers.  The  Zapatistas  in  Mexico  managed  to  do  just  that  for  nearly  one 
decade.  In  contrast  to  this  radical  movement  in  Mexico,  powerful  centre  left 
parties such as the PT in Brazil, Broad Front in Uruguay, and similar movements 
in Argentina and most other countries of the region appeared one after another.   
 
In Venezuela despite various US plans a similar process not only kept Chávez in 
power but also led to the creation of the Party of Revolution and Socialism and a 
bigger alliance of 24 organisations from Bolivarian Circles to the Revolutionary 
Marxist Current. In Brazil after gaining power the Workers Party’s moved to the 
right. Many in the party did not accept such a move. As a result, the campaign for 
Socialism and Freedom Party (P–SOL) collected more than 438,000 signatures 
and became Brazil’s 29
th officially recognized political party and the first to do so 
by this method. Those signatures were not based on the party’s ideology because 
it was not an established party when those signatures were collected and therefore 
there was no ideology. However, as the following events suggested all those who 
signed the petition supported the party of freedom and socialism. Seven million 
voted for the party’s candidate who was a former hospital worker suggesting that 198 
 
in the early 21
st century the working class is more aware of its political interests. 
The rapid growth of the P-SOL also indicated a level of frustration among the 
Brazilian working class with the right-wing policies of the Workers Party (PT). 
With their vote they rejected the leadership of the PT who had betrayed their 
socialist ideals.  
 
While  the  revival  of  the  left,  including  the  radical  socialist  multi-tendency 
organisation  has  been  relatively  successful  in  Latin  America,  Europe  and  the 
Middle  East  for  very  different  reasons  the  formation  of  a  multi-tendency 
organisation of the left has not been so successful. While in the Middle East the 
main  reason  against  the  formation  and  growth  of  a  multi-tendency  socialist 
organisation is oppression and censorship, in Europe the main reasons are the 
continuity of social democracy and misapprehension of a major part of the left 
with social democracy. No large multi-tendency socialist organisations will form 
to  change  the  balance  of  forces  in  Western  Europe  without  social  democratic 
parties’  left  inside  learning  to  trust  the  rest  of  the  radical  socialist  left,  their 
disillusionment and participation in the formation of a socialist organisation. For 
example, Arthur Scargil’s Socialist Labour Party and the UK’s Socialist Alliance 
were  not  able  to  find  a  common  language.  As  a  result,  both  organisations 
remained marginal. If instead these two organisations had fused on the basis of a 
common set of socialist principles they might have attracted many more leftists 
from the Labour Party. In spite of setbacks and problems the process of forming a 
socialist multi-tendency organisation is not a closed chapter in European politics. 
 
The previous chapters discussed the worsening of the working class’ work and 
living  conditions  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  high  unemployment,  and  the 
political oppression of dictatorial regimes. The traditional left, and in particular 
the Stalinist pro-Russian parties, betrayed the working class’ ideals and did not 
lead the working class struggle for socialism and freedom throughout the second 
half of the 20
th century. But the rise of the multi-tendency socialist organisation 199 
 
has to do with much more than the defeat and betrayal of Stalinism and social 
democracy discussed in chapter three. 
  
Four processes account for the rise of viable socialist organisations in the 21
st 
century. Firstly, the crisis of capitalism and inability of its alternatives in the third 
world; secondly, the defeat of right wing populism and its corporatist policies; 
thirdly, the defeat of the traditional left; and finally, the defeat and deadlock of 
armed struggle. The following section will discuss these factors. 
 
The World Bank and IMF’s programmes of the last thirty years resulted in more 
destruction of rural life, unemployment, foreign debts, and a bigger gap between 
rich and poor in most  African,  Latin American and Middle Eastern countries. 
Their political alternatives in the form of military dictatorships failed one after the 
other in Latin America. In many countries such as Egypt and Argentina economic 
performances were so poor that they were not able to pay off the interest from 
their foreign loans. As a result, the countries are either like Egypt, in imminent 
risk of Islamic fundamentalism or like Argentina on the verge of revolution. The 
present situation of Argentina can be explained by the defeat of the programmes 
imposed on it by the world economic institutions. 
 
Corporatism  and  corporatist  policies  were  another  way  of  dealing  with  social 
crises facing capitalism in earlier decades. The history of corporatism as a policy 
in Europe, Latin America and countries such as Iran after the Islamic Revolution 
shows that the function of corporate organisations was to blunt the class war. 
Corporatism  did  not  work  when  capital’s  exploitation  of  the  labour  force 
sharpened the  class struggle.  The defeat of the regime’s policies in Argentina 
under Peron and thereafter lay in the fact that private capital’s high exploitation of 
the working class was not compatible with Peron’s corporatist policies. In Iran, 
the  Islamic  Republic  did  not  allow  the  formation  of  independent  economic 
organisations and tried instead to organise “Khaneh kargar” (worker’s houses) to 200 
 
control labour movements. Now after thirty  years this policy is facing  serious 
challenges from workers, as well as the capitalist class. 
 
As  mentioned  in  the  earlier  chapters,  the  traditional  left  worshiped  Eastern 
Europe’s state capitalism. Its emphasis on the  role of the state in running the 
economy was extreme. Building a school or bridge, and making a road had to go 
through central planning bodies and had to wait (sometimes for more than a year) 
in the long bureaucratic channel for a decision while local people had to walk 
through mud and water and their children suffered walking  long distances to get 
to school. Stalinist parties had forgotten to a great extent the role of people as 
producers and consumers and their independent associations and organisations. 
The collapse of the USSR, East Europe, and the expansion of Western democracy 
to Eastern Europe was a major blow to this traditional left. 
 
Armed  struggle  and  guerrilla  movements  had  also  faced  a  deadlock.  Their 
inability to organise people and help them organise themselves independently was 
their Achilles heel. The idea of leading the struggle for socialism by some devoted 
intellectuals without the direct participation of the oppressed classes resulted in 
them  losing  their  appeal  by  the  end  of  the  1980s.  By  that  time,  mass  social 
movements had passed their primary stage of development. They demanded the 
democratisation  of  social,  political  and  economic  life.  At  the  start  of  the  21
st 
century it simply was not possible to unite the movements of workers, women, 
minorities, trade unions, environmentalists, and the urban poor under one banner 
or  represent  their  activities  by  a  single  tactic  or  a  closed  conspiratorial 
organisation. This factor applies to guerrilla warfare as a single tactic, as well as 
to  traditional  Stalinist  parties.  In  order  to  understand  the  socio-political 
background of the socialist left’s rise during the 21
st century, this factor must be 
added  to  the  reasons  for  the  defeat  of  social  democracy  discussed  in  earlier 
chapters.  
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The new left did not question the armed struggle in principle. Daniel 
Ortega, the Sandinista leader said: ‘We could not repeat the mistakes 
of  the  1970s  considering  those  who  did  not  have  a  gun  in  their 
pocket as not a revolutionary.  We could not say today that to be 
revolutionary  we  must  forget  the  armed  struggle  and  commit 
ourselves totally to the bourgeois democratic system’.
3  
 
Eleuterio  Fernández  Huidobro  (a  prominent  leading  member  of  National 
Liberation  Movement  (MLN)  in  Uruguay),  in  an  interview  with  International 
Viewpoint magazine criticised the shortcomings of the armed struggle, bourgeois 
parliamentarism,  Stalinism,  and  emphasised  the  need  for  social  equality, 
democracy and international cooperation amongst socialists against the dominant 
capitalism. The guerrilla movement and its method of struggle was criticised by 
its  previous  leaders  during  the  1980s  and  1990s.  The  Iranian  Revolutionary 
Workers Organisation was formed after the Islamic Revolution in 1980 on three 
premises: an analytical rejection of armed struggle as a tactic and strategy from a 
Marxist point of view; a particular understanding of concepts such as capitalism 
and Imperialism that was fundamentally different from the traditional left as well 
as the populist left; and a rejection of the USSR as a socialist society. The new 
left’s critique of armed struggle emphasised the populist nature of the movement, 
its lack of internal democracy, its lack of clear aims and vision, its ignorance of 
economic  and  grassroots  organisations,  and  its  unilateral  emphasis  on  armed 
struggle as the only recognised revolutionary tactic and strategy. 
 
In short,  In its traditional format the left could not lead the various social groups’ 
struggles in an increasingly complicated society and therefore could not survive 
because of its ideological dependency on Stalinist Russia and the other serious 
problems  discussed  above.  The  guerrilla  movement  was  not  a  solution  and 
became part of the problem itself. The left needed to find a new viable socialist 
organisation for the 21
st century.  The established organisations of the new left in 
Europe,  Latin  America  and  the  Middle  East  were  the  outcomes  of  mistakes, 
weaknesses, and defeats as well as the strengths and victories of previous leftist 202 
 
organisations. They were the efforts of activists to find a solution to the problems 
of socialists’ organisations in the 21
st century.  
 
The multi-tendency organisations that have formed so far in various parts of the 
world are organisations in a transitional period. This is a very important point to 
remember. Their programmes and constitutions have altered since their formation 
and are subject to further changes. All the parties and organisations that formed 
these alliances have not remained within the umbrella organisation – some have 
left, while others have joined. Internal relations between tendencies and groups 
coexisting  within  the  umbrella  organisation  also  changed  and  are  subject  to 
further  changes.  Some  became  lost  within  the  umbrella  organisation,  whereas 
others  became  stronger  within  it.  One  important  challenge  for  socialist  multi-
tendency  organisations  is  whether  they  are  capable  of  establishing  a  stable 
relationship between stronger and weaker tendencies. If it were possible, then on 
what  principle  would  it  be  formed?  Would  it  be  based  on  the  coexistence  of 
smaller organisations within the big umbrella organisation or would it be based on 
the dissolution of all organisations within the big umbrella organisation and the 
familiar system of political parties, where the minority has to obey the majority.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the above mentioned questions based on 
the experience of several existing alliances. This chapter will then examine their 
political  programmes  to  determine  how  socialist  they  are  and  whether  their 
socialism is different from the traditional left. There will be an analysis based on a 
randomly selected questionnaire from two organisations engaged in the formation 
of left unity in Iran in order to determine which social classes the vanguards come 
from  that  form  the  new  organisation.  The  result  of  that  study  can  be  seen  in 
appendix 1. 
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Structure and constitution 
 
The main differences between the newly formed organisations and the traditional 
left as well as guerrilla groups lie in their constitution and structure. As discussed 
in the earlier chapters the new left, unlike traditional parties, do not have a rigid 
structure  or  a  well  defined  constitution.  Moreover,  multi-tendency  socialist 
organisations have to use the process of trial and error because they are relatively 
new and there have not been similar organisations in the recent past that they 
could  base  previous  experiences  on.  From  this  point  of  view,  they  are 
organisations  in  transition.  On  theoretical  and  practical  levels  the  structure  of 
these organisations are changing. Although the range of arguments on structure 
and constitution are very wide, one can say two ideas stand within all alliances 
formed so far. One argument is in favour of a rather disciplined organisation, 
which is similar to a political party. The opposite argument emphasises a rather 
open  loose  organisation  where  internal  relations  are  similar  to  fronts.  These 
arguments differ in form according to various political climates. The following 
section will look at two examples, one from Brazil and the other from the UK. In 
the UK, the Socialist Worker Party (SWP) emphasises the need for a national 
disciplined organisation with a hierarchy and clear constitution that defines the 
position and relations between the leadership and the organisation’s base. The 
following is a brief account of what the SWP suggested for the SA’s constitution: 
 
We need a constitution, which will ensure that the Socialist Alliance 
(SA) becomes more democratic and inclusive and at the same time is 
able to provide effective and coherent national direction. We believe 
that democracy and inclusiveness in the SA requires the principle of 
every member being able to participate in determining the decisions 
and policies of the SA. In particular we believe the principle of one 
member one vote should in general apply to the election of officers 
and other representatives within the alliance. It will be better for the 
executive to be proposed as a slate to produce the most balanced and 
inclusive and at the same time most effective combination for the 
collective leadership of SA. The annual conference will then choose 
what  the  majority  regards  as  the  best  combination  to  meet  the 
objectives  of  democracy,  balance,  inclusiveness  and  effectiveness. 204 
 
Perhaps in future the number of delegates for  at least the  ground 
level affiliates might be brought into proportion to each affiliated 
body. We support the retention of an intermediate body, a national 
council,  between  the  all-members  conference  and  the  national 
executive,  based  upon  representation  for  each  of  the  locally  or 
regionally affiliated SA.
5 
 
It is clear from this passage that the SWP saw the SA as a kind of political party 
or at least possessing the internal coherence of one. When they talked about the 
method of elections for future delegates, it is clear that the SWP preferred a more 
disciplined SA. The Socialist Party (SP) put forward the opposite argument to the 
SWP. The SP was in favour of a federal system. 
 
If we are to maximise the number of campaigns and organisations 
that are prepared to join the SA, it is crucial that we have a federal 
approach. This means that we unite the participating forces on the 
basis of a common socialist platform, while allowing organisations, 
groups and individuals, to uphold their own political positions. The 
idea put forward by the SWP and others that we can only grow on 
the basis of centralisation, is utterly untrue. The constitution we are 
proposing  makes  the  local  alliances  the  key  unit  of  SA  where 
campaigning and electoral decisions will be taken.
6 
 
As far as the SP was concerned their proposed constitution and ideas about a 
federal  structure  were  not  a  temporary  solution  for  the  SA’s  problems  during 
2001. They saw the federal system as a principle that underlay the structure of the 
SA or any similar coalition, regardless of its size and effectiveness in the UK’s 
politics. 
 
 In Brazil, which has the weakest democratic tradition compared to the rest of 
Latin America, this problem appeared in a different format. Here the question is 
whether or not to allow factionalism within the Workers Party. Before outlining 
the Brazilian method and in order to understand why they chose such a method 
for the coexistence of various tendencies, one must first look at some factors that 
account for the rise of the Workers Party in Brazil. 
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The pro-Russian (Stalinist) communist party in Brazil, in line with other Stalinist 
Parties “supported the bourgeois governments of Brazil between 1950-54, 1955-
60, and 1961-64 hoping that they might push the country’s development strategy 
toward socialism and carry out land reform.”
7 But the 1964 coup that received 
total support from all the bourgeoisie’s factions discredited the communist party’s 
strategy of supporting the so-called progressive bourgeoisie. After 1964 under 
Marigla’s leadership the party started an armed struggle, which ended with his 
death  and  the  death  of  all  the  other  radical  leaders.  In  1973  following  the 
oppression of another armed movement led by a Maoist tendency, which led to 
the party’s split and complete destruction of this movement, the military regime, 
pressed  by  international  capital  to  democratise,  allowed  the  formation  of  an 
opposition party which later became the vehicle of people’s discontent against the 
military regime.  
 
The  military  regime  had  opened  the  door  for  foreign  capital  to  exploit  cheap 
labour in Brazil. As a result, Brazil became a safe haven for exploitation, and 
accompanied by rapid economic growth and industrialisation, which is known as 
Brazil’s miracle. This rapid industrialisation however, deepened social inequality, 
and as a result, the radical trade union movement of the 1970s appeared. This was 
the end of a decade of exploitation by all the major car companies including Ford, 
Krupp, Fiat, Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, etc.  
 
From 1977 onwards many Brazilian leftist forces, who did not trust the traditional 
left (pro-Russian, pro-China, and populist) started a process of meetings where 
they discussed the need for a radical socialist organisation. In 1979 the worker’s 
party officially announced its socialist principle. At the beginning 60% of the 
activists belonged to trade unions and the rest were politicians, journalists and 
representatives of ultra leftist groups. These groups were mainly Trotskyists and 
activists from the 1970s guerrilla movement. Later when the PT became more 
serious  politically  factions  from  the  communist  party,  Maoists,  student  based 
groups,  the  Fourth  International,  Castro  supporters,  feminist  groups,  human 206 
 
rights’ activists, supporters of political prisoners, local activists and some radical 
leftist catholic groups joined the party. By the beginning of the 1980s the party’s 
social base had expanded to the rest of the working class such as white collar 
workers, teachers and bank officers.  
 
The motivation of some of these leftist groups was to use the party’s semi-public 
and  open  activities  for  their  secret  political  activities  and  to  expand  their 
influence. Lula opposed the dual membership of faction members and tactical use 
of some groups within the party, as that would undermine the party authority, 
cause disagreement, problems, and division between party activists. However, he 
believed that time would solve the problem. Some of the groups, who had earlier 
joined the PT, later dissolved themselves into the Workers Party. After 1983 the 
secret  agreement  between  different  fractions  was  replaced  by  a  system  of 
proportional representation in the election for the national leadership. By this time 
the  main  fraction  of  the  party  had  managed  to  organise  the  majority  of  party 
activists, about 70%, and therefore maintained the consistency and the unity of the 
party. “In spite of this those groups and organisations that still had kept their own 
grouping  stayed  in  the  party.”
8  In  April  1986  faction  members  that  were 
dependent  on  the  Revolutionary  Communist Party  of  Brazil  participated  in  an 
armed operation to confiscate a bank’s assets in order to help the revolutionaries 
in  Nicaragua.  During  the  operation they  were captured.  The  Workers’  Party’s 
leadership expelled them immediately for their undisciplined action. Two months 
later  during  the  party’s  fourth  national  conference  control  over  the  party’s 
fractions became tighter and this process went on until the beginning of 1987. In 
January  the  fifth  national  conference  passed  a  resolution  and  agreed  on  even 
stronger control over the factions and fractions within the party. The conference 
resolution announced:  
 
The Workers’ Party would not tolerate the following organisations 
within its ranks: Those who follow particular policies and put their 
policies before the party’s general policies; those with particular 
leadership against party leadership; those who have distinguished 207 
 
particular  presence  in  the  general  meetings;  those  who  have 
particular discipline that inevitably     leads to dual membership; 
those  with  parallel  and  close  structures  against  party  structure; 
those with institutionalised organic finance system; and those with 
the regular news and general particular paper.
9 
 
However,  the  resolution  became  a  point  of  disagreement  between  the  party’s 
centre  and the fractions until the first congress held in 1991. While the centre 
argued  for  centralism,  the  fractions  emphasised  the  need  for  openness  and 
expansion on the range of their operations. In 1991 the following principles were 
accepted.  
 
All  tendencies  must  be  allowed  to  have  enough  space  for  propaganda          
around their opinions within the party, but organising meetings with non-
party members was forbidden and it was suggested that they hold their 
meetings in the party offices where other party members could also attend. 
The tendencies could have bulletins for their discussions within the party 
and  make  suggestions  about  present  political  situations  or  social 
movements,  but  distribution  of  any  publication  outside  the  party  was 
forbidden. They might have some mechanism for donations and financial 
resources if this practice did not undermine the party financial mechanism. 
International relations would be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the 
national executive of the party. The party leadership would continue all 
channels of relations created by the tendencies. The tendencies should not 
impose centralism on their activists. The position of a tendency should not 
oppose or contradict with the implementation of the party’s decisions.
10 
 
Clearly  this  system  was  different  from  a  political  front  where  the  decisions 
stemmed  from  the  front’s  group  members.  In  this  structure,  although  the 
tendencies existed and had a certain degree of freedom of operation within the 
constitution of the umbrella organisation, the structure was more like a political 
party and was based on certain principles that made it different from Stalinist 
bureaucratic  centralist  parties.  This  unique  structure  had  the  strengths  of  a 
political  party,  while  reducing  its  weaknesses  to  a  minimal  level.  In  fact,  the 
internal democracy practiced by the new left organisations represents the radical 
democracy that they suggested for the society as a whole.  
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The  differences  between  the  arguments  of  these  two  alliances  in  the  UK  and 
Brazil appeared for two reasons. Firstly, the political situation and atmosphere of 
these  alliances  were  different.  In  the  UK,  bourgeois  democracy  was  well 
established.  Consequently, the need for an organised well-disciplined party was 
much less obvious than in Brazil, which had the lowest tradition of democracy in 
Latin  America.  Secondly,  the  Brazilian  Workers’  Party  in  the  1990s  was  an 
organisation  with  several  years  of  experience.  This  organisation  was  well 
established and had become a successful alternative to state power. The SA in the 
UK had only just been formed and despite its achievements, was still a novice. It 
appeared  that  the  destiny  of  the  SA  (if  it  had  survived)  would  have  been  an 
alliance with certain degree of discipline very similar to what the SWP suggested. 
Needless to say that it is wrong to generalise this conclusion because each case 
had its particularities and stemmed from different experiences.  
 
Aim and objectives 
 
There was a clear difference between the aims and objectives of the traditional 
left and the alliances of the left created after 1980.  The difference was not just 
about what they wrote in their programmes, but more importantly it was about 
their  meaning.  For  example,  the  new  left’s  understanding  of  terms  such  as 
socialism  or  democracy  and  the  relationship  between  these  terms  was 
fundamentally different from that of the traditional left. 
 
There is no need to repeat what has been said about the traditional left in earlier 
chapters. It is enough to mention that the traditional left suffered from ideological 
dependency on the USSR, China, and even Albania. The parties of the traditional 
left did not have independent policies. Any change in the USSR’s or  China’s 
policies  reflected  immediately  on  their  national  or  domestic  policies.  Their 
programmes had nothing to do with their daily policies. After the Second World 
War,  they  rarely  mentioned  socialism  in  their  programmes  and  instead  used 
another formula. The aim became the national democratic revolution, which was 209 
 
more  right  wing  than  popular  democracies.  Socialism  for  traditional  left-wing 
Stalinist parties depended on help from the USSR in the form of non-capitalist 
development  strategy.  Without  the USSR’s  foreign  aid  there  could  be  no  talk 
about  socialism.  In  other  words,  their  socialism  (if  there  was  one)  would  be 
brought in from above. In fact, their understanding of socialism was mechanistic. 
Socialism for them meant the number of tractors, the size of steel production, etc. 
These parties talked about industrialisation more than they talked about socialism 
in their programmes. They quoted Lenin’s report to Communist International in 
1921 where he mentioned USSR’s achievements in various fields out of context 
and concluded that socialism meant electrification and soviets. They had forgotten 
the fact that once in power Lenin had to provide electricity, water, and basic needs 
to the population, which had nothing to do with them as opposition parties. In 
Russia under Stalin the bureaucratised party was so busy with its five years plans 
that it had forgotten the working class as the implementer of those plans. The 
effect of five years plans had mesmerised the traditional Stalinist parties around 
the world. The issue was not whether they were aware of the conditions of the 
working class in Russia, their alienation, disappointment, and frustration, which 
were reflected in the alcoholism of many sections of the Russian working class. 
These bureaucratic parties had removed socialism from their programmes. If they 
did mention socialism, they meant something similar to the USSR or worse. The 
working class and their role were absent in such a meaning. An elitist bureaucratic 
party could not fight for the supremacy of the working class. 
 
The new left’s alliances such as WLU in Iran, an alliance of leftist groups with a 
democratic party in Turkey, Campaign for a Marxist party, the SA in the UK, the 
Party of Socialism and Freedom (P-SOL) – previously a leftist section of PT in 
Brazil, the Party of Communist Refoundation in Italy, Workers’ Party in Russia, 
the  United  Left  founded  in  1980  in Peru,  the  Workers  Party  for  the  Socialist 
Revolution (PTRS) in Venezuela, the Zapatistas in Mexico, the leftist section of 
the  Movement  for  Socialism  in  Bolivia,  and  the leftist  tendencies  of  Socialist 
Party  –  Broad  Front  in  Ecuador  as  well  as  many  other  newly  formed  multi-210 
 
tendency socialist organisations in other countries all have similar programmes. 
The  foundations  of  these  programmes,  unlike  the  traditional  left  and  Stalinist 
parties, are not state socialism. Political freedoms, democracy, and the agency of 
the  revolution  are  equally  important.  In  most  cases,  it  is  believed  that  the 
realisation  of  the  programmes  depends  on  the  degree  of  working  class 
organisation. That is to say, without an organised working class actively involved 
in the building of the system on every level there will be no socialism. This makes 
multi-tendency  organisation’s  socialism  a  participatory  workers’  socialism.  In 
other words, the three principles of workers’ socialism by the organised working 
class  and  the  poorest  sections  of  society    based  on  the  widest  possible 
understanding  of  freedom  and  democracy  are  interconnected.  They  borderline 
policies  that lead  the  working  class  to  victory  and  change  their  position  from 
being ruled to becoming the ruling class.    
 
The programme 
 
These alliances are different from the traditional left not just in what they 
have put in their programmes, but more importantly by what they mean. 
At  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  the  Iranian  Revolutionary  Workers 
Organisation (IRWO) otherwise known as Rahe Kargar, a component of 
the Iranian  Worker’s  Left Unity (WLU) defined their understanding of 
democracy and socialism as follows: 
 
Democracy, meaning the government by the majority, can only be   
implemented  if  all  citizens,  equally  and  without  exception,  enjoy 
complete political freedom. Workers, the destitute, the dispossessed, 
and  the  poor,  who  constitute  the  vast  majority  of  the  population, 
should be able to overthrow the official and actual privileges of the 
capitalist  landowning  classes  and  high  ranking  officials  and  truly 
take control of the running of every aspect of the country.
11 
 
Moreover  it  is  equally  important  to  see  how  Rahe  Kargar  considers  the 
relationship between this radical version of democracy and socialism. In the same 211 
 
document  Rahe  Kargar  also  makes  clear  how  they  perceive  the  relationship 
between socialism and democracy: 
 
Socialism  can  be  constructed  upon  this  true  democracy,  i.e.  self-
government of the people and the rule of the exploited majority over 
the  exploiting  minority.  This  complete  democracy  is  inseparable 
from  the  definition  of  socialism  and  its  goals;  without  such 
democracy  the  social  and  economic  goals  of  socialism  are 
unobtainable.
12 
 
And finally IRWO’s definition of socialism is quite different from the socialism 
understood by the traditional pro-Russian Tudeh party in Iran. In the introduction 
to its programme, Rahe Kargar defines socialism and the way they understand it.  
 
Mankind will only be liberated from the slavery of capital through 
socialism. Socialism is when the majority of the population truly rule 
over society, in their life and destiny; when private ownership of the 
means of production and exchange is transferred to social property 
the rational programming of production and consumption; and the 
transformation of capitalist society - with its classes and class enmity 
- to a society where the free development of each individual, is the 
precondition  for  the  free  development  of  all.  The  acquisition  of 
political sovereignty by the working class is the initial condition for 
the establishment of socialism.
13  
 
The programme of the Workers’ Party in Brazil defined socialism in the same 
format. Its socialism like the ORWI was a democratic socialism. According to 
Markarian,  political  freedom  was  an  inseparable  part  of  their  socialism.  The 
party’s  critique  of  Eastern  bloc  socialism  emphasised  the  lack  of  freedom, 
monopoly of power by a single party, ultra-centralised and ineffective economic 
organisation,  and  elite  rule  instead  of  working  class  rule.  The  Workers’  Party 
emphasised socialisation instead of state ownership of the means of production as 
the essential condition of economic democracy. It also stressed the need for direct 
participation  of  the  majority  of  the  population  in  the  process  of  economic 
programming.  At its fifth conference the party emphasised the following:  
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The capture of political power as a pre-condition for the building of 
socialism, making the working class a hegemonic class in society to 
enable  this  class  for  implementation  of  these  objectives,  political 
organisation  of  the  workers  in  their  daily  struggle  as  the  main 
activity  of  the  party  instead  of  using  them  as  a  voting  machine, 
maintaining socialist aims, rejection of reformism and gradualism, 
and  support  of  democracy  as  an  inseparable  part  of  socialism, 
freedom of parties and  formation, and the support of women and 
blacks in their struggle, etc. 
14 
 
This  understanding  of  socialism,  democracy  and  the  relationship  between 
democracy  and socialism coincides with Marx’s understanding of these terms. 
When Marx and Engels stressed that “we should have an association, in which the 
free development of each is the condition for the free development of all,”
15 they 
were emphasising the relationship between democracy and socialism. Moreover, 
they wrote, “The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the 
proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.”
16 
What did they mean when they said to “win the battle of democracy?” Clearly 
Marx  opposed  the  indirect  and  bureaucratic  democracy  of  Western  Europe. 
Therefore,  parliamentary  democracy  was  not  the  answer  to  this  question.  An 
Iranian political thinker explained what they meant.  
 
No doubt they did not mean to gain power in a free election and then 
keep it forever by cancelling all free elections thereafter. One should 
remember that the possibility of gaining power in a free election was 
much less probable 140 years ago. Therefore by winning the battle 
of  democracy  they  meant  victory  in  a  political  revolution  for 
democratisation of state structure and preparation for worker’s rule.
17   
 
It  must  be  noted  that  Marx’s  understanding  of  democracy  was  completely 
different from James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Schumpeter 
and other liberal philosophers. For Marx, democracy was not only a means it was 
an  aim  in  itself.  In  a  democratic  system  the  working  class  would  gather  for 
discussions related to programming and decision making, which could help them 
to improve their culture, knowledge, and understanding of the political process. 
For Marx, unlike liberal thinkers, the effect of working class participation in the 213 
 
programming  of  society  was  more  important  than  the  technical  role  of  each 
worker as a voter. It was this participation that would make the workers a class for 
themselves. In those meetings the working class could learn much more than each 
worker  could  ever  learn  individually.  Marxists  preferred  direct  democracy  as 
opposed  to  indirect  parliamentary  bourgeois  democracy  because  of  the 
possibilities  soviet  democracy  provided  the  working  class  to  improve  their 
culture.  While  direct  democracy  educated  the  working  class,  parliamentary 
democracy (as an elitist form of governance) alienated it and kept the working 
class in darkness.     
 
The success and improvement of participatory democracy was related to political 
formations and organisation in society. That is to say, in order to enable workers 
and poor councils to confront various political, social, and economic problems 
and  help  them  overcome  many  hurdles  and  obstacles  on  their  way,  the 
proletariats’  political  organisations,  socialist  media,  press,  along  with  other 
centres  of  public  expression  will  have  an  important  role  to  play.    “The 
administration of society, which replaces the market, must be conducted with the 
maximum degree of participation. This clearly requires that there be a multi-party 
system, or at least a multi-tendency system with different views, platforms and 
open voting when necessary.”
18 Other revolutionary Marxists continued Marx’s 
understanding of democracy. 
 
Rosa Luxemburg was a Marxist thinker who expressed special emphasis on the 
relationship  between  socialism  and  democracy.  In  her  article  concerning  the 
Russian Revolution, Luxemburg criticised Bolshevik leaders such as Lenin and 
Trotsky  for  their  lack  of  understanding  of  the  importance  of  democracy.  For 
Luxemburg,  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  was  nothing  but  a  socialist 
democracy.  
 
 Socialist democracy begins simultaneously with the beginnings of 
the destruction of class rule and of the construction of socialism. It 
begins at the very moment of the seizure of power by the socialist 214 
 
party. It is the same thing as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yes, 
dictatorship!  But  this  dictatorship  consists  in  the  manner  of 
applying democracy, not in its elimination…. But this dictatorship 
must be the work of the class and not of a little leading minority in 
the name of the class - that is, it must proceed step by step out of 
the active participation of the masses, it must be under their direct 
influence, subjected to the control of complete public activity; it 
must arise out of the growing political training of the mass of the 
people.
19 
 
For  Luxemburg  the  main  teaching  of  Lenin  and  Trotsky’s  theory,  like  Karl 
Kautsky, did not see harmony between democracy and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. For them, the relationship between the two was either dictatorship or 
democracy.  According  to  Luxemburg,  Kautsky  supported  democracy  in  the 
bourgeois meaning  of  the  term  and  the Bolsheviks supported  dictatorship  and 
rejected democracy. This might not have been a fair judgment as far as Lenin was 
concerned.  Lenin ignored democratic rights during the constitutional assembly 
after the October revolution. Moreover, he led a campaign in the party to ban 
factionalism.  However,  those  undemocratic  actions  could  not  be  understood 
without  the  consideration  of  foreign  threat  and  the  condition  of  civil  war  in 
Russia. But for the other Bolshevik leaders such as Stalin, Luxemburg’s criticism 
was  very  fair  and  based  on  Marxist  theory.  Moreover,  it  was  not  difficult  to 
understand that Pol Pot’s regime had no place for democracy in any meaning of 
the term.  
 
It  was  only  in  a  system  of  participatory  socialist  democracy  that  a  socialist 
economy could be built. It was only in such a system that Marx’s famous phrase, 
“The  emancipation  of  the  working  class  must  be  won  by  the  working  class 
itself,”
20 had its full meaning. Among Marxists, Rosa Luxemburg was one of the 
most  prominent  thinkers  whose  understanding  of  the  working  class’s  socialist 
revolution  was  identical  to  that  of  Marx.    For  her, like  Marx, the  creation  of 
socialism could not be legislated from above or brought to the working class by a 
party or a government, it had to come from the masses and be built by the masses. 215 
 
As she pointed out, the participation of every proletarian and every member of the 
proletariat as a class was necessary to build a healthy socialist democracy. 
This rebuilding and this transformation cannot be decreed by some 
authority, commission or parliament; they can only be undertaken 
and carried out by the mass itself…socialism will not be and cannot 
be  inaugurated  by  decrees;  it  cannot  be  established  by  any 
government  however  admirably  socialistic.  Socialism  must  be 
created by the masses, must be made by every proletarian. 
21 
 
Therefore  multi–tendency  socialist  alliances  were  opposed  traditional  Stalinist 
parties; firstly, in the  way they looked at democracy  and its  relationship with 
socialism.  For  the  alliances  in  Europe,  Latin  America  and  the  Middle  East, 
socialism could not be built without the widest possible freedom and democracy. 
Secondly,  unlike  traditional  parties  the  structure  of  multi–tendency  socialist 
organisations  as  discussed  above  was  not  a  top  down  relation  but  rather 
horizontal. Thirdly, unlike traditional parties they emphasised the importance of 
the agent of socialism. Without an organised working class capable of defending 
its right and with it the emancipation of the whole of humanity there could be no 
talk  of  socialism.  The  previous  chapters  discussed  how  the  traditional  parties 
neglected the working class grassroots organisations, how Stalinism had reduced 
the class struggle to the relation between states, and how  Stalinist communist 
parties  sometimes  condemned  the  workers’  strike to  satisfy  the  USSR  and  its 
foreign  policy  requirements.    However,  there  was  one  more  element  that 
separated multi–tendency organisations from the traditional left. The next section 
will discuss the third element in more detail. 
 
The Achilles Heel of the alliances  
 
Before moving to the third element of the alliances’ programme, it is necessary to 
mention that (in the cases of the Brazilian Workers’ Party and Iranian Worker’s 
Left  Unity  -  WLU)  unlike  clear  understandings  of  the  relationship  between 
socialism and democracy, when it came to the political economy of socialism 
these alliances were not that clear. In analysing the causes for the collapse of the 216 
 
USSR many commentators including Mohammad Reza Shalgoni of Rahe Kargar 
in Iran put blame on the extremism of Stalinism and the complete elimination of 
market relations. As serious political organisations, to avoid being characterised 
as  semi-Stalinist,  both  of  the  above  mentioned  alliances  searched  to  find  a 
plausible argument for the necessity of the market in their political economy of 
socialism. For example, Paul Singer the main economist of the Workers’ Party in 
Brazil preferred to support the suggested pattern of Alec Nove in which a market 
mechanism  existed  to  some  degree.  After  1990  the  leadership  of  the  Iranian 
Revolutionary Workers Organisation (ORWI) also known as Rahe Kargar also 
accepted that some degree of market relations could exist in their socialism. The 
literature of these alliances on this matter was different compared to the ideas of 
Marx and Marxist thinkers. For a radical Marxist, “The commodity fetishism and 
therefore  the  abstract  labour  must  be  abolished  to  establish  socialism  and  it 
necessarily  involves  the  complete  destruction  of  exchange  value  and  so  the 
market.”
22 The implementation of this task could be the most important step and 
perhaps  the  most  difficult  task  in  the  transition  of  capitalism  to  socialism. 
Feudalism  and  capitalism  have  many  important  common  characteristics. 
However,  it  took  more  than  one  hundred  years  for  capitalism  to  sweep  away 
feudalist traditions. Capitalism and socialism have nothing in common and it will 
be unusual to expect an easy transition from the first to the latter. 
  
It must be added that the literature of the above mentioned alliances did not use 
words such as abolition of wage labour, withering away of the market, etc. In fact, 
the literature of the ORWI over the past two decades has avoided using such 
language. Instead, they preferred to use phrases such as controlled markets, which 
became fashionable after the collapse of the USSR. A controlled market could be 
different from the gradual disappearance of the market, which was much closer to 
Marx’s  view  put  forward  in  the  Critique  of  the  Gotha  Programme.  After  the 
October Revolution, unable to find a solution to the difficult task of replacing the 
market, Stalinism imposed another form of control on the Russian working class. 
In spite of several attempts to replace money, the market and exchange value 217 
 
continued  to  exist.  Stalinism  as  a  bureaucratic  tendency  was  not  capable  of 
implementing participatory socialism. However, between 1917 and 1922, under 
Lenin the Bolshevik party was not able to implement such a task either. Five 
years  after  the  October  Revolution  Lenin’s  acceptance  of  NEP  is  the  best 
argument for the difficulties of the destruction of market, money, and exchange 
value. Encircled in a sea of capitalism socialism could not be built in one country. 
Money, the market, and exchange value could not disappear in a single country as 
long  as  that  country  needed  economic  relations with other  market  economies. 
Lenin and Trotsky had held on to power waiting for the revolution to happen in 
major European countries.  
 
The  necessary  abolition  of  abstract  labour  creates  a  series  of 
problems, which if not solved can lead to a different form of control 
over  the  worker,  leaving  the  worker  alienated  in  a  new  form,  as 
under  Stalinism…the  solution  is  that  of  direct  control  over 
management of all institutions in the society.
23 
 
The  question  of  management  is  a  socialist  economic  problem  for  which  the 
answer has yet to be found. In other words, “The exact form of the transition 
period is the most controversial and possibly the most interesting question of the 
post-revolutionary  situation.”
24  In  addition  to  the  difficulties  of  economic 
transition from capitalism to socialism discussed above, it must be remembered 
that these alliances are in the process of being. They have changed in the last two 
decades and there is no doubt that they will change further in the future. Thus, 
perhaps it is too soon to generalise the ideas of one economist or even one of the 
component organisations of an alliance. The experiences of the last two decades 
do not automatically lead to the conclusion that these alliances are not socialist 
because they believe in market socialism. However, the facts from these years are 
undeniable. Many of the coalitions formed have mainly been in Latin America. In 
almost all of them the right wing populists or social democrats are dominant and 
radical Marxists have the lower hand. There is no guarantee that the right will stay 
in a coalition if the left had been dominant. In countries such as Brazil, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua the coalitions of left and centre left managed 218 
 
to come to power. Despite their electoral success everywhere the market, wage 
labouring, and commodity relations are intact. In spite of some reforms, the state 
and class structure are not directly attacked in any of those countries. Though the 
globalized  economy,  finance  capital  and  balance of  forces  in  the  international 
political system is not in favour of these leftist regimes, the leadership of the right 
wing factions in those coalitions also have an important role in their lack of will 
power to attack the essence of capitalist relations in their countries.  
 
Class based politics 
 
In  addition  to  differences  in  the  terms  of  their  aim  and  structure  with  the 
traditional left, the third major element of the WLU principles states that only a 
working class that is organised independently can be the agency of socialism. 
Working class self-organisation is a pre-condition for the victory of any socialist 
revolution. This phenomenon also separates this alliance from the traditional left’s 
organisations and parties. It was mentioned earlier that from the mid-20
th century 
until the 1980s, neither pro-Russian communist parties nor guerrilla movements 
paid much attention to the working class and its daily struggle. Three decades of 
political involvement (while at the same time neglecting working class affairs) 
left a historical gap between the older generation of experienced shop stewards 
and revolutionary workers and the younger generations of the working class. No 
doubt  there  are  specific  accounts  of  various  cases  in  different  countries.  This 
section will examine two examples of discontinuity to make the point clearer, one 
from the UK and the other from Iran. Alan Thornett, in his personal and political 
account of organising car workers in Britain, explained how the communist party 
lost its interest in the working class after the Second World War. 
 
In earlier years there had been a pressed steel branch of the CP but 
this was finished by the time I joined. There were then two branches, 
a city branch and a university branch which had little contact with 
each other. There were not many CP members in Morris Motors. In 
the city branch we met the radical middle-class core of the Oxford 219 
 
CP. Organisation in the car plants did not feature in the work of the 
city branch. CP candidates in the local elections were a major focus. 
We saw them as genuine people but having little to do with us. They 
were attracted to the Soviet Union and they were involved in the 
movement against the US bases which was strong in Oxford at that 
time, but they were steeped in the particular class collaboration of 
CP wartime politics and they supported the parliamentary road to 
socialism.
25 
 
The example of Iran is a better example. It shows the effect the Tudeh Party’s 
policy changes had on the organisation of the working class. According to Ali 
Ashtyani,  without  taking  the  role  of  this  party  into  consideration,  it  was 
impossible to study the working class movement in Iran from 1941 onwards. The 
policies and change in party programmes had a deep impact on the working class 
movement. In the early 1940s, 14 of the 18 United Council of Trade Unions’ 
members were also Tudeh party members. The policy change of a party with such 
a wide range of working class support had a huge impact on the working class’ 
movement. 
 
The policies of popular front against Fascism (the Stalin, Dimitrov 
thesis) were copied in Iran by the Tudeh party. The policies of the 
party based on popular front thesis put an end to the trade union 
activities in the southern oil areas of Iran, which was an area under 
British  rule  at  the  time.  Moreover,  this  party  even  condemned 
workers’ strike of 1946 at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as the 
sabotage of fascist supporters to protect British interests, which had 
an alliance with the USSR at the time.
26  
 
The Tudeh Party continued its anti-working class policies to the extent that it even 
participated in the bourgeois government and prepared the Labour Law, which 
made the factory council a tool of the government. According to this law: 
 
The factory council consisted of a worker’s representative, who had 
to be nominated by a union in which the majority of the workers 
were members, if there was not a union the worker’s representative 
would be elected by the workers under the supervision of the labour 
ministry.  Also  in  that  council  there  was  a  representative  of  the 
employer and a representative of the labour ministry. This was the 220 
 
suggestion of a party who claimed to be the party of the working 
class. It is no wonder the Shah’s regime kept this law.
27 
 
The traditional left’s starting point was ideology, whereas the alliances’ starting 
point was class politics. That is to say, for a traditional party in the 1970s and 
1980s, regardless of social activity, one’s acceptance of party ideology (Stalinism 
or Maoism) was enough to make one a member of the traditional party. This was 
not the case with the new alliances. Firstly, in most of these alliances there existed 
more than one ideology, even though one might be pre-dominant. Secondly, it 
consisted of activists from various social groups and therefore various fractions 
with  particular  emphasis  and  sometimes  even  different  politics.  Although,  as 
mentioned earlier in cases such as the Workers’ Party of Brazil, the alliance had 
managed to take on the form and organisational patterns of a political party, in the 
other cases the organisational pattern was something between a political party and 
a political front. To illustrate this point, one need only to look at the components 
of the original UK Socialist Alliance to see why the alliance could not be based 
upon a single ideology. The SA was supported by different organisations. These 
organisations  were:  Alliance  for  Workers’  Liberty,  Communist  Party of  Great 
Britain,  Democratic  Labour  Party,  International  Socialist  Group,  International 
Socialist  League,  Leeds  Left  Alliance,  Lewisham  Independent  Socialists,  Red 
Action, Revolutionary Democratic Group, Socialist Party of England and Wales, 
Socialist  Perspectives,  Socialist  Solidarity  Network,  Socialist  Workers  Party, 
Workers International, and Workers Power. Many journalists, lawyers, hundreds 
of  long  standing  Labour  activists,  and  hundreds  of  shop  stewards  and  trade 
unionists must be added to this list. In 2003 the SWP led the SA into an alliance 
with George Galloway and other figures involved in the Stop the War Coalition to 
form  the  RESPECT  Coalition.  In  late  2004  some  SA  member  organisations, 
which  remained  outside  of  RESPECT  joined  with  the  Socialist  Party  and  the 
Alliance for Green  Socialism to establish the Socialist Green Unity Coalition. 
Finally, what was re-launched in 2005 as the SA did not grow and eventually 
entered  into  mutual  affiliation  with  its  largest  supporting  organisation  –  the 
Alliance for Green Socialism. In spite of all these ups and downs, a brief look at 221 
 
the  original  SA  list  suggests  that  ideologies  such  as  Marxism,  Leninism, 
Stalinism, Trotskyism, anarchism and even Liberalism existed within the rank and 
file of the SA.  When this is the case, the most reasonable policy to keep the 
alliance’s unity is to avoid any step toward one interpretation of ideology. That is 
to say, to base the alliance on common political principles not only makes the 
alliance more effective, but it also helps to hold it together. This does not mean 
that the alliance must not have political principles. Freedom, real democracy, and 
socialism are those common principles that all existing members of the alliance’s 
support. What they cannot support is a particular understanding of these principles 
by any single group. There is nothing wrong with having various understandings 
of a principle as long as unity in action and policy-making is preserved. As Mao 
put it in page 302 of his Little Red Book, “Let a hundred flowers blossom and a 
hundred schools of thought contend.”  
 
The point is not to argue that having an ideology is a bad thing. The point is that 
ideology  as  a  personal  and  philosophical  system  of  beliefs  can  be  good  and 
necessary if its role is not mixed with politics. It is harmful however when it takes 
the  role  of  politics.  The  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  is  an  example  of  religious 
ideology replacing politics. The church’s rule during Middle Ages in Europe is 
another. Stalinism as an ideology is a third and there are many more examples to 
support  the  idea  when  ideology  takes  over  the  role  of  politics  the  result  is 
disastrous. Ideology is a tool used to understand and interpret the world around 
us.  Such  a  tool  is  very  necessary  and  useful.  However,  it  is  not  designed  to 
determine the tactics of the party. The role of politics is to take specific steps. 
Ideology cannot answer what should be produced, how it should be produced, or 
how products should be consumed. Just because Marx said religion is the opium 
of the masses, alliances in Latin America should not necessarily announce war on 
religion. Marxism as an ideology was not compatible with liberation theology in a 
workers’ party. However, it could be a potential ally. It was obvious that each 
Marxist  group  within  Socialist  Alliance in  the  UK  interpreted  and  understood 
British capitalism differently to the other groups. All these interpretations could 222 
 
remain within the alliance, as long as all the groups united behind the common 
policies and decisions resulting from their common understanding. To put it in a 
different way, it did not harm any group if the alliance had several interpretations 
as long as they could come up with a single united policy. There was nothing 
wrong  with  having  predomination  of  one  interpretation  as  long  as  other 
interpretations had the freedom to exist, to be active, and to defend their ideas in 
discussions. 
 
About 50% of the activists in the Workers’ Party in Brazil and around 20% of the 
original British SA’s activist came from the working class and its trade unions.
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This in itself meant that they were seriously involved in working class affairs. In 
spite  of  this  achievement,  emphasis  on  the  working  class  orientation  of  these 
alliances was not only due to the quantity of worker activists as members of the 
alliance. Based on the quantity of the workers in its ranks the Labour Party is a 
workers party. But the Labour party is not the historical representative of the 
working class in Britain. Solidarity in Poland was a similar example. Having the 
workers  as  members  on  its  own  does  not  make  an  organisation  the  historical 
representative of the working class.  When it is said that unlike the traditional 
left’s parties  the  new  alliances are  working  class oriented,  it  means  that  their 
emphasis is similar to that of Rosa Luxemburg. It means that the organisation is 
struggling  for  the  supremacy  of  the  working  class.  It  means  fighting  for 
independent workers’ organisations from the state and from the political parties. 
No doubt having 75% of the alliance’s members coming from the working class is 
better than 20% or even 50% but this pre-condition does not necessarily lead to 
real internal democracy, unless the alliance involves its lower ranks in its decision 
making.  If  referendums  are  used  regularly  as  their  policy-making  method, 
officials  and  leading  committees  are  regularly  changed  and  being  checked 
regularly, and leadership opportunities are really open to every member, then a 
workers’ alliance may become the historical representative of the working class. 
However,  without  these  qualities  having  20%,  50%,  or  75%  of  workers  as 
members does not make much difference. In other words, the higher quantity of 223 
 
workers  in  the  ranks  plus  the  higher  practice  of  direct  democracy  within  a 
political organisation are among the most important conditions of understanding 
and practicing socialist democracy by that organisation. The working classes are 
seeking an alternative that is not hierarchical, exploitative, and alienating. This 
explains the formation of alliances in so many countries after the collapse of the 
USSR. The workers joined these alliances hoping that this time they would have 
the experience of the past to keep control of their organisations in their hands. The 
fulfilment of this dream may take sometime.  
 
When considered externally and on the scale of society as a whole, the 
importance  of  the  third  element  of  the  new  alliance’s  programme  is 
greater.  Workers’  socialism  or  workers’  state  is  a  political  system  of 
participatory  democracy.  It  is  real  democracy  where  the  workers  who 
consist of more than 80% of the society participate in many ways in the 
decision  making  process.  Such  a  system  is  also  called  participatory 
socialist democracy. The members of a socialist workers’ coalition in a 
capitalist society are still alienated as long as class society continues to 
exist. Only a system of participatory socialism could put an end to the 
alienation of the working class.  
 
 
The  above  mentioned  alliances  all  have  similar  alternatives  to  the  present 
capitalist  system.  These  alternatives  whether  they  are  called  a  workers’  state, 
participatory socialism, socialist democracy, participatory democracy, etc all have 
similar emphasises. They emphasise real democracy and the right to participate in 
the process of decision making for every producer and consumer as the major way 
to end capitalism’s alienation. In many cases they have a radical understanding of 
democracy and place emphasis on the need for workers’ self management. Unlike 
Stalinist  parties  they  believe  in  the  expansion  of  bourgeois  democracy  and 
individual  freedoms,  and  a  mixture  of  direct  and  indirect  democracy  with 
particular  emphasis  on  the  role  of  direct  democracy  as  the  basis  of  their 
alternative  at  the  local  and  regional  level.  Furthermore,  they  emphasise  the 224 
 
socialisation of the means of production, reorganisation of economic and labour 
organisations with less space for the market, introduction of democratic planned 
economy from below, and some of them emphasise the end of exploitation and 
wage slavery. As mentioned earlier this last point is the Achilles heel of many 
alliances.  It  appears  that  a  great  majority  of  the  alliances’  understanding  of 
socialism is not the understanding of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Mandel, Claudine, 
and Razdolesky, as they never talked about abstract labour, the abolition of wage 
labour as the essence of socialism, etc. The emergence of a campaign for a new 
Marxist party in the UK and similar campaigns in Latin America that emphasise 
this  point  and  put  forward  a  radical  definition  of  socialism  are responses  and 
reactions to this weakness. 
 
In  their  publications  these  alliances  say  very  little  about  the  nature  of  their 
socialism. Clearly they need to explain what they mean by socialism. How do 
they intend to reach it? Is their socialism compatible with wage labour? Would 
the market exist under such a system, and if so, then at what stage and how? In 
short, as far as the economy of socialism is concerned, these alliances have very 
little to say. In the long run, the economy will be the main factor to measure how 
far they are socialist. These alliances have produced very little literature on the 
economy of socialism. As a result, the only way to find out about their position is 
to look at the literature of the components of the alliance. 
 
Earlier this chapter looked at the ORWI’s definition, which is a part of Iranian 
Worker’s Left Unity (IWLU). Their definition of socialism does not mention what 
will happen to the market and wage labour. All those organisations involved in 
the formation of both alliances in Iran have a similar understanding of socialism, 
which is to abolish private property and replace it with the common ownership of 
the means of production and planning. This is not different from the definition of 
socialism under a Stalinist programme. 
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A proletarian social revolution would replace private property with 
the common ownership of the means of production and exchange 
and  reorganise  planned  social  production  to  put  an  end  to  social 
inequality, the exploitation of man by man, division of society into 
classes, and therefore emancipate the whole of humanity. 
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In his article, “Labour’s Long March to the Right,” Mike Marqusee gave some 
direction for the future of socialist alliances in the UK. He believed that it should 
avoid  Labour’s  paternalism,  authoritarianism,  and  national  chauvinism. 
According to Marqusee the SA should not have been a simple re-grouping of the 
existing socialist organisations. 
 
It  is  not  a  question  of  a  fudge  or  a  halfway  house  between 
“reformists”  and  “revolutionaries”  but  of  embracing  a  wide  (and 
complex)  spectrum  of  opinions  and  activities.  This  must  include 
disenfranchised Labour Party members, trade union and community 
activists,  unaffiliated  socialists  of  many  stripes,  anti-corporate 
activists and outright revolutionary Marxists.
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There  is  no  need  to  look  at  the  socialism  of  disenfranchised  Labour  Party 
members.  It  is  too  obvious  that  such  socialism  is  not  a  radical  version  of 
socialism. The Labour Party has removed socialism from its programme and is 
involved  in  privatisation  of  the  British  economy.  This  involvement  applies  to 
trade unionists that came from the Labour Party tradition. However, the unity of 
the proletariat and alliance of socialist forces cannot alienate those sections of the 
left  who  have  been  liberalised  by  the  Labour  Party  tradition.  Revolutionary 
Marxists cannot and should not fall for the idea of leaving any section of the left 
outside the alliance. If they do, they themselves might become the first victims 
and find themselves left out by others. Emphasising a radical understanding of 
socialism by the alliance is one thing but allowing ideological and organisational 
walls between various sections of the socialist left is another. Emphasis on the 
domination of radical socialists in the alliance is different from  keeping away 
from less radical sections in the name of purity and radicalism. The art of being a 
revolutionary Marxist is not to stay in isolation and separate from the rest of the 
left. The art is to maximise socialists’ forces and organisations while emphasising 226 
 
the radical alternative to the present capitalism. Marx did not compromise his 
radical views but at the same time organised the First International with anarchists 
and Lassalleans. 
 
 
The Organisations of the new left and their social base  
 
Appendix 1 explains in depth the social, educational, and ethnic background of 
two major organisations of the Iranian Left. Moreover it analyses how activists of 
Kurdistan Organisation of the Iranian Communist Party (ICP Komala) and the 
activists  of  the  Komala  Party  that  had  just  split  from  the  ICP  perceived  the 
question of multi–tendency socialist organisations in 2001. As the survey revealed 
it was the pressure of the activists from below that resulted in the creation of two 
socialist unities in Iran. Both Komalas are currently based in the Kurdish region 
and are directly involved in the Kurdish national liberation movement. The study 
of these two organisations cannot be generalised and applied to the rest of the 
Iranian Left for several reasons. Firstly, as indicated in the survey, the majority of 
activists in both organisations came from the Kurdish region. Secondly, the age 
group of the activists showed that about 70% of them were below 30; and finally 
only 22% of the respondents were women. This survey is an important section of 
this study. One major differences of multi–tendency organisations with traditional 
parties is the way in which these different organisations are formed. While the 
traditional parties are formed from top down and start with a programme of a few 
intellectual leaders, multi–tendency organisations starts from bottom up and stem 
from the agreement of its activists. In a traditional party before 1990 it did not 
really matter what the members of the party or its rank and file thought about 
party policies since they did not determine the party’s policies. From the very 
beginning,  the  opinions  and  preferences  of  activists  in  a  multi–tendency 
organisation were important and determined the policies of the organisation.  
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The survey was carried out two months after the split of the Komala Party from 
ICP and its Kurdistan Organisation. This means that the timing of the survey may 
have affected its results. Moreover, it has to be remembered that the ICP suffered 
a major split several years earlier in which the great majority of its members left 
the party and joined the newly formed Workers Communist Party of Iran (IWCP). 
The IWCP left the Kurdish area and went to Europe. That major split has to be 
considered because hundreds of old activists over the age of 30 left the party. 
Those activists had many years of political experience, were mostly educated and 
intellectuals, and had an upper and middle class social background compared to 
the present younger generation of activists. That is to say, if the survey had been 
carried out 10 years earlier the results for most of the questions would have been 
different. Therefore, to get an accurate picture more surveys will be needed in the 
future.  
 
The fact that over 65% of the activists surveyed had less than 5 years of direct 
political involvement in a leftist organisation; over 70% of them were under 30 
years old; over 85% had lower and middle class backgrounds; and more than 60% 
were  workers,  unemployed,  or  pupils  before  joining  the  party  tells  several 
important things. Firstly, unlike other parts of the country during the last decade, 
leftist Kurdish organisations were able to recruit. Secondly, when the worker’s 
activists were in danger of arrest by the political police in Kurdistan’s cities, they 
joined Komala. Whereas in the rest of Iran, most of the time, their involvement in 
independent trade unions and direct class activities resulted in their arrest and 
long term imprisonment. In the last two decades, the working class movement in 
non-Kurdish areas was controlled by the regime led khaneh-e-kargar (workers’ 
house) and this is still the case to a great extent. Thirdly, this point applies to 
students’ associations too. In Kurdistan either people were with the regime or 
against it. In the capital or other big urban centres student movements in the last 
two decades were led by the supporters of the Imam and the Islamic Republic but 
gradually have separated themselves from it. In spite of these particularities there 
are good reasons why the survey was carried out using ICP Komala’s and Komala 228 
 
Party’s  activists.  The  condition  of  censorship  and  clandestine  activity  did  not 
allow a survey of this nature of left-wing political organisations whose members 
lived in various areas inside Iran ruled by Islamic Republic (IR). The activists of 
other socialist organisations were not accessible and unlike the above mentioned 
two Komalas, their activists were not concentrated in one base. Moreover, in the 
last three decades there has been a close relationship between Kurdish and non-
Kurdish socialist activists in Iran. Given the reasons for and against using activists 
of these two organisations they were the best possible targets available.  
 
So far this study has claimed that the relatively newly formed socialist alliances in 
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East have important similarities in their 
aims,  structures,  and  political  strategies.  However,  before  suggesting  any 
conclusion  about  these  aspects  there  are  a  few  other  points  that  need  to  be 
discussed.  No  doubt  all  these  alliances  have  difficulties  with  their  method  of 
gaining power and need to be studied. In addition, in the early 20
th century there 
had  been  some  attempts  to  form  a  united  front.  The  comparison  of  those 
experiences  with  contemporary  attempts  has  many  important  lessons  for  this 
study.  Finally,  the  comparison  of  the  experiences  of  the  SA  in  the  UK  with 
alliances in Latin America also has important lessons. The following section looks 
at  these  aspects  and  at  the  end  a  summary  of  the  aims  and  strategies  of  the 
alliances will be considered. 
 
 
The problems facing alliances 
 
At  this  stage  it  is  not  possible  to  look  at  all  the  problems  facing  these  new 
formations because of the simple reason that some problems will come up in the 
future. Therefore, at this point only two sets of problems are discussed: The aim 
and political programme and the structure. Though organisation members of most 
of these alliances are socialist and have clear socialist programmes, the alliance 
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that Marxist groups alone have not established these alliances. Though Marxist 
socialists are dominant forces for most of them, this does not deny the fact that 
sometimes there are also non-Marxist socialist groups and individuals, women’s 
groups, environmentalists, semi-nationalist leftist groups, and in some cases even 
religious  groups  in  these  alliances.  It  has  been  made  perfectly  clear  by  many 
alliances  that  they  do  not  consider  themselves  as  mere  ensembles  of  their 
affiliated groups. They must represent the great majority of the population, which 
includes  much  more  than  the  working  class.  Therefore,  even  if  they  say  that 
socialism is their aim, such an aim would be different from Marx’s socialism, 
which means nothing but the abolition of abstract labour and the disappearance of 
market relations and money. 
 
The  structural  problems  of  alliances  are  two  fold.  In  the  first  place  a  multi–
tendency  alliance  could  not  lead  a  revolutionary  socialist  movement  unless  it 
changes its structure and prepares for such a task. For this reason, even if these 
alliances  wished  to  have  a  secretive  centralised  organisation,  they  could  not 
because a secretive disciplined and centralised structure can be organised only 
upon an ideology, which they do not have or at least not at the present. Perhaps in 
the  future  when  one  of  the  fractions  has  gained  the  trust  of  the  majority  of 
activists, centralisation may take place around the leadership of such a fraction 
but until then all decisions have to be based on the agreement of at least all major 
fractions.  This  means  that  at  the  present  these  alliances  cannot  act  like  a 
revolutionary party and their actions are bound to be limited within the framework 
of the present political regime. Only a revolutionary party has the structure and 
capacity  to  take  the  decisive  actions  necessary  for  a  revolution.  Taking  such 
action necessarily depends upon the greatest degree of solidarity, trust, and belief 
in the success of the action. These qualities do not exist in these alliances or do 
not exist at present. Many socialist activists have refused to join the unity for this 
reason.  
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Here arises the second dilemma. Given the present reality of the alliances, is it fair 
to say that the structure of these alliances is designed for democratic aims and 
objectives. In other words, is it fair to conclude that the organisations of these 
multi-tendency alliances are too open to be able to fight for socialism? Fighting 
for socialism is necessarily fighting against the secret police, the capitalist class, 
the  government, and all departments of the state as well as bureaucracy. This 
means a war on all fronts. In such a war there are certain rules to be followed for 
the success of any side. The disclosure of any plan to the opposite army can lead 
to total defeat. The previous chapters discussed how Lenin and Gramsci saw a 
revolutionary party and why therefore Lenin emphasised a party that rests upon a 
smaller number of cadres who were able to fight against the police. The dilemma 
for the alliances in third world countries is in this question. Either they put the 
idea of inclusiveness first and therefore bring the majority of their members into 
the  process of  decision  making  which  means  the risk  of  the discovery  of  the 
alliance’s plans by the police; or they take the question of the police seriously and 
therefore forget about the inclusiveness of their members as an iron rule. There is 
no doubt that if these alliances survive the many hurdles ahead they will find an 
answer to  this  dilemma as  well.  However,  believing  truly  in the  principles  of 
revolution, inclusiveness, working class hegemony, and socialism requires putting 
them into practice not postponing any of them for the future. 
 
The main purpose of organising these alliances, wherever they have formed, is to 
change the position of the left from the margin of politics and bring them into the 
centre. It means that the use of the alliances is for the chances they provide to the 
fragmented marginalized left to gain political power. Power can be gained by two 
different strategies. One strategy is to form the widest parliamentary coalition and 
gain power through parliamentary means as in the cases of the Chilean Socialist 
Party and to some extent the Brazilian Workers’ Party. The other strategy is to 
form a revolutionary entity and follow the rules of making revolution such as 
secret  organisations,  active  propaganda  and  campaigning,  work  in  the  army, 
learning and teaching the party activists how to fight the political police, etc. The 231 
 
problem with this strategy is not just that in the past 50 years the revolutionary 
parties have not been able to gain power in any country. More importantly, no 
single party, however massive, can represent the great majority of the population. 
It is argued that not even a true workers’ party can equally satisfy the demands of 
the  women’s  movement,  environmentalists,  human  rights  campaigners,  etc. 
Moreover, as discussed in earlier chapters the working class is not a unified force. 
The members and groups of this class are divided economically, culturally, and by 
their degrees of consciousness. The communist party by definition represents the 
most conscious sections of workers who are aware of their class interests. Even 
when a revolutionary party has the chance to gain power there is always the risk 
that such a party might alienate some section of the working class as well as other 
historical  partners  of  this  class.  Therefore,  the  question  of  organising  a single 
revolutionary party to lead the working class and poor is becoming the concern of 
a smaller number of socialists. As the reality of almost all countries reveals, these 
two processes go hand in hand. That is to say, on the one hand as long as there are 
some socialists who believe in the centrality of a political party there will always 
be a party. On the other hand, the diversity of the working class, the complexity of 
demands  in  the  present  capitalism,  and  the  inability  of  a  communist  party  to 
represent  all  sections  of  the  working  class  and  poorer  sections  of  society  for 
reasons discussed in this work promote the idea of a multi-tendency organisation. 
This leads the discussion to the relationship between the two organisations. 
 
 
Alliances and the Comintern 
 
Perhaps  the  closest  experience  to  the  present  alliances  can  be  found  with  the 
Comintern and its united front policy in the early 1920s. The Comintern’s united 
front  policy  was  similar  to  the  present  alliances  except  for  the  fact  that  the 
Comintern did not organise the united front to undermine the leadership of the 
communist party. On the contrary, the united front was a means for the success 232 
 
and superiority of the party. Trotsky  gave a clear account of the Comintern’s 
policy:  
 
The  task  of  the  communist  party  is  to  lead  the  proletarian 
revolution.  In  order  to  summon  the  proletariat  for  the  direct 
conquest of power and  to achieve it, the communist party  must 
base itself on the overwhelming majority of the working class. So 
long as it does not hold this majority, the party must fight to win it. 
The  Party  can  achieve  this  only  by  remaining  an  absolutely 
independent organisation with a clear program and strict internal 
discipline. Any members of the communist party who bemoan the 
split with the centrists in the name of “Unity of Forces” or again 
“Unity of front,” thereby demonstrate that they do not understand 
the  ABC  of  Communism.  After  assuring  itself  of  the  complete 
independence  and  ideological  homogeneity  of  its  ranks,  the 
Communist  Party  fights  for  influence  over  the  majority  of  the 
working class. 
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For Trotsky and his colleagues in the Comintern the leadership of the communist 
party in the proletarian revolution was an aim as important as the revolution itself 
and everything else served to reach that aim. Trotsky’s outline of the situation 
where  the  communist  party  ought  to  organise  a  united  front  supported  this 
conclusion. 
 
Working  masses  sense  the  need  of  unity  in  action,  of  unity  in 
resisting  the  onslaught  of  capitalism  or  unity  in  taking  offensive 
against it. Any party which mechanically counter-poses itself to this 
need  of  the  working  class  for  unity  in  action  will  unfailingly  be 
condemned in the minds of the workers. 
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He went on to explain that the question of a united front was neither in the point 
of  origin  nor  substance,  a  question  of  the  reciprocal  relations  between  the 
communist  parliamentary  fraction  and  socialists,  or  between  the  central 
committees of the two parties. The problem of a united front, despite the fact that 
a  split  between  the  various  political  organisations  basing  themselves  on  the 
working class was inevitable, grew out of the urgent need to secure the possibility 233 
 
of a united front for the working class in the struggle against capitalism. Trotsky 
explained the right time for the party to confront the question of united front: 
 
Wherever the communist party already constitutes a big, organized, 
political force, but not the decisive magnitude; wherever the party 
embraces organizationally, let us say, one-fourth, one-third, or even 
a  larger  proportion  of  the  organized  proletarian  vanguard,  it  is 
confronted with the question of united front in all its acuteness 
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According to Trotsky, only in this way would the party draw closer to those two-
thirds who did not yet follow the party’s leadership and would be able to win 
them over. 
 
If the communist party did not seek for organizational avenues to the 
end that at every given moment joint, coordinated action between the 
Communist  and  the  non-Communist  (including  the  Social-
Democratic)  working  masses  were  made  possible,  it  would  have 
thereby laid bare its own incapacity to win over—on the basis of 
mass action— the majority of the working class. It would degenerate 
into a Communist propaganda society but never develop into a party 
for the conquest of power.
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Trotsky’s idea of united front was very clear. Firstly, the united front according to 
Trotsky, was not supposed to replace the party. Secondly, when the party was 
weak, it should not attempt to organise a united front. The party should only 
confront the question of a united front when it was a powerful political force and 
its organisation would enable it to win over non-communist workers. In other 
words,  the  united  front  was  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  party  to  win  over  the 
working class. Thirdly, the united front was mainly related to the working class 
and their struggle against capitalism. 
 
There are important similarities between the experience of united front and the 
idea  behind  socialists’  multi-tendency  organisations.  The  motive  for  both 
movements is the working class and its need for unity. Both cases also support 234 
 
unity  in  action  from  below  as  opposed  to  agreements  from  above  by  the 
leadership or parliamentarians. 
 
The  main  differences  between  the  two  experiences  are  the  question  of  the 
communist party’s hegemony. Whereas the united front was a tactic to increase 
the party’s chances of capturing political power, a multi-tendency organisation is 
not a tactic serving the leadership of any party or a tendency within it.  
 
Socialist alliance in the UK and alliances in third world countries  
 
The  difference  between  Western  socialist  alliances  and  third  world  socialist 
alliances is similar to the difference between Western socialist parties and third 
world socialist parties. In fact, the differences results from the different socio-
political realities they face. That is to say, they differ mainly in their political 
programmes,  tactics,  and  strategies.  For  the  Socialist  Alliance  in  the  UK, 
parliamentary activity is a much more open avenue than the IWLU, the Turkish 
socialist alliance, or any other alliance in Latin America. It must be noted though, 
the political reality of the third world is  changing. The expansion of  Western 
democracy to the third world makes open activity a more viable type of activity 
for  the  left  and  allows  political  socialist  organisations  to  use  those  public 
channels. However, this is far from an established democracy where socialists 
have  the  chance  to  participate  in  parliaments.  Therefore,  the  strategy  of  left 
alliances in third world countries cannot be based on parliamentary activity, but 
rather more direct working class organisations and actions. It is because of this 
reality that the process of the alliances’ formation in the third world is so slow and 
painful. In the UK the main problems facing socialists are the differences and 
various  preferences  of  leftist  groups  to  overcome  the  problems  of  how  to 
radicalize the liberalized working class movement. In the third world there are 
different  obstacles.  Dictatorial  regimes  and  their  oppression  even  after 
democratisation by the Western powers (as in the case of Afghanistan) lack of any 235 
 
independent working class organisations; and consequently a very low level of 
class and political consciousness add to the list of problems. 
 
To sum up, it is necessary to consider a list of the common characteristics of the 
new multi–tendency organisations in the UK, Brazil, Venezuela, Iran, Turkey, etc. 
It has to be noted that the existence of these organisations varies in many respects. 
Some of them are established and have become a mass political organisation of 
the left such as the Brazilian Socialism and Freedom Party (P-SOL), which was 
the  leftist  tendency  of  the  Brazilian  Workers’  Party.  Others  such  as  the  left 
umbrella organisation in Iran and Turkey are just about to begin. In spite of these 
differences all these organisations share many characteristics. In spite of the fact 
that the Workers’ Party in Brazil has moved to the right, the UK’s original SA no 
longer  exists,  and  the  two  Iranian  alliances  are  facing  serious  problems  these 
setbacks  do  not  change  anything  in  this  theoretical  summing  up.  When  the 
Brazilian Workers’ Party moved to the right the leftist tendencies left that party 
and organised another alliance. So the setback did not go as far as abandoning the 
idea of a multi–tendency organisation as P-SOL is a socialist alliance. In the UK 
the setback of the SA resulted in RESPECT and another coalition of socialists and 
Greens. Throughout this work it has been clear that there would be many hurdles, 
defeats, setbacks, and triumphs before the finalisation of this model. Until the 
working class and social movements come up with a better model than multi-
tendency  organisations,  this  will  be  the  best  alternative  available  to  humanity 
struggling  for  a  better  future.  That  is  to  say,  the  era  of  traditional  parties 
representing  or  neglecting  the  demands  of  a  diverse  working  class  and  social 
groups  in  a  highly  complicated  society  is  over.  The  multi-tendency  socialist 
organisation is the only organisation capable of such a task despite its problems.   
 
Below  is  a  short  list  of  common  characteristics  of  multi-tendency  socialist 
organisations. This list identifies their common features and can be a point of 
reference in comparative politics in order to compare a multi-tendency socialist 
organisation with traditional parties, a front, or a social movement. This list can 236 
 
also  be  used  as a  short definition.  Just  as any  organisation  has  a  short set  of 
principles and values, this is a short set of general common principles of multi-
tendency socialist organisations. 
 
1- The new organisations should avoid imposing any sort of ideology or heavy 
programme on the working class. This is mainly based upon the famous Marxian 
idea that the emancipation of the working class is realised by the working class 
itself.  The  advocates  of  multi-tendency  organisations  in  Iran  argued  that  they 
consciously  left  many  questions  unanswered.  Though  it  is  clear  these 
organisations had an anti-capitalist stand and their daily policies and tactics were 
clearly  leftist,  they  did  not  put  their  definition  of  terms  such  as  socialism, 
workers’ state, etc into their basic programme. Michael Löwy wrote a great deal 
about the Brazilian Workers’ Party. He believed “the reason is that the new party 
in Brazil prefers a situation where all activists obtain some degree of political 
experience before working  on a  particular  ideology.”
35 One  can  say  it mainly 
arose  from  the  fact  that  the  new  organisations  were  collections  of  many 
ideologies.  The  only  realistic  way  of  maintaining  unity  was  not  to  heavily 
emphasise ideology.  
 
2 - These umbrella organisations were initiated from working class activists as a 
result of their political experiences, in particular of the defeat of social democracy 
and  Stalinism.  Wherever  radical  independent  trade  union  leaders  took  the 
initiative of forming a left-wing political organisation, they gathered the support 
of  most  of  the  radical  non-Stalinist  socialist  groups  and  united  around  the 
common  policies  of  the  umbrella  organisation.  Two  good  examples  are  the 
Brazilian PT and British SA.  
 
3 - Unlike the bureaucratic methods of party organisation that generated its power 
from the centre, the multi-tendency socialist organisation’s power rested upon its 
base  units.  In  fact,  the  new  organisation  was  based  (to  a  great  extent)  on 
Luxemburg’s idea that the working class’ action leads it to socialism. No iron 237 
 
wall separated these new organisations from the working masses, as was usually 
the  case  with  Stalinist  parties.  It  was  not  a  coincidence  that  Stalinist  parties 
became  more  and  more  isolated  from  the  political  movements  of  workers, 
women,  youth,  environmentalists,  human  rights  campaigners,  permanently 
unemployed, etc.  
 
4  -  Within  all  these  organisations  there  were  two  main  tendencies.  The  first 
believed that the political formation of the working class had to take the form of 
an umbrella organisation. According to this view, a multi-tendency organisation 
would arise from the reality of the working class and its struggle. Only this form 
would  answer  the  needs  of  a  movement  with  such  diversity.  The  other  main 
tendency refuted this argument and emphasised the need to build a working class 
party  within  the  umbrella  organisation.  According  to  this  view,  only  a  well-
disciplined  organised  communist  party  within  a  bigger  socialist  organisation 
could  implement  the  tasks  of  a  socialist  revolution  under  a  present  capitalist 
system.  
 
5 - Unlike social democratic and Stalinist parties, multi-tendency organisations, 
while maintaining their radical anti-capitalist approach, were trying to remain as 
open  and  modern  as  possible.  They  understood  that  secrecy  and  political 
censorship  were  not  in  their  favour.  In  other  words,  they  understood  the 
shortcomings of Stalinist organisational methods and tried to employ open and 
legal avenues available to them. On the other hand, by maintaining their socialist 
approach they tried to prevent dissolving into liberal democracy and bourgeois 
parliamentarism, as was the case with social democracy. 
 
6 - Though these new organisations criticised most of the well known political 
deviations such as liberalism, parliamentarism, bureaucratism, and dogmatism in 
their  routine  activities,  there  were  some  dangers  that  threatened  them.  These 
threats mainly came from within the organisation and their contradictions that 238 
 
were routed in the reality of the working class movement and its diversity. This 
explains the right turns of Lula in Brazil and Ortega in Nicaragua.  
 
7  -  The  formation  of  these  new  umbrella  organisations  is  not  limited  to  one 
country. The working class and socialist activists in more and more  countries 
have found this new experience suitable for their model of development. In all 
those countries their formation was based on a common strategy rather than a 
common ideology. Whereas openness and democracy had a direct relationship to 
the  rapid  expansion  of  the  new  multi-tendency  organisation,  censorship  and 
oppression had an indirect relationship to such expansion. In other words, the 
more  censorship  that  existed  the  less  the  working  masses  participated  in  the 
organisation. 
 
The fact that these organisations did not emphasise their socialist ideology does 
not suggest that they lacked any idea about socialism. As mentioned above and as 
appearing in the interview in appendix 2 with an activist of IWLU, they believed 
in socialism but their socialism was radically different from the existing so-called 
socialism of the USSR in the 20
th century.  
 
Summary 
 
During the second half of the 20
th century the inability of the traditional party and 
guerrilla warfare as two methods of organisations to help working class and other 
poor social groups organise themselves resulted in the social movement looking 
for  a different  method  of  political organisation.  Guerrilla  movements  in  Latin 
America and the Middle East were a radical reaction of revolutionary youth and 
students to the revisionism of the Stalinist parties and betrayal of Stalinism and 
social democracy. However that reaction carried some important weaknesses of 
traditional parties. It did not solve the problem of the historical gap between the 
traditional party and working class movement. It became part of the problem.  
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As early as 1980 the Brazilian  Workers’  Party, as an important example of a 
socialist  multi–tendency  organisation,  offered  a  new  model  of  political 
organisation.  This  model  soon  expanded  to  other  countries  in  Latin  America, 
Europe, and the Middle East. Unlike previous models the multi-tendency socialist 
organisation,  while  struggling  for  socialism  and  a  worker’s  state,  based  its 
socialism on the widest possible democracy and the rule of workers and poor 
organised in  their  independent  organisations.  The three  elements  of  socialism, 
democracy,  and  the  self  rule  of  workers’  organisations  were  three  common 
principles of all socialist multi-tendency organisations. 
 
There was a major difference between multi-tendency organisations and all kinds 
of traditional parties and guerrilla organisations. The starting point of a multi-
tendency organisation was not ideology which resulted in a heavy programme. 
This was not a top down hierarchical organisation. The internal relations in this 
organisation were horizontal and power did not originate from its centre at the 
top. In this organisation there was potential for exercising socialist pluralism. All 
local units, affiliated organisations, personalities, and activists had their say in its 
process of decision making. The horizontal relation between the multi-tendency 
organisation’s members prevented extreme centralisation and bureaucratisation.  
 
The greatest problem facing these new organisations was not their inability to 
organise  the working  class  in  dictatorial  regimes.  Those  parties  that  had  their 
secret organisations and were at the same time members of the multi-tendency 
organisation could have done that task in such societies. The greatest problem 
demonstrated  in  Brazil  and  other  countries  in  Latin  America  was  the 
organisations’  inability  to  hold  on  to  their  radical  anti-capitalist  policies  after 
capturing  political  power.  Whether  this  is  a  temporary  problem  and  can  be 
stopped when they manage to rule in several countries in the region and the world 
remains to be seen.  
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In spite of a few setbacks in Europe as discussed in this work the multi-tendency 
socialist organisation is the only political model that the working class and poor 
social groups can trust for their emancipation. This is the most important political 
organisation for the hopeful future of the working class. In the last thirty years the 
idea and theory of multi-tendency socialist organisation has been polished and 
furbished to a great extent. This process has progressed a great deal but has not 
been finalised. The 16 principles of the Campaign for a Marxist Party in the UK, 
the registration of the P-SOL as an independent party in Brazil, and the creation 
of Socialism and Revolution Party in Venezuela are examples of this progress. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Political parties, like any other entity, influence society, and at the same time, are 
influenced  by  society.  In  the  long  run  any  changes  in  society  can  alter  the 
qualities  and  characteristics  of  a  political  party.  To  put  it  differently,  the 
relationship between political parties and civil society is similar to the relationship 
between the state and civil society; the difference being civil society exerts greater 
influence on political parties than it does on the state. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the structure of capitalist societies changed considerably during the 20
th 
century. In particular, during the last three decades of the 20
th century capitalism 
changed  to  such  an  extent,  the  likes  of  which  had  never  been  seen  before. 
Influenced by these changes, the nature, effectiveness, ability, and the function of 
the working class’ political parties altered considerably during the second half of 
the 20
th century. During the 20
th century, the most influential political parties in 
the working class movement were the pro-Russian so-called communist parties 
and European social democratic parties. As expected these parties changed from 
liberators to oppressors (as in the case of Stalinist parties) and from opposing the 
system to becoming the saviour of the dominant capitalist system (as in the case 
of social democracy.) 
 
At the beginning of the 20
th century,  Lenin preferred a smaller political party 
made up of experienced cadres who were capable of fighting Tsarist police. Iskra 
wrote: “In despotically ruled countries, socialist groups must adopt the principle 
of  rigid  and secret  conspiratorial  organisation  and  remain  confined to  a  small 
number  of  members.”
1  The  Russian  Bolsheviks  as  a  relatively  small  but  very 
effective party were able to lead the Russian working class as early as April 1917, 
and successfully destroy the old state machine in the October revolution. This 
proved that Lenin’s idea of the party worked at least in countries similar to Russia 
in the first half of the 20
th century. But two points need to be mentioned. Firstly, 
Lenin’s idea of the party could not be generalised and applied to all societies even 
at  the  beginning  of  the  20
th  century.  In  fact,  as  early  as  the1905  Revolution, 247 
 
Trotsky and later Luxemburg criticised his idea of a centralised party of cadres. 
As a result of the criticism he received, Lenin’s idea of the party improved.  That 
is to say, he developed his model of a mass centralised working class party that 
contained the most important revolutionary tendencies within workers’ activists. 
Secondly, unlike the repressive Russian state, where revolutionaries became the 
majority among the Russian social democrats, revolutionaries were a relatively 
small fraction of social democrats in almost all other European countries. 
 
 The question of majority and minority in the working class movement was not 
about quantity rather it is a qualitative measure. Essentially it was a question of 
which strategy the proletariat should follow, revolutionary or reformist. The fact 
that in the entire Western hemisphere revolutionaries composed a small fraction 
of all major social democratic parties leads to two theoretical conclusions. The 
first is that social democracy ceased to be the real representative of the proletariat. 
The third chapter discussed how social democracy in Western Europe did not use 
the revolutionary tide to lead the anti-capitalist revolution and in fact, defended 
capitalism, its war, and exploitation during the crisis of 1915-1923. The second 
conclusion, which is equally important, is that the European proletariat could not 
be represented by revolutionary ideas. The changes in the working class’ structure 
discussed in chapter one accounted for this. In Russia, at the beginning of the 20
th 
century,  industrial  working  men  and  women  comprised  the  majority  of  the 
population in the main centres, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Influenced by 
the radicalism of the Bolshevik party, they became the agents of radical changes 
in the social order. Although in many European countries the size of the industrial 
working population was much bigger than their Russian counter part, a radical 
revolutionary party did not lead the European working population in any of those 
countries. Today during the first decade of the 21
st century the industrial working 
class represents a relatively small minority of the working class in all countries. 
The revolutionary political party of the working class has also shrunk into small 
groups. Therefore, the objective and subjective conditions for a Russian October 
type of revolution hardly exist in any country.   248 
 
 
Lenin devoted his efforts to establishing a party capable of leading the Russian 
proletariat.    He  correctly  believed  that  “unless  the  masses  of  workers  are 
organized, they are nothing. Organized – the proletariat is everything.”
2 He valued 
the embryonic organisation of the party in 1905 and defended it tooth and nail to 
overcome amateurism, localism, and the disunity of the Russian working class 
movement. 
 
The principal feature of our movement…is its state of disunity and its 
amateur character, if one may so express it. Local circles spring up, and 
function in almost complete isolation from circles in other districts and 
even from circles that have functioned and now function simultaneously 
in the same districts.
3   
 
To understand why Lenin was so passionate about party organisation, it is enough 
to  say,  “between  1895  and  1902,  the  social  democratic  groups  in  Moscow 
survived, on average, no more than three months.”
4 The arrest of these groups by 
the tsarist police resulted in a lack of continuity in the working class’ movements. 
This condition explains why Lenin emphasised the necessity for a paper that was 
not only for propaganda and agitation purposes, but also and more importantly, it 
was a means of uniting the activities of all social democratic circles. Trotsky, 
Martov and Plekhanov published Iskra when Lenin returned from Siberia in exile. 
He tried to turn Iskra into such a tool.  Lenin  defended the mass party  of the 
working class and suggested the formula of freedom in discussion and unity in 
action  during  the  1905  Revolution,  which  was  a  huge  step  forward  in  his 
understanding of the centralised working class party. It was the intense pressure 
of  the  political  police,  mass  arrest  of  activists,  and  discontinuity  in  the 
improvement of the working class struggle that resulted in his method put forward 
in What Is To Be Done? as his defensive organisational strategy. 
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Russian Revolution 
 
Until  April  1917,  the  major  differences  between  the  fractions  of  the  Russian 
social democrats had nothing to do with the nature of the coming revolution as 
both fractions agreed that it was a bourgeois democratic revolution. The main 
disagreement  between  the  Bolsheviks  and  Mensheviks  concerned  tactics  and 
methods of organisation. In explaining the nature of the coming revolution, Lenin 
emphasised the dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry, which was different from 
the proletariat and poor peasantry. The Mensheviks changed their viewpoint after 
1905  and  argued  for  the  leadership  of  the  Liberal  bourgeoisie,  while  Trotsky 
argued that the revolution might begin in  a bourgeois form but that it had to 
become socialist in order to succeed. One can argue that Lenin accepted Trotsky’s 
ideas about the coming revolution in his April Thesis although he did not use the 
theory of permanent revolution. That is to say, on the threshold of the October 
Revolution,  though  the  Bolsheviks  emphasised  the  leadership  of  the  working 
class, they widely believed that they should implement the unfinished tasks of the 
bourgeois revolution. In a relatively short period from May to September 1917, 
the  Bolsheviks  who  were  trusted  by  the  urban  working  class  more  than  the 
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) while preparing themselves to 
capture  the  state  power  were  also  discussing  among  themselves  the  socialist 
nature of their revolution based on Lenin’s thesis in April. That was a very unique 
situation that might not be repeated anywhere else. The consequence of certain 
conditions in the Russian Revolution was the domination of revolutionary ideas 
over the working class movement. This uniqueness is shown by the following 
questions.  
 
It is not clear that if the Bolsheviks had a socialist programme from 1903 onward 
that they would have become a popular party. If Lenin was not able to convince 
the party to change its programme, then the relationship between the Bolsheviks 
and other parties could have been different. In other words, if the Bolsheviks were 
able  to  attract  the  cooperation  of  the  Mensheviks  and  SRs,  and  if  a  socialist 250 
 
alliance  were  created,  then  such  an  alliance  could  have  carried  out  the  post-
revolutionary tasks. “The Bolshevik Party in 1914 had 4,000 members. After the 
February 1917 revolution they had 23,000 members. In August 1917 they had a 
quarter of a million.”
5 If the Bolsheviks had used direct socialist slogans between 
1914 and 1917 instead of the slogans for peace and land, they would not have 
grown as fast as they had in such a short period. If Lenin was not able to change 
the bourgeois democratic nature of the Bolshevik party programme, there would 
not have been any talk of a socialist revolution. The Bolshevik party managed to 
improve  its  programme  from  dictatorship  of  proletariat  and  peasantry  to  the 
dictatorship of proletariat and poor peasants. But the cost of this improvement 
was  to  lose  the  possible  partnership  of  the  Mensheviks  and  SRs.  This  was  a 
contradiction, which was revealed by the Constitution Assembly election. Lenin 
could  have  put  his  April  Thesis  before  the soviets  rather than  the  party for  a 
public  debate.  The  entire  country  including  all  the  major  parties  could  have 
participated in that debate. Though he threatened the party to do so, party leaders 
gave up and accepted the thesis. One reason the Bolshevik party leaders did not 
challenge Lenin’s ideas any longer was that for them the party could lose its place 
as the most important revolutionary organisation for leading the revolution and 
the soviets. If Lenin had put his April Thesis before the soviets instead of the 
party, the Bolshevik party might still have led the revolution, taken power, and 
used it to help the world revolution. It is important to remember that for Lenin and 
Trotsky that was the sole purpose of the October Revolution. It was not to build 
socialism in one country. 
 
The  Bolshevik  party,  as  the  leader  of  the  revolution  and  a  minority  in  the 
assembly, had lost the option of a coalition government. The Bolshevik party’s 
decision to rule in spite of the popular vote showed the essence of its policy’s 
contradiction.  The  party  decision  to  rule  directly  and  implement  socialism 
appeared to be in opposition to Russian society’s democratic vote. These are some 
examples  of  the  many  questions  that  point  to  the  unique  circumstances  that 
surrounded the Russian Revolution. A revolution that carried with it an important 251 
 
contradiction! During the six months prior to the revolution, the Bolshevik party 
gained popularity because of their policies concerning land and peace, as well as 
their radicalism. However, the sudden change in the party’s programme affected 
its strategic relations with other leftist parties. The party’s socialist programme 
harmed the economy, the party, and the country as a whole. The programme could 
not be put into practice and by 1922 it had officially been undermined by NEP. A 
programme initiated by the party and imposed on society from above could not 
have had any other ending. If the workers’, soldiers’ and peasant’s councils had 
initiated  a  socialist  programme  from  below  instead,  then  all  the  major  parties 
would have had to have gone ahead with it. Real democracy could have flourished 
instead of Stalinist political oppression.   
 
The Bolshevik party considered itself above the soviet state, which contradicted 
its slogan of “all power to the soviets.” Lenin defined the soviets as the essence of 
the new revolutionary state whereas the party, regardless of its radicalism and 
revolutionary outlook, belonged to the realm of bourgeois society. Placing the 
party above the soviets after the capture and transfer of power was much more 
than just a contradiction. It was the essence of all the problems which transpired 
later in the soviet system.  
 
From  the  point  of  view  of  general  socio-politics  just  like  the  capitalist  class, 
which is divided into various industrial, financial, trade and commerce sectors 
(each part being more or less represented by a political party) the working class is 
also divided into various sections. Working conditions, political awareness, and 
class unity (among the industrial, service, and agricultural sections of the working 
class) are not equal. As a result, just like the capitalist class, which creates various 
political  parties,  these  parties  co-exist  in  a  pluralistic  bourgeois  democracy. 
Different  parties  represent  the  working  class  and  these  parties  co-exist  in  a 
pluralistic socialist democracy. Such pluralism did not develop in socialist Russia 
in  the  early  20
th  century  because  of  the  sectarian  nature  and  factionalism  of 
political  parties  involved  in  the  workers’  movement  from  1917  onwards.  The 252 
 
Social  Democrats’  disunity  clearly demonstrated  the degree  of  sectarianism  in 
Russia  from  1903  up  until  1912  and  1916.  However,  to  understand  how 
sectarianism was rooted in the Russian social democracy one example from the 
leadership  of  the  Bolshevik  party  helps.  After  Trotsky  reunited  with  the 
Bolsheviks,  Lenin  described  him  as  their  best  asset.  How  was  it  possible  for 
someone to be the best Bolshevik when he opposed the Bolsheviks for more than 
ten years? Either Lenin did not mean what he said or Trotsky had always been the 
best Bolshevik in spite of the fact that he was not in the party. Why didn’t Lenin 
consider Martov or any of the other political leaders who believed in freedom and 
socialism as the best of the Bolsheviks? The answer (more than anything else) 
was the sectarianism of political parties including the Bolshevik party. In 1917 
Lenin was asked what kept him apart from Trotsky for so long and he replied, 
ambition, ambition, ambition. The personal ambition of political leaders usually 
goes hand in hand with their political sectarianism. The cause of such levels of 
sectarianism cannot be fully investigated in this work. However, the next section 
looks briefly at the relationship between the party and soviets as one consequence 
of sectarianism. 
 
 
The Party and soviets 
 
A brief look into the relationship between workers’ councils and the Bolsheviks 
explains the sectarianism of the Bolshevik party in Russia. The idea of the soviet, 
like any other great idea, sprang from the masses. In this case, it came from the 
factories  and  workshops  of  St.  Petersburg.  These  soviets  belonged  to  and 
consisted of all workers including, socialist and non-socialist, party members and 
non-party  members,  religious  and  non-religious,  etc.  They  led  most  of  the 
workers’ strikes in 1905. Menshevik theorists, such as Martov, Dan, and Axelrod 
explained  their  approach  and  the  way  they  saw  the  soviets.  The  Mensheviks 
opposed  Lenin’s  idea  of  the  party  and  its  main  thesis  of  the  professional 
revolutionary. In the spring of 1905, Axelrod explained his idea of an all Russian 253 
 
workers’ congress as opposed to a working class party. With the formation of the 
first workers’ soviet, the Mensheviks called it the organ of workers’ self rule. 
Martov  (the  main  Menshevik  theorist)  said  these  organs  were  the  means  of 
pressure  from  below  against  an  autocracy  that  had  no  intention  of  calling  a 
Constitutional  Assembly.  According  to  R.  Farahani  in  Soviets  in  Russian 
Revolution, in September 1905 Dan wrote in the Menshevik’s Iskra: when this 
tactic succeeds, a network of these revolutionary self-ruling organs would cover 
the  whole  country.  Dan  added  that  the  confederation  of  soviets  provided  a 
political tribune for the whole country and it should not be ignored. Thus, for the 
Mensheviks, the soviets were a means of pressure from below. They considered 
them a revolutionary parliament of workers and they favoured the soviets over the 
party. However, the Mensheviks failed to recognise the relationship between the 
soviets and the revolutionary situation in 1905. The main Menshevik theorists did 
not mention any relationship between the soviets and the temporary nature of 
revolutionary state. 
     
In Russia, the Bolsheviks, who were totally devoted to the idea of the party and its 
independence, did not welcome the leading role of the St. Petersburg’s soviet in 
the  general  strike.  Radin  (the  Bolshevik  representative  in  the  St.  Petersburg’s 
soviet) in his article, “The Party or Soviets” in Novaiajhizen, suggested that the 
soviets  should  accept  the  RSDLP’s  programme  and  obey  its  leadership.  The 
Bolsheviks  in  St.  Petersburg  followed  Radin’s  line  of  argument.  Even  the 
federative party committee in which the Bolsheviks had the majority accepted this 
line.  But  the  Mensheviks  and  SR’s  did  not  accept  it  and  talked  against  it 
everywhere.  
 
In Stockholm, at the beginning of November, two weeks after the formation of the 
St Petersburg soviet, while returning to Russia Lenin looked at this phenomenon 
in his article, “The Soviet of Workers’ Representatives and Our Tasks.” In this 
article Lenin rejected Radin’s view and wrote something that became the basis for 
his fully elaborated idea of the soviets in the years after the 1905 Revolution. 254 
 
According to Lenin, the soviets consisted of all of the workers involved in the 
struggle and not just the vanguard of social democratic workers. Lenin insisted 
that it was irrational to ask the soviets to accept a party programme or to join the 
party. In his view, the party and soviets were equal in the political leadership of 
the revolution. Lenin added that with the information available to him, politically, 
the  workers’  represented  soviet  needed  to  be  considered  as  the  essence  of  a 
temporary revolutionary state. The characterisation of the soviets as the essence of 
the future revolutionary state was the basis for Lenin’s thesis on the soviet system 
in 1917. In Anarchism and Socialism Lenin opposed the Menshevik idea of the 
soviet as the organ of workers’ self rule. As a point of opposition, Lenin explained 
that the self rule organism and the election of a representative by the people was 
not a pre-condition but the last episode of an uprising. 
 
In spite of the fact that Lenin’s idea was the most radical available to the Russian 
proletariat, the proletariat did not necessarily welcome the behaviour and ideas of 
other  Bolshevik  leaders.  The  St.  Petersburg’s  party  committee  in  which  the 
Bolsheviks  were  the  majority,  treated  the  soviets  in  an  unquestionably 
bureaucratic  and  sectarian  way.  This  sectarianism,  despite  Lenin’s  effort  and 
influence, did not completely disappear. This sectarianism also helps explain how 
after  1923  Stalin  managed  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  soviets  and  eventually 
eliminate their power. His understanding of the relation between the party and 
soviets more or less followed Radin’s 1905 line. For Stalin, the proletariat without 
the  socialist  ideal  meant  nothing  and  this  ideal  according  to  Lenin’s  earlier 
teachings  could  only  emerge  from  outside  the  working  class  in  the  party. 
However, this factor is not the only explanation for Stalin’s elimination of soviet 
rule in 1923. 
 
One can explain the absence of democracy in Russia under Lenin by at least three 
factors. Firstly, the peasants constituted the vast majority of the population. Their 
rejection of the Bolsheviks left no option for Lenin except undemocratic direct 
party  rule.  The  fact  that  the  SR  obtained  a  great  majority  of  the  seats  in  the 255 
 
Constitutional Assembly proves that the Bolshevik rulers where rejected by the 
peasantry in spite of their achievement among the urban working class. Secondly, 
it is equally important to note that from 1917 to 1921 the country faced the threat 
of foreign invasion and a bloody civil war that sapped all the energy from the 
Bolshevik workers. Thirdly, the Bolshevik’s perception of democracy was also 
responsible  for  the  absence  of  democracy  in  Russia  under  Lenin.  Earlier  this 
chapter  discussed  the  way  in  which  the  Bolsheviks  viewed  the  relationship 
between their party and the soviets.  
 
The Bolsheviks fought for the supremacy of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils. 
However, they could not solve the serious problem created by the decision of the 
council movement. The decision favoured the SRs and rejected the Bolshevik 
party.  Firstly, this movement had not developed everywhere. It was limited to 
certain areas such as the main political centres. Secondly, even in areas where 
civil society had developed in Russia, due to its backwardness, the councils did 
not choose the radical policies of the Bolsheviks. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks 
emphasised socialist slogans such as all power to the soviets, while on the other 
hand,  when  the  soviets  did  not  choose  the  Bolsheviks  for  the  Constitutional 
Assembly,  the  Bolsheviks  vetoed  their  decisions.  This  dilemma  can  only  be 
explained by the Bolshevik’s sectarian policies after they gained power in 1917. 
 
Other revolutions 
 
In almost all other countries the pattern of party development was different from 
that  of  Russia.  For  example,  in  China  the  peasants  were  the  agents  of  the 
revolution.  The  party  slogans  were  completely  different  and  the  international 
arena was more favourable to the party’s success. Mao’s idea of let one hundred 
flowers  blossom,  let  a  hundred  schools  of  thought  contend  (as  the  policy  for 
promoting  progress  in  arts  and  sciences  and  a  flourishing  socialist  culture  in 
China)  allowed  the  greatest  alliance  between  socialists.  Furthermore,  the 
communist  party  alliance  with  Kuomintang  turned  out  to  favour  the  further 256 
 
growth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Therefore, in China the growth 
and  development  of  the  communist  party  was  to  a  great  extent  based  on  the 
party’s strategy against imperialism, warlords, the tax regime, exploitation of the 
peasants,  and  for  the  unification  of  the  country  as  a  whole.  These  were  all 
democratic slogans. In China, unlike Russia, socialists were united in one party 
and were in a coalition with the nationalist Kuomintang for nearly a decade. There 
is a similarity between this coalition policy and Gramsci’s strategy of the block of 
classes discussed in chapter two. During those years the poorer peasant supporters 
of the Kuomintang realised their interests, were better represented by the CCP, 
and joined it. 
 
In Vietnam the aim and slogans of the revolution were also democratic in nature. 
Independence,  unity  of  the  country,  and  land  reform  were  all  bourgeois 
democratic slogans. In addition, the Communist Party of Vietnam was the leading 
force in a larger alliance of democratic forces. In both Vietnam and Cuba, it was 
only  after  the  revolution  that  the  communist  party  announced  its  communist 
nature.  This  is  a  very  interesting  point.  After  the  political  success  in  both 
countries and under the influence of Stalinist Russia instead of expanding their 
political base, sharing power with the masses of poor peasants, workers, etc the 
leading  political  parties  called  themselves  communist  parties  and  concentrated 
power in the communist party.  While the Bolshevik party was pushed to rule 
directly  under very  exceptional circumstances,  these parties found direct party 
rule a virtue. 
 
The Bolsheviks declared their direct socialist slogan of “all power to the soviets” 
before the October revolution.  A successful revolution did not take place in any 
country that used socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat as their main 
slogans,  with  the  exception  of  Russia.  This  is  a very  important  lesson  for  all 
socialists. Wherever communists managed to capture political power they were 
acting as part of the democratic forces. In fact wherever communists captured 
political  power,  their  success  directly  resulted  from  the  strategy  of  greater 257 
 
alliances with democratic forces. Apart from a handful of successful examples, 
wherever communists tried to organise the working class for socialism, even in 
cooperation with other democratic forces, they faced massacre, severe oppression, 
and terror. In Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, etc. the repression used against 
the  communists  was  extreme.  Capitalism  could  not  afford  another  urban 
revolution  similar  to  the  Russian  Revolution.  For  this  reason,  the  harshest 
measures were used to defeat communist revolutionaries. As a result of the brutal 
measures taken against revolutionaries, the communists in Latin America chose to 
raise arms as their revolutionary method. They had realised that an anti-capitalist 
socialist urban revolution based on general strikes was no longer a viable method. 
Capitalist states were prepared to prevent a revolution from happening again at 
any price. Thus, after the experience of Russia neither the bourgeois class and its 
ever more complicated state using more sophisticated methods of suppression, nor 
the  diversity  of  the  proletariat  in  bourgeois  society  would  have  allowed  any 
political communist party to organise the grate majority of the population, gain 
political  power,  and  reorganise  socio-economic  relations  based  on  the  direct 
socialist principle.           
 
Another aspect of the Leninist party can be seen by analysing the situation in 
early  20
th  century  Russia.  The  SR  obtained  the  majority  in  the  Constitutional 
Assembly.    However,  after  the  Bolshevik  party’s  decision  to  dissolve  the 
assembly the Mensheviks and the SR became alienated. In spite of the uniqueness 
of the Russian Revolution the alienation of those parties from political power was 
one  of  the  main  reasons  for  later  Stalinist  oppression.  What  can  be  done  to 
prevent the alienation of various sections of socialists? The correct answer to this 
question determined the success or failure of any radical socialist. On the one 
hand, Lenin had no choice but to dissolve the assembly in order to continue the 
revolution. On the other hand, the Mensheviks’s and SR’s alienation damaged the 
unity of progressive forces in the long term and prepared the way for Stalinist 
tyranny. One has to understand that the development of the Russian Revolution 
and its consequences, to a great extent, related to the fact that one of the socialist 258 
 
parties had the leading role and the rest of the political parties were alienated. 
This reality, regardless of the party’s intentions and good faith, and regardless of 
the ruling party’s policies was bound to end in disaster. In Russia the disaster 
appeared in the form of Stalinist oppression. 
 
If  the  Leninist  party  was  able  to  single  handily  capture  state  power  at  the 
beginning of the 20
th century in Russia, the same would not be possible a century 
later. At the beginning of the 21
st century, the survival of the Leninist party, let 
alone capturing state power, faces a big question mark in many countries not only 
because  of  severe  suppression  but  more  importantly  as  a  result  of  the  socio-
economic  changes  in  the  capitalist  world  and  its  effect  on  the  working  class. 
Previous  chapters  discussed  the  effect  of  unemployment,  computerisation, 
globalisation,  the  structural  changes  of  capital,  and  their  impact  on  workers’ 
militancy. The political impact of all those socio-economic changes put a question 
mark on the success and survival of the disciplined Leninist party. 
 
In the 21
st century, civil society is stronger than it was during the 20
th century. 
People are more aware of socio-political processes and their demands are clearer.  
As a result, a Leninist party in the 21
st century appears anachronistic. That is to 
say, it has the potential of being out of touch with the already unionised working 
class, as well as being sectarian, and bureaucratic. It was based on this potential 
that Stalin managed to turn the revolutionary Bolshevik party into a monstrous 
bureaucratic party that suffocated all revolutionary initiatives in Russian society.  
The point is that even without these problems it is not possible for a traditional 
party to entirely represent a relatively complicated and diverse society regardless 
of its standpoint unless the party relies totally on repression to prolong its rule as 
in the case of the Ba’ath party in the Arab republics, or the parties of dictatorial 
regimes in some African countries. 
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Finance capital and the proletariat’s traditional political party  
 
The Russian Revolution happened after an important change in the structure of 
capital.    Economists  such  as  Rudolf  Hilferding  (one  of  the  leaders  and 
theoreticians  of  German  social  democracy  and  the  Second  International)  and 
Lenin described how by 1914 banking and industrial capital joined and formed 
finance  capital.  The  formation  of  finance  capital  gave  extraordinary  power  to 
capital as a whole. It is widely accepted that the misery of millions of people in 
two world wars was deeply connected to the formation of finance capital, the 
changes  in  the  structure  of  capital,  and  between  the  powerful  rivals  in  the 
capitalist world. If this theory is correct, then one needs to understand that finance 
capital, its formation and operation is directly related to war, misery, oppression, 
dictatorship,  censorship,  unemployment,  and  all  other  major  illnesses  of  late 
capitalism  as  a  system  such  as  racism,  drugs,  and  crime.  It  does  not  require 
exceptional intelligence to work out why hundreds of millions of dollars is spent 
on  football  clubs,  footballers,  tennis  players,  golf  stars,  singers,  boxers, 
supermodels, clubs, night clubs, actors, TV showmen, poor quality programmes, 
porn stars, casinos, bookmakers, etc. After 1973 more than 50% of the GDP of all 
major industrialised countries started to shift from the productive sector toward 
these unproductive activities as a result of capitalists’ greed and thirst for more 
profits that could be found easier in these areas compared to the industrial sector. 
 
The decline in the rate of profit in the production sector after the post-war boom 
had three main consequences. The first was the search for ways to reduce the 
costs  of  production  such  as  the  shift  of  operations  from  the  core  to  semi-
peripheral and peripheral zones in the expectation of reducing the cost of labour. 
The second was a considerable shift of investment from productive activities to 
the financial sphere in the search for profit. The third was the turn to increased 
military expenditure. 
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The shift from productive activity to financial sphere led to the well-
documented series of financial takeovers of major corporations and the 
flourishing of junk bonds made all the more possible by the weakened 
profit  position  of  major  corporations.  Of  course,  these  financial 
manipulations  also  had  the  consequence  of  precipitating  additional 
difficulties in the now heavily debt-laden private sector, with collapses 
that were quite costly in the long term, as in the case of the US savings-
and-loan bankruptcies.
6  
 
After the Second World War finance capital, already the dominant part of capital 
became a dreadful power whose destructive force was incomparable to earlier 
epochs. The counter revolutionary reforms of the ruling class from above, during 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, in many third world countries, prepared the way for 
finance capital’s activities. The depreciation of the national currencies in those 
countries with acceptance of all conditions imposed by the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) of the World Bank and IMF, removed all obstacles and cleared 
the way for the accession of foreign capital. Western capital poured into those 
countries in the form of foreign loans, conditional aid, and unproductive activities 
such as the stock market. In less than two decades the foreign debt of countries 
such as Egypt and Brazil increased to the extent that they were not even able to 
repay the interest on loans and their economies stooped. Even the munificence of 
the World Bank and IMF could not save them. The result could not have been 
anything but a series of military coups in Brazil during the 1970s and the rise of 
political Islam in Egypt to the point that they were able to assassinate President 
Sadat after his recognition and visit to Israel in 1973. Going into the details of the 
problems  caused  by  the  activity  of  the  parasitic  nature  of  finance  capital  in 
different countries is not the main purpose of this study. The aim of this study is 
to  understand  the effect  of  such  activities  on  the working  class  struggle  on  a 
national and world scale. 
 
The activities of the World Bank, IMF, and other private financial centres created 
important  changes  in  the  conditions  of  the  class  struggle  between  the  world 
proletariat and bourgeoisie. These changes and their deep impact are more visible 
in  developing  countries.  Finance  capital  enters  the  target  country  with  some 261 
 
conditions, regardless of the form of its entrance. The security and return of the 
capital  interest  are  the  two  determining  factors  that  put  a  shadow  over  any 
meeting, agreement, and contract between the donors and receivers of the loan. It 
is these factors that determine the terms of the loan. The preparation of the best 
possible conditions to procure and acquire foreign capital is the responsibility of 
the country that receives the loan. Repressive dictatorial regimes make sure such 
conditions are met. 
 
The preparation of the necessary conditions requires both political and economic 
measures. There is always heavy political pressure on socialists to keep them out 
of power, and to make sure that they do not reach the working class in Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America. A profit of less than 40% in the industrial 
sector results in the closure of non-profitable industries and capital’s shift into the 
more profitable finance  sector. This will result  in increasing the already large 
numbers  of  unemployed,  which  increases  the  pressure  on  the  working  class 
movement. If the needs of finance capital require it, agriculture subsidies will also 
be cut. This again results in greater misery for poor peasant families resulting in 
more people searching for jobs under the worst conditions. On top of all these 
socio-political  measures  the  dictatorial  regimes  in  the  third  world  have  the 
pleasure of organising human massacres of those who might endanger their neo-
liberal project. In Iran in the summer of 1988 thousands of political prisoners 
were secretly executed when the Islamic Republic tried to restart the unfinished 
Structural Adjustment Programme disturbed by the Iranian revolution of 1979. In 
many  third  world  countries  in  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East  dictatorial 
regimes  prepared  the  way  for  pro-Western  parliamentary  democracies  and 
ensured  that  the  socialists  had  no  voice  in  the  newly  imposed  parliamentary 
system. In Iraq in 1958 the Iraq Communist Party (ICP) was the largest political 
party;  however  in  the  2005  elections  every  effort  was  used  to  make  sure  the 
communists were unrepresented in the new parliament. In Afghanistan the leftist 
parties had power for over a decade. Today they have no say in the country’s 
affairs : it is as if they do not exist. 262 
 
 
Many of the key events of the 21
st century are connected to finance capital, which 
is a declining form of capital. These events include:  
 
·  The  failed  military  coup  in  Equatorial  Guinea  organised  by  a  former 
British Prime minister’s son who was a key figure in big arms deals and 
finance capital;  
·  In the early 1970s, many successful military coups in Chile and Brazil;  
·  Years  of  the  worst  repression  of  the  labour  movement’s  activists  by 
military dictatorships such as Pinochet;  
·  The CIA’s unfinished attempts at regime change in Venezuela;  
·  The direct military attacks of American and British imperialism on Iraq 
and Afghanistan;   
·  The CIA’s military and financial support of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 
the 1990s. 
 
Finance  capital’s  activity  has  a  direct  impact  on  the  workers’  and  women’s 
movements for equality, freedom and real democracy. A careful look at the poor 
status of the women’s movements in Middle Eastern countries supports this point. 
 
The  traditional  class  struggle  between  the  working  class  and  the  bourgeoisie, 
given the manoeuvring power of finance capital, has turned in favour of capital 
and against the working class. The smallest proletarian class action alerts capital 
to leave a country or industry and go somewhere that investments will be safe. 
There is only one way left for the working class to deal with finance capital and 
that is to obtain state power and impose anti-finance capital rules and regulations. 
The question is: How does the working class obtain state power if they are barely 
able to defend their jobs? The answer can be found in its numbers. Finance capital 
as the declining form of capital is able to overcome the resistance of the industrial 
workers; however this is not to suggest that it can defeat the resistance of wage 
and salary earners, who make up more than 80% of the population. It is true that 263 
 
the industrial working class can no longer capture state power on its own. But it is 
quite possible for the industrial working class along with other sections of the 
class to get power and impose anti-finance capital measures.  
 
 
 
Structural change and the new organisation 
 
As early as the 1960s workers in the service sector in most advanced capitalist 
countries  surpassed  the  industrial  working  class.  This  change  added  to  the 
complication  of  the  organisation  of  the  working  class.  Firstly,  service  sector 
employees were more reluctant to join traditional working class organisations. 
They were more interested in professional clubs than unions. Secondly, unlike 
workers in the industrial sector, their work was organised in smaller groups and 
their internal class communications was subject to extra effort and meetings. That 
is to say, unlike the industrial sector where the factory was a natural basis of trade 
union  organisation  and  representation  (i.e.  socialist  political  activists  got  a 
maximum effect for minimum effort), in the service sector smaller numbers of 
workers worked in any single unit. That is to say, the service workers’ work place 
might  not  have  necessarily  been  the  best  place  for  economic  and  political 
organisation.  Thirdly,  their  relatively  better  working  condition  reduced  their 
militancy.  
 
Moreover, their different social status led to an identity crisis within some layers 
of  service  sector  workers.  Bank  officers,  computer  programmers,  medical 
scientists, etc were among those groups of the service sector workers who did not 
identify themselves with the working class and were rarely organised in trade 
unions. The most recent phenomenon is the appearance of employment agencies 
in most areas of the service sector. Those who obtain employment through these 
agencies are poorly organised. They do not have job security, pensions, or rights. 264 
 
The temporary nature of their employment prevents them from gaining any sense 
of class solidarity and class action. 
 
The fact that some layers of service sector workers are reluctant to participate in 
anything that is related to the class war does not suggest that they are not involved 
or do not get involved in various types of collective action. Some might be active 
in  progressive  art,  sport, music,  or  literature.  Others  might be  peace activists, 
environmentalists, or feminists. It might be difficult to politically organise some 
social groups in a traditional Leninist party, but it does not necessarily mean that 
it is impossible to organise them at all. 
 
 
The new comers 
 
Bringing women into the labour market on the mass scale after the Second World 
War, although from the standpoint of the women’s movement was a major step 
forward, was another blow to the traditional movement of the working class by 
the  capital.  The  monopoly  of  the  labour  market  by  male  workers  and  the 
unconditional support of their female relatives and associates such as wives and 
family, in their class action before the Second World War is gone forever. The 
support  of  the  women’s  movement  for  the  workers’  movement  is  not 
unconditional.  After  the  May  1968  movement,  women  discovered  their  own 
identity and demanded the workers’ and socialist’s movements to recognise it. 
This brings further complications to the working class struggle on every level. At 
the beginning of the 21
st century the women’s movement is well aware of its 
socio-economic needs and is able to interpret those needs into political demands. 
On many occasions those demands are not identical to the traditional demands of 
the working class. Moreover, sometimes women’s demands are different and even 
oppose  the demands of the working class.     
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The working class movement for equality and socialism cannot afford to ignore 
such an important potential ally. But unity of the two ideologies in a single party 
is impossible. Both movements are aware that united they can gain everything and 
alone  they  might  lose  everything.  Such  a  dilemma  can  only  be  solved  by  an 
umbrella organisation that consists of women’s as well as workers’ organisations. 
 
Feminism: A different approach 
 
In a traditional working class party politics and ideology are interchangeable. It is 
hard to separate the two. Most of the time, the party is engaged in ideological 
conflict rather than politics. Even in European communist parties where political 
traditions are very strong, ideology greatly impacts party politics. 
 
In reality, the feminist ideology of the women’s movements has cost the working 
class movement a great deal. There cannot be more than one party ideology in a 
traditional working class party. Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism, as 
the official ideologies of traditional parties have not tolerated feminism as the 
second ideology of their party.  The split of the women’s movement from the 
traditional working class movement in the last three decades of the 20
th century is 
directly related to the negative impact of the official ideologies of the communist 
party. During the second half of the 20
th century there was hardly any party acting 
in the name of the working class that accepted feminism as the second ideology of 
the party. 
 
In  reality  both  the  women’s  and  workers’  movements  are  deeply  connected. 
Firstly, around 50% of the world’s labour force is female.  Secondly, the freedom 
of workers is directly the freedom of women, and vice versa. In other words, they 
have a common future. The great majorities of women are working and therefore 
have a direct interest in the gains of the working class. However, at the same time 
women are fighting on several fronts, against employers, the patriarchal society, 
religious  fundamentalism,  and  the  old  anti-women  conservative  tradition.  The 266 
 
working class will never gain its freedom while 50% of the society is still in 
chains. 
 
The  correct  political  strategy  for  both  movements  is  to  join  forces  in  an 
organisation  that  recognises  and  respects  their  different  ideologies.  Such  an 
organisation would be different from the parties that acted in the name of the 
working class during the 20
th century.  
 
 
Marx, Marxism, and a 21
st century party 
   
Marx’s remarks about the proletariat’s political party are limited but at the same 
time clear. In a letter to Bolte dated 23 November 1871, Marx wrote:  
 
The International was founded in order to replace the socialist or 
semi-socialist sects by a real organization of the working class for 
struggle…. The development of socialist sectarianism and that of 
the real working class movement always stand in inverse ratio to 
each other. Sects are justified (historically) so long as the working 
class is not yet ripe for an independent historical movement. As 
soon  as  it  has  attained  this  maturity  all  sects  are  essentially 
reactionary.
7  
 
His idea of a communist party in The Communist Manifesto supported the way in 
which he looked upon the First International. “The communists do not form a 
separate  party  opposed  to  other  working-class  parties….  They  always  and 
everywhere represent the interest of the movement as a whole.”
8 These lines are 
clear. Marx was against sectarianism, bureaucratism, and any other tendency in 
the working class party that might put the unity of the movement at risk. 
 
At the beginning of the 21
st century, in most capitalist countries, the majority of 
movements include women, students, poor peasants, and what Marxists used to 
call the petty bourgeoisie. Those social layers, according to Marx, would lose 
their assets and join the proletariat in great numbers everyday. Marx’s prediction 267 
 
turned out to be false and modern capitalism has created new layers of modern 
middle classes and white-collar workers. The continuity of the existence of these 
layers  has  added  to  the  problem  of  organising  all  these  social  groups  in  a 
traditional political party of the working class. The success of uniting all these 
social groups in the African National Congress (ANC) and the Brazilian Workers 
Party, regardless of their ideologies and policies, proved that only an international 
type  of  organisation  is  capable  of  representing  all  these  social  groups.  An 
international type  of  organisation  refers  to  an  organisation  in  which  all  major 
ideologies of the great 85% majority of the population can coexist. Any attempt to 
organise all of them in a monolithic party and under a single ideology would 
result in the alienation of many social groups and therefore another defeat for the 
entire movement. 
 
 
The problems of social democracy 
 
In the early 20
th century social democracy could have become the political party 
of the populous class if it had not slid into reformism and bureaucratization. As 
discussed  in  chapter  three,  bureaucratization  gradually  transformed  the 
characteristics of the social democratic party from a party of the working class 
into  a  political  party  that  belonged  to  the  working  class  only  in  name.  The 
bureaucratization  of  social  democracy  resulted  in  changes  in  policy  and  the 
outlook of the party as well as changes in the structure of the social democratic 
organisation.  
 
At  the  organisational level  the  main  difference  between  pre-war  and post-war 
social democracy was that classical social democracy was based on the voluntary 
activities  of  party  activists  as  opposed  to party  waged  officers.  Moreover,  the 
relationship  between  the  party’s  leadership  organs  and  members  was  one  of 
solidarity and comradeship, and there was not a particular status for any member 
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the most powerful part of the party organism. The party executive committee and 
in particular the party leaders were out of touch as far as the party members were 
concerned.  The  parliamentary  fraction  became  another  centre  of  power  in  the 
party that was no longer checked by the party executive. It only answered to the 
party  congress  and  that  did  not  last  long.  There  came  a  time  when  the 
parliamentary party committee could no longer be checked by the congress let 
alone by the party executive. Today Tony Blair (the leader of the Labour Party) 
took the party into an imperialist war without even consulting his cabinet let alone 
the  party  executive  committee.  Needless  to  say,  social  democracy’s 
bureaucratisation started as early as the end of the 19
th century and certainly by 
the  early  20
th  century  as  discussed  in  chapter  three.  The  German  Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) for instance had paid functionaries in the early 1900s.  
 
The parallel existence of leadership organs such as the party executive, the control 
commission, and the parliamentary party committee could have had a positive 
role in enhancing a healthy internal democracy if social democracy was not a 
reformist  organisation  seeking  political  power.  In  a  healthy  relationship  these 
parallel  committees  could  have  helped  party  members  enhance  their  political 
knowledge and information, and could have enabled them to keep the leadership 
organs under control. However, their existence in parties that had nothing to do 
with socialism added to the problem of the bureaucratization of these parties. 
 
The process of the social democracy’s bureaucratization will be better understood 
when it is looked at in relation to the growing reformism of these parties. There 
was a connection between SPD support for war, its leadership’s anti-revolutionary 
sentiment, and the bureaucratisation of the party’s structure. 
  
On 3 November the revolution had begun with the naval mutiny at Kiel. 
Forty  thousand  sailors  and  dockers  surged  through  the  streets  and  a 
workers’ and sailors’ council took control of the town. On 4 November 
the revolution spread: red flags flew over every ship. On 6 November, 
sailors’,  soldiers’  and  workers’  councils  were  now  in  power  in 
Hamburg,  Bremen  and  Luebeck.  On  7  and  8  November  Dresden, 269 
 
Leipzig,  Chemnitz,  Magdeburg,  Brunswick,  Frankfurt,  Cologne, 
Stuttgart,  Nuremburg  and Munich  all  followed  suit.  On  9  November 
Berlin joined and established its workers’ and soldiers’ council.
9  
 
This  was  a  full  scale  revolution  by  any  standard.  During  this  revolutionary 
moment Scheidemann urgently warned the Emperor’s palace: “We have done all 
within our power to keep the masses in check,”
10 and urged the Kaiser to abdicate 
in order to quell the workers’ anger. This was nothing but an act of treason by a 
social democratic leader. A huge party bureaucracy was needed to cool down and 
keep the revolutionary fire under control. Only in a bureaucratic party could the 
leaders do what they wanted without considering the feelings and opinions of 
party members. The history of social democracy after the war and the first social 
democratic government is the history of capitalism and colonialism. Therefore, 
more than a century after its formation social democracy is no longer left-wing. 
Social democracy cannot provide a stable base for the formation of an umbrella 
socialist organisation in Europe, and like any other bourgeois party, it opposes the 
unity and empowerment of the socialist left. 
 
 
A viable socialist organisation for the 21
st century 
 
At the early 21
st century, the movement of the workers, the poor, women, and all 
those social groups who belong to the great majority of the exploited population 
in the capitalist society (in order to be victorious in their struggle for freedom and 
equality) need a type of political organisation that includes all sections of the 
movement of the bottom 85% of the population in its revolutionary strategy. That 
is  an  organisation  that  represents  their  interest  in  its  programme.    Such  an 
organisation, by definition, is not a political party in the traditional meaning of the 
term. The major difference between the two is that the party represents one class 
whereas an umbrella organisation (as suggested above) represents more than one 
class.  However,  this  is  not  to  suggest  in  any  way  that  multi-tendency 
organisations oppose disciplined parties. On the contrary the two organisations 270 
 
complete each other and without active participation of revolutionary  working 
class parties, the formation of an umbrella organisation would be meaningless and 
could be steps toward social democracy.  
 
The second  major characteristic of the new organisation is that it would be a 
revolutionary organisation rather than a reformist one. That is to say, it would 
believe  in  the  fundamental  change  in  the  present  socio-economic  system  and 
would  rely  on  revolutionary  methods  rather  than  reforms  to  bring  about  such 
changes. Whereas in the early 20
th century revolutionaries relied on conspiratorial 
methods,  in  the  21
st  century  the  new  socialist  organisation  would  rely  on  the 
united action of the majority and their harmonious movement. In other words, the 
political  success  of  this  organisation  would  be  based  on  the  harmony  of  the 
political action of the majority – the more harmonious the movement, the greater 
the chance of the final victory.  
 
The next major principle of the suggested organisation is socialism. This would 
be  a  socialist  organisation.  The  belief  in  socialism  would  be  the  determining 
factor of its political existence. For a 21
st century organisation socialism is not just 
a word in its programme for the satisfaction of leftist parties; it is an important 
factor without which the organisation could not function. Socialism means the 
participation  of  the  majority  in  the  decision  making  process  in  the  political 
organisation, in society, and at the economic level. It is fundamentally different 
from  a  system  that called  itself socialist only to  give all  the  decision  making 
power  to  the  bureaucrats  in  the  party-state.  This  would  be  a  participatory 
democratic  socialism.  This  would  be  a  system  in  which  the  majority  of  the 
population finds itself in the ruling position for the first time. This would be a 
system in which the majority of producers and consumers directly decide every 
important  policy  related  to  the  production,  consumption,  health,  education, 
housing,  retirement,  defence  and  policing,  crime  and  punishment,  public 
transport, leisure and tourism, etc. This would be a system of planned economy. It 
would not be planned by a few bureaucrats from above, but rather by the majority 271 
 
from  below.  This  would  be  a  system  that  would  reject  the  problems  of  a 
representative Western democracy while taking on its effectiveness; at the same 
time it would be a system whose greatest principle is socialism and equality and 
would reduce bureaucracy to the lowest level.   
 
Real socialism for Marx and Marxists from Mandel to Ticktin to Mészáros is 
participatory socialism. It is a system based on the democratic regulation of the 
economy  from  below  by  conferences  of  producers  and  consumers.  Given  the 
bitter experiences of the past, how can the great majority of workers and poor 
become interested in the running of the economy? Wherever they have joined the 
revolutionary  movement, real power eventually  slipped out of their hands and 
became concentrated in the hands of the top elite and bureaucrats. Russia and 
Germany provide good examples of this process. In many countries this bitter 
experience has left this generation of workers so disappointed that they hardly 
join  the  political  movement  for  freedom  and  socialism.  What  can  be  done  to 
prevent recurrence of this bitter experience? 
 
The answer to the above question is the degree of awareness of the masses, as 
well as the level of their direct participation in bringing about these changes. The 
participation of the masses in all revolutionary processes is in inverse relationship 
to the concentration of power in the hands of party elites and bureaucrats. In spite 
of all the previous defeats of the working class, there must be no doubt that it 
joins and leads the revolutionary movement in the coming years again and again. 
This  is  the  dialectic  of  their  life  and  struggle.  Hence,  in  order  to  distance 
themselves from the mistakes of the past, the mass participation of workers and 
poor needs to make sure that there will be no power over their power and no 
decision over their conscious decisions in the future. They must ensure that they 
stay  put  in  the  revolutionary  field  and  do  not  pass  the  power  lead  to  any 
charismatic elite figure. The continuation of the anti-capitalist movement based 
on horizontal relationships for more than one decade proves the ability of activists 
to take the lead.  272 
 
 
Another  major  characteristic  of  a  socialist  umbrella  organisation  would  be  its 
unique structure and political programme. Unlike the traditional parties of the Left 
it would not have a heavy programme, which contains many pages of details. 
Moreover, they would not have a rigid top down hierarchical structure. Instead 
they would enjoy a system that sprang from the very heart of every movement for 
freedom,  equality,  democracy,  peace,  safer  environment,  and  human  rights.  It 
would  spring  from  the  harmony  of  the  greatest  numbers  of  organisations  and 
parties  as  well  as  individual  members  deeply  involved  in  those  activities  and 
movements.  In  this  organisation  power  would  not  be  concentrated  at  the  top. 
There would be limits to the leadership’s power and jurisdiction both collectively 
and individually. Policies would be based upon unanimity or at least a two-thirds 
majority rather than absolute majority. All strategic policies would be taken after 
the  widest  discussion  and  public  debate  in  the  country  with  media  and  press 
coverage.  Within  these  general  policies  the  general  executive  of  the  country 
would run the daily affairs and would be subject to a recall. In short in this system 
there  would  be  little  space  for  the  elite  in  either  the  political  organisation  or 
society as a whole. For the first time in history the majority of people would be 
allowed and able to rule their own affairs. 
 
These  organisations  are  still  in  the  process  of  forming  and  where  they  have 
formed the process is by no means complete. In developing a programme these 
organisations  should  not  suffocate  themselves  with  extra  rules  and  regulations 
provided they are able to agree on the basic requirements. This purpose is served 
by  principals  such  as  participatory  democratic  socialism  (as  opposed  to  the 
indirect democracy used in parliamentary systems), a revolutionary strategy (as 
opposed to reformism), and unity of the greatest parts of the left with the working 
class  and  other  popular  movements  (as  opposed  to  sectarianism  and 
bureaucracies). Anything more than that would be unnecessary and unfruitful.    
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The relationship between the rigid party and the umbrella 
organisation 
 
This section will discuss the relationship between a centralised Leninist type of 
party and an umbrella organisation. The obvious favourable qualities of the latter 
particularly in Western Europe, does not mean the former will subside and join 
the rest of the left. On the contrary, in almost every country there are political 
parties  who  have  so  far  rejected  the  idea  of  a  united  movement  under  one 
umbrella organisation. In Iran the Worker’s Communist Party never joined the 
WLU or the parallel Socialist Unity. In Britain the Socialist Labour Party had a 
similar position against the Socialist Alliance. It would be unrealistic to expect 
otherwise. It takes time for former social democrats, Stalinists, and Maoists to 
learn to think wider than the close boundaries of their particular party. Moreover, 
it  takes  longer  for  ordinary  members  of  these  parties  and  movements  to 
understand  the  damage  caused  by  three  decades  of  the  Cold  War  and  the 
degeneration  of  the  USSR,  than  it  takes  their  leaders.  It  is  important  for  the 
ordinary members of these political groupings to understand this history if it is 
their duty to create a new type of organisation for the 21
st century. That is to say, 
the movement for the unity of socialists has to spring from below. This unity 
cannot be the result of agreements between the leadership of separate movements. 
The history of the 20
th century proved that those leaders were not able to think 
beyond their particular party or group. 
 
In  any  given  country,  there  is  more  to  the  relationship  between  an  umbrella 
socialist organisation and a revolutionary Leninist type of party. In particular, one 
needs to mention that successful revolutions in developing countries have been 
the  work  of  highly  disciplined  revolutionary  parties.  Mészáros  explained  in 
Beyond Capital that the political dimension of social control is far greater today 
than during the classical period of capitalist development. In other words, in the 
21
st century reliance on the police, army, prisons, and other forms of repressive 
apparatuses is much greater than compared to the 19
th and the first half of the 20
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centuries. It goes without saying that the use of repression, censorship, torture, 
human rights abuses, execution, political imprisonment, etc. is more common in 
the third world than to Western Europe. Under conditions of severe oppression 
and daily persecution, both relatively small well-disciplined and larger more open 
organisations come under attack. The impact of such attacks on the functioning of 
those organisations depends on another factor – the existence of strong popular 
movements  of  workers,  women,  etc.  Those  organisations  will  maintain  their 
continuity if they have close regular contact with social movements and if they 
are able to recruit activists who are being brought into politics everyday by those 
movements. However, without strong movements political organisations of any 
kind would be unprotected and any loss of activists would be detrimental and they 
would be difficult to replace. To put it differently, the reason for the survival of 
the various RSDLP factions between 1900 and 1916 was not entirely due to the 
ability of these political factions to fight the Tsarist police. Rather it was due to 
the  existence  of  strong  working  class  movements,  women’s  movement  in  the 
cities, and peasant movements in the countryside. Although the police arrested a 
high number of people from these factions, new recruits to the party took their 
places.       
 
While  an  umbrella  socialist  organisation  might  be  less  bureaucratic,  less 
centralised and less sectarian than Stalinist and Maoist parties, emphasising the 
advantages of an umbrella socialist organisation does not suggest that the times of 
these  parties,  regardless  of  the  socio-political  conditions  of  their  struggle,  are 
over.  On  the  contrary,  in  many  African,  Middle  Eastern,  Asian,  and  Latin 
American countries the need for a revolutionary, well-disciplined party is as great 
as ever. The recent success of the Maoist party in Nepal is a good example. That 
is why defining the relationship between the disciplined centralised party and the 
umbrella socialist organisation is the most important task facing political theory in 
the 21
st century. 
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No  doubt  the  coming  years  and  decades  will  provide  many  examples  of  the 
coexistence and cooperation of the two organisations. So long as socialist activists 
are routinely oppressed by dictatorial regimes, their most common reaction will 
be more discipline and further centralisation. However, the same activists will 
also  realise  that  a  centralised  well-disciplined  party  cannot  represent  various 
social  movements.  They  will  realise  that  unity  with  other  organisations  and 
movements will have two advantages. Through the strategy of unity in a multi-
tendency  organisation,  they  will  gain  strength  as  well  as  security  for  their 
particular activities. As a result of understanding these advantages the activists of 
traditional parties will welcome such unity. For this reason it can be said that the 
relationship between well-disciplined Leninist parties and umbrella organisations 
cannot be but one of cooperation and support if they do not want to miss future 
opportunities. The dialectic of the revolutionary process is such that in order for a 
revolution  to  be  successful  the  existence  of  a  well-disciplined  revolutionary 
socialist  party  is  vital.  However,  after  the  revolution  has  taken  place,  the 
dictatorial regime has been overthrown, and the problems of the economy have 
become  the  immediate  task  of  the  revolutionaries,  it  is  at  this  point  that  the 
disciplined  party  must  give  way  to  a  socialist  umbrella  organisation  (an 
organisation that is connected with many strings to popular societal movements.) 
 
In  certain  societies  a  multi-tendency  organisation  and  a  well-disciplined  party 
might operate at the same time. For example, in parts of a country where, for 
various reasons, the central military or dictatorial regime cannot use the same 
degree of oppression as in the rest of the country, an umbrella organisation might 
exist. Some parts of the country might have a strong national movement with a 
heavy presence of international human rights groups, UN peace keeping force, 
and  heavy  media  presence  which  reduces  the  repressive  ability  of  the  central 
regime in those parts. Environmental and human rights campaigners  are more 
tolerable to many dictatorial regimes. The above situation prevents the central 
regime from using heavy oppression in those parts of the country. In situations 
like this secret activities decrease and give way to the open and wider activities of 276 
 
socialists in the area. The formation of an umbrella organisation of all socialist 
groups and parties becomes a real possibility. At the same time in other parts of 
the country where the highest degree of torture, censorship, and persecution is the 
daily routine of the central government, a popular movement of any kind faces 
strong police attack, the natural reaction of socialist revolutionaries would be to 
create the most rigid, highly disciplined party to cope with the pressure of the 
political police. The two political organisations do not oppose each other. On the 
contrary they would support each other against the bourgeois regime. 
 
Therefore, this study does not suggest that the time of rigid organisations and 
well-disciplined Leninist type parties is completely over. However, it suggests 
that when there is less pressure from the political police, as in Western Europe or 
as a result of a political revolution there is a degree of democratic freedom and no 
police brutality and oppression, there is less of a need for a secretive Leninist type 
of party than compared to conditions of censorship and oppression. Furthermore, 
if a disciplined party continues to exist while having political power, there is a 
higher risk of the party’s bureaucratization. Hence, to prevent such a disease, the 
party needs to open up and expand its social base. One of the most successful 
ways for this expansion is to create coalitions and alliances with its closest allies. 
Trotsky’s  method  for  building  a  workers’  front  provides  the  best  guide  and 
methodology. As opposed to Trotsky’s purpose, the aim behind a socialist multi-
tendency organisation is not to secure the supremacy of the communist party but 
rather  to  secure  the  supremacy  of  the  working  class  and  the  bottom  85%  of 
society.  
 
Therefore, in some societies for the political stage of revolution to bring about 
such  a  political  revolution,  a  well-disciplined  Leninist  type  party  is  the  most 
important  political  need.  However,  after  the  revolutionary  period  and  the 
overthrow of the old state machine the way forward for the party would be to 
transfer power to the already organised masses of workers and poor. This would 
be done through the creation of the widest coalition of socialists, if one does not 277 
 
already exist. This is one of the advantages and disadvantages of a traditional 
party versus the umbrella organisation of the socialists. Firstly, a participatory 
socialism  and  real  freedom  can  rest  on  the  alliance  between  the  workers’ 
movements and parties, women’s groups, environmentalists, the peace movement, 
young  people’s  organisations,  the  permanently  unemployed  and  student 
movements all in a united organisation that operates in the common interests of 
all these movements.  That would be an organisation that belonged to both civil 
society as well as political society. If there is  a  major  alliance parallel to the 
traditional  party’s  organisation,  the  latter  should  not  impose  its  method  of 
organisation. Joining forces with the existing alliance would enhance a greater 
alliance with stronger grassroots among the masses. Secondly, a traditional type 
of political party, which by definition rests on ideology, cannot represent, and 
more importantly, comprise activists from all the above mentioned social groups.     
 
Unacceptable policies of alliances and their socialist tendencies 
 
In Brazil, since its first electoral success, the PT’s policies moved to the right.  
For  example  its  policies  deal  with  international  capital  as  a  partner,  it  lacks 
support for the radical actions of landless peasant movement (MST), it is reluctant 
to tackle corruption and drug problems as it had promised, and it puts restrictions 
on the activities of leftist tendencies. As a consequence of the PT’s right wing 
turn leftist activists left the party in the last few years and some elements of these 
leftist groups and individuals formed a new radical socialist party in 2004. This 
new organisation is called the Party of Socialism and Liberty (P-SOL). The main 
components of this party are four different Trotskyist parties and groups known as 
the Block of Four. In addition, many more individuals and groups joined the P-
SOL in the last three years. P-SOL grew fast and in the last presidential election 
their candidate secured about 7% of the vote, which is very impressive compared 
to the PT’s share of the vote the first time it participated in a national election. 
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In the UK the original Socialist Alliance (SA) as well as the Scottish Socialist 
Party’s setbacks, internal fighting and lack of success, along with the split of the 
Socialist Worker Party (SWP) and Socialist Party of England and Wales (SP), as 
discussed in the previous chapters, also created different reactions amongst the 
socialist activists. At the end of 2006, the CPGB, some editorial members and 
supporters of Critique, and other socialist groups and individuals launched the 
Campaign For a New Marxist Party. According to the founding principles of this 
campaign, it recognises the rights of tendencies and platforms, its socialism is 
Marxian, and its suggested structure is based on the participation of all activists. 
 
As mentioned many times throughout this work, it is not possible to put forward a 
complete judgment on these newly formed organisations simply because they are 
still in the process of forming and establishing their principles and structures. That 
is to say, it is not clear whether they will survive, and if they do, only time will 
tell which direction they will choose to follow i.e. sectarianism or inclusiveness. It 
is not clear if they will keep their radical understanding of socialism or smooth it 
down  as  they  approach  future  elections.  Furthermore,  only  the  future  can  tell 
whether  they  will  allow  Stalinists  and  social  democratic  leftist  tendencies  to 
eventually join them or if they will prefer to divide the working class’ movement 
into two camps.  
 
However, even at this early stage of their development some points are clear. 
Firstly,  the  formation  of  the  above  mentioned  radical  organisations  do  not 
undermine the main hypothesis of this work. In fact, their formations prove its  
hypothesis. In both P-SOL in Brazil and the UK campaign, there is more than one 
group  or  party.  Both  organisations  support  the  idea  of  socialism  from  below, 
inclusiveness,  as  well  as  tendencies  and  platforms  in  their  internal  systems. 
Secondly, the bitter experiences of the 20
th century do not allow them to go back 
to the failed methods of traditional parties. Though the UK example chose the 
name Campaign for a Marxist Party, which included sixteen principles, this does 
not mean that it is a movement from above by the leadership and the programme 279 
 
is not its starting point. In other words, this is not a unity based solely on those 
sixteen  principles.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  quite  clear  that  it  has  to  be  an 
organisation built by activists from below in order to defend the working class’s 
movement against reformism, bureaucratism, Stalinism, sectarianism, and for the 
independent  council  movement  of  the  working  class.  The  coming  years  will 
witness to what extent this radical reaction affects the entire leftist movement and 
helps its unity. Finally, the formation of these organisations as well as similar 
organisations  in  Latin  America  suggests  that  working  class  multi-tendency 
organisations are in the process of growth. Their changes and development are as 
fast as the changes of the present-day capitalist system and therefore analysis of 
various aspects of their development require real concentration on political theory 
in the coming years. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The new left and their social base  
 
The aim of this work has been to prove that multi-tendency political organisations 
of  the  proletariat  and  poor,  which  constitute  more  than  80%  of  all  countries’ 
populations are strengthened by the changes in capitalist society i.e. changes in 
the structure of capitalism, which has led to diversity within the working class. 
This idea is not new to Marxist political theory. It has been supported by most 
Marxist  theorists  from  Marx  to  Mandel,  from  Lenin  and  Trotsky  to  Mao  and 
Gramsci. However, a multi-tendency organisation would not be possible without 
the support of activists and ordinary members of various political groups and their 
active participation in building the organisation. In the 1930s, Antonio Gramsci 
developed the idea that ordinary members were the most important element in 
making a political party. For more than half a century, traditional Stalinist parties 
have forgotten this idea. This survey asks the activists and members of two leftist 
organisations  their  opinions,  feelings,  and  preferences  towards  building  future 
organisations and the viability of socialist organisations in the coming years. 
 
In early 2001 the Communist Party of Iran (ICP) split for the second time. As a 
result, those who split from the party established a new organisation by the name 
of  Revolutionary  Organisation  of  Toilers  of  Kurdistan  (Komala,  which  means 
organisation).  Komala’s  members  were  dedicated  to  re-establishing  the 
organisation according to its original principles prior to joining the ICP in the 
early 1980s. After the 2001 split there were two organisations operating under the 
name of Komala. The first was the Kurdistan Organisation of the ICP (Komala) 
and the second was the newly formed Revolutionary Organisation of Toilers of 
Kurdistan (Komala) that did not want to be associated with the ICP at all.  For 
clarity this study refers to the Communist Party of Iran’s Komala as ICP Komala 282 
 
and the new Komala as Komala Party. This is a name that the organisations use 
for their English publications. 
 
During the summer of 2001, a random sample of more than 100 individuals were 
asked  to  complete  a  questionnaire.    The  subjects  were  activists  from  the  two 
respective Komala organisations in Iraqi Kurdistan.  This study was conducted 
shortly after their split. At the time of the survey both organisations were involved 
in the process of forming a socialist unity outside the Iranian Worker’s Left Unity 
(IWLU).  Their  participation  in  building  a  socialist  unity  demonstrated  their 
commitment towards building a multi-tendency organisation. For this reason, they 
were chosen to participate in this study. 
 
Six years after the survey the newly formed Komala Party has moved towards 
nationalism and is involved in a bourgeois coalition of federalist forces in Iran. In 
its  recent  congress,  Komala  Party  officially  announced  that  it  has  applied  for 
membership  to  the  International  Socialist  and  will  organise  a  tour  to  visit 
European  social  democratic  parties.  This  shift  was  not  unexpected,  though 
perhaps not in such a speedy fashion.  Komala Party always had a nationalist 
tendency. Given the historical possibilities of Kurdish movements and creation of 
a self-ruled Iraqi Kurdistan after the first gulf war, this tendency found a new 
strategy sooner rather than later. In other words, leftist nationalism would only 
carry  the  banner of  communism  as  long  as  there  was  not  a  viable  nationalist 
organisation to take its place. 
 
However, what happened to Komala Party in 2007 cannot undermine the survey’s 
2001 findings. In spite of Komala Party’s new strategy the findings of this survey 
are still useful and reliable. Though the survey information is six years old the 
question  of  left  unity  in  Iran  is  still  relevant  and  has  not  yet  been  answered. 
Moreover, since the 2001 split ICP Komala has become stronger. Hundreds of old 
experienced cadres have rejoined the organisation. It is not the aim of this study to 
predict what will happen to Komala Party as a result of its strategic change. It is 283 
 
enough to say that in Iranian Kurdistan the Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDPI) has been a social democratic organisation and a recognised member of 
world social democracy. Given the awareness of activists of this fact, the impact 
that this hasty change will leave on Komala Party’s activists remains to be seen. 
During 2007 Komala Party had its first split and is now experiencing a serious 
political crisis. In addition, the survey aim was not to find out what would happen 
to Komala Party or even ICP Komala but to find out about the activists of these 
two organisations.   
 
Why a Kurdish organisation and not an Iranian organisation? 
 
Leftist organisations in the Kurdish area were chosen for this study because it was 
not and is still not possible to conduct a study other than by direct observation in 
other areas of Iran ruled by the oppressive Islamic Republic. The activists in Iran 
should not put their existence at risk for a survey. Direct observation was not 
suitable  in  this  case because  of the  lack  of  accessibility.  Moreover,  given  the 
activists of ICP Komala and Komala Party’s are concentrated at two bases (or 
camping places) it was possible to carry out sampling and reduce the risk of error 
to  a  minimum.  Furthermore,  it  was  not  possible  to  distribute  and  collect  the 
results of such a questionnaire in a short period of time in other parts of Iran given 
the clandestine nature of activity in Iran. The identity of the activists and therefore 
their safety could have been compromised. Furthermore, no political organisation 
would reveal the details of their activists inside Iran. The participation of activists 
and their answers to any questions about socialist organisations could have put 
their lives in danger.     
 
It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  activists  of  both  Komalas  mainly  came  from  the 
Kurdish region. Before the two ICP splits Komala as its Kurdistan organisation 
was the only left-wing organisation with popular appeal in the Kurdish region. 
There has been a national movement in the Iranian Kurdistan since the Iranian 
revolution  and  Komala  represented  a  radical  solution  by  tying  nationalism  to 284 
 
socialism.  The  particularities  of  the  political  situation  in  Kurdistan  and  their 
effects on Komala did not allow this organisation to fully represent the entire left 
in Iran. For example, over the past few decades the level of regional investment in 
Kurdistan was the second lowest in Iran after Balouchestan. The industrial sector 
was amongst the weakest and the central government did not pay much attention 
to  the  economic  development  of  the  region.  This  abnormal  situation  affected 
public opinion in Kurdistan, political organisations, and their activists.  
 
Despite the above mentioned factors Kurdistan is part of Iran. Its struggles are 
part of the Iranian struggle. Over the past two decades Komala was affiliated with 
the Communist Party of Iran. In addition their involvement in the formation of an 
alliance with the Iranian left demonstrated that these organisations could represent 
other parts of the left as far as the survey questions were concerned.  In addition, 
the rest of the left was based in areas under the authority of the Islamic Republic 
that would have made such a method of research impossible.  
 
Thus, in short Komala could not fully represent the entire Iranian left. However 
given the oppression in the rest of Iran, and the history of Komala as an important 
part of the Iranian left after the revolution, Komala activists were a good target in 
which  one  could  study  how  activists  perceived  the  idea  of  multi-tendency 
organisations. If in the future multi-tendency socialist organisations become the 
voice of the majority of socialists in Iran, then the ICP Komala’s activists and 
some sections of Komala Party’s activist will be part of such an organisation. 
 
It must be emphasised that the survey was carried out two months after the split 
and both organisations were involved in the process of a socialist unity. Needless 
to say both factors may have affected the answers of some respondents.  
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The survey method   
 
Several  questions  were  prepared  before  travelling  to  Iraqi  Kurdistan.  The 
questions  were  designed  to  find  out  the  social  background,  philosophical 
standpoint,  and  political  opinions  of  activists  of  both  Komala  organisations. 
Activists were asked questions regarding their age, gender, the history of their 
activity  in  Komala,  occupational  background  before  joining  Komala,  level  of 
education, and family income and background. In addition, activists were asked to 
discuss their views regarding the political needs of the Kurdish movement, the 
relationship between the two Komala organisations after the split, which classes 
they  believed  to  be  their  allies,  how  they  defined  or  saw  themselves,  the 
organisational priority of Komala, the place of armed struggle as a revolutionary 
method of struggle, and the importance of social groups and classes.  
 
For each question there were several answers and the respondents were asked to 
tick only one answer. In two cases respondents had ticked more than one answer. 
For example, they ticked that they were unemployed and self-employed. In both 
cases the tick for unemployed were disregarded. If the number of answers for 
different  questions  were  not  equal  i.e.  for  some  questions  there  were  105 
responses  whereas  in  another  case  only  101,  then  the  calculation  was  made 
according to the available data. In such situation the difference is the margin of 
error.  
 
To prevent and reduce the risk of error and to make sure the questionnaire was 
handed to the right candidate according to random selection the best method for 
distributing  the  questionnaire  was  to  hand  it  to  a  randomly  selected  activist 
standing  at  the  lunch  queue  and  ask  him or  her to  fill  in the  form  after  they 
finished their lunches. In the cases where the respondents were illiterate, they 
were allowed to get help from one of their comrades under the condition that the 
answers were their own. In those cases the author observed while the respondents 
and  his  or  her  colleague  were  filling  in  the  form.  It  was  explained  to  the 286 
 
respondents  before  the  distribution  of  the  questionnaire  that  the  survey  had 
nothing  to  do  with  their  organisation  and  it  was  purely  for  the  purpose  of 
scientific research. The activists were also told that participation in the survey was 
not mandatory and they were given the opportunity to refuse participation.  
 
Once the forms had been completed, participants were given the opportunity to 
make their own suggestions for improving the questionnaire. More than 90% of 
the respondents did what they were asked and individually returned the form. 
However, all activists did not attend the lunch queue and it was not possible to get 
to those respondents who were not present in person. Only members of those 
organisation where allowed to know about the location of those activists at that 
particular time. In those cases, I had to trust party officials and send the number of 
questionnaires they had requested. There were two cases in the ICP Komala and 
five in the Komala Party. In addition there were families or members of some 
organs in each camp who would not queue for lunch. In these cases I handed the 
questionnaire in the order I saw them. For example, if the sequence was one in ten 
the individual number 1, 11, 21, 31, 41, 51, etc would get the questionnaire. One 
reason for distributing the questionnaire to randomly selected activists was the 
fact that giving the form to all activists was not practical and it could have put the 
security of those organisations at risk.  
 
Prior to handing out the questionnaire the research method was not disclosed to 
any party members in either case. They did not know who in the lunch queue 
would get the questionnaire or which members of those organs or families who 
were  not  present  in  the queue.  When  the  two  questionnaires were  sent  to  the 
guards in their fortifications it was explained to the messenger what to do and 
what  the  sequences  were.  The  same  explanation  was  given  to  Komala  Party. 
Therefore the margin of error can be estimated to be a maximum of 6% to7%. 
This  estimation  is  based  on  those  seven  cases  and  the difference between  the 
numbers of respondents for different questions. 
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Once all the responses were collected from both Komala activists the data showed 
that there were no significant differences between the two sets of responses. Only 
question ten regarding the relationship between the two organisations post-split 
did  the  activists  of  ICP  Komala  place  more  emphasise  on  no  relation  (3%)  - 
slightly more than the respondents of Komala Party. The reasons for combining 
the results were as follow: There was not any significant difference between the 
responses of ICP Komala activists and the responses given by activists of Komala 
Party.  As  far  as  the  majority  of  the  questions  were  concerned  the  political 
affiliation of respondents did not make a difference. The survey was not about the 
history  of  Komala  or  the  Kurdish  movement.  One  report  for  each  set  of  the 
respondents would be redundant. 
 
The survey’s findings  
 
ICP Komala and Komala Party - age group 
 
                    Age Group              Actual Numbers                       No % 
                       16 – 20                            15                                 14.4 
                       20 – 25                            40                                 38.4 
                       25 – 30                            20                                 19.2 
                       30 – 35                            16                                 15.3 
                       35 – 40                              4                                   3.8 
                       Over 40                             9                                   8.6 
                       Total                               104                                99.7    
Table  1  represents  the  percentage  of  the  age  groups  for  activists  of  ICP 
Komala and Komala Party during the summer of 2001.  
 
As it can be seen from the above table, all age groups existed among Komala 
activists - teenagers, young, middle, and old. The table shows that the number of 
young  activists  was  greater  than  the  over  40  age  range.  This  meant  that  the 
population of both Komala Party and the ICP Komala were compatible with the 288 
 
population of the country as a whole. What is more interesting is that more than 
50% of both organisations’ population were under 25 and over 70% were under 
30. This fact reveals a rather important factor about the Iranian left.  In spite of all 
the political pressure and severe oppression of the Islamic Republic at least one 
part of the left based in Kurdistan was able to recruit. It was not getting old and its 
age demographic was still young.   
 
 
                                       History of activity with Komala 
                                      
Category                                             Actual Numbers                              No % 
Under one year                                         28                                              26.78 
1 – 2 years                                                13                                              12.50 
2 – 3 years                                                07                                                6.78 
3 – 4 years                                                10                                                9.64 
4 – 5 years                                                07                                                6.76 
5 & over                                                    39                                               37.26 
Total                                                       105                                              99.72 
Table 2 represents the background of activists with Komala  
 
The table shows that after the Iranian  Worker’s Communist Party split 
from the Iranian Communist Party (ICP), which left the latter with a few 
activists,  the  ICP  managed  to  hold  itself  together  and  started  to  grow 
again. The fact that around 50% of activists joined Komala in the last two 
years proved that as a movement Komala was deeply embedded within the 
population  in  Kurdistan.  Even  after  the  serious  damage  it  experienced 
after the split, Komala once again began to flourish. This table illustrate 
the recruitment capacity of Komala after the first ICP split. It is not clear 
from this table if such capacity continued after the second split in 2001.  
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Occupational background before joining Komala 
 
Background                           Actual Numbers                                            No % 
 
Pupil (School age student)           30                                                         28.87 
Student (university)                      10                                                           9.82 
Worker                                          29                                                         27.91 
Peasant                                          01                                                           0.98 
Self-employed                               13                                                         12.68 
Unemployed                                 11                                                          10.77 
Other                                             09_____________________________08.87                                                                 
Total                                            105                                                          99.90 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3  
 
Table 3 shows that more than 27% of the activists came from the working class, 
10.7%  were  unemployed,  and  more  than  28%  were  pupils  before  joining  the 
organisation. If this is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that well over 
65% of Komala’s activists came from working class and poor backgrounds. It 
should be noted that the category of “other” in this table represents occupations 
such as housewives. In one case the respondent ticked both self-employed and 
unemployed. In another case the respondent ticked both student and unemployed.  
In all these cases no number was added to the unemployed category to prevent the 
occurrence of bias in the survey. In Iran today many graduates are unemployed, 
which is one of the social problems of the country. The fact that someone had 
ticked both unemployed and self-employed also can mean that self-employment 
in Iran and Kurdistan refers to a low income part of the population who cannot 
find regular job and have to sell cigarette, cold water, etc. It usually refers to 
peddlers.  
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The level of education 
 
Category                                Actual Numbers                                     No % 
 
None                                                      3                                                2.88 
Primary                                                11                                              10.57 
Secondary                                            28                                              26.92 
High school                                         50                                              48.07 
University                                            12                                              11.53 
Total                                                  104                                               99.97 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 4  
 
According to the data collected more than 88% of the activists had a high school 
education or less and only about 11.5% obtained university educations. This fact 
illustrates the social background of these two organisations. Here again the effect 
of the first ICP split in the early 1990s is shown. A great number of those who 
supported  the  Iranian  Worker’s  Communist  Party  were  highly  educated, 
intellectuals, and academics.  
 
                                         Place of living before joining Komala 
 
Category                                     Actual Numbers                                   No % 
 
Big city                                                       55                                            53.2      
Town                                                           26                                            25.2 
Village                                                         21                                           19.4 
Non-Kurdish areas                                        2                                             1.8                                                            
Total                                                            104                                          99.6 
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Of the participants surveyed 53.2% said they came from big cities, 25.2% from 
small cities, 19.4% from villages and the rest came from non-Kurdish areas. This 
data reveals some important political factors. Firstly, it reveals that Komala was 
an urban movement. Secondly, the popularity of these organisations was deeply 
connected to the national question in Kurdistan. About 20% came from villages. 
Peasant unrest in Iranian Kurdistan was connected to political movements in the 
last decade. The literature of Sharifzadeh Movement from 1965 onward and the 
involvement of Komala in defending the poor peasants against big land owners 
and feudal lords are only two examples. That is to say, the national and peasant 
questions in Kurdistan are related to a great extent. Of those village activists who 
joined  Komala  and  leftist  organisations  after  the  Iranian  Revolution  the  great 
majority were poor and came from landless peasant families.  
 
Of the 101 respondents 78.2% were male and 22% were female. If taken into 
consideration, the fact that a big number of women left these two organisations 
during the IWCP split in the mid-1990s it becomes clear that the participation of 
women of all ages in leftist groups was much greater than in the Iranian Kurdistan 
Democratic  Party  (KDPI).  This  level  of  women’s  participation,  in  spite  of 
economic barriers, can be explained by the Iran’s present system’s treatment of 
women. It also reveals a much more important factor. The question of women and 
their  struggle  for  equality,  justice,  and  freedom  in  the  current  Iranian  socio-
political regime is one  of the most important social bases of for  any  political 
organisation fighting for socialism and freedom. Arriving at Komala’s area was a 
huge step for a woman to take. It meant accepting the risk of arrest on the way 
and living in a completely alien environment.   
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Family income 
 
Category                 Actual Numbers                                        No %  
 
Poor                                      21                                                  20.16 
Lower middle                       32                                                  30.76 
Middle                                  36                                                  34.61 
Upper middle                       12                                                  11.59 
Rich                                       3                                                    2.88 
Total                                   104                                                 100.00 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6 
 
The data in this table support the data presented in the previous tables. Only 14% 
of  activists  came  from  upper  middle  and  rich  families,  while  more  than  85% 
belonged to middle class and poor families. Thus, the data presented in Tables 1-6 
leaves  no  doubt  that  Kurdistan’s  workers  and  poor  supported  Komala  as  a 
political  organisation.  It  has  to  be  noted  here  that  middle  income  families  in 
Kurdistan includes teachers, nurses, office workers, etc. These social groups did 
not consider themselves as part of the working class, although they did not earn 
much more than workers. Some respondents preferred to categorize themselves as 
middle class in spite of their low-income. The survey could not ask respondents to 
specify family income as some respondents might have found this offensive and 
refused to partake in the study. Therefore there is a risk of inaccuracy in options 
available to the respondents. For example for the reason stated above the survey 
could not specify the range of salary for low, middle and high income families. 
Therefore it has relied on the understanding of respondents of those terms.  
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                                   Political need of the Kurdish movement 
 
Category                                        Actual number                         No % 
 
Unity of the left                                       24                                   23.52 
International pressure                                1                                     0.98 
Revolution in Iran                                   39                                   38.23 
Self consciousness of the masses            22                                   21.56 
Most of those above                                15                                   14.70 
Other                                                          1                                    0.98 
Total                                                       102                                  99.97 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6 illustrates the political preference of Komala activists in relation to the 
Kurdish cause.  
 
The analysis of this table suggests at least two important points. While more than 
23% of the respondents ticked the Kurdish movement needed the unity of the left, 
14% said one of the needs was the unity of the left. Historically Komala and the 
Communist Party of Iran, which considered the USSR a state-capitalist country 
until its collapse never considered any sort of cooperation with the pro-USSR left, 
let alone unity with them. The fact that around 40% of activists emphasised unity 
of  the  left  demonstrates  a  very  important  change  in  the  mentality  of  the  left 
compared  to  the  period  before  1990.  In  addition,  the  data  from  this  survey 
indicates that more than 50% of respondents believed the Iranian revolution had 
an  important  role.  This  data  suggests  that  at  least  the  activists  of  the  most 
powerful organisations of the Iranian left were revolutionary. However, it has to 
be noted that the survey did not specify what it meant by revolution in Iran. Thus 
it was not clear whether the activists took revolution in its true meaning or simply 
as regime change. 
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Open and mass organisation or closed disciplined organisation 
 
Stalinist types of organisations were recognised by their hierarchical centralised 
organisation and very little space for the rank and file to breath. Though Komala 
and  the  ICP  were  not  pro-USSR  in  the  past  two  decades  their  method  of 
organisation had great similarities with other Stalinist groups. The survey asked 
the respondents whether they preferred an open mass organisation or a closed 
well-disciplined organisation. The data verified that 60% were in favour of a well-
disciplined organisation, 35% favoured a mass open organisation, and 5% ticked 
both. If the activists questioned recognised a well-disciplined party and a mass 
open  organisation  as  the  only  possibilities  for  the  formation  of  a  political 
organisation then this explains why the ICP did not join the WLU’s formation 
process in the early 1990s. One must note that it was after two major splits that 
more than 35% of activists had realised that the political party they knew was not 
the only recognised organisation of the left. The fact that 5% said they preferred 
both suggests either they did not understand the question or they believed that 
open mass organisation could still be well-disciplined. 
  
Relationship between the two organisations post-split 
 
Category                                                   Actual Number                                 No%  
 
No relation                                                               45                                       45% 
Unite again                                                                 9                                         9% 
Unite in a front                                                           6                                         6% 
Political cooperation                                                15                                       15% 
Alliance with other leftist groups                            25                                       25% 
Total                                                                      100                                     100% 
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Out of the 100 people who responded to this question 45% wanted their Komala 
to be totally separated from the other Komala and believed the best policy was to 
have no relationship between the two.  It is evident that two months after the split 
many people had not come to terms with the political reality. This conclusion is 
strengthened  by  the  fact  that  9%  of  the  respondents  said  they  should  reunite. 
Though Komala was not a single united organisation anymore and its parts were 
closer to each other compared to other left-wing political groupings in 2001. But 
more importantly, 46% of activists wanted their organisation to join an alliance 
either with the other Komala or form political cooperation with the other Komala 
and the other leftist groups.  
 
                                                     Class alliances 
 
Category                                                        Actual numbers                           No% 
 
Only workers                                                         0                                            0                                              
Workers and poor                                                 33                                         31.73 
All classes but capitalists                                      29                                        27.88 
All classes                                                             37                                        35.57 
Mainly workers and poor                                       5                                           4.80 
Total                                                                   104                                        99.98 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8  
 
It is important to note that 0% of the activists believed that only workers were the 
force of change and revolution. That was the result of two things. Firstly, in their 
own  experiences these  activists  had  seen  that  apart  from  workers  other  social 
groups  also  had  an  interest  in  socialism.  Secondly,  these  organisations  were 
deeply  rooted  in  the  struggles  of  workers,  women,  students,  teachers,  poor 
peasants, youths, etc. During the 1990s they had participated considerably in the 
improvement  of  socialist  theory.  Along  with  the rest of  the left  their  position 296 
 
improved with the progress of international socialist movements. More than 35 % 
of  the  respondents  said  Komala  should  ally  with  all  classes,  which  clearly 
indicates a political tendency within the rank and file of these organisations. The 
rest of the respondents preferred Komala to ally with workers and the poor. No 
doubt nationalism as a political tendency existed within these organisations but 
that  should  not  explain  the  fact  that  65%  of  the  respondent  emphasised  the 
organisation of workers and poor as the social basis of any radical change. 
 
                                            How do you define yourself? 
 
Category                                              Actual Number                                    No % 
 
Religious                                                        1                                                0.98% 
Liberal                                                          15                                              14.70% 
Democrat                                                       0                                                     0% 
Socialist                                                       17                                              16.66% 
Communist                                                  69                                              67.64% 
Total                                                          102                                              99.98%  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 9 shows the political philosophy of activists. 
  
Around  15%  stated  they  were  liberals  and  the  rest  were  communists  and 
socialists. This data shows that Komala, as a political organisation, did not follow 
the  organisational  pattern  of  the  traditional  left,  which  was  based  upon  an 
ideology,  namely  Stalinism  or  Maoism.  Though  the  dominant  ideology  was 
communism,  as they understood it, other ideologies (socialism and liberalism) 
were tolerated. Whether this tolerance was characteristic of the 1990s after the 
collapse of Stalinist Russia and the Eastern European political system or a pattern 
to be followed in the future by socialist organisations is a question that only time 
can  answer.  The liberal nationalist  tendency  could  be identified  from  Komala 
Party  organisation’s  conference  resolutions.  Two  points  need  clarification 297 
 
regarding the data about liberals and democrats in the above table. The equivalent 
of the word liberal in Farsi is azadikhah, which does not contain a negative tone 
and  certainly  does  not  convey  an  anti-socialist  sense.  On  the  contrary,  the 
activist’s concept of a democrat was associated with the KDPI, which was at war 
with Komala for two years and killed hundreds of leftist activists.  
 
The workers’, peasants’, women’s and youth movements have been important in 
Iran over the past two decades. The responses from these activists show that they 
were aware of the reality of the politics of contemporary Iran. 
  
Organisation Priority 
 
Category                                             Actual Number                                    No % 
 
Workers, peasants, women, youth             25                                                24.50% 
Workers, youth, women, peasants             12                                                11.76% 
Workers, women, youth, peasants             41                                                40.19% 
Youth, women, workers, peasants             18                                                17.64% 
Other                                                           2                                                   1.96% 
No answer                                                   4                                                   3.92% 
                                                                 
Total                                                        102                                                 99.97% 
Table  10  the  priority  of  popular  organisation  from  the  point  of  view  of 
respondents  
 
 Table 10 represents the views of Komala’s activists on the role of classes and 
social groups in the struggle for socialism. The data obtained from this question 
was limited due to the fact that around 5% either did not tick any category or said 
they preferred other options. For example, it was not clear if the option women, 
workers, youth, and peasants was popular. In spite of this problem, the fact that in 
the question before the previous no respondents chose the “only workers” option 298 
 
and the majority of respondents believed workers and poor were the social classes 
that  Komala  should  help  to  organise  was  supported  by  the  data  in  Table  10. 
According  to Table  10  95%  of  activists  believed  that Komala  should base  its 
organisation on workers, women, youth, and peasants. In other words, according 
to  activists  these  social  classes  and  groups  constituted  the  social  basis  for 
socialism and revolution, as they understood it. In fact, all the new alliances tried 
to organise these social groups and classes. The table also indicates that the option 
“workers, women,  youth, and peasants” was the most popular among activists  
(more than 40% chose this option).  
Chapter five argued that the leaders of new social movements in Latin America 
and former guerrilla activists in the Middle East criticised armed struggle as a 
method and illustrated the example of Iran. The respondents’ answers support the 
critiques of armed struggle as the only recognised revolutionary tactic. 
                           
The place of armed struggle 
 
Category                                           Actual number                    No % 
 
Increase popular unrest                                       20                                   19.41 
Decrease popular unrest                                       1                                      0.97 
Necessary in spite of its negative impact             0                                      0.00 
To keep pressure on the regime                            4                                      3.88 
Be used along with popular political struggle    70                                    67.96 
None of the above                                                7                                      6.79 
No answer                                                            1                                       0.97 
Total                                                                 103                                    99.98 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 11 
 
Komala  was  a  leading  organisation  in  the  Iranian  Kurdish  movement  and  its 
presence could be seen in every aspect of this popular movement. During the 299 
 
1980s disbelief in armed resistance was not tolerated. People who did not believe 
in the effectiveness of armed struggle or considered it a bourgeois method did not 
openly express their opinions. If they did, it could have resulted in criticism or 
expulsion. In the mid-1980s Komala became involved in the creation of the ICP. 
The ICP emphasised the workers’ movements although armed struggle was never 
criticised. At present armed resistance as a method is kept at a very low level. 
Based on the party’s background it was not surprising that 68% of the respondents 
considered armed resistance as a method that could be used alongside the popular 
political struggle of workers and poor. Nor was it surprising that another 20% 
believed it could help popular unrest. However, this 68% stated that it should be 
used as a secondary tactic and only alongside the popular struggle of workers and 
poor. Table 10 also demonstrates that some respondents held a negative view of 
armed resistance as a method. About 12% of respondents did not answer, had 
something else in mind, or claimed that although it was necessary, it had some 
negative effects. One must remember that this question was asked of leftists who 
lived and struggled in an area where public opinion favoured armed resistance as 
it was the most popular method used by most national movements.  
 
Summary 
 
The data collected from this survey supported the overall argument of this thesis. 
The  majority  of  leftist  organisations  supported  the  idea  of  a  multi-tendency 
revolutionary  socialist  organisation.  The  ICP  Komala  and  Komala  Party,  who 
participated in a socialist coalition with other revolutionary socialist organisations 
both,  supported  the  idea  of  multi-tendency  organisation.  According  to  the 
available  data,  their  activists  supported  this  idea.  The  presence  of  workers, 
women,  youth,  and  students  among  the  activists  demonstrated  that  these 
organisations were a part of the new left. Unlike traditional parties, they were 
based  on  social  groups  that  constituted  more  than  85%  of  the  society  of  all 
countries. These organisations belonged to workers and poor and were supported 
by these classes. The existence of youth in their rank and file proved that they 300 
 
were  able  to  increase  their  numbers.  The  relatively  high  number  of  women 
participating in these organisations separated them from traditional leftist parties. 
Their activists had direct grassroots, as well as intellectual backgrounds. The data 
suggested that the majority of the activists in both organisations supported the 
unity of the entire left. However, this did not suggest that the leadership in both 
organisations listened to their activists. In spite of the fact that the ICP had been 
critical of the USSR for two decades, their organisational structure had a lot in 
common with Stalinist parties.  
 
The history of Komala before joining the ICP and during the ICP’s existence has 
been  a  history  of  sectarianism  and  suspicion  of  Iranian  leftist  groups.  This 
suspicion was justified by the treacherous political behaviour of the Tudeh party 
and  Fedaie  Majority  who supported  the  Islamic  Republic against  Komala  and 
other radical Marxist and semi-Maoist groups. For more than ten years, Komala 
was  part  of  the  ICP.  However  during  all  those  years  it  held  onto  a  kind  of 
autonomy inside the party. Between 1980 to1990 Komala and ICP never led the 
way for  a  greater alliance of the left in  Iran and turned down suggestions by 
smaller groups. The ICP organisational policies demonstrated a contradiction. On 
the one hand it had accepted Komala’s autonomy, which was more than a right of 
a platform and tendency. On the other hand this party rejected any unity beyond 
ideological unity i.e. it accepted one interpretation as the basis for political unity.   
 
The majority of Komala’s activists in both organisations favoured unity of the left 
under the heavy impact of the first split and immediately after the second split as 
the data suggested. However, in spite of the views of its activists, the ICP and 
Komala refused to participate in the unity process of the left for so many years. 
Therefore, it can be said the activists in 2001 demonstrated their support for any 
leadership’s effort towards the unity of the left. 
 
The example of Komala and its radicalism in the Kurdish movement in Kurdistan 
during  the  last  two  decades  supported  the  idea  of  the  relationship  between 301 
 
national and peasant movements and their importance in the unity of the left put 
forward in the introduction. The traditional left neglected these movements for 
many decades. There are many similarities between the Komala movement as a 
popular radical socialist organisation and similar movements in Mexico, Brazil, 
Bolivia, and other Latin American countries. The fact that activists recognised the 
importance of popular social movements, as the data demonstrated, is a positive 
move away from sectarianism similar to the Zapatistas efforts after 2006. 
 
This  survey  is  relatively  old.  Since  2001  the  ICP  Komala  has  improved  its 
policies by actively supporting all social movements and by putting them under its 
daily  media  coverage.  But  the  improvement of  ICP  Komala  in  all  policy  and 
organisational aspects has been a positive move and strengthened the argument of 
this work. The sectarian policy of the past was replaced by a more positive policy 
of cooperation with other leftist organisations. That is to say the last six years has 
not  undermined  the  survey’s  finding  as  far  as  the  ICP  Komala  is  concerned. 
Komala Party followed a social democratic policy, went deeper into nationalism, 
and faced a political crisis, which resulted in its first split in 2007. The crisis of 
that organisation has not come to a close. 
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Section two 
Two interviews 
 
Introduction 
                                             
Two interviews were selected for this section. The first is with Mani Azad (a 
member of IRWO) and the second with Jafar Resa (a former member of ICP). 
These  two  interviews  represent  opposing  views  of  the  formation  of  multi-
tendency socialist organisations amongst leftist activists. Azad supports this idea 
while Resa is against it. Though Resa’s interview is not as detailed as Azad’s, its 
line of opposition is quite clear.  
 
The contents of these two interviews reveal the disagreement or lack of consensus 
amongst  activists  regarding  the  place  and  function  of  multi-tendency 
organisations. The disagreement between leftist activists with different political 
background is not unusual. The idea of left-wing multi-tendency organisations is 
relatively  new.    Organisations  that  based  themselves  on  this  idea  are  still  in 
embryonic form. It will take some time before the multitude of activists line up 
behind the idea and those organisations.  
 
These  two  interviews  not  only  represent  the  support  and  opposition  of  two 
political activists, they also reveal the reasons and arguments for their support or 
opposition. In order for the socialist movement to move forward, all the different 
factions  must  unite  around  one  form  of  organisation  or  another.  Though  the 
Brazilian Worker’s Party (PT) and similar multi-tendency organisations did not 
have  a  good  start  after  capturing  state  power  and  as  a  result  failed,  their 
alternative could not have been a traditional party.  These two interviews indicate 
that  the  idea  of  multi-tendency  socialist  organisations  have  captured  the 
imaginations of political activists and they are trying to find the best possible 303 
 
organisational model capable of leading the struggle of the great majority during 
the  present  century.  These  efforts  can  be  seen  everywhere.  In  the  UK  the 
Campaign for a Marxist Party is the latest example. In Brazil the P-SOL is trying 
to fill the gap created by the right turn of the PT. The Zapatista movement in 
Mexico offers a different model. This model puts emphasis on radical grassroots 
politics rather than state power. The interaction between all these ideas, efforts, 
and organisational models will culminate into a fully matured alternative to the 
failed traditional parties of the 20
th century. 
 
The interview with Resa was conducted in English. Permission to reproduce this 
interview has been granted by Dr J. Resa. However, the author translated Azad’s 
interview from Farsi into English. The author will take responsibility for errors 
created during the translation process. Finally these two interviews, as most of the 
work, bare the mark and impression of the Iranian political history. In a way, this 
is the strength of this work. The knowledge, familiarity and background of Iranian 
politics are being used to analyse the question of future socialist organisations 
common to all countries. 
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                                             Appendix two 
 
Interview with Dr Mani Azad 
 
    1- The 1990s witnessed further splits in the communist parties. Although 
the   organisational and political illnesses are partly to blame for those 
splits,  it  is  believed  that  regardless  of  the  structural  and  political 
shortcomings, the traditional communist party, capable of organising 
all  sections  of  society,  cannot  survive  anymore  and  that  is  the  main 
cause of the partition within the communist parties. What is your view?  
 
That is right, but I think if we look at the experience of the last one hundred years 
from the point of view of the socialist and communist struggle, these parties – the 
traditional  communist  parties  –  were  unsuccessful  before  the  1990s  too. 
Moreover, they did not have the necessary capacity for the leadership of such a 
struggle. Although these parties, particularly after the October Revolution, had an 
important role in pushing and leading reforms to better the lives of the working 
class, labour force, and oppressed people around the world. In recent decades 
these parties could not hold themselves together and faded away. The monolithic 
communist  party  proved  itself  incapable  of  organising  all  sections  of  society, 
which was largely due to an important change in the structure of the workforce 
and working class as the agent of the socialist struggle. That is to say, the working 
class has become bigger in number and more diverse. This enormous force, which 
is exploited because of the commodity relations of capitalist production becomes 
alienated. In the present era in particular, the working class can clearly see the 
pressure of neo-liberalism on itself and the environment. It experiences instability 
and insecurity with every moment and gets into conflict with the main causation 
of all these miseries – capitalism. From this point of view an underlying thread 
connects  the  entire  working  class together.  However,  the  same  expansion  and 
diversity creates different degrees of life experiences and culture. Sections of the 
working class (on the basis of such differences) join the struggle. A traditional 305 
 
communist party with traditional definitions and structure contradicts the reality 
of the force of communism. 
 
Traditional communist parties were formed in the 20
th century during a historical 
period of growth in the fabrics and manufacturing industries and the development 
of Fordist organisation.  It was a time when the metal industry employed most of 
the  labour  force  and  was  the  most  effective  section  of  the  whole  economy. 
Traditional communist parties based their activities on this labour force and got 
along with its ups and downs. In the first half of the 20
th century, the labour 
movement  was  particularly  strong  in  these  sections.  These  parties  also  felt 
strengthened. After the Second World War, in particular the 1960s, in order to 
maintain  the  rate  of  profit,  profitability,  and  control  the  labour  movement, 
capitalism changed its organisation and structure of the work force. As a result of 
the movement of capital into different departments, the service industry increased 
and  the  number  of  people  working  in  this  sector  multiplied.  New  industries 
producing semi-conductors started to appear, which unlike classical industries, 
did not employ large numbers of people but had an important role in the whole 
economy. The neo-liberal programme with a flexible working programme and a 
reduction  of  permanent  employment  (particularly  from  the  1980s  onwards), 
allowed a part-time and unofficial work force to increase. In addition, short-term 
contracts without any support (such as pensions, etc) explosively increased. These 
sectors  of  the  economy  cannot  use  classical  methods  of  organisation,  i.e. 
traditional unions, which traditional communist parties used as their main model. 
In the unemployed section of society, housewives are exploited by any measure 
whom without wages or salaries carry on an important part of domestic work 
(similar to hotel services) and provide education and health care in their homes 
and for the capitalist economy. 
 
That is to say, in some countries the sum total of services provided by domestic 
workers (housewives) is about 1/3 of the whole GDP for the country. Equally, if 
we take into account all of the young students who have to work part-time to be 306 
 
able to live and study, we can see that the expansion and diversity of potential 
social forces of the communist struggle is much bigger than a force that can be led 
by the monolith structure of a traditional party. Traditional communist parties did 
not understand these changes. Their definition of the working class was the same 
as in the early years of the 20
th century. By the worker and working class, they 
meant factory workers and only those who worked manually. The culture and 
methods of organisation in these parties were frozen in the traditions and political 
conditions  of  the  early  20
th  century.  When  changes  imposed  themselves,  their 
understanding was still limited. At best, some sections of the service industry 
came into consideration. To date, all of the service sectors are not included. This 
is where education, personal service, and service to producers becomes important 
sections of the capitalist economy and take a more important role. This lack of 
consideration has to do with their anachronism and the incompatibility of parties’ 
traditional structures with the organisation of such a diverse mass of potential 
force in  the  struggle  for  communism.  Moreover,  these traditional parties  have 
made  rules  or  principles  out  of  their  metaphysical  method  of  thinking.  If  the 
experiences of the last one hundred years have not made it clear to all that this 
method and structure of the communist struggle was not effective (rather their 
internal relations and method of organisation having failed) then nothing else will. 
To the deniers of such experiences we can only say good-bye and good luck.  
 
 
     2- In the 1990s the left gave birth to a new form of political organisation in 
the different countries of Asia, Europe and Latin America. These newly 
formed organisations embodied, in addition to the working class, other 
social groups. For example, organisations such as RESPECT, consist of 
women’s  groups,  trade  unions,  environmentalists  and  even  religious 
groups  (e.g.  the  British  Muslim  Association),  and  peace  movements. 
How do you define these newly formed organisations? 
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To define these types of organisations, I think we have to take into consideration 
what they decided as their aims. We also need to look at their social composition, 
areas  of  their  struggle,  as  well  as  their  methods  of  organisation  and  internal 
relations  with  regard  to  the  social  struggle.  The  more  general  pattern  to  your 
example would be social forums and other umbrella organisations that are active 
these days. What is clear is that these types of organisations have been able to 
lead a mass movement against neo-liberalism and put a stop to its advance. Most 
of these organisations consider themselves to be anti-capitalist. Many forces with 
socialist and communist aims can be seen among them. They have the capacity to 
make  such  a  horizon  even  clearer.  The  areas  and  basis  of  struggle  for  these 
movements are wider than the traditional parties and cover various aspects of life 
under capitalist pressure and oppression. This method of organisation, instead of 
centralised  structures  led  by  the  top,  allows  initiatives  from  below  and  has 
appropriate structures to engage with social “movements” rather than bureaucratic 
hierarchical structures with “army type” commanding systems. 
 
The new political organisations have the capacity to create harmony amongst the 
various  sections  of  the  labour  force  and  social  movements  around  a  common 
issue. They organise diversity to enable united action. They are essentially based 
on the existing active movements in society and provide space for their work and 
action.  Through  them  the  struggle’s  structure,  relations,  and  aims  find  an 
appropriate  base  for  the  harmonisation  of  the  struggle  on  a  global  scale  and 
transcends the struggle beyond the boundaries of one country. 
 
 
      3-  In the Communist Manifesto, Marx defines communists as the most 
conscious section of the working class. How would Marxism perceive 
an organisation that seeks to go beyond its main purpose of organising 
the working class for socialism? 
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Karl Marx correctly said in the Communist Manifesto that communists are the 
conscious section of the working class.  He added that communists are not a party 
against other workers’ parties and emphasise the united anti-capitalist struggle. 
They do not have a separate principle with which to mould and form the working 
class movement. He also said that the communists’ theoretical conclusions are not 
based on the opinions or principles discovered or made by this or that world peace 
maker – they are the general voice of the real relations stemming from the class 
struggle. In my view, Marx’s brilliant words refer to the real problems of the 
existing class struggle rather than the problems facing schools of thought…etc. 
With this introduction, I will answer the main question posed. We need to note 
that all of these types of organisations do not want to overthrow capitalism and do 
not pursue communism  and the abolition of private property in their struggle. 
Hence, their importance is not their ideology but the vastness of their struggle and 
popularity. The main point to this question is the organisation that seeks to go 
beyond  their  main  aim,  which  is  the  organisation  of  the  working  class  for 
socialism, and whether such a thing is acceptable. The whole point here is this 
word, which is the point of question for the working class (i.e. its structure) as 
well as the areas and aspects of its struggle. In my view, if we take into account 
what I said in my introductory answer to this question and what Marx refers to as 
the  problems  of  the  existing  and  present  class  struggle,  then  the  structural 
diversity of these organisations’ forces and vastness of the areas in which they 
struggle  is  not  negative.  On  the  contrary,  it  means  that  they  are  taking  into 
account the present class struggle and its problems that put forward new questions 
every moment. Regarding the diversity of the social forces of these organisations, 
two points have to be taken into account: 
1-  Consideration of the new structure of the working class and social forces 
of communism answers the first question. I talked about these and pointed 
out the changes in the composition of social forces. I think we need a 
different approach to look at the potential social forces of the struggle for 
socialism. 
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2-  Diversity of ideologies, thoughts, and beliefs of these forces, for instance 
the existence of forces that maintain their religious beliefs with the criteria 
of a traditional organisation based on ideological unity as above is not 
compatible  and  faces  many  questions  since  the  communism  and  class 
struggle of traditional parties was one and the same as Marxism. This is 
contrary to the ideas of Marx himself.  
 
Communists’  theoretical  conclusions  were  limited  to  the  ideas  of  one  world 
philosopher. Ideology born out of metaphysics becomes dogmatic and aesthetic. 
Revolutionary and communist ideas, on the contrary, are dialectical and renewing 
themselves all the time. Ideology and metaphysics place emphasis on identity and 
being. Revolutionary communist ideas emphasise and are based upon becoming. 
It does not accept or tolerate any aesthetic or fixed identity and is always in the 
process of change. Capitalist relations are based on capital and its accumulation. It 
turns everything into a commodity to reach its aim. It turns human labour into a 
commodity and alienates it from humanity. For this aim, it has to remove human 
beings and their labour (which in its essence is a social force) from its social 
character. Under capitalist relations, mankind becomes a tool or machine - each 
one separate from each other and each one engaged in some kind of activity. Only 
capital has self-determination. Each individual worker is a captive of the secret 
rule of capitalist accumulation and works for this god.  He is not himself anymore 
and has left his living social relations behind and has instead found an illusory 
identity. Capitalism distributes all these disasters to be accepted as a collection of 
ideological  values  and  criteria.  The  leftists  who  became  aware  of  this  secret 
(because of the great efforts of people such as Marx) and understood the need to 
oppose  this  ideology  unfortunately  chose  the  same  logic  put  forward  by 
“scientific ideology” (the so-called teachings of Marx). In fact, it was the same 
capitalist logic that turned man from being a subject into an object. Using the 
same logic, leftists after Marx wanted to help the masses (primarily the working 
class) with their ideological machine to enable it in its struggle. Moreover, one 
needs  to  ask  whether  it  is  possible  for  ideology  to  unite  the  working  class 310 
 
movement. Apart from many other factors that make such a project impossible, a 
simple question is: if our understanding of unity is based on an ideology such as 
Marxism, then which Marxism? Now some 160 years after the Manifesto was 
first  published  there  are  as  many  as  160  Marxist  tendencies  and  each  one 
considers itself to be the true one. Who is to judge? We were told that the working 
class would decide for itself which one. The last one hundred years has shown 
that the masses of the working class have not chosen one of these tendencies and 
we  have  not  reached  a  final  unity  through  this  method.  Worse  than  that, 
everything with this capitalist logic is being torn into pieces under the false flags 
of the illusory identities of groups and factions.  
 
With such a long discussion, we now need to ask whether we should still look at 
the ideological diversity within the new organisations as a negative point. Another 
distinctive feature about these organisations is their wide range of actions. Are 
these areas and aspects of struggle compatible with the communist struggle to 
overthrow capitalism? The truth is that traditional parties can concentrate their 
struggle in the production sphere with the aforementioned short-sightedness. They 
believe that since production is an organiser and an essential part of capitalism, 
which in itself is not wrong. Furthermore, they believe that if labourers were to 
conquer this essential department and the party captured political power under the 
party’s leadership , then capitalism would be defeated. Under this strategy there 
are various aspects of everyday live that are under the domination of the class and 
capitalism  which  are  not  taken  into  consideration.  As  a  result,  the  capture  of 
power by the party with the claim of class representation then becomes the central 
issue  of  struggle.  The  experiences  of  the  last  century  show  that  this  strategy, 
which was used after the October Revolution in different countries, resulted in 
nothing  more  than  a  few  reforms  in  the  lives  of  hardworking  people.  The 
overthrow of capitalism did not take place and the conditions for socialism were 
never met. After a short period of time and the early victories, capitalist relations 
were reproduced and strengthened and class society continued. Capitalism, unlike 
its predecessor’s methods of domination, does not only rule by state oppressive 311 
 
apparatus,  although  political  power  and  the  state  are  its  most  important  and 
central  parts  of  domination.  Capitalism  as  a  social  relation  starts  from  an 
economical and production sphere and covers all aspects of life. Just like labour, 
it  is  separated  from  the  producer  and  is  concentrated  in  the  form  of  capital. 
Capitalism takes power from people and in the form of domination concentrates it 
in the state, and creates this domination of power over relations between people. 
The dominative role of capitalism has penetrated into every corner of social life, 
between men and women, parents and children, friends and colleagues, teachers 
and pupils, and between man and nature, etc. Thus, the struggle to overthrow 
capitalism is an all encompassing war. Tearing apart and destroying this entire 
network  cannot  be  stopped  even  temporarily.  Priority  must  be  given  to  state 
power,  which  is  one  of  the  main  links  of  the  network.  New  organisations’ 
concentration on the struggle of everyday life is the real basis on which capitalism 
can  be  overthrown  and  its  reproduction  prevented.  In  short,  I  think  new 
organisations,  by  encouraging  initiatives  from  below;  keeping  away  from 
authority and centralism, which gives space to the united actions of real social 
movements and challenges capitalism in all corners of life; and accepting their 
members  diversity  and  efforts  to  organise  united  action,  have  the  capacity  to 
create a viable organism for the communist struggle through the clarification of 
their principles.  
 
 
    4- In your view are these organisations  capable of leading  the working 
class and the great majority of the population toward democracy and 
socialism? 
 
To answer this question, I think we need to look at concepts such as leadership, 
democracy and socialism. Different understandings of these concepts will lead to 
different  answers  to  the  question.  In  my  view,  freedom  from  the  clamp  of 
capitalism  and  building  a  different  (communist)  world  is  possible  with 
emancipation. Over the past several thousand years, what divided the logic of the 312 
 
struggle for freedom into two periods - before and after Marx - is the concept of 
“emancipation.”  All  types  of  struggle  that  did  not  aim  for  emancipation 
reproduced upper class domination despite their degrees of reform and freedom. 
In capitalist relations where social domination is an organic essence of the system, 
there is a greater emphasis on the principle of emancipation. Emancipation means 
the ability to “stand on one’s feet,” “to think with one’s brain,” and “to get with 
one’s hand.” That is to say, to create and form the real life and social identity of 
man. 
 
Traditional  parties’  understanding  of  leadership  refers  to  an  organisation  of 
conscious elements preparing a programme and then attracting the support of the 
masses  (the  majority  of  the  population)  to  follow  it  either  by  revolutionary 
authority or through democratic voting. Hence, the masses are pulled behind so 
that  the  implementation  of  the  party  programme  will  enable  victory  to  be 
achieved. The leading group is formed separately and creates clear boundaries 
with the working class and has set aside the role of leadership for itself.  Such a 
model viewed from any angle has differences with the masses of the class and in 
the process of the struggle plays the role of the subject turning the members of the 
class into the object. The same logic of organisation exists in capitalism between 
capital and the labour force. The method of organisation in a class society is based 
on elitism and hierarchy. These two aspects of organisation are found in every 
aspect of life during the past ten thousand years of class society and can be seen in 
capitalist relations. The traditional party not only uses this method in relation to 
the masses but also its own internal relations are based on the same manner. The 
most prominent, i.e. the highest elite are at the centre. From within the centre, the 
most prominent and distinguished usually becomes the determining leader. It is 
not  accidental  that  all  the  parties  have  had  one  prominent  leader  who  held  a 
central role. In other words, party members become objects to a certain degree 
and because this cycle is institutional it prepares the way for reproducing the old 
class society and domination of the new generation.  
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Are  leadership  and  this  type  of  organisation  compatible  with  the  communist 
struggle for emancipation for all people? I think new organisations do not yet 
have  a  compatible  structure  to  pursue  emancipation,  although  they  show  the 
potential to facilitate such a pursuit. Emancipation can only be brought into reality 
by  the  ability  of  each  potential  combatant  or  challenger  participating  in  the 
advancement of the great forces of socialism to fully participate in the struggle. 
The communist organisation must completely reject the method of organisation of 
capitalist relations. You cannot challenge capitalism by using its methods because 
this method makes its executives reproduce its relations. One cannot justify it by 
saying that we live in a capitalist society and cannot get away from its means. As 
the Farsi saying goes: potential justification would be worse than the offence. 
This means the acceptance of real politics. This contradicts revolutionary thought, 
which  is  not  after  describing  but  changing  the  world.  If  the  tasks  of  the 
communist organisation are not limited to political power but rather to the effort 
and preparation to enable the class for emancipation and self governance; if it is 
not isolating itself at the centre of leadership and is in close contact with the 
existing movements instead of building leader-follower relationships; if it gives as 
well as takes, learns from as well as teaches the masses practical and political 
matters,  then  it  would  be  able  to  prepare  for  the  conditions  of  overthrowing 
capitalism  and  preventing  its  reproduction  by  building  new  relations  that  are 
opposed to the organisational methods of a capitalist society such as leadership.  
 
There is no doubt that there are always people in any group, who for biological 
reasons (i.e. genetic and capacity of brain activity) or other social possibilities, are 
separated from others. With their higher IQ and subjective activity, they can place 
themselves ahead or in the practical struggle to become prominent. The point is 
not to reject them or deny these differences. The problem is that structures should 
not be built upon these differences. In other words, these differences or top-down 
relationships should not be institutionalised and placed into a structure. On the 
contrary,  the  structure  should  be  such  that  it  allows  direct  intervention  of  all 
individuals  at  various  stages  of  decision  making,  implementation  of  those 314 
 
decisions and control over such execution to prevent concentration of all affairs in 
the hands of the elite and as a result centralization of power. We should not forget 
Rosa Luxemburg’s words; socialism is the work of each proletarian. This means 
that  in  building  an  ideal  society  a  limited  few  should  not  be  the  designing 
engineers and the rest should build it. A society built in such a manner will not be 
a socialist and communist society. A difficult project is ahead, but the only way 
through is to carry it out. 
 
           
    5-  Without  a  detailed  programme,  a  centralised  organisation,  and  a 
disciplined  internal  relation  would  the  scope  of  these  multi-factional 
organisations  be  limited  to  societies  where  a  degree  of  democracy 
existed? In other words, what is the pre-condition for their existence 
and  development?  Can  any  pattern  be  identified  for  their  future 
development? 
 
The first part of this question is about this type of organisation’s pre-conditions. It 
asks whether these organisations can exist without a degree of democracy. One 
could say, in a society living under despotic conditions the existence and activities 
of any sort of organisation are threatened. A disciplined organisation with a long 
in-depth  programme  under  an  oppressive  regime is not  any  safer.  Apparently, 
internal  discipline  is  a  defensive  shield.  However,  it  is  effective  to  a  limited 
extent.  Our  specific  experience  in  Iran  against  a  despotic  regime  and  police 
oppression tells us that even organisations with maximum discipline have limited 
effectiveness.  This  is  especially  true  if  our  perspective  is  from  a  mass  social 
movement whose aim is not the capture of political power by a disciplined party, 
which relies on its internal forces, but rather to abolish the present political order 
and replace it with self-rule. If politics and political activity are not based on class 
and  social  movements,  then  they  are meaningless.  Under such  conditions,  the 
party will find another task and function.  
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Another  realistic  aspect  of  a  movement  existing  under  the  oppression  of  a 
despotic  regime  is  that  those  that  lack  so-called  discipline  and  centralised 
leadership might cope better, receive less harm, and would therefore be safer. 
This would thereby enhance the possibility of continuity because communication 
channels would find its condition and bases of dialog on a  mass scale. There 
would be no need for a steely disciplined organisation in order to distribute a few 
pamphlets and papers. Indeed, what do those disciplined steely organisations do 
other than try to make connections and new contacts. The experience in dictatorial 
Iran shows that movements continue to exist, operate, contact one another, and 
support each other. 
 
However, regarding the future and its conditions of development one should wait 
and see. It is important to remember one or two points and principles about future 
developments.  I  mentioned  those  points  earlier.  In  short,  as  part  of  the  anti-
capitalist camp, while rejecting  all capitalist criteria and international capital’s 
established political machine and institutions and trying to defeat its hegemony 
and organise a serious struggle, we should act with a certain degree of openness 
and flexibility in our activities and dialog, welcoming various efforts to build a 
future without capitalism.  In this movement each force has its place and does not 
put  restrictions  on  other  forces.  The  movement  follows  the  principle  of  no 
homogeneity and no hegemony. Organisations that participate on such a basis 
should base their internal relationships on such a principle. Let the programme 
come out of the heart of common action and struggle of all those individuals 
participating in the anti-capitalist struggle. Self-determination means all those free 
wills that capital takes away from people and turns them into slaves of capitalism. 
Therefore, after capitalism no one, nothing, or no force that has any intention of 
programming  the  participating  activists  and  turning  them  into  passive  beings 
should replace it. On the contrary, the road for the full activity of each proletarian 
(i.e. the majority of humanity) should become open with maximum space and 
possibilities for popular participation. I refer to the methods of struggle used at 
present in Latin America (in particular Mexico and Argentina). These methods are 316 
 
possibly the way for the progress and development of the organisation we have in 
mind. Research about them is important.  
 
   6-   What, if any, are the similarities and dissimilarities between the new              
 organisations, and Stalinist and social democratic types of parties?  
 
It can be clearly seen that in their aims and methods (these two have organic 
relations) that these types of organisations are different from both Stalinists and 
social democratic parties. Over the last one hundred years, social democrats and 
revolutionary  parties  split  over  their  different  methods  of  capturing  power. 
Revolutionaries  emphasised  revolution  and  social  democrats  believed  that  by 
getting  a  majority  into  parliament  they  would  obtain  power.  Both  wanted  to 
change the system. Social democrats washed their hands of altering the system 
and openly changed their aim to reforming capitalism. Their participation in the 
bourgeois state machine and its management had an impact. Revolutionaries put 
power in the hands of revolutionary parties. In spite of their claim to abolish the 
capitalist  system,  they  too  preserved  this  system,  though  carried  out  more 
important  reforms  in  favour of  the  poor within the  system but  left  capitalism 
intact. 
 
There is no doubt that their methods, both in capturing power as well as managing 
power, was mainly based on the party. In reality members of the class, and the 
poor did not become active and political power was still concentrated in one place 
(in capitalism it is in the capitalist state and in revolutionary states it is in the 
hands of the revolutionary state or party state). Instead of abolishing capitalism, it 
became  stronger  than  ever.  People  remained  passive  and  separated  from 
determining  their  actions  from  capitalist  relations.  In  new  parties  and 
organisations  (I  do  not  have  any  particular  organisation  in  mind)  a  condition 
where the aim is to change the system because the concentration of the struggle is 
varied, they can attack the system better from all directions. If they rely upon the 
activity and not passivity of the activists, then power after capitalism would not be 317 
 
concentrated in certain hands. The parties formed in Europe, both in their aim as 
well  as  methods,  have  many  shortcomings.  However,  they  are  different  from 
Stalinist,  Trotskyist,  Maoist,  and  social  democratic  parties.  Again,  to  find 
examples that are the most dissimilar to the examples given in your question and 
closest to my model, we should look at Latin America. I refer to the models that 
operate in Mexico. 
 
 
     7- The First International also consisted of organisations with different 
ideologies.  In  what  ways  are  organisations  such  as  the        Socialist 
Alliance similar to the First International? 
 
 I do not have specific information about the Socialist Alliance. 
  
 
   8- What about the Workers’ Front proposed by the Third International, 
which  according  to  Trotsky  aimed  to  prepare  the  conditions  for  the 
hegemony  of  the  communist  party?  Should  organisations  such  as 
RESPECT  prepare  the  ground  for  the  leadership  of  the  communist 
party? 
 
I think I talked about this matter in my previous answers. Anyway, I do not agree 
with  Trotsky  or  other  20
th  century  revolutionaries  who  advocated  the  party’s 
hegemony and wanted to sort out everything via capturing power through the 
party. The result of the last one hundred years of struggle has proven that by 
capturing political power through the party, as I explained earlier, the capitalist 
system cannot be abolished, power will remain concentrated, and the system will 
continue to be reproduced. Therefore, I am seeking a different type of politics 
where  political  organisations  serve  all  individuals,  returns  power  from  its 
concentrated point in the capitalist system (i.e. the capitalist state) into the hands 
of  the  exploited  people,  for  emancipation,  and  self-governance.  Therefore,  the 318 
 
Workers’ Front should not be concerned with party hegemony, but rather with an 
active  alternating  movement  against  every  aspect  of  capitalism  not  only  the 
economic aspect, the work place and factories, but also in all aspects of human 
relations - between humans and institutions and between man and nature). That 
turns  every  individual  producer  from  an  object  into  a  subject.  Defeating 
capitalism means abolishing and destroying its criteria including the sphere of 
political power and rejection of being led, emancipation and self-governance.  
 
 
   9- The Brazilian Workers’ Party is the home to Trotskyists, elements of 
guerrilla  movements,  Stalinists,  trade  unionists,  religious  groups, 
women’s movements, landless peasant movements, etc. How do you see 
the  future  of  this  party  -  radicalising  towards  socialism  or  leaning 
towards social democracy?  
 
The future of the Brazilian Workers’ Party is to a great extent affected by the way 
it participates in the state and deals with the capitalist order. The Workers’ Party 
is now in power and manages the system instead of the previous social democrats. 
If the party’s rank and file go ahead with this and leave the leadership to continue 
in this way, then it will end up being no more than a social democratic party. 
However,  developments  in  Latin  America  are  spreading  and  it  is  not  clear 
whether the party’s base will stay unchanged. The mass movement in Brazil has 
good potential to make its mark on the development of Latin America. 
 
 
   10- In Iran, Leftist parties and groups have formed two different unities, 
Socialist Unity and Worker’s Unity, whereas in Turkey only a small 
portion of the left supported and joined a similar unity. This clearly 
shows that different Marxist organisations perceived the unity of the 
left differently. Should the formation of multi-factional organisations be 
considered  as  progressive  and  therefore  supported  by  Marxists  or 319 
 
should  it  be  seen  as  a  metamorphism  into  Social  Democracy  and 
therefore opposed? 
 
Both Iranian unities that you mentioned were unsuccessful. One of them dissolved 
itself after a few years and the other, after a decade, is nothing more than several 
political activists in Europe and the US getting the support of trade unions in their 
host countries for the workers’ movement in Iran. To a considerable degree, both 
unities during their formations and in their activities followed the position and 
political thought of the traditional left. At least one of them claimed that unity was 
based  upon  cooperation of  various  tendencies.  In  spite  of  that  programme,  an 
organisational method and platform similar to the past was used. Moreover, the 
capture of power by the party was still strong within them and therefore from the 
very  beginning  of  their  formation  both  organisations  were  not  appropriate  for 
those aims and therefore unsuccessful  
 
If by multi-functional you mean the struggle against the domination of capital in 
all aspects of life, economy and politics, social relations, the women’s question, 
minorities, and in relation to the nature, then I could not agree more. That is much 
more than progressive, that is the only way to struggle against capitalism and for 
communism. Capitalism should be attacked as a system that has covered every 
corner of human life like a spider web. This web should be cut and destroyed 
from all sides. Hence, from this perspective, the real struggle is anti-capitalist for 
creation of the new communist rule. However, if the aim is to carry out some 
reform, as most of the present organisations are doing in spite of their communist 
names in that case we can talk about metamorphism. With regard to any of these 
instances specific analysis is needed. 
 
   11- Is there any other way to gain popular support for the communist left 
other than participation in umbrella organisations by the majority of 
the left? 
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I  think  I  have  already  talked  about  the  viable  effective  organisations  of  the 
communist struggle but the platform for more discussion to find various ways is 
always open. 
 
     12- These organisations confess that they are in a transitional period. No 
doubt, any attempt to finalise their organisational structure, policies, 
and principles would lead to serious opposition. Should they, in your 
view, compromise over detailed programmes and create disciplined 
internal  relations  or  should  they  continue  as  they  are  maintaining 
their unity and postponing their unsolved problems? 
 
One needs to see what purpose the unity serves. Is it unity for unity’s sake or is it 
to strengthen the mass movement for self-government? If it is the first scenario, 
then surely they would form a discussion club to sit and solve disagreements, 
which is something they have been doing for years, but it hasn’t worked. In those 
instances  where  they  created  big  united  monolithic  parties  in  Russia,  China, 
Vietnam, and other places, what did they do other than strengthen capitalism? In 
other countries, unities were formed between different tendencies, but with the 
same traditional method. Because they tried to unite all aspects and subjects, their 
efforts led to nowhere but failure. Shouldn’t we learn a lesson from a century of 
struggle’s  by  many  devoted  communist  activists?  Why  can’t  we  return  to  the 
essence of Marx’s Manifesto (1848) and unite to progress the class movement. In 
this case unity will be a step towards the progression of the practical movement 
and not it’s pre-condition. The problems of such a unity will be dealt with within 
the same movement and possibly find its answers and not though discussions 
about groups’ and parties’ programmes or by putting all the hopes on the miracle 
of dogmatic disciplined organisation and worship of the party.  
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Interview 2 with Dr Jafar Resa 
 
1-  The 1990s witnessed further splits in communist parties. Although the 
organisational  and  political  illnesses  are  partly  to  blame  for  those 
splits,  it  is  believed  that  regardless  of  the  structural  and  political 
shortcomings, the traditional communist party, capable of organising 
all sections of society, cannot survive anymore and that is the main 
cause  of  the  partition  within  the  communist  parties.  What  is  your 
view? 
 
I cannot agree with  you that there is intrinsically something about political 
parties that makes them incapable of representing a particular social class or 
grouping without undergoing a split or fragmentation. Indeed, there are many 
historical precedents, which suggest that there could be very large and effective 
political parties representing the working class. Where there has been a split in 
these  parties  and  where  they  have  experienced  a  process  of  organisational 
degeneration over time, is more to do with social and political changes that 
have  occurred  in  their  national  or  global  ambience  and  their  inability  to 
adequately respond to these changes. 
 
One  could  consider  the  fate  of    communist  parties  belonging  to  the  Third 
International in the 1920s and 1930s to see that the fragmentation of these 
parties  in  Western  Europe  for  instance  was  more  to  do  with  the  clash  of 
different political outlooks between a burgeoning bourgeois class in the old 
Soviet Union who ruled in the name of communism and the militant working 
class  movement  which  was  still  advocating  revolutionary  communism.  In 
effect, you had two different political movements that only shared a common 
past whether in terms of the personalities involved or as symbols. If you look 
at the issue from this perspective, then the question becomes: to what extent 
can two different political movements co-exist within a common organisational 
structure? I suppose one obvious answer would be to the extent that each of 322 
 
these different movements still believes that this structure serves their political 
purpose. 
 
 
2-  In the 1990s the left gave birth to a new form of political organisation 
in the different countries of Asia, Europe and Latin America. These 
newly  formed  organisations  embodied,  in  addition  to  the  working 
class,  other  social  groups.  For  example,  organisations  such  as 
RESPECT,  consist  of  women’s  groups,  trade  unions, 
environmentalists, and even religious groups (e.g. the British Muslim 
Association), and peace movements. How do you define these newly 
formed organisations? 
 
I think we need first to consider where these new political entities come from. 
There  was  a  time  where  leftist  tendencies  in  societies  were  associated  with 
trends within the working class, whether they were anarchism or communism is 
not the issue. They were political movements within the working class, which, 
had  engendered  political  organisations  that  represented  these  various  leftist 
tendencies. From the 1960s onwards, the mantle of leftism was lost from the 
working  class movement. The militant aspirations of the working class with 
regard to various social issues were lost or failed to offer such aspirations for 
new social issues. In the vacuum that was created and the absence of effective 
working class political organisations, we witnessed the emergence of one-issue 
movements.  They  had  their  impact  for sometime  but  then  realised  that  they 
could not deal with the rise of neo-liberalism and conservatism and thus found 
that by necessity they needed to regroup into bigger congregations. These new 
formations are in a sense a response to such a need but they don’t necessarily 
enjoy a common broad vision and maybe they don’t need to have such a vision 
because they are essentially pressure groups and not effective alternatives to 
current dominant political movements. 
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3-  In the Communist Manifesto Marx defines the communists as the most 
conscious section of the working class. How would Marxism perceive 
an organisation that seeks to go beyond its main purpose of organising 
the working class for socialism? 
 
In my reading of Marx, communism is not just about the working class. It is 
about the human race. It is about how a new human society could be born. The 
working class is the means to achieving such an aim. Remember, communism 
is about the emancipation of humanity from the  yoke of capitalism. Wage-
labour is a particular social relationship that obstructs the progress of mankind 
from such an ideal. In this sense, Marxism is by definition about going beyond 
the  purpose  of  organising  the  working  class  for  socialism.  It  can’t  be 
otherwise. 
 
 
4-  In your view are these organisations capable of leading the working 
class and the great majority of the population toward democracy and 
socialism? 
 
I  think  one  needs  to  be  aware  of  the  historical  specificity  of  the  word 
democracy. It is a particular political formation. It differs from liberty, which I 
suppose  you  might  have  in  mind.  Political  democracy  is  about  the 
establishment of the rule of law and a civil society, which is very much based 
on  private  ownership  and  wage-slavery.  So  I  don’t  think  working  class 
organisations should endeavour to sustain their own source of wage-slavery. 
But going back to the question, the extent that such organisations can lead the 
majority of the population depends on the extent that they have managed to 
make their aspirations and ideals a reflection of people’s needs for fundamental 
change. For instance, when people think about unemployment, to what extent 
do they think it is a matter to do with wage-slavery? When they think about 324 
 
poverty, to what extent do they think that it is with us and will perpetuate as 
long as wage-slavery exists? When people think about war, to what extent do 
they think it is to do with capitalist competition based on wage-slavery and so 
on? Leading the people means convincing them of the genuine cause of their 
misery  and  the  alternative  there  is  for  it.  However,  it  is  itself  a  historical 
challenge and depends to a large extent on the throwing away of the historical 
baggage  that  communism  has  had  to  carry  with  it  during  these  decades. 
Without the passage of an historical era it is hard to imagine that the majority 
of the population would begin to see communism different from the relics of 
old currents purporting to be of such affiliation. 
 
 
5-  Without  a  detailed  programme,  a  centralised  organisation,  and  a 
disciplined internal relation, would the scope of these multi-factional 
organisations  be  limited  to  societies  where  a  degree  of  democracy 
existed? In other words, what is the pre-condition for their existence 
and  development?  Can  any  pattern  be  identified  for  their  future 
development? 
 
Where we are now, the issue is not essentially about detailed programmes 
or degree of organisational centralisation or internal discipline. It is more 
about the preponderance of ideas, the popularisation of certain beliefs. In 
this sense, of course political democracy is a great help. It allows for the 
prolification of such ideas much better than if there were some autocratic 
political  structure  at  work.  However,  the  growth  of  such  ideas  is 
essentially  about  how  well  they  grow  within  the  working  class 
community.  Without  adequate  germination  of  such  beliefs  among  the 
working class communities, it is hard to imagine that they would have the 
social backing to develop into widespread ideas in the rest of society. 
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6-  What, if any, are the similarities and dissimilarities between the new 
organisations and Stalinist and social democratic type parties? 
 
I am not sure what new organisations you have in mind. But I take it that some 
of these organisations are indeed the product of splits and personalities of the 
old Stalinist and social democratic types of parties. So, I wouldn’t be surprised 
if we could see some of the old antics in these new parties too. But maybe 
there is one distinct dissimilarity with the old political parties. For all their 
weaknesses  and  mischief,  the  old  parties  were  organisations,  which  had  a 
holistic programme for society. They were not one-issue organisations. At least 
in their ambitions, they were parties for government, albeit in opposition. The 
new organisations are, to a large extent, pressure  groups that have become 
bigger and more vociferous in some places. 
 
 
7-  The First International also consisted of organisations with different 
ideologies. In what ways are organisations such as the Socialist 
Alliance similar to the First international? 
 
I am not sure which Socialist Alliance you have in mind. To the extent that I am 
aware of the history of  the  First  International, different organisations in this 
institution  represented  different  ideologies  and  trends  within  the  European 
working class movement in the 19
th century. I am not sure that the same could 
be said about the Socialist Alliance. Indeed, the influence of the working class 
in this organisation is by no means comparable to that of the First International. 
 
 
8-  What about the Workers’ Front proposed by the Third International, 
which according to Trotsky aimed to prepare the conditions for the 
hegemony of the communist party? Should organisations such as 326 
 
RESPECT prepare the ground for the leadership of the communist 
party? 
 
 
Again,  I  suppose  one  needs  to  put  the  idea  of  the  Workers’  Front  in  the 
historical context of its time. Above all, it was an idea for uniting the European 
working class beset by years of war, deprivation and hardship in the struggle for 
their own survival and social well-being. It was an idea about a time where the 
European  working  class  was  split  in  the  middle  between  reformist  social 
democracy  and  militant  communism.  I  suppose  revolutionaries  like  Trotsky 
thought  that  by  actively  leading  a  better  struggle  for  the  well-being  of  the 
working class, the communist movement would be able to attract vacillating 
workers to its ideals and aspirations. But RESPECT is far from such settings. It 
is  essentially  a  pressure  group,  which  aims  to  put  the  mangles  on  foreign 
adventures of American and British imperialisms and in so doing it has found 
very strange bedfellows who do not in the least share any of the aspirations of 
the working class. 
 
 
9-  The Brazilian Workers’ Party is the home to Trotskyists, elements of 
guerrilla  movements,  Stalinists,  trade  unionists,  religious  groups, 
women’s movements, landless peasant movements, etc. How do you 
see the future of this party - radicalising towards socialism or leaning 
towards social democracy? 
 
I  am  not  that  much  familiar  with  the  Brazilian  Workers’  Party  and  its 
composition. But I know that since coming to power they have done some good 
work to alleviate the extreme hardships of the dispossessed and the working 
class in Brazil. They have tried to become the social democratic alternative in 
that country. But none of their reforms are as fundamental as you would have 
expected from a genuine die-hard social democratic party worthy of the name. 327 
 
All of the social and economic indicators demonstrate that Brazil is as much a 
capitalist society as it was before this party came to power, there is an abject 
disparity in wealth and power as there was in the past and the fundamentals of 
Brazilian capitalism are still as strong as they were before. So, the future of this 
party is probably towards a split where the more militant part of the party would 
find it difficult to offer legitimacy for actions and measures, which in truth only 
strengthen the rule of capitalism. 
 
 
10- In Iran leftist parties and groups have formed two different unities, 
Socialist Unity and Workers’ Unity, whereas in Turkey only a small 
portion of the left supported and joined a similar unity. This shows 
clearly that different Marxist organisations perceived the unity of the 
left differently. Should the formation of multi-factional organisations 
be considered as progressive and therefore supported by Marxists or 
should  it  be  seen  as  a  metamorphism  into  Social  Democracy  and 
therefore opposed? 
 
I can see that there is a common thread linking this question with the spirit of 
your previous questions. You see the issue of structure and organisation very 
much in abstraction. For me, the matter starts not so much from structures but 
from political and social movements that try to organise themselves. So, the 
formation of multi-factional organisation is neither progressive nor regressive 
on its own because the first issue to consider is what these factions represent. 
Do we have a working class movement in Iran, which is striving to organise 
and is made up of distinct factions? Do these factions try to work under a 
common organisational umbrella? Do leftist parties that exist in Iran represent 
these various factions and are they trying to form a unitary organisation? If the 
answer to all of these questions is “yes,” then we could discuss whether this 
unitary  organisation  is  progressive  or  not  depending  on  the  political 
programme and tactics it is pursuing. In the absence of clear evidence for any 328 
 
of  these  questions  it  is  hard  to  discuss  the  fate  of  such  would  be  unitary 
organisations in any meaningful way, albeit very much hypothetical. 
 
 
11- Is there any other way to gain popular support for the communist left 
other than participation in umbrella organisations by the majority of 
the left? 
 
Yes, of course. But first you need to develop your vision and need to bring it 
to the working class. This vision is not just about pressuring the ruling parties 
but  also  about  a  view  of  the  future  and  society.  Then  you  need  genuine 
working class leaders to accept your vision and help you to convey it to the 
working  class at large. Once  you’ve  gone that far then  you begin to have 
popular support for communist beliefs and your sceptics would accept that 
you have a genuine alternative to participation in umbrella organisations by 
the majority of the left. 
 
12- These organisations confess that they are in a transitional period. No 
doubt, any attempt to finalise their organisational structure, policies, 
and principles would lead to serious opposition.  Should they, in your 
view, compromise over detailed programmes and create disciplined 
internal  relations  or  should  they  continue  as  they  are  maintaining 
their unity and postponing their unsolved problems? 
 
I  don’t  think  they  should  paper  over  any  real  differences  in  policies  or 
visions.  Nor  do  I  think  that  disciplined  internal  relations  are  a  long-term 
remedy if indeed it even works in the short-term. Genuine organisations are 
the outcome of organising efforts of social and political movements. And for 
those claiming to be communist, it has to be the outcome of such organising 
efforts in genuine working class movements. Without such a foundation, even 
the most disciplined organisations are no more than a caricature of the real 329 
 
thing whose existence is as ephemeral and transient as the very ideas and 
schemes they represent. 
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